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FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN EXPLOSIVES MANUFACTURERS 37TH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 5th JUNE 2013 BRUSSELS

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Title: FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN EXPLOSIVES MANUFACTURERS 37TH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 5th JUNE 2013 BRUSSELS


1
FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN EXPLOSIVES
MANUFACTURERS37TH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING5th
JUNE 2013BRUSSELS
2
A Warm Welcome to all Members, Delegates and
Guests
3
Item 1CHAIRMANS OPENING REMARKS
Daniel Antille
4
37th FEEM ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING (DRAFT) AGENDA
  1. Chairman's opening remarks D. Antille
  2. Approval of the Agenda H.
    Meyer
  3. Compliance with Competition Regulations H.
    Meyer
  4. Minutes of the 36th AGM in Vienna H. Meyer
  5. Report of the Executive Committee D. Antille
  6. Report of the Secretary General H. Meyer
  7. Coffee Break 30 minutes approx. 10h30
    11h00

5
37th FEEM ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING (DRAFT) AGENDA
  • Security Issues at EU Level J. Foley
  • IME Report Ch. Ronay
  • Reports of the FEEM Working Groups
  • Blasting Practise Working Group H. Meyer
  • Transport Working Group H. Meyer
  • HS Working Group H. Meyer
  • 2012/13 Financial Report H. Meyer
  • 2012 Statistics H. Meyer
  • Election to the Executive Committee H. Meyer
  • Any other business H. Meyer
  • Date and place of the next meeting H. Meyer
  • Closure of the meeting D. Antille

6
Item 2APPROVAL OF THE AGENDA
7
Do I find your agreement to this Agenda?
8
Item 3COMPLIANCE WITH EUROPEAN COMPETITION
REGULATIONS
9
COMPLIANCE WITH EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
  • As an Association, FEEM operates in strict
    compliance with
  • European competition Compliance laws. Respect for
    these laws is a
  • core value applying to all FEEM activities.
  • All participants at the FEEM AGM have been
    informed by the
  • Secretary General about prohibited discussion
    topics which apply not
  • only during meetings but also to social
    gatherings before and after
  • meetings. By signing the participation form, the
    participants declare
  • their adherence to the Competition Compliance
    Programme and
  • agree to comply with Competition Law.
  • The CEFIC competition law checklist for meetings
    has been handed
  • out to the delegates prior to this meeting.

10

COMPETITION LAW COMPLIANCE (cont.)
  • Pay attention!
  • It is applicable to all FEEM activities!
  • Ignorance is not an excuse!
  • It is not just what you do, but, WHAT YOU ARE
    SEEN TO DO that is important!
  • Competition authorities are very active in
    scrutinising cartels (e.g. when leniency occurs)
    regarding companies and organisations (they would
    not hesitate to open an inquiry).
  • They look for traditional elements of cartels
    but also increasingly issues regarding
    standardization, intellectual property, joint
    activities.
  • You see increasingly damage claims in Europe
    (collective redress) regarding competition cases.

11
ITEM 4MINUTES OF THE 36TH AGMVienna, 31 May
2012
12
The Minutes have been circulated to the Members
in due course immediately after the Meeting.Do
I find your agreement to these Minutes?
13
ITEM 5REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEEbyDaniel AntillePresident of FEEM
14
THE 2012/2013 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
  • Mr. D. Antille, President SSE Group,
    Switzerland
  • Mr. B. Pougny, Vice-President EPC Groupe, France
  • Mr. G. Facchinetti, Past President Pravisani,
    Italy
  • Mr. S. Connolly Orica EMET, Germany
  • Mr. O. Greben (as of 27.2.13) Austin Detonators,
    Czech
  • Mr. V. Huelamo Maxam Group, Spain
  • Mr. U. Sjöblom Forcit, Finland

