History of Modern Macroeconomics Lecture 2. The Great Depression: Keynes and His Critics (the 1930s) Kevin D. Hoover Department of Economics Department of Philosophy Center for the History of Political Economy Duke University - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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History of Modern Macroeconomics Lecture 2. The Great Depression: Keynes and His Critics (the 1930s) Kevin D. Hoover Department of Economics Department of Philosophy Center for the History of Political Economy Duke University

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Title: History of Modern Macroeconomics Lecture 2. The Great Depression: Keynes and His Critics (the 1930s) Kevin D. Hoover Department of Economics Department of Philosophy Center for the History of Political Economy Duke University


1
History of Modern MacroeconomicsLecture 2. The
Great Depression Keynes and His Critics (the
1930s) Kevin D. HooverDepartment of
EconomicsDepartment of PhilosophyCenter for the
History of Political EconomyDuke University
2
John Maynard Keynes(1883-1946)
3
Keynes is the Most Influential Economist of the
20th Century (by articles in JSTOR)
Economist Name in Title Name in Article
Keynes 1,428 30,249
Friedman 130 17,828
Samuelson 110 14,524
Lucas 44 9,535
Prescott 10 4,846
4
Keyness Paternity Natural and Academic
Alfred Marshall (1842-1924)
John Neville Keynes (1852-1949)
5
Some Bloomsburies
Lytton Strachey 1880-1932 (by Dora Carrington)
Duncan Grant 1885-1978 (Self-portrait)
Virginia Woolf 1882-1941
E.M. Forster 1882-1941
6
Keynes and the Arts
7
Maynard and Lydia
8
Keyness Books circa 1930
1919
1921
1930
1923
9
If the books seem dry . . . Maynard and Lydia
again
10
A Doctrinaire Quantity Theorist and the Urgency
of the Present
  • Now in the long run the neutrality of money
    is probably true. If, after the American Civil
    War, the American dollar had been stabilized and
    defined by law at 10 per cent below its present
    value, it would be safe to assume that . . . p
    would be just 10 per cent greater than it
    actually is and that the present values of k
    and y would be entirely unaffected. But this
    long run is a misleading guide to current
    affairs. In the long run we are all dead.
    Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a
    task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell
    us that when the storm is long past the ocean is
    flat again.
  • Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform

11
Malthus as a Precursor to Keynes
  • Theoretical writers are too apt, in their
    calculations, to overlook these intervals i.e.,
    trade cycles but eight or ten years, recurring
    not unfrequently, are serious spaces in human
    life. They amount to a serious sum of happiness
    or misery, according as they are prosperous or
    adverse, and leave the country in a very
    different state at their termination.
  • T. Robert Malthus, Principles of Political
    Economy

12
Perfectionist and Imperfectionists Accounts of
the Business Cycle
  • Ricardo-Malthus debate as a prelude
  • Says Law
  • Supply creates its own demand
  • Capital always finds productive uses
  • No natural barriers to full employment
  • No general gluts
  • Imperfectionist Labor resistance (implicit or
    explicit) to real wage cuts the source of
    unemployment
  • Perfectionist (Keynes) unemployment in the
    nature of the economy

13
The General Theory of Employment Interest and
Money (1936)
  • Monetary theory of production
  • Perfectionist account of the business cycle
  • Real output not prices the central theoretical
    focus

14
Mr. Keynes and the Classics The Most
Influential Interpretation of the General Theory
Sir John Hicks(1904-1989)
IS-LM Model
15
The IS-LM (originally IS-LL) Model 1
16
The IS-LM (originally IS-LL) Model 1
17
Hicks IS-LM Interpretation of Keynes
18
Keynes Heterogeneity
  • Relative social position in labor markets and
    aggregate supply
  • Coordination failure (ex ante and ex post)
  • Fallacies of composition
  • Monetary economy

19
Uncertainty and Rationality 1
  • Risk vs. Uncertainty (Treatise on Probability)
  • the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or
    the price of copper and the rate of interest
    twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new
    invention, or the position of private wealth
    owners in the social system of 1970. About these
    matters there is no scientific basis on which to
    form any calculable probabilities whatever. We
    simply do not know.
  • Keynes 1937, pp. 113-14 Collected Works,
    vol. 14.

20
Uncertainty and Rationality 2
  • Conventions as a solution to uncertainty
  • a convention . . . assuming that the existing
    state of affairs will continue indefinitely,
    except in so far as we have specific reasons to
    expect a change . . .
  • Keynes General Theory, p. 152

21
Uncertainty and Rationality 3
  • Room for psychology and temperament (animal
    spirits) but not irrationality
  • . . . it is our innate urge to activity which
    makes the wheels go round, our rational selves
    choosing between the alternatives as best we are
    able, calculating where we can, but often falling
    back for our motives on whim or sentiment or
    chance.
  • Keynes, General Theory, p. 163
  • Rationality requires decision

22
Implications of Uncertainty
23
The Trade Cycle
  • Investment major source of fluctuations
  • marginal efficiency naturally falls as boom
    progresses
  • large shifts from reassessments of future profits
    dimmed animal spirits
  • firms hesitate to cut wages
  • wage cuts reduce income and have adverse
    multiplier effects

24
Policy to Fight a Slump
  • Government expenditure (especially public works)
    can replace investment socialization of
    investment
  • Indirect effect on expected future profits and
    firms confidence (animal spirits) dominate

25
Policy to Maintain a Boom
  • Predictable and consistent monetary and fiscal
    policy supports conventional response to
    uncertainty
  • In estimating the prospects of investment, we
    must have regard . . . to the nerves and hysteria
    of those upon whose spontaneous activity it
    largely depends. Keynes, General Theory, p.
    162

26
The Central Message (or Central Innovation) of
The General Theory
  • Perfectionist account of the failure of real wage
    changes to clear the labor market
  • Distinction between aggregate supply and demand
  • The multiplier
  • Liquidity preference
  • The liquidity trap
  • Activitist (fiscal) policy
  • Focus on uncertainty

27
  • Thanks
  • ??
  • The End
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