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Title: Philosophy 190: Seminar on Kant


1
  • Philosophy 190 Seminar on Kant
  • Spring, 2015
  • Prof. Peter Hadreas
  • Course website
  • http//oucampus.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas/cour
    ses/Kant/index.html

2
The First Edition Version ltAgt (1781) of the
Transcendental Deduction (pp. 219-244).

3

4
TABLE OF CATEGORIES p. 212

5
Differences Between the First and Second Edition
Versions of the Transcendental Deduction
The Second Edition deduction differs from the
first edition in omitting any detailed account of
the synthesis, and in inserting a passage which
shows clearly the connection between the
metaphysical and the transcendental deductions
(B141-3) and also a discussion of the phenomenal
self and its relation to the transcendental unity
of apperception. (B153-9).1 1. Ewing, A. C., A
Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason, (1938, reprinted 1996) p. 114

6
General Remarks about the Transcendental Deduction
The Transcendental Deduction is at the heart of
the Analytic. Even by Kants standards, it is one
of the most original abstract and taxing parts of
the Critique. Certainly it is the most enigmatic
the text is of such complexity that it may be
reasonably doubted that a single line of argument
comprehending all its themes and theorems can be
extracted from it. Kant recorded
dissatisfaction Gardner Sebastian, Kant and the
Critique of Pure Reason, (London Routledge,
1999), p. 135.

7
General Remarks about the Transcendental Deduction
continued from previous slide with its
exposition in the first edition and rewrote it
entirely for the second (Bxxxxviii, Proleg 381),
but as with other major changes between the
editions, the B Deduction is far from being a
mere clarification of its predecessor, and we
are left with two contrasting versions of the
Deduction whose relation raises many questions.1
1. Gardner Sebastian, Kant and the Critique of
Pure Reason, (London Routledge, 1999), p. 135.

8
Heidegger on the Difficulty of the Transcendental
Deduction ltAgt
Kant repeatedly stressed the difficulty of the
deduction and sought to remedy its obscurity.
The diversity and complexity of relations
involved in the problem of the deduction,
properties which become increasingly apparent as
the content of the problem is made precise,
prevented Kant from the very beginning from
remaining content with a single point of
departure for the deduction and a single way of
carrying out. 1 1. Heidegger, Martin, Kant and
the Problem of Metaphysics, (Bloomington, Indiana
University Press, 1962), p. 73. Original German
Kantbuch, 1929.

9
Heidegger on the Difficulty of the Transcendental
Deduction ltAgt
continued from previous slide But despite the
diversity of his approach to the problem of the
deduction, Kant still found his labors immense
and unceasing. Often it is only on the way
thereto that the objective pursued by the
deduction is clearly perceived and expressed. And
what should first be disclosed in the course of
the deduction is often anticipated in a simple
preliminary observation.1 1. Heidegger, Martin,
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962),
p. 73. Original German Kantbuch, 1929.

10
  • The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
    Understanding
  • Second Section
  • (pp. 226-236
  • One the a priori grounds for the possibility of
    experience
  • Preliminary Reminder
  • 1 On the synthesis of apprehension in he
    intuition
  • 2 On the synthesis of reproduction in the
    imagination
  • 3 On the synthesis of recognition in the
    concept
  • 4 Provisional explanation of the possibility of
    the categories as a priori cognitions.


11
Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the
Categories
There are, however, three original sources
(capacities or faculties of the soul), which
contain the conditions of the possibility of all
experience, and cannot themselves be derived
from any other faculty of the mind, namely
sense, imagination, and apperception. On these
are grounded 1) the synopsis of the manifold a
priori through sense 2) the synthesis of this
manifold through the imagination finally 3) the
unity of this synthesis through original
apperception. In addition to their empirical
use, all of these faculties have a transcendental
one, which is concerned solely with form, and
which is possible a priori. We have discussed
this with regard to the senses in the first part
above, however, we will now attempt to understand
the nature of the two other ones. (p. 225)

