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Judea

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Title: Judea


1
IMPORTANCE OF JUDEA SAMARIA MOUNTAIN RIDGES IN
THE ERA OF MODERN WEAPONRY
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
2
Table of Contents
3
HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT
THREAT" TO ISRAEL?
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
4
HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT
THREAT" TO ISRAEL?
NEXT
  • In 1967, Israel obliterated Egypt, Syria and
    Jordan, producing a "No Threat" delusion. The
    delusion was crashed in 1973, when Israel barely
    escaped annihilation.
  • In 1979, Iran was abruptly transformed from an
    ally (of US and Israel) to an enemy.
  • The 1989, demise of the USSR gave rise to the
    illusion of global peace, but the world has
    become more violent.
  • In 1948, King Abdullah (Jordan) promised Israel
    to stay away from war, but reneged. In 1966 King
    Hussein met with Israel's leaders, but bombed
    Jerusalem in 1967, and provided the PLO with
    terrorist infrastructure in 1968-70. In 1990
    Jordan was a key supply channel to Saddam.

5
HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT
THREAT" TO ISRAEL?
NEXT
  • The 1993 Oslo vision of peace produced a
    nightmare of unprecedented terror
  • War on terrorism is Bush's top priority will his
    successor follow suit? A possible US retreat
    from Iraq would exacerbate terrorism.
  • Saddam's regime was perceived doom in 1991,
    became a non-conventional threat in 2002 and was
    eliminated in 2003. When will a brutal regime
    resurface in Baghdad?
  • How would the Mideast be impacted by a demise of
    the current Hashemite, Saudi or Egyptian regimes?

6
HAS SADDAM's DEMISE ELIMINATED "EASTERN FRONT
THREAT" TO ISRAEL?
NEXT
  • Mideast precedents - in the most unpredictable,
    volatile and violent region in the world -
    behoove Israel to be prepared for realistic
    scenarios, including "The Eastern Front Threat."

7
CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
8
CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES
NEXT
  • Thousands of tons of daily bombing did not end
    the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 70 of the
    bombing was inaccurate.
  • Saddam was brought to submission when the ground
    forces reached Baghdad
  • Ballistic missiles cause damage, but they don't
    conclude wars. An Arab tank battalion in Tel Aviv
    would be more significant than a shower of
    missiles on Tel Aviv.
  • Without ground forces, the 1991 and 2003 wars
    would've been prolonged, causing more casualties
    and tension with allies, allowing Saddam to
    declare victory
  • The centrality of ground forces suggests the
    centrality of ground barriers (geographic depth
    and topographic edge).

9
CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES
NEXT
  • "Enduring Relevance of Landpower", US Army's
    Institute of Land Warfare, Oct. 2003 "Land force
    (is) the cornerstone of deterrence...Ground units
    can both destroy and occupy...sustain land
    dominance and achieve a lasting decision...Remote
    precision strikes will not provide this
    capability, as was demonstrated (in Afghanistan
    and Iraq)...Determined adversaries are seldom
    defeated quickly. Achieving a lasting decision
    requires the ability to conduct sustained,
    multidimensional joint operations. Land forces
    provide these qualities...During the Afghan
    campaign of 2002, precision air strikes were
    critical, but they neither annihilated opposition
    nor finished the enemy...In the 1999 Kosovo
    operation, the air war created the conditions for
    negotiations, but it was the ground forces that
    created the stability that now exists. In 1995,
    in Bosnia, the threat of airpower did not
    significantly deter Serbia. It took the ground
    forces to create the conditions for the Dayton
    Accords. In 1991, months of strike operations
    did not achieve decision. The four-day ground
    war led to Iraqi surrender...(In 1989 in Panama),
    the surrender of Noriega was the result of
    soldiers on the ground..." 

