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Title: THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT REGIME


1
  • THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
    REGIME
  • by
  • Jean du Preez
  • Director
  • International Organizations and Nonproliferation
    Program
  • Center For Nonproliferation Studies
  • Monterey Institute of International Studies
  • 3 November 2005

2
WHY A NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME?
  • Estimated 30 000 nuclear warheads worldwide
  • 5 NPT nuclear weapons states (China, France,
    Russia, UK, US)
  • 3 de facto nuclear weapons states (India, Israel,
    Pakistan
  • North Korea broke out
  • Libya, Iran cheated
  • Others?

HIROSHIMA August 6, 1945
NAGASAKI August 9, 1945
Fat Man (21Kt)
I have become Death, destoyer of worlds.-Robert
Oppenheimer, quoting the Bhagavad-Gita
Little Boy (15 Kt)
3
WMD DELIVERY SYSTEMS
  • Delivery systems capable of delivering nuclear
    weapons
  • Ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SRBMs)
  • Cruise missiles (airborne, seaborne)
  • Gravity bombs
  • Rockets, artillery shells, mortars
  • UAVs
  • Others (trucks, containers, suitcases?)

4
WHAT IS THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME?
5
UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
General Assembly (deliberative)
Security Council
Special sessions on disarmament 1978, 1982 and
1988
Conference on Disarmament (negotiating forum)
Disarmament Commission
First Committee
6
NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES
  • NWFZs now cover the entire Southern Hemisphere,
    with more than 100 state parties
  • Latin America Caribbean (Tlatelolco) 1st NWFZ
    to affect a major inhabited region (1967), prior
    to the NPT 1962 Cuban missile crisis
  • Antarctic
  • South Pacific (Rarotonga)
  • South East Asia (Bangkok)
  • Africa (Pelindaba)
  • Mongolia
  • Central Asia (?)
  • Middle East (?)
  • South Asia (?)

7
THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
  • Non-treaty based regimes
  • EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
  • Zangger Committee (1972)
  • Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 1974
  • Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 1987
  • Wassenaar Arrangement 1995
  • Australia Group
  • OTHER INITIATIVES
  • Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missiles
  • Proliferation Security Initiative

8
NONPROLIFERATION DISARMAMENT TERMS
  • Nuclear Nonproliferation prevention of the
    spread of nuclear weapons
  • Horizontal proliferation spread of weapons to
    states not currently possessing nuclear weapons
  • Vertical proliferation increase in
    number/destructiveness of nuclear weapons within
    a state already possessing them
  • Arms Control Measures to reduce or control
    weapon systems or armed forces.
  • Disarmament Total elimination of WMD
  • Export control arrangements Agreements to
    restrict sale of sensitive technologies and
    materials to certain countries or to ensure that
    safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to
    the exports
  • Safeguards Legal agreements between States and
    the IAEA to verify that a State is not using
    nuclear material or equipment to develop or
    produce nuclear weapons.
  • Verification The process of using mechanisms
    such as satellites, seismic monitoring, or
    on-site inspections, to collect data that
    demonstrates a party's compliance with an
    agreement or treaty.

9
NONPROLIFERATION DISARMAMENT TERMS
  • International law international rules or norms
    dealing with the relations between two or more
    states
  • Treaty Formal agreement between states that
    defines and modifies their mutual duties and
    obligations
  • Agreement Formal written agreement between two
    or more parties, or informal agreements among
    states that are often not legally binding
  • Protocol A negotiated document supplementary to
    a treaty or agreement
  • Adoption Formal act by which the form and
    content of a proposed treaty text are established
    through the expression of the consent of the
    states participating in the treaty-making
    process.
  • Signature The signing of a treaty by a senior
    representative of a country which indicates that
    the country accepts the treaty and commits, until
    the country completes its ratification process
  • Ratification Implementation of the formal
    process established by a country to legally bind
    its government to a treaty (approval by
    parliament/Senate).
  • Accession Act whereby a state accepts the offer
    or the opportunity to become a party to a treaty
    already negotiated and signed by other states.
    Same legal effect as ratification. After the
    treaty has entered into force.
  • Deposit written instruments (documents), which
    provide formal evidence of consent to be bound
    placed in the custody of a depository.
    Establishes the consent of a state to be bound by
    the treaty.

10
Nuclear nonproliferation history
  • 26 June 1945 UN Charter signed (did not address
    atomic weapons/energy)
  • 16 July 1945 US conducts worlds first atomic
    bomb test at Alamogordo, New Mexico
  • 6 9 August 1945 US drops atomic bombs Little
    Boy a 15 kiloton HEU gun-type device, and
    Fatman a 21 Kt plutonium device - on
    Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing more than 300,000
  • 12 September 1945 US War Secretary Stimson
    recommended
  • that US and USSR conclude a treaty to control
    and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an
    instrument of war and .. To direct and encourage
    the development of atomic power4 for peaceful and
    humanitarian purposes.

