The Future of the Liberal World Order

1

• The Future of the Liberal World
  Order
• 
  
• 
  Princeton University
• Foreign Affairs
  Journal
• May 2011
• 
  Presented by Sajad Bahrami ,Guilan University
  ,Iran .
• 
  Fall
  ,2012.

John Ikenberry
2

• Introduction

International order has risen and fallen. One
of the great dramas of world politics over the
last hundred years has been the rise of American
liberal hegemonic order . At its core, it was a
hierarchical order with liberal characteristics.
America played the leading role in the provision
of rule and stability in this order. Currently
economic growth in countries like China and
India has created new centers of global power.
these and other developments have led to profound
questions about the American-centered nature of
the old order.
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The future of international order,less American
or less liberal ?

• As the United States' relative power declines,
  will the open and rule-based liberal
  international order start to erode?
• The question that John poses is whether we are
  witnessing  just the decline of the United States
  or we are also witnessing the decline of the
  liberal world order . If the latter is true then
  the global order will not only look less American
  but less liberal. As the newly emerging states
  become more central to the world order, they will
  bring a more illiberal less open, less
  rules-based and less democratic world order.

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Some anxious observers argue that it wnot just
less American but also less liberal

• 
  
• 
  The panicked narrative
• The fact that today's rising states are
  mostly large non-Western developing countries
  gives force to this narrative.
•  Liberal International order could give way to a
  more fragmented system of blocs, spheres of
  influence, mercantilist networks, and regional
  rivalries.
• Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging
  states have a different set of cultural,
  political, and economic experiences, and they do
  not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist
  societies they see the world through their
  anti-imperial and the colonial pasts.
• The recent global economic crisis has also
  bolstered this narrative of liberal international
  decline. the crisis has tarnished the American
  model of liberal capitalism and raised new doubts
  about the ability of the United States to act as
  the global economic leader.

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Ikenberry argue that it will be less American but
more liberal

• 
  The panicked narrative misses a deeper
  reality
•  Although the United States' position in the
  global system is changing, the liberal
  international order is alive and well. 
• The struggle over international order today
  is not about fundamental principles. 
• China and other emerging great powers do not
  want to contest the basic rules and principles of
  the liberal international order.
• China and the other emerging powers do not face
  simply an American-led order or a Western
  system. They face abroader international order
  that is highly developed, expansive, integrated
  and deeply rooted in the societies and economies
  of both advanced capitalist states and developing
  states
• Today's power transition represents not the
  defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate
  ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all
  become more prosperous and capable by operating
  inside the existing international order.
• Rising states have deep interests in an open and
  rule-based system that provides members with
  tools for economic and political advancement.
• There is no competing global organizing logic
  to liberal internationalism
• "Beijing model"--would presumably be organized
  around exclusive blocs, spheres of influence, and
  mercantilist networks. on a global scale, such a
  system would not advance the interests of any of
  the major states, including China. The Beijing
  model only works when one or a few states
  opportunistically exploit an open system of
  markets. But if everyone does, it is no longer an
  open system but a fragmented, mercantilist, and
  protectionist complex--and everyone suffers.

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Creation of current international liberal order,
Tow projects Westphalian project and
Anglo-American project .

• 
  
• 
  Westphalian project
• On is the creation and expansion of the modern
  state system, a project dating back to the Peace
  of Westphalia .
• the project has promulgated rules and principles
  associated with state sovereignty and norms of
  great-power conducted.
• At the heart of the Westphalian project is the
  notion of state sovereignty and great-power
  relations. 
• The original principles of the Westphalian
  system--sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
  nonintervention--reflected an emerging consensus
  that states were the rightful political units for
  the establishment of legitimate rule. Founded in
  western Europe, the Westphalian system has
  expanded outward to encompass the entire globe. 
• The Westphalian project has focused on solving
  the "realist" problems of creating stable and
  cooperative interstate relations under conditions
  of anarchy.

