Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures

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Options for Protection Protecting National
Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures
Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman
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An Overview of Space Weather EMP Risks and the
US Electric Power Infrastructure
Comparing Space Weather Threat to Other Power
System Threats
Conventional Terrestrial Threats
Geomagnetic Storm Threats
High Winds Ice Loading Design Code
Storm Development Electromagnetic Processes
nearly Instantaneous
Lightning Shield Wires Lightning Arresters
Geographic Extent Planetary Scale - Impact at
each station with Large Cumulative Impact
Seismic Design Code
Terrestrial Weather Air mass related that can
take many days to evolve - Hurricanes
Industry Design Approach Design Evolutions have
unknowingly Escalated GIC Risks and Potential
Impacts Un-Recognized Systemic Risk No Design
Code Yet to minimize this Threat
Severe Threats are geographically confined
Continuously monitor and base operational
decisions on Terrestrial weather conditions
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Common Solution Approaches - Overview

• Hardening the Power Grid for Naturally Occurring
  Geomagnetic Storms also Hardens against slow
  pulse or E3 portion of EMP
• Hardening the Power Grid for Fast Pulse or E1
  portion of EMP Threat also diminishes Threat from
  RF Weapon Attacks (IEMI)
• Proximity Control important for Physical
  Attacks also diminishes Threat from IEMI
• Layered Mitigation Approach for both Geomagnetic
  Storms and EMP
• Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid
  Operators is needed and is readily available
• (Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels
  instead of ambiguous K Indices)
• Hardening - Major Emphasis should be focused on
  Preventing Storm-Related Catastrophic Failure -
  Remedial Design measures for the Grid
  (transformer neutral devices) are readily
  feasible and cost effective

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Common Solution Approaches - Overview

• Given Sufficient Time the Reoccurrence of Large
  Storm Event is a Certainty with Significant
  Consequences for Society
• Power Grid has not been designed for Terror or
  War Fighting Mission, but it does provide an
  attractive and asymmetric target.
• Proliferation of Nuclear Materials Designs is a
  reality
• Non-Nuclear Device Options are readily available
  growing in unchecked capability
• Methods for Hardening Infrastructures are known
  and readily available not a Technology Push
• International Standards Guidelines exist for
  Hardening against EMP and IEMI Threats

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Common Solution Approaches GIC Blocking

• Blocking Devices will Protect Transformers and
  Grid from Damage
• Devices were originally developed in early 1990s
  
• At Present Only Limited Numbers of Devices are
  installed
• Wide-Spread Installation Needed to Reduce GIC
  Flows
• Appropriate Robust Design will work to Block
  GIC from Storms and EMP
• Can be easily applied Remedially to Todays Power
  Grids

GIC Blocking Capacitor
Hi-Speed ByPass
Electron Tube is Critical High Speed / High
Current Technology
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Improved Situational Awareness View of Storm
Environment - May 4, 1998
Provides Details on Impacted Region to End-Users
Synoptic Condition Map provides Ability for
End-Users to Quickly make Situational Assessments
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Improved Situational Awareness Storm and GIC
Flows in New England
Transformer GIC Red Green Indicate Polarity of
GIC Red Into Transformer, Green Out of
Transformer
Geo-Electric Field Orientation and Size of
Vector Indicate Relative Direction and Intensity
of Field
Power Grid State Estimation at 416 UT May 4,
1998
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Improved Situational Awareness Other Critical
Infrastructures

• Improved Situational Awareness End Users of
  Electric Power with Critical Functions
• Examples are various IT, Telecommunications,
  SCADA centers
• Critical Systems which have UPS (Uninterruptible
  Power Supply) and Back-Up Generation Capability
• Island or Disconnect from the Grid for extra
  protection
• UPSs general vulnerabilities to Harmonic
  Distortion due to Geomagnetic Storms (from
  Defense Dept work)

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Common Solution Approaches E1-EMP IEMI
Hardening

• Shielding Structures
• Filtering
• Zoning or Nesting of Multiple Barriers

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Common Solution Approaches E1-EMP IEMI
Hardening
Concept of Layered Mitigation
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Common Solution Approaches E1-EMP IEMI
Hardening

• Cable Management
• Power cables
• Data communications (e.g. IT networks)
• Auxiliary circuits (e.g. door openers, fire
  alarm)
• Sensitive circuits

Widespread migration to Fiber Optic-based Data
and Signal Cabling is an important improvement in
Robust Hardening for E1 IEMI Threats
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Example of Bulkhead Device for EMP Protection for
Power Supply to Secure Facility
4138 Bi-tronSeries Configuration
13.8kV Power Out
13.8kV Power In
Flange Provides secure grounding of power feed
penetrations at Facility Wall Perimeter
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Time Scale of EMP Protection
MOV much slower
New Advanced Fusion Systems technology
significantly improves Protection margin compared
to MOV