11
Nuclear nonproliferation history
  • January 1946 1st UNGA resolution established UN
    Atomic Energy Commission
  • 13 June 1946 Baruch Plan at UNAEC called for
    IADA disbanded at the end of 1949 as a result
    of disagreement over nuclear disarmament between
    the US and the USSR
  • Behind the black portent of the new atomic age
    lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can
    work our salvation. If we fail, then we have
    damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us
    not deceive ourselves We must elect World Peace
    or World Destruction.
  • Bernard Baruch to UNAEC

12
Nuclear nonproliferation history
History
  • 29 August 1949 Soviet Union tested its first
    atomic bomb
  • October 1952 UK carried out a plutonium fission
    bomb on the Christmas Islands
  • 8 December 1953 President Eisenhowers Atom
    for Peace speech at the UNGA
  • July 1957 The International Atomic Energy Agency
    (IAEA) established following
  • the 1956 UN Conference in NY
  • 1956 1958 US proposals on CTBT, FMC,
    dismantlement
  • February 1960 France conducted its first nuclear
    device test in Algeria

13
Nuclear non-proliferation history
  • October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis brought
    US/USSR to brink of nuclear war
  • "I think well be facing a situation that could
    well lead to general war
  • - Secretary of State Dean Rusk
  • "I dont know quite what kind of world we live
    in after weve struck Cuba
  • - Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
  • 1963 President Kennedy 15 - 20 nuclear armed
    countries by 1975
  • October 1964 China conducted first atomic bomb
    test.
  • November 1965 UNGA resolution 2028
    Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons -
    conceptual basis for the NPT
  • 1967 Tlateloloco Treaty creating the 1st NWFZ
  • 1967 Outer Space Treaty

14
Nuclear non-proliferation history
  • 11 March 1968 US/USSR presented draft NPT text
    to ENDC
  • 12 June 1968 NPT Endorsed by UNGA
  • 1 July 1968 Signed by 62 states including 3
    depositary governments (US, USSR, UK)
  • 5 March 1970 NPT Entered into force (without
    France China)
  • October 3, 1972 ABM Treaty between the U.S. and
    USSR enters into force
  • May 18, 1974 India detonates a peaceful nuclear
    explosive
  • July 29, 1991 U.S. and USSR sign the START I
    Treaty
  • March 24, 1993 South Africa announced it
    dismantled a nuclear weapons program only state
    to develop a nuclear program and dismantle it
    voluntarily
  • October 21, 1994 U.S.-North Korea sign the
    Agreed Framework
  • May 1995 NPT extended indefinitely at the 1995
    Review and Extension Conference


15
Nuclear nonproliferation history
  • May 1998 India and Pakistan conduct nuclear
    tests
  • May 19, 2000 2000 NPT Review Conference adopts
    Final Document
  • May 24, 2002 The U.S. and Russia sign the Moscow
    Treaty
  • June 13 2002 The U.S. formally withdraws from
    the ABM Treaty
  • January 10, 2003 North Korea declares its
    withdrawal from the NPT
  • March 19, 2003 U.S. and allies invade Iraq on
    basis of non-compliance with UNSC resolutions and
    suspicions over nuclear and other WMD programs
  • December 19, 2003 Libya renounces its WMD
    programs
  • April 28, 2004 UNSC adopts resolution 1540
  • May 2005 NPT RevCon fails to adopt Final
    Document


16
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES
  • Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
    Weapons
  • Partial Test Ban Treaty
  • Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
  • Sea-bed Treaty
  • Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear
    Material
  • Nuclear Safety Convention
  • Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (?)
  • Nuclear Terrorism Convention (?)
  • PAROS (?)
  • Nuclear Weapons Convention (?)

17
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
  • A cornerstone of global security
  • Embodies the international community's efforts to
    prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons
    its aspirations for global disarmament, while
    also facilitating cooperation in the peaceful
    uses of nuclear energy under safeguards
  • Entails commitments by both NWS NNWS
  • Only multilateral treaty under which the NWS are
    legally committed to nuclear disarmament
  • NNWS have permanently renounced nuclear weapons
    and accepted intrusive on-site inspection of all
    nuclear material and activities
  • IAEA responsible for verification of compliance
    with nonproliferation undertakings through the
    application of safeguards
  • Parties 188 Non-parties India, Israel,
    Pakistan, North Korea? (announced withdrawal on
    April 10, 2003)

18
NPT A Deal Between the Haves and the
Have-nots
  • Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)
  • retain their nuclear arsenals
  • not transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient
    whatsoever
  • not assist any NNWS to acquire, manufacture or
    control nuclear weapons
  • commit to pursuing negotiations in good faith
    towards ending the nuclear arms race and
    achieving nuclear disarmament
  • Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS)
  • not build, acquire or possess nuclear weapons
  • inalienable right to research, produce use
    nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
  • must accept IAEA safeguards (audits and intrusive
    on-site monitoring) on all nuclear activities
    materials to verify peaceful use application
  • may conclude regional treaties in order to assure
    the total absence of nuclear weapons

19
NPT A Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
Deal
  • Art I
  • NWS not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
    nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
    devices and not to assist, encourage, or induce
    any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire them
  • Art II
  • NNWS not to receive nuclear weapons or other
    nuclear explosive devices, and not to manufacture
    or acquire them
  • Art VI
  • All parties to pursue negotiations in good faith
    on effective measures relating to the cessation
    of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear
    disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
    complete disarmament under strict and effective
    international control

20
A Deal to Ensure Peaceful Nuclear Activities
  • Art III
  • (1) NNWS to accept IAEA safeguards agreements to
    verify fulfillment of obligations.
  • (2) All parties not to provide a) source or
    special nuclear material, or (b) equipment or
    material specially designed or prepared for the
    processing, use, or production of special
    fissionable material to any NNWS for peaceful
    purposes, without IAEA safeguards. (basis for
    Zangger Committee controls in INFCIRC/209)
  • (3) Safeguards to be implemented in a manner
    to comply with Article IV, and not to hamper
    economic or technological development or
    international peaceful nuclear cooperation
  • (4) Negotiation of agreements to commence
    within 180 days from Treatys entry-into-force,
    or upon date of deposit for those states
    ratifying or acceding at later date. Agreements
    to enter into force not later than 18 months
    after the date of initiation of negotiations.