10
CENTRALITY OF GROUND BARRIERS IN DEFEATING ENEMIES
NEXT
  • The US - the 1 ballistic power - stations
    200,000 GIs (125 increase since 2001) in
    overseas military land installations in 120
    countries.
  • All wars are conventional, requiring ground
    forces (India-Pakistan, US-Afghanistan, US-Iraq,
    US-Panama, Britain-Argentina, Ethiopia-Eritrea,
    Iran-Iraq, Morocco-Mauritania, etc.).

11
U.S. GENERALS ON JS MOUNTAIN RIDGES
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
12
U.S GENERALS ON JS MOUNTAIN RIDGES
NEXT
  • The late Admiral Bud Nance The eastern mountain
    ridge of the West Bank is one of the world's best
    tank barriers. Invading tanks will have to climb
    a 3,000ft steep slope from the Jordan Valley. The
    western mountain ridge, which is a 2,000ft gentle
    slope, constitutes a dream platform of invasion
    to Israel's narrow (8-15 miles) coastal plain.
    Control of the West Bank provides Israel the time
    to mobilize its reservists, which are essential
    to its survival during a surprise attack.
  • General (ret.) Al Gray, former Commandant, US
    Marine Corps Missiles fly over any terrain
    feature, but they don't negate the strategic
    significance of territorial depth. The key
    threat to Israel will remain the invasion and
    occupation by armored forces. Military success
    requires more than a few hundred missiles. To
    defeat Israel would require the Arabs to deploy
    armor, infantry and artillery into Israel and
    destroy the IDF on the ground. That was true in
    1948, 1967 and 1973, and it remains true in the
    era of modern missiles.

13
U.S GENERALS ON JS MOUNTAIN RIDGES
NEXT
  • Lt. General (ret.) Tom Kelly, Chief of Operations
    in the 1991 Gulf War "I cannot defend this land
    (Israel) without that terrain (West Bank)...The
    West Bank mountains, and especially their 5
    approaches, are the critical terrain. If an enemy
    secures those passes, Jerusalem and Israel become
    uncovered. Without the West Bank, Israel is only
    8 miles wide at its narrowest point. That makes
    it indefensible."
  • 100 retired Generals and Admirals signed an Oct.
    1988 advertisement in the Washington Times
    Israel should not withdraw from JS, lest it fail
    to provide security to its People. It is
    impossible to demilitarize JS effectively
  • The late Admiral Bud Nance "No logical reason
    for Israel to give up one inch of the disputed
    areas. Quite to the contrary, I believe if
    Israel were to move out of the Golan Heights, the
    West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it would increase
    instability and the possibility of war, increase
    the necessity for Israel to preempt in war and
    the possibility that nuclear weapons would be
    used to prevent an Israeli loss, and increase the
    possibility that the US would have to become
    involved in a war."

14
U.S GENERALS ON JS MOUNTAIN RIDGES
  • Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Earl
    Wheeler The minimum required for Israel's
    defense includes most of the West Bank and the
    whole of Gaza and the Golan Heights (a secret
    document submitted to the Secretary of Defense on
    June 29, 1967). Wheeler realized that in the
    Mideast peace is based on deterrence

15
LAND - DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS - SURPRISE ATTACK
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
16
LAND - DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS - SURPRISE ATTACK
NEXT
  • The transition from peace to war, in the Mideast,
    is as abrupt and unpredictable as Mideast
    inter-Muslim politics.
  • A surprise attack provides Arab regular forces
    (tanks and infantry) a 71 advantage adjacent to
    the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area. 50 hours are
    required to mobilize Israel's reservists (75 of
    IDF), in order to close the gap and block the
    Arab invasion.
  • The more advanced the Arab weaponry, the faster
    and more destructive is the surprise offensive,
    the longer it takes to mobilize Israel's
    reservists, the more essential are JS mountain
    ridges for halting the invasion. Control of the
    mountain ridges enables a small Israeli force to
    block the invasion until the arrival of
    reservists
  • The slimmer is Israel's geographic depth, the
    less time is available to mobilize reservists,
    and the more critical is the control of the
    mountain ridges. The demilitarization of JS
    would provide Israel with merely 5-10 hours early
    warning time (50 hours are required to mobilize
    the reservists), before the invasion could reach
    Israel's "Soft Belly."

