Civil War in Mississippi Lsn 19 Civil War in Mississipp

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Civil War in Mississippi

• Lsn 19

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Civil War in Mississippi

• Ship Island
• Corinth and Iuka
• Vicksburg
• Meridian
• Brices Crossroads
• Tupelo

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Ship Island
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Ship Island

• In Apr 1861, Lincoln declared a blockade of
  Southern ports
• The Confederacy had 189 harbor and river openings
  and 3,549 miles of shoreline so this was easier
  said than done
• Clearly some focus was needed
• In June 1861, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells
  created a Navy Board and charged it to study the
  conduct of the blockade and to devise ways to
  improve its efficiency

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Ship Island

• The Board was tasked to make a thorough
  investigation of the coast and harbors, their
  access and defenses.
• It became obvious that the Navy would need ports
  of refuge for its own use, especially in the
  stormy South Atlantic
• Even in good weather, the blockade was weakened
  every time a ship had to return to Hampton Roads,
  Virginia, the nearest Federal base, for food,
  fuel, and ammunition
• The solution was for the Army and Navy to
  cooperate in seizing and maintaining a number of
  critical harbors to facilitate the Navys
  blockading operation

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Ship Island

• The first such location was Hatteras Inlet, NC
• This harbors seizure would become the first
  joint operation of the war
• It was an easy Federal victory won largely by the
  navy
• Buoyed by its success at Hatteras Inlet, the Navy
  Board planned an operation to seize Ship Island,
  Mississippi

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Ship Island

• In Sept 1861, the Federals occupied Ship Island
  before the Confederates were prepared to fire a
  shot in its defense

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Ship Island

• The Federals captured an unfinished fort and
  turned it into Fort Massachusetts
• One soldier described the importance of Ship
  Island as being quite as desirable a base for
  movement against Mobile or the Texas coast as New
  Orleans, its selection served the double purpose
  of affording ample accommodations as a Union
  naval station and of keeping the rebel
  authorities in a constant state of uneasiness as
  to the point of attack.

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Ship Island

• Twenty-seven Federal infantry regiments saw
  service on Ship Island during the Civil War, as
  well as six batteries of light artillery and a
  battalion of cavalry
• Each of these units stayed for varying lengths of
  time
• The unit to stay the longest (almost three years)
  was the African-American 2nd Louisiana Native
  Guards

2nd Louisiana Native Guards arriving at Ship
Island in Jan 1863
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Ship Island

• Troop strength on Ship Island peaked in April
  1862 when more than 15,000 men assembled for the
  assault on New Orleans
• Ship Island also served as a prison and detention
  facility for civilian detainees from New Orleans,
  Federal soldiers convicted of serious crimes, and
  Confederate prisoners
• 153 Confederate prisoners died on Ship Island and
  were buried there
• 232 Federal soldiers also died on Ship Island

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Ship Island

• Life on Ship Island was austere
• Soldiers complained of the hot weather, sand,
  insects, rough living conditions, and monotony
• Today Ship Island is part of the National Park
  Services Gulf Islands National Seashore

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Corinth and Iuka
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Corinth and Iuka

• After Shiloh the Confederates retreated to
  Corinth and dug in north of the city
• Grant was temporarily out of favor because of his
  army being surprised on the first day of Shiloh
  and he yielded command to Henry Halleck
• Halleck excelled in making war on the map
  (Hattaway and Jones 77), but he would show
  himself to be an incompetent leader of field
  armies

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Corinth and Iuka

• At Corinth it took Halleck almost a month to
  advance just 20 miles
• He stopped and entrenched at the end of each
  days march and ultimately planned to besiege the
  city
• Before Halleck finally was ready to begin his
  bombardment, the Confederates withdrew
• Halleck occuppied Corinth, but rather than push
  on into Mississippi after the Confederates, he
  elected to consolidate his gains
• Then he broke up his massive army by sending
  detachments to various other commanders, thus
  allowing the Confederates to camp unmolested at
  Tupelo
• Corinth showed Hallecks talents lay as a
  military manager rather than as a practitioner,
  and he was ultimately called to Washington to
  serve as general-in-chief

