Between%20Exit%20and%20Loyalty:%20The%20Dealignment%20and%20Realignment%20in%20the%20Turkish%20Party%20System

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Between Exit and Loyalty The Dealignment and
Realignment in the Turkish Party System

• Thesis Defense by Emre Erdogan

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Major Aims of the Dissertation I

• To understand the nature of the change in the
  Turkish party system
• To explain the change by referring similarities
  between political parties
• To show the significance of government programs
  as symbols of positions of different governments

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Major Aims of the Dissertation II

• To discover the relationship between government
  programs and governing parties electoral
  manifestoes
• To present usefulness of the Exit, Voice and
  Loyalty Framework to understand the change in the
  party system
• To show validity of spatial voting models to
  understand the voting behavior of Turkish voters

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Evidence for the Change

• Fragmentation of the party system
• Effective Number of Political Parties

Elections
Parliament
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Evidence for the Change

• Fragmentation of the party system
• Power Fragmentation Index

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Evidence for the Change

• Volatility of the party system

Pedersens Volatility Score
Laakso and Taageperas Index of Electoral
Volatility
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Reasons of the Change

• Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Hirschman, 1970)
• Exit the withdrawal from a relationship with a
  person or organization
• Voice consumers prefer to communicate their
  dissatisfaction stemmed of quality decline,
  rather than Exit
• Loyalty Consumer prefers to being loyal to
  his/her previous choice, despite the quality
  decline, without communicating his/her
  satisfaction

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Reasons of Exit Schematized Framework
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Reasons of Exit Turkish Case
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Similarity in Promises Government Programs
Consensus on Declaration Technology and infrastructure Economic goals Distributional Policies Military Government Efficiency
Consensus on Ignorance Social services expansion negative Education expansion negative Military negative National unity negative Minority Rights Decentralization negative
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Determinants of the Government Agenda
1980s Economic Orthodoxy Free Enterprise Democracy Freedom and domestic human rights Non economic demographic groups Environmental protection European community () Economic Planning Regulation of capitalism Social services expansion () Protectionism () Labor groups () Social justice Technology and infrastructure Constitutionalism () Government effectiveness () Military () National effort National way of life () Traditional morality()
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Determinants of the Government Agenda
Interim Governments Government efficiency Government effectiveness and authority Law and order Constitutionalism () Military () Foreign relationships Nationalization Controlled economy Agriculture and farmers Social services expansion () Labor groups () National effort, social harmpny () Traditional morality () Defense of national way of life ()
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Determinants of the Government Agenda
Electoral Government Labor groups () Free enterprise Agriculture and farmers Foreign relationships European Community () Technology and infrastructure Government efficiency
Coalition Governments European Community () Government corruption Democracy Economic goals
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Determinants of the Government Agenda
Left in government National effort, social harmony Democracy Labor groups Law and order Economic goals Technology and infrastructure Productivity Social services expansion (-)
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Grouping Turkish Governments
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Grouping Turkish Governments
1960-1980
1980-2000
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Plotting Turkish Governments
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Plotting Turkish Governments
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Plotting Turkish Governments
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Relationship Between Government Programs and
Party Manifestoes

• Determinants of the government agenda
• Party Effect If the government program is
  totally determined by the governing partiess
  programs
• Issue Effect If each issue in the government
  program has reserved spaces
• The Basic Equation
• Gf (P,I)

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Additional Variables

• Majority Effect If the party is the major party
  or single party in the government
• Post-1980 Effect If the government is set up
  after 1980
• Coalition Effect If the government is a
  coalition government

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Findings

• Issue effect dominates all other external
  variables. (R20.72) (Model 2)
• There is no majority/single party effect
• 1980s
• Spaces reserved for issues changed
• The effective power of Party declined
• Being a coalition partner reduces the power of
  the Party Effect
• Distributional policies are among first
  compromises given by the coalition partners

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Perceptions of the Voter

• Respondents are asked to position themselves and
  major parties in a seven item issue set
• When perceptions (P) are compared with average
  positions of the voters (AV)
• The WP and the NAP have no image gap
• All other parties are moderate than perceptions

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Findings

• Left-Right and Religiosity are important
  components of the voter preferences
• Some issues are cross-cutting
• Parties attract voters despite distances
• Nationalism for the NAP, Local values for the TPP
• When vote changers are considered
• Left-Right and Religiosity confirm our
  expectations
• Other issues dont confirm
• Explanatory power remains limited

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Findings

• When utilities are considered
• The .NAP, the VP and the TPP dont borrow voters
• All other parties borrow voters from other
  parties

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Why the Voice is not a valid option?

• Voice Dependent to the openness of communication
  channels
• Party organization is the most important
  communication channel
• History of organization of political parties, is
  the evolution of communication channels

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Different Party Types
The Old Cadre Party Organized in the parliament Connection of ruling elites Personalistic network
The Mass Party Organized to mobilize the electorate Strong Organization Intra-party democracy Financed by members fees Uses the party newspaper Electoral campaigns labor intensive
The Catch-all Party Transformation of the traditional parties Financed by contributions Uses independent channels of communication Electoral campaigns labor and capital intensive Party mechanism is not important
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The Cartel Party

• Aim keeping in touch with resources of the state
• Financed by state subventions
• Electoral campaigns professionalized and capital
  intensive
• Has access to state regulated channels of
  information
• Membership is not significant
• The least sensitive type to the Voice

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The Voice in the Turkish Case

• Transition to democracy was mobilization of
  clientelist networks
• Transformation to mass parties prevented by
  frequent military interventions
• Post-1980 parties failed to takeover party
  mechanisms of old regime
• Competition for old clientelist networks
• Emergence of new patronage mechanisms
• The WP, the NAP and the DLP
• Emphasized on establishing party organizations
• Strong intraparty discipline

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Turkish Political Parties are Cartel Type Parties

• Elections dont serve to transform the power from
  one party to others. All political parties have
  continuous access to the state funds
• Major source of finance is the state subventions
• Electoral competition became clashing advertising
  campaigns
• Major political parties dominate the use of the
  national media

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Turkish Voter Dont Use Party Organizations as
Communication Channels

• Political parties are among least trusted
  institutions
• There is no intraparty democracy
• Members dont care about intraparty democracy and
  dont participate

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Future Research

• Increased similarities between political parties
• Similarity in reputations
• Similarity in promises
• Perceptions of voters
• Effect of institutions
• Party members and organizations
• Development of the Cartel party