17
LAND - DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS - SURPRISE ATTACK
NEXT
  • Most of Israel's reservist infrastructure is
    located in the "narrow waistline" of
    Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area (70 population,
    80 industry and finance, key fuel depots and
    intersections), which is dominated by the JS
    mountain ridges. The control of JS determines
    the time available for the deployment of
    reservists and for blocking a surprise invasion.
  • Primitive Scud missiles created havoc in the
    Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area during the 1991
    Gulf War. The more advanced are the missiles, the
    more vulnerable are population centers and air
    force bases (which are crucial to stop invading
    tanks). In 1967, Jordan shelled Israel's leading
    air force base by JS-based artillery.
  • Security arrangements, as a substitute for ground
    barriers, require geographic depth, which
    provides early warning time, should a peace
    accord collapse (as happens often in the
    Mideast). Israel does not possess geographic
    depth. Ground barriers was tactically pertinent
    in 1948. In 2003 - due to modern weaponry -
    ground barriers are strategically critical.

18
IS TECHNOLOGY A SUBSTITUTE FOR GROUND BARRIERS?
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
19
IS TECHNOLOGY A SUBSTITUTE FOR GROUND BARRIERS?
NEXT
  • High Tech of today always becomes Low Tech of
    tomorrow. But, High Ground of today remains High
    Ground tomorrow. One can always develop a
    superior response to any advanced weapon system.
    However, one cannot develop superior ground
    barriers to JS mountain ridges.
  • One can, eventually, jam any existing technology.
    However, one cannot jam the topographic edge of
    JudeaSamaria mountains
  • A country does not alter its boundaries in
    accordance with the development of weapon system
    and technologies .
  • The best surveillance systems, stationed in the
    Persian Gulf by the US, failed to detect Iraq's
    invasions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990). They
    caused over 1 million fatalities and a
    mega-billion dollar damage.
  • In 1973, Israel's technology detected Egypt's and
    Syria's plans of invasion, but the human factor
    failed to comprehend the data, as happens often
    in other countries. Ground barriers, rather than
    technology, stopped the invasion and prevented
    annihilation

20
IS TECHNOLOGY A SUBSTITUTE FOR GROUND BARRIERS?
NEXT
  • Technology is fallible, while ground barriers
    enables one to overcome technological,
    intelligence and operational failures. In 1973,
    Sinai, Golan and JS were the cushion, which
    spared Israel oblivion.
  • US superior technology could not destroy Iraq's
    missile launchers in 1991.
  • In 1999, "Newsweek" reported that China might
    have developed a technology, capable of
    neutralizing the US Air Force and paralyzing
    Taiwan's air defense.
  • Advanced technology is not an effective
    substitute to ground barriers. It could be a
    temporary and uncertain improvement, deepening
    dependence on outside powers. Its supply can be
    suspended, curtailed or cancelled.
  • The US does not consider technology as a
    substitute for ground barriers, and therefore it
    operates military land installations in 120
    countries.

21
JUDEASAMARIA vs. SINAI
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
22
JUDEASAMARIA vs. SINAI
NEXT
  • The Sinai giveaway has constrained Israel's
    strategic maneuverability and Israel's potential
    of concessions in other fronts, including JS.
  • Sinai borders the Negev, while JS borders
    Israel's "Soft Belly" (Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa
    area), which contains 70 of the population, 80
    of the industry and finance, key fuel depots and
    intersections.
  • Sinai does not possess a topographic edge over
    the Negev, while JS does possess a significant
    edge over Israel's coastal plain.
  • The Negev (2/3 of pre-1967 Israel) is sparsely
    populated, constantly accommodating most of
    Israel's reserve maneuvers, and therefore can
    absorb a surprise offensive by Egypt. The densely
    populated sliver coastal plain may not be able to
    absorb a surprise offensive by a resurrected
    Eastern Front.

