John Boyd and FourthGeneration Warfare: Applications to Terrorism and Counterterrorism

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John Boyd and Fourth-Generation Warfare
Applications to Terrorism and Counterterrorism

John Boyd (1927-1997)
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Contents

• I. Who was John Boyd?
• II. Why Students of Terrorism should care about
  Boyd
• a. OODA loop
• b. Fourth generation warfare gt terrorism
  counterterrorism
• III. Discovering the Boyd Cycle
• a. Air combat in Korea
• b. Penetrating an opponent's decision cycle
• IV. The Four Generations of War
• a. Generations 1 - 4.
• b. Examples
• V. Putting the Puzzle Together
• a. Military and Strategic thinkers in History
• b. Fourth Generation War The U.S. in Vietnam
• c. Guerilla Warfare - T.E. Lawrence et al.
• VI. Boyd's 4GW Methods Counterterrorism
  Counter-insurgency
• VII. Sources

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• Who was John Boyd?
• U.S. Air Force Colonel, retired with over 25
  years of service.
• Overseas Tours Saw combat in Korean War
  Vietnam conflicts.
• Education Ga. Institute of Technology, B.S.
  Industrial Engineering.
• Author of "Aerial Attack Study," the first USAF
  air-to-air combat manual, and a founder of the
  Air Force Fighter Weapons School.
• Participated in the design of the F-15 and F-16
  fighters.
• Leader of 1970s-1980s military reform movement in
  Pentagon.
• Advisor to political, military and industrial
  leaders in the U.S. and abroad. Theories on
  competition taught widely in business schools.
• Military and strategic theorist noted for the
  Boyd Cycle and the comprehensive study "Patterns
  of Conflict."
• Father of U.S. Marine Corps maneuver warfare
  doctrine.
• Strategic planner of 1991 Gulf War.
• Iconoclast and rebel known as "Genghis John" and
  "The Ghetto Colonel."

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Why should students of terrorism care about
Boyd's work?

• Boyd's OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) and
  theories of fourth-generation warfare are
  directly applicable to the counter-insurgency and
  anti-terrorist efforts being waged by U.S.
  coalition forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
  elsewhere.
• The Boyd Cycle
• Source "Fourth Generation Warfare OODA Loop
  Implications of the Iraq Insurgency" Chet
  Richards, G.I. Wilson and Greg Wilcox

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• Discovering the Cycle Boyd the fighter pilot in
  Korea
• US F-86 fighters achieve 101 kill ratio over
  North Korean MIG-15s, despite
• inferior speed, climb and turning radius. Why?
  The U.S. planes had better visibility and could
  change position more quickly, in part because of
  hydraulically-assisted controls.
• To Boyd, this suggested that operating at a
  faster tempo than your adversary was critical for
  success. By changing conditions faster than an
  enemy can adapt to them, he is made vulnerable
  and can be defeated. Using change, tactical
  variety and initiative, one can enhance one's own
  capacity for action and reduce that of an
  adversary.
• Boyd called this process "getting inside an
  enemy's decision cycle." It later became the
  influential OODA loop or Boyd Cycle.
• O - Observe Collect data and disrupt your
  enemy's ability to do so.
• O - Orient Know your situation and confuse the
  enemy about his.
• D - Decide Reach a conclusion, discourage your
  enemy from doing so.
• A - Act Execute your plan, keep the enemy from
  executing his.

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• Boyd's Generations of Warfare
• Boyd categorized wars in a systematic manner,
  into stages or generations. Modern war begins
  with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia in which
  European states claim a monopoly on waging war.
  Boyd organized his view of human conflict
  according to the 'generations of war' model.
• A. First Generation War (1GW) - War of the
  organized line and column in use from 1648 to
  1860.
• B. Second Generation War (2GW) - Attrition
  warfare characterized by massive firepower and
  extensive casualties. Prototype is World War One
  in use from 1860 to present. Militaries are vast,
  bureaucratic and slow-moving.
• C. Third Generation War (3GW) - Maneuver warfare,
  best characterized by the German World War Two
  Blitzkrieg. Used from 1940 to present. Rapid and
  mobile warfare that inflicts psychological as
  well as physical damage.
• D. Fourth Generation War (4GW) - Irregular
  warfare. Also called asymmetric war, guerilla
  war, terrorism, low-intensity conflict, etc.
  Often waged by non-state entities such as tribes,
  clans, families, criminal organizations,
  religious groups, ethnic/racial groups and
  related. In use currently, date of creation ?