12
The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of
Understanding
If every individual representation were entirely
foreign to the other, as it were isolated and
separated from it, then there would never arise
anything like cognition, which is a whole of
compared and connected representations. If
therefore I ascribe a synopsis to sense, because
it contains a manifold in its intuition, a
synthesis must always correspond to this, and
receptivity can make cognitions possible only if
combined with spontaneity. This is now the ground
of a threefold synthesis, which is necessarily
found in all cognition that, namely, of the
apprehension of the representations, as
modifications of the mind in intuition of the
reproduction of them in the imagination and of
their recognition in the concept. Now these
direct us toward three subjective sources of
cognition, which make possible even the
understanding and, through the latter, all
experience as an empirical product of
understanding. ) pp. 227-8.

13
Three syntheses are required to constitute an
object The Synthesis of Apprehension, of
Reproduction and of Apperception.
I. Through the the Synthesis of Apprehension in
Intuition we are able to "run through" and "hold
together" the many discrete synthetic appearances
given through sensibility. Only as such can we
apprehend the appearances as a single object
(representation), e.g. a roan horse.

14
Three syntheses are required to constitute an
object The Synthesis of Apprehension, of
Reproduction and of Apperception.
I. continued The Synthesis of Apprehension
presumes the intuition of time. "Every intuition
contains a manifold in itself, which however
would not be represented as such if the mind did
not distinguish the time in the succession of
impressions on one another for as contained in
one moment no representation can ever be anything
other than absolute unity. Now in order for unity
of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say,
in the representation of space) it is necessary
first to run through and then to take together
this manifoldness, which action I call the
synthesis of apprehension, since it is aimed
directly at the inuition, which to be sure
provides a manifold but can never effect this as
such, and indeed contained in one representation,
without the occurrence of such a synthesis. (p.
228/A99)

15
Three syntheses are required to constitute an
object The Synthesis of Apprehension, of
Reproduction and of Apperception.
II. Through the Synthesis of Reproduction in
Imagination i.e. we areable to "re-produce" the
unities formed in the synthesis of apprehension
as we progress through time (and its necessary
succession). Thus, for example, the roan horse
that we see at t1, as a unity is the roan horse
that we see at time t2 as a unity (on the
subjective side we must recall or recollect
it). Note The synthesis of Apprehension includes
the synthesis of the Reproduction (p. 230/A102).
Thus the two combined give us the full sense of
the role of the Imagination.

16
Three syntheses are required to constitute an
object The Synthesis of Apprehension, of
Reproduction and of Apperception.
III. These unities which progress through time
always progress according to concepts (brown,
color, cube, shape, etc.) and these concepts
necessarily presuppose (p. 231/A104) a unitary
consciousness which sustains the whole movement
of knowledge. This unity of consciousness is
called apperception.1 1. Note Apperception
is a term that Kant appropriates from Leibniz. It
means consciousness of ones own mental activity,
i. e., self-consciousness.

17

18
Second Section, 4, Provisional explanation of
the possibility of the categories as a priori
cognitions, pp. 234-236
1. Like space and time, perceptual experience is
a unity.
There is only one experience, in which all
perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing
and lawlike connection, just as there is only one
space and time, in which all forms of appearance
and all relation of being or non-being take
place. (p. 234)

19
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
2. Diverse experiences are part of one universal
experience.
If one speaks of different experiences, they
are only so many perceptions insofar as they
belong to one and the same universal experience.
The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of
perceptions is precisely what constitutes the
form of experience, and it is nothing other than
the synthetic unity of the appearances in
accordance with concepts. (p. 234)

20
Change Blindness a change in a visual stimulus
is introduced and the observer does not notice
it.

21
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
3. The synthetic unity of experience is due to
some manner of conceptual format.
The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of
perceptions is precisely what constitutes the
form of experience, and it is nothing other than
the synthetic unity of the appearances in
accordance with concepts. (p. 234) This follows
because experience is made of intuitions and
concepts and intuitions themselves cannot provide
the unity of perceptual experience. Hence the
unity must be the result of concepts.

