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Title: The%20Parmalat%20case%20and%20the%20recent%20bankruptcy%20reform


1
The Parmalat case and the recent bankruptcy reform
  • Lorenzo Stanghellini
  • Facoltà di Giurisprudenza
  • dellUniversità di Firenze ()

Colloquium IEEI, Rome, 19 maggio 2006 ()
lorenzo.stanghellini_at_unifi.it
2
Part 1
  • The Collapse of Parmalat

3
Parmalats position in 2003
  • Leading Italian food group
  • Parent company listed
  • 51 owned by the Tanzi family
  • Truly international business
  • 32 countries, 36 operating companies, 132
    locations
  • Fifth Italian bond issuer ( 7.0 bn, a part of
    which publicly rated)

4
2003 the first cracks
  • Balance-sheet 2002 3.5 bn liquidity
  • February a new bond issuance (300 ml) is turned
    down for lack of sufficient information
  • CFO resigns but remains on board
  • November Supervising authorities ask
    clarifications about liquidity
  • Deloitte casts doubts over financial statements

5
December 2003 The collapse
  • 9th Enrico Bondi, a turnaround specialist, is
    hired by Tanzi and the board
  • 12th Parmalat shares plunge a 150 ml bond is
    reimbursed
  • 15th Tanzi resigns, Bondi takes on as Parmalats
    President
  • 19th BOA denies Parmalats account with BOA
    holding substantial liquidity
  • 23rd Italian Government enacts an emergency
    bankruptcy law for very large firms (gt1,000
    empl.)
  • On the same day, Parmalat files for bankr.
    protection Bondi is appointed commissioner

6
Parmalats collapseWhy? How?
  • Why the people did it?
  • At least for the core actors (Tanzi), it is not
    easy to tell
  • How could they do it?
  • Bad corporate governance
  • Ineffective external checks
  • Stock market
  • Auditors
  • Incremental lenders

7
Part 2
  • The Rescue of Parmalat

8
A good candidate for rescue
  • 32,000 employees
  • More people and firms dependent on Parmalats
    continuing operations
  • Business in equilibrium (decision on rescue based
    on assets, not liab.)
  • Liquidation was simply not an option

9
Italian insolvency law (before)
  • Allowed continuation of business under court
    supervision and protection from creditors
  • Allowed industrial restructuring and
    super-priority financing
  • Did not allow for financial restructuring
  • Only real option under existing law sale of
    Parmalat as a going concern

10
Italian insolvency law (after) d.l. 347/2003
and Law 39/2004
  • But
  • Selling large businesses is difficult
  • Often yields fire-sale prices
  • Law amended to allow financial restructuring,
    including debt-equity swap (Law No. 39-2004)
  • Debt-equity swap proposed to creditors Parmalat
    would be sold to its creditors

11
Parmalat insolvencyThe restructuring plan
  • The plan encompasses 16 companies of the Parmalat
    group
  • Combined assets valued 1.5 bn (enterprise
    value)
  • Total liabilities 25.5 bn (with duplications
    for intra-group guarantees and loans net liab.
    around 14 bn)

12
Parmalat insolvencyThe restructuring plan (2)
  • Following a majority vote of the creditors
    (August-September 2005)
  • Creditors claims have been reduced
  • According to the asset/liability ratio of each of
    the 16 companies some 100, some almost zero
  • A Newco has been set up
  • Liabilities (reduced to 1.5 bn to equal
    enterprise value) have been transferred to Newco
    together with assets, at no cost

13
Parmalat insolvencyThe restructuring plan (3)
  • Unsecured credits. of 16 comp. have received
    Newcos shares in settlement of claims
  • Forced debt-equity swap (creditors will receive
    shares, plus 1 warrant per sh. up to the first
    650)
  • Secured creditors (plus administr. expenses) have
    been fully paid in cash by Newco ( 204 ml)
  • Newco has emerged with an almost all-equity
    financial structure
  • Newco has finally been listed (Oct. 2005)
  • New Parmalats corporate governance according to
    international best practices

14
Parmalat insolvencysheer technical complexity
  • Hundreds of companies in different jurisdictions
  • Hard test for EU Reg. 1346/2000 (Eurofood plc)
    ECJ decision on 2nd May 2006
  • Coordination of non-EU procedures (Brazil, US)
  • No consolidation of the group
  • The intra-group distribution of assets and
    liabilities is taken as a snapshot
  • No subordination of large intra-group claims

15
Parmalat insolvencysheer technical complexity
(2)
  • Liability suits against Parmalat in US
  • claimants bound by the plan?
  • Liability suits (and avoidance actions) by
    Parmalat against directors, auditors, and banks
  • Potentially, a big source of recovery

16
Part 3
  • Italian Law after Parmalat

17
Parmalat Any lessons to be learnt?
  • Availability of procedures that allow efficient
    financial restructuring is crucial
  • Distribution of value is difficult
  • Valuation of an insolvent firm is difficult
  • Multiple valuations are even more so
  • Keeping management of distressed firms is
    important ex-ante, but less so ex-post in large
    companies
  • Rehabilitation What does it means?

18
Parmalat Any lessons to be learnt? (2)
  • Creditors committee necessary to achieve
    consensus
  • Unfavourable international press (see,
    e.g.,Global Turnaround March 2004)
  • A Newco necessary to get around the necessary
    shareholders vote
  • ECJ Pafitis v. Banca Trapeza (1993)

19
Parmalat case What it does NOT tell
  • Parmalat needed pruning and turnaround
  • Business was profitable (albeit much less than
    told)
  • Therefore no tragic choice (creditors vs.
    employees/suppliers) has been necessary
  • Alitalia (more than 20.000 employees and
    significant operating losses) would be a much
    more problematic case

20
however, Parmalat was an easy case The
business was profitable
  • Financial statements 2002-2003 revised by PWC
    (press release 26 January 2004)

21
The new composition procedures (a) The
Concordato preventivo
  • Decree-Law 14 March 2005, n. 35 New concordato
    preventivo
  • Plan by the debtor to avoid the bankruptcy
    procedure (Fallimento) through a composition
    with the creditors
  • High degree of flexibility, classes of creditors
  • No constraints on financial restructuring
    proposals by the debtor
  • Debt for equity swap possible pursuant to a
    majority vote
  • New Art. 160 of bankruptcy is taken almost
    literally from Art. 4-bis l. 39/2004 (Parmalat
    law)

22
The new composition procedures (b) The
Concordato fallimentare
  • D.lgs. 9 January 2006, n. 5 the new concordato
    fallimentare
  • Plan by the debtor, any creditor or third party,
    to close the bankruptcy procedure (Fallimento)
  • Same potential for restructuring of the new
    concordato preventivo
  • New concept of concordato

23
The legacy of Parmalat
  • A giant leap forward. Now let us consolidate
  • Reform of general bankruptcy law by d.lgs. 9
    January 2006, n. 5 an important work in progress
  • Generalize Parmalat NO, thanks
  • Creditors have been kept out of the door
  • Called upon at the end for a vote on a plan take
    it or leave it
  • The success of Parmalat turnaround is due to the
    business and the people who worked on it. Now
    its enough
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