21
ROLE OF IAEA IN THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
REGIME
  • NNWS to place all nuclear materials in all
    peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards
    (NPT Art III)
  • IAEA verifies compliance with nonproliferation
    obligations through safeguards
  • All nuclear material facilities subject to
    safeguards agreements in order to verify
    compliance
  • Conduct independent inspections
  • Board of Governors approve safeguards procedures
    safeguards agreements, general supervision of
    safeguards activities
  • Non-compliance Board of Governors is to call
    upon the violator to remedy such non-compliance
    to report the non-compliance to the UN Security
    Council and General Assembly.

22
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) TODAY
  • Foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific
    and technical co-operation in the peaceful use of
    nuclear technology
  • Inspection system verifies States compliance
    with NPT and other nonproliferation agreements
    ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear material and
    facilities
  • Assists Member States in the peaceful uses of
    nuclear energy
  • Member States meet on an annual basis at the
    General Conference while the Board of Governors
    meets at regular intervals.

Autonomous organization under the UN 138 Member
States Located in Vienna, Austria
23
WHAT IS THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM?
  • Continual monitoring of nuclear material to
    ensure non-military use
  • set of technical measures to independently verify
    correctness and completeness of state
    declarations about their nuclear material and
    activities nuclear accountancy
  • confidence-building tools of the nuclear
    nonproliferation regime in inspections of nuclear
    and related facilities under safeguards
    agreements
  • NNWS committed not to possess nuclear weapons,
    pursuant to the NPT - IAEA is the verification
    authority
  • Trilateral Initiative between Russia, US, IAEA -
    supports steps to verify weapon-origin and other
    fissile materials released from defense programs
  • As of September 2005, 155 states have
    safeguards agreement in force with the IAEA, 104
    states have signed the Additional Protocol, and
    69 states have entered it into force.

24
WHAT IS THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM? (cont.)
  • Why are safeguards important?
  • Prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
  • Foster the beneficial uses of atomic energy
  • Provide confidence and build trust

Verification in Iraq UNSC resolutions mandated
the IAEA as inspectorate for nuclear-related
monitoring and verification in Iraq. Activities
were carried out by IAEA's Iraq Nuclear
Verification Office (INVO).
25
TYPES OF SAFEGUARDS
  • Classical Full scope safeguards (INFCIRC/153,
    1972)
  • Legal agreements with IAEA required under NPT Art
    III
  • Compromise between need to verify compliance and
    national sovereignty concerns
  • Verification of correctness of States initial
    declarations on nuclear material facilities
    through inspections, surveillance and physical
    inspections
  • Restricted to defined strategic points
  • 40 NPT NNWS without agreements in place
  • IAEA not capable to detect
  • Diversion or misuse of very small amounts of
    materials
  • Nuclear activities that had not been declared to
    the IAEA
  • 1991 Iraq clandestine nuclear program
  • 2002 DPRK hidden reprocessing facility

26
TYPES OF SAFEGUARDS
  • Strengthened Safeguards (INFCIRC/540)
  • Additional Protocol
  • Complimentary legal authority
  • Result of failures in Iraq DPRK
  • Detect undeclared nuclear facilities and
    activities diversion from peaceful to military
    use
  • Voluntary measures expansion of legal agreement
    with IAEA
  • Information and access to all parts of a States
    nuclear fuel cycle declared or not
  • Comprehensive picture of a States nuclear
    related activities, including imports and exports
  • Short-notice access to all buildings on a nuclear
    site
  • Collection of environmental samples at locations
    beyond those provided under safeguards agreements
  • Voluntary character
  • Only 69 NPT States have implemented (in force)
    but 104 Signatories, 112 approved by the Board
  • Constrained Resources
  • Middle Eastern States regard Protocol as lesser
    priority than Israeli acceptance of full scope
    safeguards

27
NuclearFuel Cycle
28
NWS Safeguards
  • Nuclear Weapon States Voluntary Offer Agreements
    (VOA)
  • Not required under the NPT
  • Designed to satisfy NNWS concerns that IAEA
    safeguards might place them at commercial and
    industrial disadvantage in developing nuclear
    energy for peaceful use
  • Cover specified non-military facilities only
  • First offer by United States 1967, entered into
    force with UK in 1976, US in 1980, France in
    1981, USSR/Russia in 1985 and China in 1988. Now
    India?

29
Integrated Safeguards
  • significantly strengthen efficiency
    effectiveness of the safeguards system
  • builds on lessons learned after the 1991 Gulf War
  • give the Agency more flexibility in deciding
    where to focus efforts and limited resources,
    including what inspectors should concentrate on,
    where they need to go, and which verification
    tools to apply
  • Combines "classical" and "strengthened"
    safeguards measures in place
  • IAEA can move ahead with inspections that are
    tailored on a State-by-State basis to give a more
    accurate and fuller picture of the entire nuclear
    program.
  • End result higher level of assurance that
    safeguarded nuclear material is not being
    diverted for weapons-making
  • only applied in States that have the required set
    of legal agreements in force with the Agency -
    safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the
    NPT, and the Additional Protocol
  • applied in Australia, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan,
    Norway, and Uzbekistan

30
A Deal to Ensure Peaceful Nuclear Activities
  • In exchange for Article III
  • Art IV
  • (1) Not to affect the inalienable right of all
    parties to develop research, production and use
    of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
    discrimination and in conformity with Articles I
    and II of the Treaty.
  • (2) All parties to facilitate and
    participate in the fullest possible exchange of
    equipment, materials, and scientific and
    technological information for the peaceful uses
    of nuclear energy.
  • Art V
  • Each party to take appropriate measures, to
    ensure that under appropriate international
    observation and procedures, potential benefits of
    peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will
    be made available to NNWS party to the Treaty on
    a non-discriminatory basis.
  • - None sought or accrued, subsequently overtaken
    by 1996 CTBT.