22
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
4. If the concepts that unify perceptual
experience were empirical, the perceptual unity
would be contingent, and would fall short of
experience.
Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical
concepts would be entirely contingent, and, were
it not grounded on a transcendental ground of
unity, it would be possible for a swarm of
appearances to fill up our soul without
experience ever being able to arise from it. (p.
234)

23
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
5. If the concepts that unify perceptual
experience were empirical, the perceptual unity
could never obtain the cognition of objects
But in that case the unity of perceptual
experience based in empirical concepts all
relation of cognition to objects would also
disappear, since the appearances would lack
connection in accordance with universal and
necessary laws, and would thus be intuition
without thought, but never cognition, and would
therefore be as good as nothing for us.1

24
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
6. So it follows that the conditions of
experience are at the same time the conditions of
their being objects which we experience.
The a priori conditions of a possible experience
in general are at the same time conditions of the
possibility of the objects of experience. (p.
234)

25
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
7. The categories of the understanding, like the
pure intuitions of space and time, are necessary
conditions to think a possible experience.
Now I assert that the categories introduced
earlier are nothing other than the conditions of
the thinking in a possible experience, just as
space and time contain the conditions of the
intuition for the very same thing. (p. 234)

26
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
8. But the possibility of applying the categories
of the understanding rests upon the unity of
self-consciousness, i. e., the unity of
apperception.
However, the possibility, indeed even the
necessity of these categories rests on the
relation that the entire sensibility, and with it
also all possible appearances, have to the
original apperception, in which everything is
necessarily in agreement with the conditions of
the thorough-going unity of self-consciousness,
i.e., must stand under universal functions of
synthesis, namely of the synthesis in accordance
with concepts, as that in which alone
apperception can demonstrate a priori its
thoroughgoing and necessary identity.

27
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
9. The unity of the apperception could not be
cognized unless there were an identity of its
action as subjects the manifold of intuition to
its syntheses. The identity of this action also
accounts for the unity of the object.
. . . for the mind could not possibly think
of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of
its representations, and indeed think this a
priori, if it did not have before its eyes the
identity of its action, which subjects all
synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to
a transcendental unity, and first makes possible
their connection in accordance with a priori
rules."

28
Subject and Object as Making One Another
Possible Gardner, Sebastian, Kant on the
Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 157-160
. . . So far Kants account of the grounds of
each the transcendental unity of apperception
and the transcendental object is merely
negative neither, he argued, is merely
empirical. Kants master stroke in the Deduction
is to propose that each explains the other.
First, the subject makes the object possible. The
relation od representation to object is, Kant
says, constituted by the necessary unity of
representations, and this unity is in turn
identical with the necessary unity of
consciousness (A 109).

29
Subject and Object as Making One Another
Possible Gardner, Sebastian, Kant on the
Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 157-160
continued. . . . . . Second, the object makes
the subject possible, again through a priori
synthesis. Because I cannot become aware of my
identity directly, by intuiting a single
continuing thing, consciousness of self identity
can be achieved only through awareness of myself
as the source of the synthetic unity of objects
the mind could never think its identity in the
manifold of its representations . . . if it did
not have before its eyes the identity of the act,
whereby it subordinates all synthesis of
apprehension . . . . to a transcendental unity,
thereby rendering possible their interconnection
(A108) . . .

30
Subject and Object as Making One Another
Possible Gardner, Sebastian, Kant on the
Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 157-160
continued. . . . . . The result is a picture
of self and nature as mirroring one another, and
a reconception of self-consciousness. If
Descartes may be credited with having discovered
the significance of subjectivity for
philosophical thought. Kants achievement is to
have transformed the Cartesian approach by
suggesting that self-consciousness be viewed, not
as a relation in which a pre-existent object of a
special kind becomes known to itself, but as the
encompassing ground of the world of objects.
Descartes sought to bring out the distinguishing
features of subjectivity by isolating it from the
world of objects, yet continued to regard it as a
content of that world. Kant, by contrast,
conceives self-consciousness as something not
included in the world of objects.