23
JUDEASAMARIA vs. SINAI
NEXT
  • A demilitarized Sinai (22,000 sqm) accords 40
    hours early warning time for the deployment of
    Israel's reservists. A demilitarized JS
    (2,200sqm) would accord 5-10 hours, while the IDF
    requires 50 hours for full deployment
  • Retaking Sinai would be less difficult due to the
    Negev's similar topography. Retaking JS would
    be more difficult due to JS' topographic edge
  • The Sinai giveaway was a calculated risk. A JS
    giveaway might be a lethal gamble .
  • A JS giveaway would doom Jerusalem, transforming
    the Jewish capital into an enclave, connected to
    the coastal plain by a narrow 5 mile corridor,
    overtowered by JS mountain ridges.

24
SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF JS MOUNTAIN
RIDGES
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
25
SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF JS MOUNTAIN
RIDGES
NEXT
  • The eastern mountain ridge of JS - rather than
    the Jordan Valley - constitutes one of the
    world's best tank barriers (a 3,000ft steep slope
    over the Jordan Valley). The five roads
    traversing it are easily controllable by a
    relatively small regular force.
  • The western mountain ridge of JS (a 2,000ft
    moderate slope) constitutes a dream platform for
    invaders into the sliver coastal plain, for the
    firing of shoulder launched missiles at civilian
    aircraft, and for daily terrorism, which would
    transform the terror reality of the Gaza
    bordering towns to the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa
    area.
  • The JS mountain ridges constitute a platform for
    air defense, jamming and surveillance systems,
    which extend all the way to the Persian Gulf, and
    is essential for the "Arrow" anti-missile system.
    A Jordanian bomber could reach Israel in 4
    minutes from the Jordan Valley, which is the
    minimum time required to deploy Israel's
    interceptors.

26
SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF JS MOUNTAIN
RIDGES
NEXT
  • JS mountain ridges prevent Israel's coverage by
    Arab surveillance systems, thus enhancing
    Israel's defensive and offensive capabilities.
  • A JS giveaway would exacerbate terrorism,
    dwarfing the 1994-2003 losses.
  • Until 1967, Israel forced Jordan to limit its
    military force in JS to 5,000 soldiers, in order
    to preclude a lethal threat. In 2003, there are
    40,000 armed Palestinian terrorists in JS, which
    are equal to 4 infantry divisions .

27
SECURITYWISE IRREPLACEABILITY OF JS MOUNTAIN
RIDGES
NEXT
  • A JS giveaway would induce Arab belligerence.
    JS mountain ridges constitute the "Golan
    Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. They
    enhance Israel's strategic profile and power of
    deterrence. They transform Israel from a
    strategic liability to a strategic asset. Without
    JS, Israel wouldn't have been able to force a
    Syrian withdrawal from Jordan in 1970 and might
    not have been able to carryout the bombing of
    Iraq's nuclear reactor in 198.
  • The signing of the Oslo Accord radicalized
    Israeli Arabs. The current stage of Palestinian
    terrorism (since 2000) has exacerbated
    Arab-Jewish relations. A JS giveaway would
    further deteriorate co-existence.

28
UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
29
UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT
  • The world expects Israel to yield land, which it
    does scarcely possess. Israel's area is 0.196
    of the area of the Arab countries, which is 150
    larger than the US and 130 larger than Europe.
    The West expects the Arabs to accord Israel
    peace, which they have yet to accord to one
    another (Arieh Stav, Executive Director of the
    Ariel Center for Policy Research).

NEXT
30
UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT
NEXT
  • The geographic depth of JS, Golan Heights and
    Sinai enabled Israel to fend off the 1973
    surprise offensive. The absence of geographic
    depth would require more preventive wars.
  • Israel has a zero margin of error during wartime,
    due to the violent and unpredictable nature of
    the Mideast, due to the lack of geographic depth,
    due to a critical topographic and geographic edge
    enjoyed by its enemies, and due to a sustained
    arms race conducted by them.
  • Topographic and geographic inferiority mandates
    Israel to transfer war, promptly, to enemy's
    territory.

