Does Corporate Governance Affect Dividend Policy - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 27
About This Presentation
Title:

Does Corporate Governance Affect Dividend Policy

Description:

Pooled Probit regression. Pooled Tobit regression. Pooled OLS Results (dividends to cash flows) ... Pooled Probit Results. Pooled Tobit Results (dividends to ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:111
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 28
Provided by: oskarkow
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Does Corporate Governance Affect Dividend Policy


1
Does Corporate Governance Affect Dividend Policy?
  • Oskar Kowalewski
  • Ivan Stetsyuk
  • Oleksandr Talavera

International Research Conference on Corporate
Governance in Emerging Markets November
15-17th, 2007
2
Motivation
  • What determine the dividend policy in a
    transition country (Poland)?
  • Does corporate governance have an impact on
    corporate dividend policy in a transition country
    (Poland)?

3
Survey of Dividend Theories
  • Free Cash Flow Theory
  • Dividends may mitigate agency costs by
    distributing free cash flows that otherwise would
    be spent on unprofitable projects by the
    management
  • Easterbrook (1984) Jensen (1986) Zwiebel
    (1996) Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
    Vishny (2000) DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz
    (2004)

4
Survey of Dividend Theories
  • Signaling Theory
  • Lintner (1956) partial adjustment process towards
    a target payout ratio and communicate the level
    and growth of earnings or future prospects of the
    company to investors
  • Bhattacharya (1979) Miller and Rock (1985)
    Bernheim and Wantz (1995) Amihud and Murgia
    (1997)

5
Survey of Dividend Theories
  • Ownership Theory
  • Dividend may signal conflicts between large
    controlling shareholder and minority shareholders
  • Shleifer and Vishny (1997) Gugler (2003) Gugler
    and Yurtoglu (2003)

6
Country studies on corporate governance and
performance
  • Gompers, Ishii, Metrick (2003) using 1500 US
    listed companies present that CG results in
    higher annual returns than in companies with weak
    corporate governance rights.
  • Black, Jang, Kim (2003) based on a study of 526
    Korean firms present that higher corporate
    governance standards increase the value of the
    company. A best to worst governance improvement
    predicted a 44 increase in company valuation as
    measured by Tobins Q.

7
Country studies on corporate governance and
performance
  • Black (2001) a worst-to-best improvement in
    corporate governance practices would predict a
    700 fold in market value for a Russian company
  • Drobetz, Schillhofer, Zimmerman (2003) using
    German companies present that companies with
    highly corporate governance standards enjoy
    higher firm valuations. An increase in the
    Corporate Governance ratings by 3 points results
    in an increase of market capitalization by 12.5
    percent.

8
Cross-country studies on corporate governance
and performance
  • La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
    (2000) test the substitution and outcome model on
    a cross section study of 4,000 companies from 33
    countries.
  • Durnev and Kim (2002) find that higher scores on
    both the CLSA corporate governance index and the
    SP disclosure and transparency index predict
    higher firm value for a sample of 859 large firms
    in 27 countries
  • Klapper and Love (2002) present similar results
    using the CLSA index for a sample of 495 large
    firms in 25 countries.

9
Data
  • Corporate Governance Index (TDI) based on
  • financial statements and annual reports
  • issuance prospects
  • fillings to regulatory agency (KPWiG)
  • company internet site, newspapers
  • Ownership and financial indicators based on
  • Euromoney ISI Emerging Markets
  • Notoria

10
Data
  • Corporate governance index on 155 listed
    companies
  • In the panel regression the number of companies
    reduced to 110 with 760 observations
  • The period of analysis 1998 2004 and control
    for two sub-periods1998-2001 and 2002-2003

11
Transparency and Disclosure Index
12
TDI - Board structure and procedures
13
TDI - Disclosure
14
TDI - Shareholders
15
Dependent variable
  • Dividend payout measures
  • dividends to cash flows
  • dividends to earnings
  • dividends to sales

16
Explanatory variable
  • Free cash flow hypothesis
  • return on assets
  • Tobins Q
  • Ownership hypothesis
  • control rights of the ultimate shareholder
  • cash flow rights of the ultimate shareholder
  • one share one vote rule dummy
  • domestically owned companies dummy

17
Explanatory variable
  • Signaling hypothesis
  • one period lagged dividend payout ratio
  • Control variables
  • long term debt of assets
  • growth rate of sales
  • assets (size)
  • years of listing (maturity)
  • industry and time dummies

18
Descriptive Statistic
19
Mean Difference Test
20
Our methodology
  • Pooled OLS regression
  • Pooled Probit regression
  • Pooled Tobit regression

21
Pooled OLS Results (dividends to cash flows)
22
Pooled Probit Results
23
Pooled Tobit Results (dividends to cash flow)
24
Results
25
Robustness Checks
  • Control for endogenity and causality applying
    instrumental variables.
  • Dividend measures based on assets and equity
  • Corporate Governance standards
  • Polish Forum for Corporate Governance Rating
  • WSE Best Practice Code
  • Control Variables ADR, age, fixed assets,

26
Results Robustness Checks
27
Conclusions
  • The results presents that there is a strong
    relationship between corporate governance,
    ownership and corporation performance and
    dividend policy.
  • Corporate governance upgrading seems to be in the
    interest of the private investors and the public
    interest.
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com