31
A thought experiment to convey how subject and
object interrelate. Eco, Umberto, Kant and the
Platypus Essays on Language and Cognition,
trans. McEwen, (New York Harcourt, Inc., 1999),
pp. 320-1.
 On the other hand, we shall see in 6.10 that we
have no problem in imagining that we have a third
eye on our index finger, with which we can
observe the nape of our neck or see cavities
inaccessible to our normal eyes. The
inconceivability arises when we try to imagine
what would happen if we were to point the third
eye toward our face. Would we see the index
finger with the eyes in our head, or the eyes in
our head with the index finger? Once more either
we go by zones of focus (we imagine,
alternatively closing the eyes in our head and
the eyes in our finger) or we slip into complete
imaginative confusion.

32
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
10. The apprehension of a cause and effect, for
example, requires not only a temporal before
and after as well as concepts of cause and
effect. It also requires the unity of
consciousness to be aware as one experiential
piece cognition of a cause followed by an effect.
Thus the concept of a cause is nothing other
than a synthesis (of that which follows in the
temporal series with other appearances) in
accordance with concepts and without that sort
of unity, which has its rule a priori, and which
subjects the appearances to itself, thoroughgoing
and universal, hence necessary unity of
consciousness would not be encountered in the
manifold perceptions. But these would then belong
to no experience, and would consequently be
without an object, and would be nothing but a
blind play of representations, i.e., less than a
dream.

33
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
11. Every attempt to find an empirical origin of
the categories of understanding must be doomed to
failure.
All attempts to derive these pure concepts of
the understanding from experience and to ascribe
to them a merely empirical origin are therefore
entirely vain and futile. I will not mention
that, e.g., the concept of a cause brings the
trait of necessity with it, which no experience
at all can yield, for experience teaches us that
one appearance customarily follows another, but
not that it must necessarily follow that, nor
that an inference from a condition to its
consequence can be made a priori and entirely
universally. (p. 235)

34
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
12. The manifold of intuition would seem to have
an inherent propensity to unification. That might
be called the affinity of the manifold. Why
should there be such an affinity?
The ground of the possibility of the association
of the manifold, insofar as it lies in the
object, is called the affinity of the manifold. I
ask, therefore, how do you make the thoroughgoing
affinity of the appearances (by means of which
they stand under constant laws and must belong
under them) comprehensible to yourselves? (p.
235)

35
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
13. The explanation for the affinity is quite
easily comprehended, Kant says. Its due to the
identity of self-consciousness or in more
strictly Kantian language the transcendental
unity of apperception.
On my principles it the affinity of the
manifold is easily comprehensible. All possible
appearances belong, as representations, to the
whole possible self-consciousness. But from this,
as a transcendental representation, numerical
identity is inseparable, and certain a priori,
because nothing can come into cognition except by
means of this original apperception. (p. 235)

36
But is there necessarily a unity to
apperception? What about cases Dissociative
Identity Disorder what is commonly called
split personalities. Do such people experience
a unique unity of apperception. Consider Chris
Sizemore, the patient of psychiatrists, C. H.
Thigpen and H. Checkley, in Three Faces of Eve.
Eve White, Eve Black and Jane, the three multiple
personalities portrayed in Three Faces of Eve.
They conflict disapprove and finally put an end
to other alters. Dont they each have their own
ego

37
But, Eve White, Eve Black and Jane all have
their own Ego. If anything, cases of MPD would
provide support for the uniqueness of the Ego.
In the case of multiple personalities there still
is one Ego to a customer. It's just that the
customers occupy a crowded body.