31
UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT
NEXT
  • Unlike other countries - and due to the ideology
    and track record of its enemies - Israel has to
    win each war. The Jewish nation was defeated
    2,000 years ago, and the Jewish People was
    dispersed. In view of the ideology amplified
    daily by official Arab education, media and
    clergy, there would be no Diaspora, should Israel
    be currently defeated...
  • Israel's pre-1967 borders were the longest in the
    world per sqm (and therefore less defensible).
    They were 360 kilometers (225 miles) longer than
    the current borders, characterized by more
    complex geography, which requires more personnel
    and hardware

32
ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
33
ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
NEXT
  • The width of Israel's coastal plain (8-15 miles)
    is equal to the distance between JFK and La
    Guardia airports in New York.



34
ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
NEXT
  • The width of Israel's coastal plain (8-15 miles)
    is less than the length of DFW airport in Texas,
    equal to the width of Washington DC, San
    Francisco and Miami and equal to the distance
    between Wall Street and Columbia University in
    New York .

35
ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
  • The width of Israel's coastal plain (8-15) is
    less than the distance between downtown London
    and Heathrow Airport and equal to a roundtrip
    distance between Albert Hall and the Tower of
    London, between Bois Du Boulogne and La Place De
    La Bastille in Paris and between the Kennedy
    Center and the RFK Stadium in Washington, DC.

36
ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
NEXT
  • The late Admiral Bud Nance "The entire state of
    Israel - including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip
    and the Golan Heights - is smaller than the
    gunnery range at Nellis Air Force Base...Israel
    is only 9 miles across at is center close to Tel
    Aviv. This is scarcely more than the distance
    from the Pentagon to Mount Vernon. A modern tank
    can traverse this distance in about 15
    minutes...With the West Bank included, Israel is
    approximately 40 miles across at its mid-point.
    The city of Atlanta is more than 40 miles across.
  • Israel's area - before 1967 - was just 6 times
    more than the largest ranch in Texas, King's
    Ranch.
  • The US military declared a 25 kilometer radius
    area, in Bosnia, as a "killing zone", in order to
    ensure the safety of US soldiers.

37
PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
38
PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST
NEXT
  • 1,300 years of inter-Muslim and inter-Arab
    conflicts have transformed the Mideast into the
    most violent region in the world No
    comprehensive inter-Arab peace, no inter-Arab
    ratification of all borders, no compliance with
    all inter-Arab agreements/treaties, no Arab
    democratic regimes and no Arab regime which stays
    in power without the use of violence. Is it
    logical to assume that the Arabs are ready to
    accord to the Jewish ("infidel") State that which
    they have yet to accord to one another?!
  • Peace in the Mideast is Peace of Deterrence
  • The test of peace boundaries in the violent and
    unpredictable Mideast is not in their ability to
    entice a peace accord. Rather, it is in their
    ability to deter and/or withstand a typical
    Mideast scenario An unpredictable violation of a
    peace agreement, by a concerted inter-Arab
    offensive against sliver Israel, led by a tank
    and infantry invasion, and backed up by a barrage
    of missiles, a wave of Palestinian terrorism and
    a possible insurgency by Israel's Arabs.

39
PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST
NEXT
  • The durability of a peace accord in the Mideast
    is as durable as Mideast politics, which is the
    shiftiest and the most tenuous in the globe.
  • Peace accord enhance security as long as the
    parties adhere to the agreement. Peace accord
    undermines security, once it is violated, as a
    result of the territorial concessions made.
  • "Territories for Peace" is logically flawed
    While Israel should, supposedly, concede
    territories in return for peace, would a reduced
    peace - through Arab violations - entitle Israel
    to retrieve territories?

40
Hatikvah Educational Foundation www.acpr.org.il/ha
tikvah Tel. 6911145-03
Written and edited by Yoram Ettinger
JudeaSamaria (JS) mountain ridges - 3,000ft
above the Jordan Valley and 2,000ft above the
8-15 mile coastal plain - constitute THE "GOLAN
HEIGHTS" OF JERUSALEM , TEL AVIV AND HAIFA.
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