31
A Deal to be Free of Nuclear Weapons
  • Art VII
  • Any group of States has the right to conclude
    regional treaties in order to assure the total
    absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
    territories
  • More than 110 states covered by Nuclear Weapons
    Free Zone Treaties
  • Antarctic
  • Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco)
  • South Pacific (Rarotonga)
  • South Asia (Bangkok)
  • Africa (Pelindaba)
  • Mongolia

32
THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME Keeping The
World Free of Nuclear Weapons
33
What is a NWFZ?
  • An internationally binding agreement among a
    group of states that prohibits the development,
    manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing,
    and control of nuclear weapons by states that
    join the zone.
  • In a NWFZ, peaceful uses and applications of
    nuclear energy, under IAEA supervision, are
    permitted.
  • Local or municipal nuclear-free zones, such as
    those declared by many cities in Western Europe
    or the United States (such as Santa Cruz), are
    not considered as NWFZs.
  • Such local declarations have only political
    significance, but no legal force or international
    recognition

34
What is the Relationship Between the NPT and
NWFZs?
  • The NPT only prohibits the control of nuclear
    weapons by NNWS parties
  • NWS can thus base their weapons in NNWS parties
    (i.e. U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany)
  • NWFZs, by contrast, prohibit any deployment of
    nuclear weapons, regardless of control
  • NWFZs may include measures that complement the
    NPT, such as
  • confidence-building measures
  • transparency provisions
  • negative security assurances
  • NWFZs are thus complementary to the NPT.
  • Expanding the number of NWFZs is one possible
    route to achieving nuclear disarmament, as
    codified in Article VI of the NPT.

35
No Deal Not to be Threatened by Nuclear Weapons
  • NPT does not formally provide security assurances
    NWS agreed to disarm (Art VI) and offered
    non-binding assurances to NNWS
  • Positive Security Assurances
  • Nuclear aggression against any NNWS parties would
    require immediate action by UNSC (resolution 255,
    1968)
  • Negative Security Assurances
  • All NWS have issued formal pledges not to
    threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons against
    NNWS parties leading to UNSC resolution 984 of
    1995
  • US/other NWS actively used SC resolution to lobby
    for the indefinite extension of the treaty.
  • 1995 Principles and Objectives document
    incorporated negative security assurances
    vital to securing indefinite extension of the
    treaty
  • 2000 RevCon Final Document could calls for
    recommendations in 2005 (no progress)
  • Under NWFZ protocols NWS required to undertake
    legal obligations not to use or threaten to use
    nuclear weapons against NWFZ parties

36
The NPT Amendments and Review Conferences
  • Art VIII
  • Amendments can be proposed by any State Party. At
    the request of 2/3 of the State Parties,
    Depositary States shall convene an Amendment
    Conference
  • (2) Amendments must be approved by a majority of
    all States Parties, including all NWS, and all
    other States Parties which on the date of
    circulation of an amendment are members of the
    IAEA Board of Governors. Amendment shall enter
    into force for each Party that ratifies it. When
    ratifications of all above are deposited, the
    amendment shall enter into force
  • (3) Review conference to be held five years after
    the Treatys entry into force (and at intervals
    five years thereafter) to review the operation of
    the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the
    purposes of the Treaty are being realized

37
Ensuring National Sovereignty Leverage
  • Article X
  • (1) A State Party may withdraw from the Treaty
    in exercising its national sovereignty, if it
    decides that extraordinary events, related to the
    subject matter of the NPT have jeopardized its
    supreme interestsit will give three months
    advance notice to all other States Parties and to
    the UN Secretary Generalsuch notice shall
    include a statement of the extraordinary events
    it regards as having jeopardized its supreme
    interests.
  • (2) 25 years after the entry into force of the
    Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide
    whether the Treaty shall continue in force
    indefinitely, or shall be extended for an
    additional fixed period or periods. This decision
    shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to
    the Treaty.
  • Art VIII
  • Review conference to be held five years after the
    Treatys entry into force (and at intervals five
    years thereafter if so agreed) to review the
    operation of the Treaty

38
NPT Review ConferencesOverview
  • Periodic reviews was a novelty devised for the
    NPT
  • a) off-set the imbalance in the obligations of
    the majority who had to do something right away
    (accept safeguards to prove non-proliferation)
    and the few who made a long-term promise to
    disarm
  • b) a way for the majority to see how the Treaty
    was operating and express themselves on what they
    found
  • c) produce conclusions for further action.
  • Only the 1975, 1985 2000 Review Conference
    adopted Final Documents
  • No Final Document at 1980, 1990, 1995 2005
    Conferences
  • No consensus on key nonproliferation
    disarmament issues

39
1995 Review and Extension Conference
  • Extended the Treaty indefinitely as part of a
    package deal
  • Decision I Strengthened review process
  • Decision II Principles and objectives for
    nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament,
    including a Program of Action for implementing
    Art VI
  • Decision III Indefinite extension
  • Resolution on the Middle East
  • No Final Document was adopted.
  • Differences between NNWS NWS over
    interpretation over NWS nuclear disarmament
    record

40
NPT Review and Extension Conference
Review process
  • Decision I Strengthened review process
    (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1)
  • PrepCom each year prior to the RevCons (1997),
    4th in year of RevCon (if necessary) to
  • Consider principles, objectives ways to promote
    the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as
    its universality make recommendations thereon to
    the RevCon, including those identified in the
    decision on principles and objectives for nuclear
    non-proliferation and disarmament,
  • Make procedural preparations for RevCon
  • Mandatory RevCons every 5 years
  • RevCons should look forward as well as back.
  • evaluate the results of the period under review,
    including the implementation of undertakings of
    the States parties,
  • identify the areas in which, and the means
    through which, further progress should be sought
    in the future
  • address specifically what might be done to
    strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and
    to achieve its universality

