Assessing Governance Structures and the Distribution of Rights and Responsibilities

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Assessing Governance Structures and the
Distribution of Rights and Responsibilities
Willow Battista, Ryan Kelly, Ashley Erickson, Rod
Fujita
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What is Governance

• the activity or process of governing
• those people and institutions charged with the
  duty of governing and
• the manner, method, and system (instruments and
  processes) by which a particular society is
  governed.
• In fisheries it is usually understood as the sum
  of the legal, social, economic, and political
  arrangements used to manage fisheries.

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Effect of Governance Structure on Fisheries
Management

• Managers and scientists around the world struggle
  to achieve and maintain sustainable fisheries.
• Governance characteristics (e.g., quality of
  institutions, instruments, and arrangements) can
  hinder (or help) achieve management goals.

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Effective Governance Attributes
Regulatory Authority Efficient Enforcement Mechanisms Governance Goals Aligned with Conservation Objectives Formalized Science-Based Decisionmaking Agency Flexibility Explicit Recognition of Trade Offs Dependable Funding
Participation Systematic Representation Deliberation Clear Decisionmaking Rules Clear Objectives and Directives Accountability and Transparency Appropriate Scale Social Justice and Empowerment Organized to Allow Transfer of Authority
(MacCay and Acheson 1987 Wade 1988 Berkes et
al. 1989 Ostrom 1990 Ostrom, Gardner, and
Walker 1994 Baland and Platteau 1996 Ostrom and
Schlager 1996 Goodin 1998 Fung 2003 Olsson,
Folke, and Berkes 2004 Folke et al. 2005 Lebel
et al. 2006 Ward et al. 2006 Sivas and Caldwell
2008 Reed 2008 Pitcher et al. 2009 Basurto and
Ostrom 2009 Cinner et al. 2011)
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Simple Scoring Metric
Score Translation
1 Low Meets none of the qualities listed in attribute definition.
2 Medium Meets some, but not all qualities listed in attribute definition.
3 High Meets all of the qualities listed in attribute definition.
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Systematic Analysis of Governance Structures

• Fully realized, partially realized, and missing
  attributes might be impacting the achievement of
  conservation goals.

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Fisheries Management in the US and EU

• Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
  Management Act (MSA)
• Passed in 1976, reformed to focus on
  sustainability in 1996, and then again in 2006

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Fisheries Management in the US and EU

• Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
• Passed in 1983, reformed to focus on
  sustainability in 2002 and then again in 2014.

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Fisheries Management in the US and EU

• The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) and Common
  Fisheries Policy (CFP) are similar in many ways
• Manage wide variety of stocks using FMPs
• Set catch limits and other control rules based on
  recommendations of scientific advisory boards
• Created and administered by central governing
  body
• Regional councils to better match scale of
  resource
• Encourage stakeholder participation

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Percentages of Assessed Stocks with Unhealthy
Status
Year CFP MSA MSA
Over-Exploited Overfished Subject to Overfishing
2006 45 25 20
2013 39 17 9
What can an analysis of governance tell us about
the disparate records of success in reforming
fisheries under the CFP and MSA?
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Fisheries Governance in the US
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Fisheries Governance in the EU
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Effective Governance Attributes
Regulatory Authority Efficient Enforcement Mechanisms Governance Goals Aligned with Conservation Objectives Formalized Science-Based Decisionmaking Agency Flexibility Explicit Recognition of Trade Offs Dependable Funding
Participation Systematic Representation Deliberation Clear Decisionmaking Rules Clear Objectives and Directives Accountability and Transparency Appropriate Scale Social Justice and Empowerment Organized to Allow Transfer of Authority
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Governance Gaps in the US
Regulatory Authority Efficient Enforcement Mechanisms Governance Goals Aligned with Conservation Objectives Formalized Science-Based Decisionmaking Agency Flexibility Explicit Recognition of Trade Offs Dependable Funding
Participation Systematic Representation Deliberation Clear Decisionmaking Rules Clear Objectives and Directives Accountability and Transparency Appropriate Scale Social Justice and Empowerment Organized to Allow Transfer of Authority
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Governance Gaps in the EU (pre-2014 reform)
Regulatory Authority Efficient Enforcement Mechanisms Governance Goals Aligned with Conservation Objectives Formalized Science-Based Decisionmaking Agency Flexibility Explicit Recognition of Trade Offs Dependable Funding
Participation Systematic Representation Deliberation Clear Decisionmaking Rules Clear Objectives and Directives Accountability and Transparency Appropriate Scale Social Justice and Empowerment Organized to Allow Transfer of Authority
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Focus on Maximal Differences

• EU in comparison to US
• Regulatory Authority
• Efficient Enforcement Mechanisms
• Appropriate Scale

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Regulatory Authority

• In the US, the agencies who craft the regulations
  (Regional Fisheries Management Councils (RFMCs)
  with oversight from National Marine Fisheries
  Service (NMFS)) also have authority to implement,
  modify, and enforce them.
• In the EU, agencies who craft the regulations
  (central EU Commission and Council with advice
  from Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) and
  other groups) do not have authority to implement,
  modify, or enforce Member States hold these
  rights (with oversight from EFCA and DG MARE).