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Corinth and Iuka

• After Corinth, both sides kept a wary eye on each
  other and made leadership changes
• When Halleck went to Washington to become
  general-in-chief, Grant took over command
• Braxton Bragg replaced Beauregard as overall
  Confederate commander with Earl Van Dorn
  commanding at Vicksburg and Sterling Price in
  northeast Mississippi

Sterling Price
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Corinth and Iuka

• Both sides wanted to prevent the other from
  reinforcing Tennessee
• In Sept Van Dorn left Vicksburg headed
  north-northeast and Price occupied Iuka
• Iuka was on the railroad line that connected
  Memphis and Corinth with Chattanooga and could be
  used to send reinforcements to Tennessee
• Grant could not ignore this threat

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Corinth and Iuka

• Grant ordered a coordinated two-pronged attack
  led by William Rosecrans and E. O. C. Ord to
  catch Price in a pincer
• Rosecrans and Ord began moving on Sept 18

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Corinth and Iuka

• Grant told Ord to attack when he heard the sound
  of Rosecrans guns, but apparently Ord never
  heard them
• The wind, freshly blowing from us in the
  direction of Iuka during the whole of the 19th,
  prevented our hearing the guns and co-operating
  with General Rosecrans.
• Price was able to steal a days march on a road
  Rosecrans had not blocked and escape to the east
• Rosecrans marched into Iuka

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Corinth and Iuka

• By the end of Sept, Price had joined forces with
  Van Dorn near Ripley, southwest of Corinth
• Van Dorn named the combined forces the Army of
  West Tennessee, revealing his strategic intention
• He planned to attack Corinth, control the
  railroad junction there, and continue west to rid
  west Tennessee of Federal troops

At Corinth, the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
met with the Mobile and Ohio line. Corinth was
known as the crossroads of the Confederacy.
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Corinth and Iuka

• Rosecrans had prepared strong defenses at Corinth
• He also had smaller detachments scattered
  throughout the region
• Van Dorn was gambling that he could strike
  Rosecrans and take Corinth quickly before
  Rosecrans could call in all his outposts
• If that plan failed Rosecrans could assemble a
  force of some 23,000 at least a thousand more
  than Van Dorn had

William Rosecrans
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Corinth and Iuka

• On Sept 29 Van Dorn marched out of Ripley and the
  fighting began on Oct 3
• Van Dorn got the best of Rosecrans on the first
  day but did not gain the quick victory he needed
• Rosecrans still held Corinth and was receiving
  reinforcements by the hour
• Van Dorn attacked again on Oct 4 but after
  initial gains fresh Federal reserves beat him back

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Corinth and Iuka

• Van Dorn retreated to Ripley giving the Federals
  an important strategic victory
• With both Iuka and Corinth secure, north
  Mississippi was now firmly in Federal hands and
  Grant could turn his attention toward Vicksburg
• Van Dorn was relieved of command after the
  Corinth debacle but performed much better later
  as John Pembertons cavalry commander during the
  Vicksburg Campaign

Earl Van Dorn
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Meridian
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Meridian

• Meridian was a key strategic point
• Roughly between the Mississippi capital of
  Jackson and the canon foundry and manufacturing
  center of Selma, Alabama.
• Intersection of three railroads
• Served as a storage and distribution center for
  not just the industrial products of Selma but
  also for grain and cattle from the fertile Black
  Prairie region just to the north

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Meridian

• Sherman is about 150 miles away at Vicksburg
  waiting for the weather to improve enough to
  support the spring campaign
• Doesnt want to sit idle
• Believes he can do what he wants to do in
  Meridian and get back in time to be ready for
  future operations
• On February 3, 1864 he begins his campaign to
  break up the enemys railroads at and about
  Meridian, and to do the enemy as much damage as
  possible in the month of February, and to be
  prepared by the 1st of March to assist General
  Nathaniel Banks in a similar dash at the Red
  River country