41
NPT Review and Extension Conference
  • Decision II Principles and Objectives for
    Nuclear
  • Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
    (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2)
  • A set of yard sticks and an agenda for measuring
    progress towards the full implementation of the
    treaty
  • Reiterated that the ultimate goal of the NPT
    was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons
    and a treaty on general and complete disarmament
    under strict and effective international
    control.
  • Contained a program of action on nuclear
    disarmament
  • CTBT no later than 1996
  • negotiations on a treaty banning production of
    fissile material for nuclear weapons and
  • Determined pursuit by NWS of systematic and
    progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons
    globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating
    those weapons
  • Further steps (to UNSC 984) should be considered
    to assure NNWS against use or threat of use of
    nuclear weapons could be in form of legally
    binding instrument
  • Noted that the IAEA is the competent authority
    to verify and assure compliance with safeguards
    required under the NPT, and that this authority
    should not be undermined
  • Transfer of source or fissionable material and
    equipment specifically designed for production of
    such material should require as necessary
    precondition IAEA full-scope safeguards
  • Transparency in nuclear related export control
    should be promoted.

42
NPT Review and Extension Conference
  • Decision III Indefinite Extension
    (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.3)
  • Although a majority of states supported
    indefinite extension no consensus existed
  • President Dhanapala formulated a decision based
    on understanding that decisions I and II will be
    taken first as part of a package
  • reaffirmed the treatys continued implementation
    in a strengthen manner, and to this end,
    emphasizing the decision on the strengthening the
    review process and the decision on the
    principles and objectives for nuclear
    non-proliferation and disarmament, also adopted
    by the conference
  • Decides that, as a majority exists, among States
    party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension,
    the Treaty shall continue in force
    indefinitely
  • Several States qualified their support for the
    decision after it was taken

43
NPT Review and Extension Conference
  • Resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.1995/32/RE
    S.1)
  • Arab States (under leadership of Egypt) blocked
    the indefinite decision unless specific reference
    is made to the need for a NWFZ in the Middle East
    addressing concerns over Israels nuclear weapons
    program
  • 3 Depositories sponsored resolution calling on
  • All States in the Middle East (not directly
    mentioning Israel) to take practical steps in
    appropriate forums aimed at making progress
    towards, inter alia, the establishment of an
    effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of
    (WMD) and their delivery systems, and to refrain
    from taking any measures that preclude the
    achievement of this objective
  • Also called on all States, including the NWS to
    extend their fullest cooperation towards this goal

44
2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
  • High expectations following 1995 RevExtCon
  • BUT.
  • CD was deadlocked
  • US Senate rejected CTBT
  • US NMD plans
  • Renewed legitimization of nuclear weapons in US
    and Russian doctrines
  • Unsatisfactory outcomes of 3 PrepCom sessions
  • Discord in US-Russia and US-China relations
  • Lack of progress in Art VI implementation
  • Iraqi and North Korean non-compliance with
    safeguards
  • 1998 Indian Pakistani nuclear tests
  • Questions over Russian nuclear exports

45
2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
  • A milestone agreement in the nuclear
    nonproliferation regime
  • Adopted Final Declaration without a vote 1st
    NPT document to fully negotiated, comprehensive
    and forward looking
  • Result of negotiations between New Agenda
    countries and the NWS
  • Strong political will
  • Fear that failed conference could unravel 1995
    agreements
  • Decision by NWS to remove NMD issue from agenda
  • NWS gave an unequivocal undertaking to
    eliminate their nuclear arsenals as part 13
    practical steps for the systematic and
    progressive efforts to implement Art VI

46
13 PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS THE TOTAL
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS
  1. early entry into force of the CTBT
  2. moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions
    pending CTBT
  3. treaty banning the production of fissile material
    for nuclear weapons within five years
  4. CD nuclear disarmament body
  5. irreversibility to disarmament, arms control and
    reduction
  6. unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total
    elimination of nuclear arsenals
  7. entry into force of START II and the conclusion
    of START III while preserving and strengthening
    the ABM
  8. completion and implementation of the
    US/Russia/IAEA Trilateral Initiative
  9. Steps by all NWS
  10. efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals
    unilaterally
  11. increased transparency
  12. reduction of non-strategic weapons
  13. measures to reduce operational status of nuclear
    weapons
  14. diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security
    policies
  15. engagement of all NWS in the process of
    elimination of nuclear weapons
  16. all NWS to place fissile material under
    international verification
  17. Reaffirmation of ultimate objective of general
    and complete disarmament under effective
    international control
  18. Regular reporting within the framework of the
    strengthened review process (accountability)
  19. Further development of the verification
    capabilities to provide assurance of compliance
    with nuclear disarmament agreements

47
2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
  • Other significant agreements
  • Safeguards
  • Endorsed measures of IAEA 1997 Model Protocol
    (Additional Protocol) not mandatory
  • Security Assurance Called for recommendations on
    a legally binding instrument
  • Middle East
  • Called Israel by name to accede to NPT first
    time
  • All parties to report on steps taken to promote
    Middle East nuclear-weapon and WMD free zone at
    2005 RevCon
  • Noted that IAEA has been unable to provide
    assurance of Iraqs compliance with safeguards
    agreement and UNSC resolution 687
  • South Asia
  • Declared that nuclear test by India Pakistan do
    not confer NWS status (accede to NPT and observe
    moratorium on FM production)
  • DPRK
  • Noted that IAEA is unable to verify initial
    declaration (cannot conclude that no diversion
    occurred)