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• Putting the Puzzle Together
• Boyd studied the greatest military minds........
• A. Sun Tzu (400 B.C.) - Know yourself and your
  enemy use deception and subversion to be
  enigmatic to your enemy. Shape his perceptions
  and manipulate him. Employ the expected and
  unexpected. Strive to defeat your enemy before
  fighting him.
• B. Karl von Clausewitz ("On War" 1832) -
  Obstacles to employing
• military force friction, uncertainty, and
  inflexibility.
• 1. Friction - errors and miscues which affect
  all armies.
• 2. Uncertainty - What are your forces doing
  what are those of the enemy doing?
• 3. Inflexibility - the larger the force, the
  more inflexible it is
• large formations have fire power but are
  difficult to move.
• Boyd Von Clausewitz devoted effort to reducing
  these effects on his forces, but not on
  multiplying them in the enemy as Su Tzu
  recommends.

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• Putting the Puzzle Together (II)
• Revolutionary Socialism of Karl Marx and
  Friedrich Engels (mid-1800s)
• A. Corrupt capitalist societies of 1800s
  privileged elites exploit the masses such
  societies can be toppled from within.
• B. Misery of masses and unwillingness of elites
  to address it will
• lead to a precipitating event - or crisis -
  which enables the revolutionary vanguard to lead
  the masses to destruction of the old state and
  creation of the new.
• C. Boyd Crises and Vanguards are the 'golden
  keys' to unlocking the power of insurgency,
  guerilla war and revolution.
• D. Mao Zedong unites revolutionary socialism,
  guerilla warfare methods, conventional war and
  Sun Tzu into a powerful new
• form of guerilla warfare. Wins Chinese Civil War
  and drives
• Nationalist forces out of mainland China.

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• Putting the Puzzle Together (III)
• Historical practitioners of guerilla warfare
  T.E. Lawrence "Lawrence of Arabia," Allied
  Resistance Movements of WW2, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi
  Minh Vo Nguyen Giap in Vietnam. Lawrence, in
  "The Twelve Pillars of Wisdom," writes of
  guerilla war
• Guerilla must operate among the people and hide
  among them
• He is inconspicuous, and does not afford his
  enemy a clear target he is
• "everywhere and nowhere."
• The guerilla movement should possess a sanctuary
  in which to train, refit and plan operations.
• The guerilla engages the enemy at the time and
  place of his choosing. When the enemy is strong,
  retreat when he is weak, attack.
• The guerilla can win if he outlasts a foreign
  invader he is in his own country and the enemy
  must eventually return to his homeland.
• The guerilla does not have to win militarily he
  has only to convince his opponent to abandon the
  fight.
• Conventional forces and guerillas can be used
  together in the open
• when both are strong enough and have the
  advantage.

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• Fourth Generation Warfare
• As a young officer, Boyd had seen the U.S. losing
  the war in Vietnam despite overwhelming military
  superiority, but he had not known why or how.
• Now he knew T.E. Lawrence, Chairman Mao, General
  Giap and the others had shown him the answers. In
  Vietnam, America had been beaten by a
  sophisticated 4GW opponent, and not merely a
  bunch of simple peasant guerillas. The North
  Vietnamese and Viet Cong had operated inside the
  American OODA loop and used it to destroy our war
  effort at the moral-mental-physical levels,
  thereby defeating us. Moreover, he concluded
• Western militaries focus on the
  strategic-operational-tactical levels of war.
• Boyd created a new trinity people-ideas-technolog
  y, and he believed wars are fought, in order of
  importance, at the moral-mental-physical levels.
• Boyd's conclusion "Machines don't fight wars -
  people do. And they use their minds."
• Most western armies are focused on "breaking
  things and killing people," the physical side of
  war. This is exactly opposite of what should be
  emphasized - the moral then the mental, and then
  the physical.