38
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
14. Since appearances are all subject to the
possibility of self-consciousness, they are
subject to a priori principles following from the
identity of apperception.
Now since this identity must necessarily enter
into the synthesis of all the manifold of
appearances insofar as they are to become
empirical cognition, the appearances are thus
subject to a priori conditions with which their
synthesis (of apprehension) must be in
thoroughgoing accord. (p. 235)

39
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
15. Whatever a priori conditions the unity of
self-consciousness may posit, can be thought of
as rules if they are possible and laws if
they are necessary.
Now, however, the representation of a universal
condition in accordance with which a certain
manifold (of whatever kind) can be posited is
called a rule, and, if it must be so posited, a
law. All appearances therefore stand in a
thoroughgoing connection according to necessary
laws, and hence in a transcendental affinity, of
which the empirical affinity is the mere
consequence. (p. 235-6)

40
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
16. Perhaps it seems nonsensical that nature
should arrange itself according to the subjective
grounds of self-consciousness, i. e.,
apperception.
That nature should direct itself according to
our subjective ground of apperception, indeed in
regard to its lawfulness even depend on this, may
well sound quite contradictory and strange. (p.
236)

41
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
17. But it will cease appearing nonensical and
strange when one considers that nature is but a
sum of appearances.
But if one considers that this nature is nothing
in itself but a sum of appearances, hence not a
thing in itself but merely a multitude of
representations of the mind, then one will not be
astonished to see that unity on account of which
alone it can be called object of all possible
experience, i.e., nature, solely in the radical
faculty of all our cognition, namely,
transcendental apperception and for that very
reason we can cognize this unity a priori, hence
also as necessary, which we would certainly have
to abandon if it were given in itself
independently of the primary sources of our
thinking. (p. 236)

42
Part 2 Transcendental level Provisional
explanation of the possibility of the categories
as a priori cognitions 4, pp. 234-236
18. And if we didnt supply the unity of nature
a priori, we would need to obtain it from nature
itself. This could happen only empirically. As a
result nature would not have a nature, as we
say, that is, an inherent structure or ruled
behavior.
For then I would not know whence we should
obtain the synthetic propositions of such a
universal unity of nature, since in this case one
would have to borrow them from the objects of
nature itself. But since this could happen only
empirically, from that nothing but merely
contingent unity could be drawn, which would fall
far short of the necessary connection that one
has in mind when one speaks of nature. (p. 236)

43
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
1. The previous arrival at the a priori primacy
of the transcendental unity of apperception and
the unity of perception will now be expanded to
include the function of pure imagination in
cognition.
We now want to unify and represent cohesively
what we presented as isolated and individual in
the previous sections. (p. 236)

44
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
2. There are three subjective recognition
sources sense, imagination and apperception.
Each of these can be considered empirically, but
all have a priori elements.
The possibility of an experience in general and
cognition of its objects rest on three subjective
sources of cognition sense, imagination, and
apperception each of these can be considered
empirically, namely in application to given
appearances, but they are also elements or
foundations a priori that make this empirical use
itself possible. Sense represents the appearances
empirically in perception, the imagination in
association (and reproduction), and apperception
in the empirical consciousness of the identity of
these reproductive representations with the
appearances through which they were given, hence
in recognition. (p. 236).

45
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
3. There is an a priori basis to each of the
three of these sources of cognition.
But pure intuition (with regard to it as
representation, time, the form of inner
intuition) grounds the totality of perception a
priori the pure synthesis of the imagination
grounds association a priori and pure
apperception, i.e., the thoroughgoing identity of
oneself in all possible representations, grounds
empirical consciousness a priori. (p. 236).

46
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
4. If we want to comprehend the point at which
these three sources of cognition merge so as to
produce the unity of recognition for a possible
experience, we must begin with the pure
apperception.
Now if we wish to follow the inner ground of
this connection of representations up to that
point in which they must all come together in
order first to obtain unity of cognition for a
possible experience, then we must begin with pure
apperception. (p. 237).