48
2005 Review Conference A Successful failure?
  • DIFFICULTIES
  • Procedural disputes over the agenda and
    subsidiary bodies
  • The roles played by the United States, France,
    Egypt, and Iran
  • Conference leadership
  • Entrenched national positions
  • Break-down of regional and political groupings
  • Failure to address defection of the DPRK
  • No agreement on a Final Document
  • ON THE BRIGHT SIDE
  • Discussion of key challenges spotlight
  • Strong support for some key issues
  • Address withdrawal
  • Additional Protocol standardization
  • Compliance enforcement
  • Nuclear security and physical protection
  • CTBT entry into force
  • Avoided watered down consensus language

49
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
  • 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty
  • 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

50
In need of a Nuclear Test Ban Early steps
Secretary of Defense McNamaras Secret
declassified memo to President Kennedy on 12
February 1963 The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons
with and without a Test Ban Agreement.
51
TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE
ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER
(PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY - PTBT)
  • Entry into force 10 October 1963
  • 131 States Parties
  • Result of US/USSR compromise on CTBT in late 50s
  • Negotiations followed French test in Algeria
    (February 60)
  • Bans nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear
    explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space,
    under water, or in any other environment
  • Parties to refrain from causing, encouraging, or
    in any way participating in, the carrying out of
    any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other
    nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take
    place in any of the above-described environments.
  • no international verification mechanism - it is
    understood that each party may do so by its own
    national technical means
  • Made redundant by CTBT. However, should a PTBT
    party withdraw from the CTBT, or not sign the
    CTBT, it would still be bound by the provisions
    of the PTBT

52
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATYOverview
  • Long standing goal (1956 US proposals on CTBT and
    FMCT)
  • NPT Preamble to seek to achieve the
    discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
    weapons for all time and to continue negotiations
    to this end
  • Bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any
    other nuclear explosion (true zero yield) in all
    environments.
  • Negotiated in the CD (1993 1996)
  • Adopted by General Assembly on 24 September 1996
  • Signed by 176 States with 125 State Parties
    (Libya 1/6/04))
  • Entry into force requires ratification of 44 CD
    member States with nuclear power capacities 41
    signed, 33 ratified
  • Verification by CTBTO

53
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
ORGANIZATION PREPCOM
  • Preparatory Commission
  • Establish a global verification regime by the
    time Treaty enters into force
  • Establish a worldwide network of 321 monitoring
    stations built in 19 countries and run by the
    host countries in cooperation with the PTS (some
    100 stations are already transmitting data to the
    International Data Center in Vienna via
    satellite-based global communications
    infrastructure)
  • IMS monitors
  • seismological
  • radionuclide (16 laboratories)
  • hydro acoustic
  • infrasound monitoring
  • Develop procedures for on-site inspections and
    confidence-building measures
  • Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS)
    cooperates with the host countries in the
    development and running of an international
    network of 321 monitoring stations

54
CTBT INTERNATIONAL MONITERING SYSTEM(IMS)
? ? ? ? Seismic primary/secondary
array/stations - Hydroacoustic stations
Radionuclide stations ? Infrasound stations ?
Radionuclide laboratories
55
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATYOverview
  • RevCon 10 yrs after entry into force
  • Facilitating the Entry into Force Conferences
    (Art XIV)
  • Non-signatories include India, North Korea, and
    Pakistan
  • US (led efforts to conclude a CTBT and first to
    sign) and China - remaining NWS that have signed
    but not ratified
  • U.S. Senate voted in 1999 not to ratify
  • Bush Administration stated that it has no plans
    to seek reconsideration of the Senate's action,
    but it intends to maintain its moratorium on
    nuclear testing, in effect since 1992 (?)
  • 2000 RevCon early entry into force of the CTBT
    moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions
    pending CTBT
  • 2003 U.S National Defense Authorization Act
    plans for achieving enhanced readiness posture
    for resumption of underground nuclear testing -
    from 3yrs to 18 months
  • 2005 NPT RevCon Strong US opposition to CTBT

56
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
  • Challenges
  • Requires 44 specific states to ratify
  • Significant nuclear capable states, including
    India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed
  • US walked away questions continued value
  • Possible US testing (budget allows for shorter
    term notice)
  • What will be happen if US resumes testing?
    Others?
  • Significant nuclear capable states still outside
  • Expensive verification

57
OTHER RELATED TREATIES
  • CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR
    MATERIAL (CPPNM)
  • To protect nuclear materials (Pu, U-235, U-233
    and irradiated fuel) for peaceful purposes at
    agreed levels during international transport
    across the territory of States Parties or on
    ships or aircraft under their jurisdiction
  • CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
  • To maintain a high level of safety according to
    international benchmarks at land-based nuclear
    power plants
  • JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL
    MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE
    MANAGEMENT
  • Safe storage of radioactive waste and spent fuel
    in countries with and without nuclear programs
    during all stages of management of such materials
    for civilian uses.
  • INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF
    ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
  • Cooperation in preventing or prosecuting acts of
    nuclear terrorism by adopting necessary
    legislative and technical measures to protect
    nuclear material, devises, instillations and
    forestall their use by a third party.

58
THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIMEFUTURE
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
  • Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
  • Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
  • Nuclear Weapons Convention

59
UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
General Assembly (deliberative)
Security Council
Special sessions on disarmament 1978, 1982 and
1988
Conference on Disarmament (negotiating forum)
Disarmament Commission
First Committee
60
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
.consider the general principles of cooperation
in the maintenance of international peace and
security, including the principles governing
disarmament and the regulation of armaments UN
Charter, Article 12
  • Very first resolution addressed nuclear
    proliferation (1946)
  • 191 UN Member States
  • The only truly representative body discussing
    disarmament and international security issues and
    its decisions have lead to significant
    developments
  • Endorsed NPT (1968), BTWC (1972), CWC (1992),
    CTBT (1996)
  • Programme of Action agreed to at the Conference
    on the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and
    Light Weapons (2001)
  • Makes recommendations to UN Member States or to
    the Security Council.

