Paradoxes and Puzzles of War

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Paradoxes and Puzzles of War

• Key Problems in Conflict Studies

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I. Paradoxes of War

• Why do people choose sub-optimal outcomes?
• War is sub-optimal
• Bargaining without war Side A and Side B are
  arguing over something. Expressing each sides
  share as a percentage, A gets x of the disputed
  resources or territory and B gets 1-x. So As
  share plus Bs share 1, or 100. This is
  called Pareto Optimality (nothing is left on the
  table).

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b. Compare to War

• Each side has a chance of winning and losing.
  One sides chance of winning is the other sides
  chance of losing.
• Winner gets everything (100 of disputed
  resources), loser gets nothing (0)
• Both sides suffer costs (economic, social,
  military, etc.)

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The Math

• Represent As probability of winning as p. Then
  Bs probability of winning is 1-p.
• As payoff for war p1 (1-p)0 CostsA
• Simplify p - CostsA
• Bs payoff for war (1-p)1p0 CostsB
• Simplify 1- p - CostsB
• The total return on war is (p-CostsA)
  (1-p-CostsB)
• p CostsA 1 p CostsB
• 1 CostsA Costs B
• Since bargaining gives a total return of 1 and
• 1 gt 1 CostsA CostsB
• war is inefficient. Not Pareto Optimal.

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2. The Paradox

• No matter what the outcome is to a war, the two
  sides could always have found some agreement that
  BOTH would have preferred to war IF both of
  them agreed on how the war was likely to turn
  out.
• Example Both sides in a war would ALWAYS be
  better off by simply adopting the wars outcome
  (other than the actual fighting part) as a
  pre-war bargain.
• So why do people fight?

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B. The Para Bellum Puzzle

• Arms races are supposed to deter aggression If
  you want peace, prepare for war
• Problem If you want war, you also prepare for
  war
• Implication If rivals prepare for war we dont
  know whether they want peace or war
• Paradox If we also prepare for war, we give
  rivals an incentive to strike first (before our
  arms buildup takes effect) ? force choice between
  continue costly arms race and war
• Key puzzle Do power politics strategies for
  avoiding war increase or decrease the risk of war?

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C. The Paradox of Deterrence

• Deterrence requires threat and restraint
• Successful deterrence requires a clear, credible,
  and overwhelming threat that will be carried out
  if a line is crossed
• Successful deterrence also requires restraint,
  the belief that the deterring state will refrain
  from carrying out the threat if the line is not
  crossed
• Credibility means rational to carry out the
  threat (i.e. it produces more benefits than
  costs)
• Problem As it becomes more cost-beneficial to
  use force, use of force is more likely
• Paradox Measures to reinforce threat undermine
  restraint, undermining deterrence. Rational
  deterrence relies on being seen as irrational in
  some way.

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D. The Puzzle of Peace

• War happens
• but usually it doesnt! Probability any two
  countries are at war in any year 1 in 1000.
• Implication I can predict war or peace with
  99.9 accuracy by just saying no war this year.
• Most countries and peoples spend far more time at
  peace than at war.
• The puzzle Explanations of how war is possible
  must also explain why it is so rare!

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E. The Puzzle of War Termination

• Wars start presumably there is a reason for
  this
• But the same wars end and almost all interstate
  wars and many civil wars end WITHOUT a fight to
  the finish
• Why do the same people who decide to start a war
  decide to stop fighting before the bitter end?

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II. Models, Ideologies, and Theories

• Whats the difference?

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II. Models, Ideologies, and Theories

• Whats the difference?

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II. Models, Ideologies, and Theories

• Whats the difference?

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II. Models, Ideologies, and Theories

• Whats the difference?

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II. Models, Ideologies, and Theories

• Whats the difference?

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III. Focus of Course Empirical Puzzles,
Empirical Theories

• A. Empirical propositions
• 1. Descriptive (one variable at a time)
• 2. Causal (two variables are related)
• a. Independent variable the cause
• b. Dependent variable what were trying to
  predict
• B. Paradoxes of war as empirical problems
• 1. What variables predict conflict onset?
• 2. What variables predict conflict escalation?
• 3. What variables predict conflict termination?