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Enforcement Mechanisms

• CFP
• Enforcement authority lies with the governments
  of the individual Member States
• Authorities from one State may not enforce
  regulations on vessels from other States
• Fines and sanctions are insufficient for
  discouraging illegal activities
• Process by which Commission sues Member States is
  complex and slow-moving

• MSA
• NMFS has full authority to prosecute states that
  dont follow through on their mandated
  commitments
• Fines and sanctions are graduated and appropriate
  to type of violation

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Appropriate Scale

• MSA Regional scale of RFMCs and regional NMFS
  offices ensures that the spatial jurisdiction of
  the management authority matches the spatial
  scale of the resources
• CFP RAC authority was/ is drastically limited by
  the Lisbon Treaty they cannot legislate, are
  not included in decision-making on technical
  management measures, and have no voting role in
  the final fishery management plans
• Note One corner stone of the 2014 CFP reform is
  regionalization

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Result

• Uneven compliance and incentives to disregard the
  law

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Key Leverage Points in the system

• So what have we revealed?

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Governance Levers

• Better aligning regulatory authority and
  implementation (i.e. granting more implementation
  and enforcement powers to central EU agencies),
• Improving efficiency of enforcement mechanisms,
  and
• Granting regional RACs more legislative power
• would all facilitate more positive management
  outcomes for fisheries in the EU.

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2014 Improvement in Formalized Science-Based
Decisionmaking

• Both the MSA and the CFP have ample available
  scientific data to draw on
• Before the 2014 reform, only the MSA mandated
  that catch limits be based on scientific
  recommendations
• Thus, in the EU, the advice of scientists was
  rarely adopted in full
• 2014 reform included a mandate to base TACs on
  scientific recommendations (FMSY) by 2020!

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Questions?

• Thank you!

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Extra Slides
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Governance Gaps in the EU post-2014 reform
Regulatory Authority Efficient Enforcement Mechanisms Governance Goals Aligned with Conservation Objectives Formalized Science-Based Decisionmaking Agency Flexibility Explicit Recognition of Trade Offs Dependable Funding
Participation Systematic Representation Deliberation Clear Decisionmaking Rules Clear Objectives and Directives Accountability and Transparency Appropriate Scale Social Justice and Empowerment Organized to Allow Transfer of Authority
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Societal Enabling Conditions
Capacity for Self-Organization Capacity for Adaptation and Learning Preexisting Local/Traditional Organizations Social Agreement
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Distribution of Rights and Responsibilities

• We also evaluate the

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Ostroms Common Property Rights

• Operational- Level Rights

• Collective-Choice Rights

Right Definition
Access the right to enter a defined physical property
Withdrawal the right to obtain the "products" of a resource
Management the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improvements
Exclusion the right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be transferred
Alienation the right to sell or lease either or both of the above collective-choice rights
(Ostrom 1990 Schlager and Ostrom 1992
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Also Important to Consider Responsibilities
Operational- Level Rights Holders
Adhere to all rules and regulations pertaining to access and withdrawal . Use the resource that they withdraw .
Collective-Choice Rights Holders
Create and implement Management Plans Monitor and enforce all rules and regulations Select penalty or sanction amounts to be applied to varying degrees of violations. Host conflict resolution mechanisms for resource users. Clearly define guidelines laying out which individuals are included in, or excluded from, the system. Secure funding for management efforts, including day-to-day upkeep, monitoring and enforcement, and conservation or restoration projects.
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Incentives (and Disincentives) to Conserve

• Resulting

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Incentives
Type of Incentive Explanation
Economic Using economic and property rights approaches to promote the fulfilment of MPA objectives.
Interpretative Promoting awareness of the conservation features of the MPA, the related objectives for conserving them, the policies for achieving these objectives and support for related measures.
Knowledge Respecting and promoting the use of different sources of knowledge (local/traditional and expert/scientific) to better inform MPA decisions.
Legal Establishment and enforcement of relevant laws, regulations, etc as a source of state steer to promote compliance with decisions and thereby the achievement of MPA obligations.
Participative Providing for users, communities and other interest groups to participate in and influence MPA decision-making that may potentially affect them in order to promote their ownership of the MPA and thereby their potential to cooperate in the implementation of decisions.
(UNEP 2011)