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• Boyd and Counterterrorism
• Why is Fourth-Generation War so difficult to
  understand and defeat?
• At the heart of this phenomenon, Fourth
  Generation war, is not a military but a
  political, social and moral revolution a crisis
  of legitimacy of the state. All over the world,
  citizens of states are transferring their primary
  allegiance away from the state to other things
  to tribes, ethnic groups, religions, gangs,
  ideologies and so on. Many people who will no
  longer fight for their state will fight for their
  new primary loyalty.
• - William Lind -
• Military force alone is incapable of' restoring
  legitimacy to a state, so there can be no purely
  military solution to the problem of 4GW.
• The central paradoxes of 4GW What works at the
  strategic or tactical level often fails at the
  moral level. Moreover, weakness is actually
  strength much of the time in 4GW.
• Appropriate analogy of 4GW "David vs. Goliath"

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• Boyd's Counterterrorist Methods
• 4GW is fought at the moral-mental-physical
  levels, CT must address each.
• The support of the people is critical for the
  success of both guerilla and counter-guerilla
  operations. Why? The guerilla depends upon the
  population as a source of intelligence and as a
  place to hide.
• Government must address the inequities and
  causes of crises and eliminate the conditions in
  which vanguards flourish.
• Root out corruption and punish it publicly
  government must demonstrate integrity and
  competence in its affairs.
• Use sympathizers to infiltrate the guerilla
  movement and gain intelligence.
• Deploy special operations forces in the sanctuary
  of the movement or in their basing areas.
• Use police, administrative and social services to
  safeguard the population and improve conditions
  for them. "Hearts and Minds" campaign.
• Guerilla movements sow mistrust, menace and
  uncertainty these must be counteracted by
  initiative, courage and adaptability.
• OIF soldiers were initially deployed without
  sufficient knowledge of Arabic culture, and were
  ill-equipped to root out insurgents. Thus, in the
  violence and round-ups of suspects that followed,
  coalition forces created many enemies among
  would-be sympathizers.

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• Boyd's Counterterrorist Methods
• 10. 4GW blurs or eliminates the line between
  civilian and military, the battlefield and the
  home front. The war can be lost in the court of
  public opinion, so no leader can afford to
  neglect preparing the population for asymmetric
  warfare and its implications. To the extent
  possible, the nation should go to war united. The
  Bush Administration has neglected this vital
  step.
• 11. 4GW is the war of the Strategic Corporal.
  Street-level personnel will face decisions with
  strategic consequences. Decision-making should be
  pushed downward to them as much as possible.
  Generals are supportive in function.
• 12. Personnel cannot be rotated home every 6-12
  months without severely depleting institutional
  memory. Troops must have time to learn their jobs
  and know the people and ground in-theater.
• 13. Ethical behavior must be the top priority
  if military forces make a mistake, it must not be
  swept under the rug or denied. Our leaders and
  fighters must tell the truth. We must do what we
  say and say what we mean.
• 14. Correct the mismatch between the fighting
  culture of our enemies and our military one is
  low-tech and the other is not. One emphasizes
  people and ideas, the other does not.

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• Boyd's Counterterrorist Methods (II)
• 15. Accurate and timely intelligence is critical
  street-level personnel must have the authority to
  evaluate and disseminate it without getting
  senior command approval.
• 16. U.S. forces must cultivate personal networks
  among influential people in Iraq everything
  there is driven by people power is not always
  resident in 'city hall.'
• 17. Observe Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs
  Lower-order needs before higher order ones food
  and water come before a new constitution.
• 18. Dismantling the Iraqi army and civil service
  was mistake those thrown out of work often
  joined the insurgency.
• 19. Reconstruction should include as many Iraqis
  as possible, to foster a sense of ownership and
  give the dispossessed something to do. Example
  When electrical power fails, better an Iraqi
  contractor is blamed than U.S. forces.
• 20. 100 victory may not be possible, but 51 may
  be. Expectations must be realistic in leaders and
  the public.
• 21. Martial law should have been declared
  immediately after the first Americans arrived, to
  restore order and predictability.
• 22. In the rare cases where massive force is
  needed, we must not hesitate to use it.