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Meridian

• Meridian is a small-scale trial run for Shermans
  later March to the Sea
• Shows Shermans ability to operate independently
  deep in enemy territory, far from higher
  headquarters, and pioneered the art of destroying
  Confederate war-making capability
• Is a case study in the characteristics of the
  offensive
• Audacity
• Surprise
• Tempo
• Concentration

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Meridian Audacity

• a simple plan of action, boldly executed
• Sherman would be marching some 150 miles from his
  base, living off the land, and exposing himself
  to a potential Confederate concentration from
  three directions
• The undertaking caused much anxiety in
  Washington, but Grant knew that any risk was
  mitigated by the fact that Sherman, as a raider,
  could choose his line of retreat
• Grant was confident Sherman would find an
  outlet. If in no other way, he will fall back on
  Pascagoula, and ship from there under protection
  of Admiral David Farraguts fleet.
• Audacious commanders take prudent risks in order
  to achieve decisive results and dispel
  uncertainty through action
• At Meridian and elsewhere, Sherman epitomized
  audacity.

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Meridian Tempo

• a faster tempo allows attackers to disrupt enemy
  defensive plans by achieving results quicker than
  the enemy can respond.
• Sherman knew that his success depended on speed.
  
• He would travel light, ordering Not a tent will
  be carried, from the commander-in-chief down.
• The expedition is one of celerity, and all
  things must tend to that.

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Meridian Tempo

• Sherman began his march in two columns of a corps
  each in order to facilitate both speed and
  foraging
• Confederate resistance was light, and Sherman
  refused to be distracted by minor skirmishes
• He pressed forward, precluding the Confederates
  from disrupting his crossing of the Pearl River
  which was the only place the terrain was
  promising for the defense
• By February 9, Sherman was in Morton, covering
  over half the distance from Vicksburg to Meridian
  in less than a week
• By midafternoon on the 14th, Shermans lead
  elements were in Meridian
• By then Confederate resistance had evaporated.

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Meridian Tempo

• Sherman was frustrated William Sooy Smiths
  cavalry advance did not keep pace
• Sherman had ordered Smith to bring his large
  force from Memphis southeast in order to arrive
  at Meridian by February 10
• Sherman instructed Smith not to be encumbered by
  minor objects but instead to concentrate on
  destroying bridges, railroads, and corn not
  wanted.
• Part of Shermans own haste had been motivated by
  his desire to rendezvous with Smith as planned,
  but now Smith was nowhere to be found.
• It will be a novel thing in war, Sherman
  lamented, if infantry has to wait the motions of
  cavalry, but such would be the case.
• Smith had run into Confederate cavalryman Nathan
  Bedford Forrest and been whipped soundly

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Meridian Surprise

• attacking the enemy at a time or place he does
  not expect or in a manner for which he is
  unprepared
• Sherman would gain much surprise from the speed
  of his advance, but he would also employ a series
  of feints designed to keep Leonidas Polk, the
  Confederate commander at Meridian, guessing
• In an effort to maintain flexibility against all
  possible threats, Polk would never be able to
  concentrate against Shermans true attack.

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Meridian Surprise

• Sherman played on Polks fear for the safety of
  Mobile
• He asked Nathaniel Banks, commander of the
  Department of the Gulf at New Orleans, to have
  boats maneuvering in the Gulf near Mobile and
  to keep up the delusion and prevent the enemy
  drawing from Mobile a force to strengthen
  Meridian.
• Sherman told Banks he would be obliged if Banks
  would keep up an irritating foraging or other
  expedition in the direction of Mobile to help
  Sherman keep up the delusion of an attack on
  Mobile and the Alabama River.
• As Sherman advanced, he fueled this deception
  himself
• I never had the remotest idea of going to
  Mobile, but had purposely given out that idea to
  the people of the country, so as to deceive the
  enemy and divert their attention.