  • Three Special sessions on disarmament 1978,
    1982, 1988
  • Annually adopts resolutions and decisions on
    nonproliferation, disarmament, arms control and
    security on recommendation by its First
    Committee.
  • Considers IAEA annual report

61
UN SECURITY COUNCIL
..establishment and maintenance of
international peace and security, including
through disarmament and the establishment of a
system for the regulation of armaments UN
Charter, Article 26
  • Members
  • Five permanent with veto powers (China, France,
    Russia, UK, USA)
  • Ten non-permanent members without veto (Algeria,
    Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Denmark, Greece,
    Japan, Philippines, Romania, Tanzania)

62
UN SECURITY COUNCIL
  • Nonproliferation accomplishments
  • Mandatory sanctions/inspection in Iraq through
    Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
    Commission (UNMOVIC) and IAEA
  • Responded to 1998 nuclear tests by India and
    Pakistan -- denied NWS status
  • Recognized negative security assurances by the
    NWS in April 1995
  • 1992 Presidential statement declaring the
    proliferation of all WMD a threat to
    international peace and security
  • 2004 prohibits use of, or threat to use, nuclear
    material, nuclear fuel, radioactive products or
    waste, or any radioactive substance with toxic,
    explosive, or other dangerous properties.
  • Prohibits unauthorized receipt through fraud,
    theft, or forcible seizure of any nuclear
    material, radioactive substances, nuclear
    installations, or nuclear explosive devices
    belonging to a State Party, or demands by the
    threat or use of force or by other forms of
    intimidation for the transfer of such material
  • obligates parties to cooperate in preventing or
    prosecuting acts of nuclear terrorism by adopting
    necessary legislative and technical measures to
    protect nuclear material, devises, instillations
    and forestall their use by a third party.
  • Res 1540 Nonproliferation of WMD
  • 2005 Res 1624 calls upon states to prevent
    terrorist conduct and incitement within their
    territories asks states to sign Nuclear
    Terrorist Convention

63
UN Security Council Resolution 1540
  • U.S. and U.K. sponsored
  • Addresses non-state actors states
  • Response to concerns of
  • WMD terrorism (Sept. 11th)
  • Illicit trafficking (A.Q. Khan network)
  • Complement to WMD treaties filling gaps?
  • Under Chapter VII enforcement
  • States are required to
  • Not provide non-state actors with WMDs
  • Develop domestic controls over WMDs
  • Develop export controls over WMDs
  • Present reports on implementation
  • Establishes review committee under UNSC
  • Calls for cooperation in preventing illicit
    trafficking (legitimization for US-led PSI?)

64
UNSC Res 1540 Obligations
  • New binding legal obligation on every UN member
    state to put in place appropriate effective
  • Laws criminalizing non-state WMD proliferation
  • Security and accounting for WMD, their means of
    delivery, and related materials
  • Physical protection
  • Border controls and law enforcement to block
    illicit trafficking
  • Export controls and transshipment controls

65
UNSC Res 1540 Obligations II
  • Assistance in implementing the resolution
  • A call for universal adoption and full
    implementation and strengthening of NBC related
    treaties
  • Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on
    non-proliferation
  • Submit a report about implementation
  • Obligation not limited to parties to NPT or other
    multilateral agreements
  • But what would an appropriate effective system
    be, in each of these cases? Not defined
  • Definition of related materials (para. 3)
    unclear / potential for confusion over national
    control lists mentioned in definition

66
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)
  • Single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum
    of the international community
  • 66 member states
  • Meets in Geneva from January to September
  • Own rules and agenda
  • Funded by UNGA
  • Reports annually to UNGA
  • Deadlocked since 1998!
  • NPT (1968)
  • BTWC (1972)
  • CWC (1993)
  • CTBT (1996)
  • PAROS (?)
  • FMCT (?)

67
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
  • Long standing goal (56 US proposals on CTBT and
    FMCT)
  • Pres Eisenhower 1957 Atoms for Peace
  • Pres Clinton 1993 UNGA
  • 1993 UNGA resolution (48/75L) called for the
    Prohibition of the production of fissile
    materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
    explosive devices no reference to stockpiles
    to gain consensus
  • 1995 CD agreed to negotiate a non-discriminatory,
    multilateral and internationally and effectively
    verifiable treaty banning the production of
    fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
    nuclear explosive devices (Shannon mandate)
  • Differences over scope
  • only the future production of fissile material
  • not only of future but also of past production.
  • not only relate to production of fissile
    materials (past or future) but also to other
    issues, such as the management of such material.
  • agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee mandate does not
    preclude any delegation from raising for
    consideration in the ad Hoc Committee any of the
    above noted issues

68
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
  • Since beginning of space age (1957) UNGA, COPUOS
    and Conference on Disarmament
  • Discussed space issues along 2 separate lines
  • Peaceful application of space technology
  • Prevention of an arms race
  • Existing Treaties
  • 1963 PTBT
  • 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits putting WMB in
    space
  • ABM treaty
  • 1979 Moon Agreement
  • None of these treaties explicitly bans
    space-based weapons, or ASATs (except the ones
    aimed at spy satellites)