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The other project is the construction of the
liberal order, which over the last two centuries
was led by the United Kingdom and the United
States and which in the twentieth century was
aided by the rise of liberal democratic states.

• In the nineteenth century, liberal
  internationalism was manifest in the United
  Kingdom's championing of free trade and the
  freedom of the seas, but it was limited and
  coexisted with imperialism and colonialism.
•  In the twentieth century, the United States
  advanced the liberal order in several
  phases. After World War I, Wilson and other
  liberals pushed for an international order
  organized around a global collective-security
  body, the League of Nations, .the Wilsonian
  worldview in the interwar period of closed
  economic systems and imperial blocs, this
  experiment in liberal order collapsed.
• After World War II, President Franklin
  Roosevelt's administration tried to construct a
  liberal order again, drawing lessons from
  Wilson's failure and incorporating ideas from the
  New Deal, American architects of the postwar
  order also advanced more ambitious ideas about
  economic and political cooperation, which were
  embodied in the Breton Woods institutions. This
  vision was originally global in spirit and scope,
  but it evolved into a more American-led and
  Western-centered system as a result of the
  weakness of postwar Europe and rising tensions
  with the Soviet Union.
•  As the Cold War unfolded, the United States took
  command of the system, adopting new commitments
  and functional roles in both security and
  economics. Its own economic and political system
  became, in effect, the central component of the
  larger liberal hegemonic order.
•  This order currently challenged by rising powers
  but it have capability and capacity for over
  coming this challenges.

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Ikenberrys propose Today is the best time for
update the liberal international order for a new
era

• Now, as this hegemonic organization of the
  liberal international order starts to change, the
  hierarchical aspects are fading while the liberal
  aspects persist.
• The hierarchical aspects of international
  liberal order should be updated .
• The rising powers challenges can be
  managed by liberal advanced states.
• Today is the best time for the democratic
  partners to update the liberal order for a new
  era
• So even as China and other rising states try to
  contest U.S. leadership--and there is indeed a
  struggle over the rights and responsibilities of
  the leading states within the system--the deeper
  international order remains intact. 
• Rising powers are finding incentives and
  opportunities to integrate into this order, doing
  so to advance their own interests. 
• For these states, the road to modernity runs
  through the existing international order.

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• 
  more explorations and
  studding
• On the classic study of world order and
  international order see
• Hedly Bull, The Anarchical Society A Study of
  Order in World Politics (London Macmillan, 1977)
  
• On anticipations of the end of American
  dominance, see
• Charles Kupchan, he End of the American Era U.S.
  Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the
  Twenty-First Century (New york Knopf, 2003).
• Fareed Zakaria, he Post-American World (New York
  Norton, 2009).
• On the politics and ideas of order building after
  major wars, see
• G. John Ikenberry, Ater Victory Institutions,
  Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order
  after Major War (Prince-ton, NJ Princeton
  University Press, 2001)
• Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War Armed Conflicts
  and International Orders, 16481989 (New York
  Cambridge University Press, 1991)
• For explorations of the rise and spread of
  Anglo-American liberal internationalism, see
• Mark R. Brawley, Liberal Leadership Great Powers
  and their Challengers in Peace and War
• (Ithaca, Ny Cornell University Press, 1993)
• Tony Smith, Americas Mission he United States
  and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the
  Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ
  PrincetonUniversity Press, 1994)
• Michael Mandelbaum, the Ideas that Conquered the
  World Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the
  Twenty-irst Century (New york Public Afairs,
  2002)
• Wal-ter Russell Mead, God and Gold Britain,
  America, and the Making of the Modern World (New
  york Knopf, 2007)
• David Ekbladh, he Great American Mission
  Modernization and the Construction of an
  American World Order (Princeton, NJ Princeton
  University Press, 2010).
• Ferguson, Empire the Rise and Demise of the
  British World Order and the Les-
• sons for Global Power (New York Basic Books,
  2002),
• G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan The
  Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the
  American World Order (Princeton Studies in
  International History and Politics 2011).