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Meridian Surprise

• By threatening Polk with feints, Sherman forced
  the Confederate to retain forces at Mobile that
  he could have used against Sherman
• To further add to Polks confusion, Sherman sent
  gunboats and infantry up the Yazoo River to
  reconnoiter and divert attention.
• The intention was to make a diversion and
  confuse the enemy.
• Then when Sherman departed Clinton on February 5,
  he divided his command with James McPherson
  advancing on Jackson from southwest to northeast
  while Stephen Hurlbut marched due east.
• Polk had more than he could handle

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Meridian Surprise

• Sherman called such a tactic putting the enemy
  on the horns of a dilemma.
• He had helped Grant do this to Pemberton in the
  Vicksburg Campaign, and Sherman would do it later
  by keeping the Confederates guessing if his
  objective was Macon or Augusta and then Augusta
  or Savannah on his March to the Sea
• The result of this uncertainty is enemy
  paralysis and hesitancy

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Meridian Concentration

• the massing of overwhelming effects of combat
  power to achieve a single purpose
• In spite of Shermans overriding concern for
  speed, he would not compromise in the size of his
  force
• Sherman had four divisionstwo from McPhersons
  corps at Vicksburg and two from Hurlbuts at
  Memphisfor a total of 20,000 infantry plus some
  5,000 attached cavalry and artillery
• Polk could muster a force just half that size and
  these were widely scattered with a division each
  at Canton and Brandon and cavalry spread between
  Yazoo City and Jackson

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Meridian Concentration

• Sherman devoted his forces to the decisive aim to
  do the enemy as much damage as possible.
• On February 9, his army entered Morton and spent
  several hours tearing up the railroad track using
  the usual method of burning crossties to heat the
  rails and then bending the metal into useless
  configurations dubbed Shermans neckties.

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Meridian Concentration

• At Lake Station on February 11, Sherman destroyed
  the railroad buildings, machine-shops,
  turning-table, several cars, and one locomotive.
  
• But it was after reaching Meridian itself that
  Sherman unleashed his full fury
• For five days he dispersed detachments in four
  directions with Hurlbut superintending
  destruction north and east of Meridian and
  McPherson focusing on the south and west.

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Meridian Concentration

• McPherson destroyed 55 miles of railroad, 53
  bridges, 6, 075 feet of trestle work, 19
  locomotives, 28 steam cars, and three steam
  sawmills
• Hurlbut claimed 60 miles of railroad, one
  locomotive, and eight bridges
• Sherman reported 10,000 men worked hard and with
  a will in that work of destruction, with axes,
  crowbars, and with fire, and I have no hesitation
  in pronouncing the work as well done. Meridian,
  with its depots, store-houses, arsenal,
  hospitals, offices, hotels, and cantonments no
  longer exists.
• His work done, Sherman returned to Vicksburg on
  February 28

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Meridian The Bigger Picture

• Shelby Foote would call Meridian something of a
  warm-up, a practice operation in this regard for
  what Sherman would execute on a much grander
  scale in Georgia.
• John Marszalek concludes, When Sherman later
  contemplated a march to the sea, the important
  lessons of Meridian were instrumental in his
  thinking. He could march an army through
  Confederate territory with impunity and feed it
  at the expense of the inhabitants. He could wage
  successfully war without having to slaughter
  thousands of soldiers in the process.

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Meridian The Bigger Picture

• Lawrence Smith cites Meridian as the validation
  of the strategy of exhaustion that Grant would
  employ thereafter until the end of the war.
• Archer Jones agrees that Shermans Meridian raid
  confirmed the effectiveness of Grants new
  raiding logistic strategy.

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Meridian The Bigger Picture

• Sherman has been identified as one of only a few
  generals who grew during the Civil War and the
  Meridian Campaign is an important milestone in
  his development.
• Though much less well-known than the later March
  to the Sea, the Meridian Campaign served as a
  proving ground for the evolution of strategy and
  the Civil Wars relentless ascent toward total
  war that would ultimately result in Union
  victory.