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C. A basic modelOpportunity and Willingness

• Key Actors Leaders of States
• Goals Stay in Office, Improve Policy, Personal
  Gain
• World System, Internal Politics Constraint on
  Leaders
• Menu Analogy
• a. Some items arent on the menu (no
  opportunity)
• b. Some items are on the menu but not
  desirable (no willingness) possibly because
  leaders misunderstand their consequences!
• c. Item chosen preferred, available dish
  (both opportunity and willingness)

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5. Example Saddam Hussein

• Menu
• Kick the US out and execute traitors who thought
  about surrender
• As above, but then invade the US to preempt
  future attacks
• Surrender and go into exile
• Delay US forces while searching for a way out of
  the war

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5. Example Saddam Hussein

• Menu
• Kick the US out and execute traitors who thought
  about surrender
• As above, but then invade the US to preempt
  future attacks
• Surrender and go into exile
• Delay US forces while searching for a way out of
  the war

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5. Example Saddam Hussein

• Menu
• Kick the US out and execute traitors who thought
  about surrender
• As above, but then invade the US to preempt
  future attacks
• Surrender and go into exile
• Delay US forces while searching for a way out of
  the war

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IV. The Level-of-Analysis Problem
A. Levels of Analysis
System Region Dyad State Bureaucratic Group
Individual
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B. Whats the Problem?

• Problem Testing Hypotheses at the Wrong Level of
  Analysis
• Fallacy of Equivocation Using the Same Word to
  Mean Two Different Things
• Balance of Power Does this mean all states
  are equal (system level), that two states are
  balanced with each other (dyad level), or that a
  leader is committed to preserving a balance of
  power (individual level)?
• Applying findings at one level to another
  Possible but not straightforward

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2. Example Do Alliances Cause War?
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2. Example Do Alliances Cause War?
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2. Example Do Alliances Cause War?
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2. Example Do Alliances Cause War?
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2. Example Do Alliances Cause War?
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2. Example Do Alliances Cause War?

• Answer It depends on the level of analysis!
• A system with more alliances is more war prone
• A state in an alliance is less likely to fight a
  war

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3. Applying Findings at One Level to Another

• Aggregation Building up from lower levels.
  Results may be unexpected!
• Example The Democratic Peace hypothesis
• Democracies Dont Fight Each Other
• Autocracies are Less Likely to Fight Each Other
  Than Average
• Democracies Do Seem to Fight Just as Often as
  Autocracies
• Question Is more democracy in the world a good
  thing if we want to avoid war?

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Democratic Peace Example
Risk for Autocratic dyads is 1 Risk for
Democratic dyads is 0 Risk for Mixed Dyads is 2
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Democratic Peace Example
Risk for Autocratic dyads is 1 Risk for
Democratic dyads is 0 Risk for Mixed Dyads is 2
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Democratic Peace Example
Risk for Autocratic dyads is 1 Risk for
Democratic dyads is 0 Risk for Mixed Dyads is 2
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Democratic Peace Example
Risk for Autocratic dyads is 1 Risk for
Democratic dyads is 0 Risk for Mixed Dyads is 2
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Democratic Peace Example
Risk for Autocratic dyads is 1 Risk for
Democratic dyads is 0 Risk for Mixed Dyads is 2
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Democratic Peace Example
Risk for Autocratic dyads is 1 Risk for
Democratic dyads is 0 Risk for Mixed Dyads is 2
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Democratic Peace Example
Risk for Autocratic dyads is 1 Risk for
Democratic dyads is 0 Risk for Mixed Dyads is 2
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Democratic Peace Example

• Solution Relationship is nonlinear Adding
  democracies to a world of dictatorships increases
  war risk until critical point reached. After
  that point, more democracy means less war.

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V. Implications

• War and Peace are choices Leaders must select
  them from a range of options
• Keys to the puzzle
• How does the international environment constrain
  opportunities for peace or war?
• How does the internal structure of a state
  constrain opportunities for peace or war?
• How do leaders choose from their menus for
  choice?