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• Boyd's Counterterrorist Methods (III)
• 23. The enemy is not defeated until his will to
  resist is broken. Precision weapons may not be
  the best choice older battleships and bombers
  have a much greater psychological impact - they
  make the ground literally shake.
• 24. David is always better loved than Goliath
  our conduct must reflect that. Except in specific
  circumstances, the forces we use should be
  unobtrusive and only sufficient to do the job.
  Don't swat a fly with a tank. Remember weak is
  strong in 4GW.
• 25. De-escalation is almost always preferable to
  escalation of violence. Soldiers will have to be
  able to think like a cop - de-escalate - and then
  a soldier - escalate. People, no matter who they
  are, hate those who destroy their homes or harm
  their families.
• 26. 4GW may require that U.S. forces accept more
  casualties than the enemy.
• 27. Civilian deaths, injuries or property damage
  may compel those insulted or harmed to take
  revenge.
• 28. 4GW is a war of light infantry heavy weapons
  applied carefully only in specific support jobs
  and at certain times

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• Boyd's Counterterrorist Methods (IV)
• 29. The weapons of 4GW are unusual money, food,
  water, shelter, clothing, employment,
  medical care. As well as respect and recognition.
  
• 30. Use "Apaches to fight Apaches" as we did in
  the Indian Wars.
• 31. Use the Mafia model "Everyone gets a cut"
  and violence is hidden when an enemy needs
  elimination "No fingerprints."
• 32. Reservists and National Guardsmen make better
  counter-insurgency warriors, as they tend to be
  older and possess significant life experience.
• 33. Dealing with the press Relations must be
  open and based on trust if possible. Openly
  hostile media organizations must be banned or
  removed.
• U.S. forces are not obligated to let hostile
  media report on the war - e.g. Al-Jazeera.
• 34. The terrorists often treat our media as the
  enemy, and act accordingly - as in the death of
  Daniel Pearl. State militaries may be forced to
  follow suit.
• - Additional methods are found in Boyd's
  "Patterns of Conflict" -

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For Further Study of John Boyd and 4GW

• Coram, Robert. Boyd The Fighter Pilot Who
  Changed the Art of War. Boston Little,
• Brown and Co., 2002.
• Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone On War
  in the 21st Century. St.Paul
• MBI/Zenith Press, 2004.
• John, Lehman. Our Enemy is not Terrorism,
  Soldiers for the Truth, 21 October 2005.
• lthttp//www.sftt.usgt (20 May 2004).
• Lind, William. The Four Generations of War,
  Soldiers for the Truth, 12 October 2005.
• lthttp//www.sftt.usgt(10 June 2004).
• Lind, William. Fourth Generation Warfare Manual
  Draft, Defense and the National
• Interest, 12 October 2005. lt http//www.d-n-i.net
  /index.htmlgt(June2005).
• Peters, Ralph. New Glory Expanding Americas
  Global Supremacy. New York
• Sentinel, 2005.

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• Further Study (continued)
• Richards, Chet. Fourth Generation Warfare,
  Defense and the National Interest, 6
• October 2005. lt http//www.d-n-i.net/index.htmlgt
  (23 March 2005).
• Richards, Chet. G.I. Wilson, and Greg Wilcox.
  Fourth Generation Warfare OODA
• Loop Implications of The Iraqi Insurgency,
  Defense and the National Interest, 12
• October 2005.lt http//www.d-n-i.net/index.htmlgt
  (December 2004).
• Spinney, Chuck and Chet Richards. Patterns of
  Conflict - by John R. Boyd, Defense
• and the National Interest, 7 October 7,
  2005.lthttp//www.d-n-i.net/index.htmlgt(27
  February 2005).
• Sun Tzu, The Art of War The Denma Translation.
  (Boston and London Shambhala
• Library, 2002).
• Van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War.
  (New York Free Press, 1991).