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Brices Crossroads
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Brices Crossroads

• In the summer of 1864, Sherman is about to begin
  his Atlanta Campaign and knows his long supply
  line will be vulnerable to Nathan Bedford
  Forrests cavalry raids
• Sherman said Forrest must be hunted down and
  killed even if it costs 10,000 lives and
  bankrupts the Federal treasury
• Grant called him That devil Forrest

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Brices Crossroads

• On June 1, 1864, Forrest left Tupelo with 3,000
  cavalrymen and two artillery batteries, headed
  for middle Tennessee
• Stephen Lee had ordered Forrest to attack the
  railroad from Nashville and to break up lines
  of communication connecting that point with
  Shermans army in Northern Georgia
• Forrest was on his way to accomplish this mission
  when Lee notified him on June 3 that a large
  Federal column was moving from Memphis toward
  Tupelo
• Forrest returned at once

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Brices Crossroads

• This Federal force was commanded by Samuel
  Sturgis and had been ordered to keep Forrest
  occupied and destroy him if possible
• Sturgis had 8,000 men and 250 wagons
• He had been ordered to head to Corinth, clear the
  town of any Confederate soldiers, and then head
  south to destroy track and depots of the Mobile
  and Ohio Railroad

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Brices Crossroads

• On the evening of June 9, Forrest ascertained
  Sturgis line of march and decided he could
  intercept Sturgis at Brices Crossroads, west of
  Baldwyn
• Forrest would be outnumbered two to one, but he
  still developed an aggressive plan to defeat
  Sturgis in detail
• First he would defeat Sturgis cavalry
• The Federal infantry would rush to their aid but
  would be tired from the forced march
• Then Forrest would defeat them as well

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Brices Crossroads

• Forrest led one brigade to the far left of his
  line to the Ripley-Guntown road south of Brices
• While this force attacked Sturgis flank, Forrest
  had his other men press the Federal right and
  center
• The Federals eventually gave way and their
  retreat began clogged at the narrow Tishomingo
  Creek bridge

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Brices Crossroads

• Forrest pursued the retreating Federals and
  caught up with them at Ripley
• There Forrest completely routed the Federals who
  fled in disarray to Colliersville, TN

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Tupelo
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Tupelo

• Brices Crossroads made Sherman even more
  determined that Forrest must be stopped and he
  ordered Andrew J. Smith to go after him
• Smith assembled an army of some 14,000 at La
  Grange, TN and on July 5 began moving toward
  Mississippi
• Smith moved cautiously, determined not to repeat
  Sturgis mistake of being drawn into battle on
  Forrests terms
• Forrest resented that his commander Stephen Lee
  had been promoted to lieutenant general before
  him and didnt fully have his heart in the
  campaign
• Lee would actually be the senior commander at
  Tupelo

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Tupelo

• Smith maneuvered well and kept the Confederates
  guessing
• Ultimately he decided to head for Tupelo because
  he thought it would be hard for the Confederates
  to concentrate their forces there

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Tupelo

• As Smith moved toward Tupelo Forrest pressed the
  Federal rear, but Smith had a good head start
• Smith made it safely to Tupelo and established a
  defense on a high ridge just west of Tupelo
• On July 14 Forrest attacked, hoping to get around
  Smiths left
• The Confederates were repulsed and fell back to
  build breastworks to receive the inevitable
  Federal counterattack

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Tupelo

• Instead Smith remained cautiously behind their
  lines
• On July 15 Smith began to retreat northwest
• Forrest followed but a painful foot wound put him
  out of action
• With only minimal Confederate harassment, Smith
  withdrew back to La Grange where he arrived on
  June 21

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Tupelo

• In addition to inflicting 1,300 casualties on
  Forrest compared to just suffering 648 himself,
  Smith had facilitated Sherman by keeping Forrest
  occupied
• Smith had turned Forrests own tactics against
  him by outguessing the enemy, screening his
  intentions, enticing the enemy into fortified
  positions, and flank firing

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