47
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
4. continued Now if we want to comprehend the
point at which these three sources of cognition
merge so as to produce the unity of recognition
for a possible experience, we must begin with the
pure apperception.
All intuitions are nothing for us and do not in
the least concern us if they cannot be taken up
into consciousness, whether they influence it
directly or indirectly, and through this alone is
cognition possible. We are conscious a priori of
the thoroughgoing identity of ourselves with
regard to all representations that can ever
belong to our cognition, as a necessary condition
of the possibility of all representations (since
the latter represent something in me only insofar
as they belong with all the others to one
consciousness, hence they must at least be
capable of being connected in it). (p. 237)

48
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
5. Necessarily then my recognition of any
experience must belong to one consciousness
(myself).
We are conscious a priori of the thoroughgoing
identity of ourselves with regard to all
representations that can ever belong to our
cognition, as a necessary condition of the
possibility of all representations (since the
latter represent something in me only insofar as
they belong with all the others to one
consciousness, hence they must at least be
capable of being connected in it). (p. 237)

49
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
6. Only the productive synthesis of the
imagination can take place a priori because the
reproductive synthesis depends on conditions of
experience.
But only the productive synthesis of the
imagination can take place a priori for the
reproductive synthesis rests on conditions of
experience. The principle of the necessary unity
of the pure (productive) synthesis of the
imagination prior to apperception is thus the
ground of the possibility of all cognition,
especially that of experience. (p. 238)

50
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
7. The synthesis of the manifold in the
imagination is transcendental if, without regard
to any distinction in the intuitions, it aims
merely at the connection of the manifold a
priori. And the unity of this synthesis is called
transcendental if, with reference to the original
unity of the apperception, it is represented as a
priori necessary.
Now we call the synthesis of the manifold in
imagination transcendental if, without
distinction of the intuitions, it concerns
nothing but the connection of the manifold a
priori, and the unity of this synthesis is called
transcendental if it is represented as necessary
a priori in relation to the original unity of
apperception. (p. 238)

51
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
8. There is in us an active capacity for the
synthesis of this manifold which capacity we
call imagination, and its action, executed
immediately on the perceptions, Kant calls
apprehension.
There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis
of this manifold in us, which we call
imagination, and whose action exercised
immediately upon perceptions I call apprehension.
For the imagination is to bring the manifold of
intuition into an image it must therefore
antecedently take up the impressions into its
activity, i.e., apprehend them. (p. 239)

52
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
9. If we had the capacity for associating
perceptions, it would still remain entirely
undetermined and contingent whether they were
actually associable as such. If they were not
associable, a flood of perceptions, disjointed
and incompatible would appear.
Since, however, if representations reproduced one
another without distinction, just as they fell
together, there would in turn be no determinate
connection but merely unruly heaps of them, and
no cognition at all would arise their
reproduction must thus have a rule in accordance
with which a representation enters into
combination in the imagination with one
representation rather than with any others. (p.
239)

53
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
10. But a array of disjointed incompatible
impressions is not possible because I could not
be conscious of them without their being
subjected to the transcendental unity of
apperception which requires their unification. He
calls this agreement among appearance, their
affinity.
For only because I ascribe all perceptions to
one consciousness (of original apperception) can
I say of all perceptions that I am conscious of
them. There must therefore be an objective
ground, i.e., one that can be understood a priori
to all empirical laws of the imagination, on
which rests the possibility, indeed even the
necessity of a law extending through all
appearances, a law, namely, for regarding them
throughout as data of sense that are associable
in themselves and subject to universal laws of a
thoroughgoing connection in reproduction. I call
this objective ground of all association of
appearances their affinity.(p. 240)

54
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
11. The necessary condition even of
every possible perception, and the (close or
remote) affinity of all appearances is a
necessary consequence of a synthesis in the
imagination which is a priori and based on rules.
The objective unity of all (empirical)
consciousness in one consciousness (of original
apperception) is thus the necessary condition
even of all possible perception, and the affinity
of all appearances (near or remote) is a
necessary consequence of a synthesis in the
imagination that is grounded a priori on rules.
(p. 240)

55
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
12. A relationship of the manifold to the unity
of the apperception, is required before concepts
can emerge. But the unity of apperception also
requires the imagination in reference to the
sensitive intuition.
For in itself the synthesis of the imagination,
although exercised a priori, is nevertheless
always sensible, for it combines the manifold
only as it appears in intuition, e.g., the shape
of a triangle. Through the relation of the
manifold to the unity of apperception, however,
concepts that belong to the understanding can
come about, but only by means of the imagination
in relation to the sensible intuition. (p. 240)

56
A Fundamental Problem With Kants Argument? Is
there a problem with Kants application of the
Transcendental Unity of Apperception in the
Transcendental Deduction inasmuch has he
assumes that any experience we have can be made
into an experience about which we can be
self-aware? Current cognitive psychology
recognizes experiences in which we have
recognition but no conscious awareness, for
example in cases of blindsightedness.

