Title: Between Exit and Loyalty: The Dealignment and Realignment in the Turkish Party System
1Between Exit and Loyalty The Dealignment and
Realignment in the Turkish Party System
- Thesis Defense by Emre Erdogan
2Major Aims of the Dissertation I
- To understand the nature of the change in the
Turkish party system - To explain the change by referring similarities
between political parties - To show the significance of government programs
as symbols of positions of different governments
3Major Aims of the Dissertation II
- To discover the relationship between government
programs and governing parties electoral
manifestoes - To present usefulness of the Exit, Voice and
Loyalty Framework to understand the change in the
party system - To show validity of spatial voting models to
understand the voting behavior of Turkish voters
4Evidence for the Change
- Fragmentation of the party system
- Effective Number of Political Parties
Elections
Parliament
5Evidence for the Change
- Fragmentation of the party system
- Power Fragmentation Index
6Evidence for the Change
- Volatility of the party system
Pedersens Volatility Score
Laakso and Taageperas Index of Electoral
Volatility
7Reasons of the Change
- Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Hirschman, 1970)
- Exit the withdrawal from a relationship with a
person or organization - Voice consumers prefer to communicate their
dissatisfaction stemmed of quality decline,
rather than Exit - Loyalty Consumer prefers to being loyal to
his/her previous choice, despite the quality
decline, without communicating his/her
satisfaction
8Reasons of Exit Schematized Framework
9Reasons of Exit Turkish Case
10Similarity in Promises Government Programs
Consensus on Declaration Technology and infrastructure Economic goals Distributional Policies Military Government Efficiency
Consensus on Ignorance Social services expansion negative Education expansion negative Military negative National unity negative Minority Rights Decentralization negative
11Determinants of the Government Agenda
1980s Economic Orthodoxy Free Enterprise Democracy Freedom and domestic human rights Non economic demographic groups Environmental protection European community () Economic Planning Regulation of capitalism Social services expansion () Protectionism () Labor groups () Social justice Technology and infrastructure Constitutionalism () Government effectiveness () Military () National effort National way of life () Traditional morality()
12Determinants of the Government Agenda
Interim Governments Government efficiency Government effectiveness and authority Law and order Constitutionalism () Military () Foreign relationships Nationalization Controlled economy Agriculture and farmers Social services expansion () Labor groups () National effort, social harmpny () Traditional morality () Defense of national way of life ()
13Determinants of the Government Agenda
Electoral Government Labor groups () Free enterprise Agriculture and farmers Foreign relationships European Community () Technology and infrastructure Government efficiency
Coalition Governments European Community () Government corruption Democracy Economic goals
14Determinants of the Government Agenda
Left in government National effort, social harmony Democracy Labor groups Law and order Economic goals Technology and infrastructure Productivity Social services expansion (-)
15Grouping Turkish Governments
16Grouping Turkish Governments
1960-1980
1980-2000
17Plotting Turkish Governments
18Plotting Turkish Governments
19Plotting Turkish Governments
20Relationship Between Government Programs and
Party Manifestoes
- Determinants of the government agenda
- Party Effect If the government program is
totally determined by the governing partiess
programs - Issue Effect If each issue in the government
program has reserved spaces - The Basic Equation
- Gf (P,I)
21Additional Variables
- Majority Effect If the party is the major party
or single party in the government - Post-1980 Effect If the government is set up
after 1980 - Coalition Effect If the government is a
coalition government
22Findings
- Issue effect dominates all other external
variables. (R20.72) (Model 2) - There is no majority/single party effect
- 1980s
- Spaces reserved for issues changed
- The effective power of Party declined
- Being a coalition partner reduces the power of
the Party Effect - Distributional policies are among first
compromises given by the coalition partners
23Perceptions of the Voter
- Respondents are asked to position themselves and
major parties in a seven item issue set - When perceptions (P) are compared with average
positions of the voters (AV) - The WP and the NAP have no image gap
- All other parties are moderate than perceptions
24Findings
- Left-Right and Religiosity are important
components of the voter preferences - Some issues are cross-cutting
- Parties attract voters despite distances
- Nationalism for the NAP, Local values for the TPP
- When vote changers are considered
- Left-Right and Religiosity confirm our
expectations - Other issues dont confirm
- Explanatory power remains limited
25Findings
- When utilities are considered
- The .NAP, the VP and the TPP dont borrow voters
- All other parties borrow voters from other
parties
26Why the Voice is not a valid option?
- Voice Dependent to the openness of communication
channels - Party organization is the most important
communication channel - History of organization of political parties, is
the evolution of communication channels
27Different Party Types
The Old Cadre Party Organized in the parliament Connection of ruling elites Personalistic network
The Mass Party Organized to mobilize the electorate Strong Organization Intra-party democracy Financed by members fees Uses the party newspaper Electoral campaigns labor intensive
The Catch-all Party Transformation of the traditional parties Financed by contributions Uses independent channels of communication Electoral campaigns labor and capital intensive Party mechanism is not important
28The Cartel Party
- Aim keeping in touch with resources of the state
- Financed by state subventions
- Electoral campaigns professionalized and capital
intensive - Has access to state regulated channels of
information - Membership is not significant
- The least sensitive type to the Voice
29The Voice in the Turkish Case
- Transition to democracy was mobilization of
clientelist networks - Transformation to mass parties prevented by
frequent military interventions - Post-1980 parties failed to takeover party
mechanisms of old regime - Competition for old clientelist networks
- Emergence of new patronage mechanisms
- The WP, the NAP and the DLP
- Emphasized on establishing party organizations
- Strong intraparty discipline
30Turkish Political Parties are Cartel Type Parties
- Elections dont serve to transform the power from
one party to others. All political parties have
continuous access to the state funds - Major source of finance is the state subventions
- Electoral competition became clashing advertising
campaigns - Major political parties dominate the use of the
national media
31Turkish Voter Dont Use Party Organizations as
Communication Channels
- Political parties are among least trusted
institutions - There is no intraparty democracy
- Members dont care about intraparty democracy and
dont participate
32Future Research
- Increased similarities between political parties
- Similarity in reputations
- Similarity in promises
- Perceptions of voters
- Effect of institutions
- Party members and organizations
- Development of the Cartel party