69
PAROS Any progress possible?
  • CD deadlocked over PAROS FMCT
  • US reiterated its position in 2002 that it saw
    no need for new outer space arms control
    agreements. - current Outer Space Treaty
    regulating the use of space meets all U.S.
    purposes.
  • Intense debate with China, the Russian Federation
    and the G-21 (NAM)
  • PAROS should assume greater urgency because of
    legitimate concerns that existing legal
    instruments are inadequate to deter imminent
    attempts for further militarization of outer
    space.
  • 2003 Five Ambassadors Initiative (Dembri, Lint,
    Reyes, Salander, Vega) CD to identify and
    examine, without limitation, any specific topics
    or proposals, which could include
    confidence-building measures, general principles,
    treaty commitments and the elaboration of a
    regime capable of preventing an arms race in
    outer space, including the possibility of
    negotiating a relevant international legal
    instrument.
  • supported by most all CD members
  • China and the Russian Federation announced their
    unified flexibility
  • United States and France has not taken a
    position on the issue

70
Nuclear Weapons Convention Is it possible?
  • Long standing goal by many NNWS, especially the
    NAM Heads of State or Government reiterated
    their call on the Conference on Disarmament to
    establish, as the highest priority, an ad hoc
    committee to start in 1998 negotiations on a
    phased programme for the complete elimination of
    nuclear weapons with a specified framework of
    time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention
    - Kuala Lampur Summit.
  • NPT Article VI All parties to pursue
    negotiations in good faith on effective measures
    relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms
    race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty
    on general and complete disarmament under strict
    and effective international control
  • 1995 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of
    Nuclear Weapons while there is a need to
    further develop verification and weapons
    dismantlement systems, there are no technological
    barriers to concluding an agreement or agreements
    to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons
  • ICJ determined (1996) that the threat or use of
    nuclear weapons is illegal, and that there exist
    an obligations to pursue and conclude
    negotiations leading to complete nuclear
    disarmament
  • CD agreed (1998) to established ad hoc committee
    on nuclear disarmament, but has since been
    deadlocked
  • 2000 NPT RevCon unequivocal undertaking to
    accomplish the total elimination of nuclear
    arsenals

71
THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
  • NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
  • Zangger Committee (1972)
  • Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 1974
  • Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 1987
  • Wassenaar Arrangement 1995

72
Importance of Export Controls
  • Export controls are an important element of the
    nonproliferation regime
  • While they cannot stop proliferation, they slow
    the spread of WMD and delivery systems
  • Assist states to coordinate compliance with
    international agreements
  • Effective export controls necessary to maintain
    good standing in the international trading
    community
  • Export controls help control borders and prevent
    export violators from making dangerous or
    politically embarrassing transfers

73
Zangger Committee
  • Informal group of NPT signatories established in
    1971 under the chairmanship of Claude Zangger
    (Switzerland), to draft a trigger list of items
    that should be subject to IAEA safeguards in
    accordance with Article III(2) of the NPT
  • NPT does not describe in detail what materials
    and technology should be subject to safeguards
    when exported to non-nuclear weapon states.
  • It names only source or special fissionable
    material and equipment specially designed or
    prepared for the processing, use or production of
    special fissionable material as being subject to
    such safeguards.
  • Zangger is an informal regime, and not a treaty.
    Its commitments are political, not legal, and are
    implemented by individual members
  • Members share information about their nuclear
    exports and export license applications,
    particularly for exports to NNWS not party to the
    NPT
  • Current membership 35, including China

74
Nuclear Suppliers Group
  • Prompted by the Indian nuclear test in 1974,
    which showed very clearly that nuclear exports
    could contribute to proliferation.
  • NSG provided a forum to reform nuclear export
    controls. It was not limited to interpreting the
    NPT, and could include countries that were not
    NPT members at that time, such as Japan and
    France.
  • Requirement for full-scope safeguards.
  • NSG established in 1992 a list of nuclear related
    dual-use goods and technologies that could make a
    major contribution to a nuclear explosive
    activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle
    activity. Partly motivated by the Iraq case.
  • A political agreement, not a treaty. States that
    join have a political commitment to follow the
    guidelines, but not a binding legal commitment
  • States that join have responsibility for
    implementing the guidelines they can also have
    more restrictive national controls
  • Membership has now expanded to include 40
    countries. Belarus, Cyprus, Turkey, Slovenia and
    Kazakhstan are the most recent members, joining
    in 2000, 2001 and 2002.

75
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
  • Established in 1987 to reduce and ultimately
    eliminate the proliferation of systems (other
    than manned aircraft) capable of delivering WMD
  • Controls exports capable of delivering WMD and of
    equipment and technology relevant to missiles
    whose performance in terms of payload and range
    exceeds stated parameters
  • MTCR is not a treaty it is an informal
    non-treaty association of governments with common
    interests
  • MTCR entails political, but not legal obligations
    and commitments
  • MTCR obligations are implemented by each member
    as it sees fit, through its national export
    control system
  • Membership later expanded to include 26
    countries, for a total of 33 (as of May 2001).
  • Hague Code of Conduct (November 2002 signed by 93
    states)
  • politically binding commitments to curb the
    proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles
    and to exercise maximum restraint in developing,
    testing, and deploying such missiles.

76
The Nuclear Nonproliferation RegimeIn a Crises
or Challenged?
  • Universality (Outlier states India, Pakistan,
    Israel)
  • North Korean withdrawal
  • Non-compliance Iran?
  • Inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy or
    cover for nuclear weapons should the fuel cycle
    be limited?
  • Strengthening IAEA safeguards comprehensive
    safeguards or additional protocol?
  • Nuclear disarmament
  • Abrogation of 13 practical steps Any future
    for CTBT, FM(C)T?
  • Impact of new nukes resumption of testing new
    arms race?
  • De-alerting
  • Non-strategic nuclear weapons
  • Verifiability and transparency
  • Threat of nuclear weapons use
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