57
Blindsightedness 1 Lawrence Weiskrantz and
colleagues first discovered blindsight while
studying a patient, DB, who had become blind in
his left field of view following surgical removal
of his right occipital lobe. Weiskrantz found
that DB was able to point with relative accuracy
towards an object occupying the blind area of
DBs visual field, and further, that DB was able
to guess as to the shape and orientation of these
objects with greater accuracy than chance alone
would permit. During these tests, DB sincerely
maintained that he could not see these objects.
1. Dowloaded fromhttp//serendip.brynmawr.edu/e
xchange/node/373 See Weiskrantz, L., Blindsight
A case study and implications, (Oxford Oxford
University Press, 1986).

58
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
13. The foundations of the recognition
rekognition of the manifold, to the extent they
concern merely the form of an experience, are the
categories. Only by means of categories can they
belong to the recognition and in general to our
consciousness, hence to us.
These grounds of the recognition of the
manifold, so far as they concern merely the form
of an experience in general, are now those
categories. On them is grounded, therefore, all
formal unity in the synthesis of the imagination,
and by means of the latter also all of its
empirical use (in recognition, reproduction,
association, and apprehension) down to the
appearances, since the latter belong to our
consciousness at all and hence to ourselves only
by means of these elements of cognition. (p.
241)

59
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
14. Hence, we ourselves introduce the order and
regularity of the appearances which we call
nature, and also would not find such order there
if we or the nature of our minds had not done so
originally.
Thus we ourselves bring into the appearances
that order and regularity in them that we call
nature, and moreover we would not be able to find
it there if we, or the nature of our mind, had
not originally put it there. For this unity of
nature should be a necessary, i.e., a priori
certain unity of the connection of appearances.
(p. 241)

60
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
15. Even though we learn many laws through
experience, these are nonetheless only particular
determinations of yet higher laws, among which
the highest (under which all others stand) are
taken a priori from the understanding itself.
They make experience possible.
Although we learn many laws through experience,
these are only particular determinations of yet
higher laws, the highest of which (under which
all others stand) come from the understanding
itself a priori, and are not borrowed from
experience, but rather must provide the
appearances with their lawfulness and by that
very means make experience possible. (p. 241)

61
Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding Third Section. On the relation of
understanding to objects in general and the
possibility of cognizing these a priori pp.
236-243
16. It may seem exaggerated and nonsensical,
nonetheless, to say that the understanding is
itself the source of the laws of nature, and
hence of the formal unity of nature, is entirely
proper and correct.
Thus as exaggerated and contradictory as it may
sound to say that the understanding is itself the
source of the laws of nature, and thus of the
formal unity of nature, such an assertion is
nevertheless correct and appropriate to the
object, namely experience. (p. 241)

62
Slides 1 and following, Portrait of Immanuel
Kant in mid-life http//www.lancaster.ac.uk/user
s/philosophy/courses/100/Kant003.jpg Slide 2,
illustration of change blindness
http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Change_blindnessmedi
aviewer/FileGlobe_and_high_court_28Spot_the_diff
erence29.jpg Slide 15, Do you see a musician or
a girls face? https//www.google.com/search?qop
ticalillusionsbiw1358bih830tbmischtbouso
urceunivsaXeiVSj1VIKXINGzoQS4uoHYCQsqi2ved
0CCwQsAQimgdii slides 34 and 35 poster for
Three Faces of Eve, https//www.google.com/search?
qThreefacesofevebiw1358bih830tbmischimg
il
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