15
ITEM 6REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
GENERALHans H. Meyer
16
FEEM AS AN AFFILIATE OF CEFIC
  • FEEM is an affiliated Member of CEFIC the
    European Chemistry
  • Federation. CEFIC is the Brussels based
    organization representing
  • the European chemical industry. CEFIC represents
    directly or
  • indirectly, about 29.000 large, medium and small
    chemical
  • companies which employ about 1.3 million people
    and account for
  • nearly a third of worlds Chemical production.
    CEFIC guides and
  • advises FEEM in matters related to
  • EU Legislation Integration
  • Contacts to relevant EU General Directorates
  • Transport Logistics
  • General legal matters and advocacy
  • Competition compliance programmes

17
PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES(Up-date as per
May 2013)
18
PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES
  • AGENDA
  • Directives 93/15 2008/43 - News since the last
    meeting
  • REACH Up-date Lead and lead compounds /
    substances
  • Transport of ANFO in tank trucks

19
DIRECTIVES 93/15 2008/43 News since the last
meeting
Item 6 (Secretary Generals Report)
20
STATUS OF PREPARATIONS BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES,
INCLUDING TRANSPOSITION OF DIRECTIVE
2012/4/EUAt the beginning of 2013 only 14
Member States had fully transposed the amending
Directive 2012/4 4 Member States had partially
implemented the Directive and 9 Member States
have not yet communicated their measures to the
Commission. The Commission strongly encouraged
those Member States that had not yet transposed
the Directive to do so urgently, otherwise formal
infringement proceedings, which had so far been
deferred, were likely to follow soon. To our
knowledge no infringement proceedings have been
started so far.
Item 6 (Secretary Generals Report)
21
UPDATE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN
ON ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF EXPLOSIVESThe
Commission (DG HOME) is producing a progress
report by the mid of 2013, which would contribute
towards a review of the plan. In parallel a
review of the CBRN (Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear) action plan was ongoing
with a view to developing a more coherent and
streamlined approach with greater synergies
between CBRN and explosives security policies at
EU level in a future combined CBRNE STRATEGY.
This had been discussed at a strategic EU level
conference on 2-3 October 2012 in Malmo, the
outcome of which would inform Council conclusions
on a new CBRNE agenda later this year, leading to
a Commission communication around mid 2013.
Item 6 (Secretary Generals Report)
22
Item 6 (Secretary Generals Report)
RECAST OF DIRECTIVE 93/15/EEC Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the harmonization of the laws of the
Member States relating to the making available on
the market and supervision of explosives for
civil uses. Council Directive 93/15/EEC of 5
April 1993 on the harmonization of the provisions
relating to the placing on the market and
supervision of explosives for civil uses has been
substantially amended. In order to ensure the
free movement of explosives it is necessary to
harmonise the laws relating to making available
explosives on the market. Presently a package of
nine Directives is regulating the European
Explosives Industry, e.g. 93/15, 96/82/EC of
9 December 1996 (control of major-accident
hazards involving dangerous substances, 2008/43,
2012/4). You will find the complete revised text
of the DRAFT DIRECTIVE on our website.
23
Item 6 (Secretary Generals Report)
UPDATE ON SCEPYLT, THE PAN-EUROPEAN INFORMATION
SYSTEM ON EXPLOSIVES CONTROL TO PREVENT AND FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORISM, AND ITS FUTURE The SCEPYLT
system has been operational since October 2011.
Since then various functional, technical and
documentary improvements had been introduced.
Currently 11 Member States are connected to the
system. However it was being used by only 3
Member States. Some indicating that they hoped to
be ready to use the system, some others
indicating that although they were ready they
would not do so until their neighbours did. E.g.
Spain was unable to use the system since its
neighbours were not doing so. Spain also
mentioned that it would like to see SCEPYLT
linked with the unique identification and
traceability required by DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC.
24
Item 6 (Secretary Generals Report)
(SCEPYLT cont.) The Commission intends that the
system eventually be made mandatory, but before
that the system needed to be seen to be operating
well and being more widely used than currently.
The Commission had invested over 2 MILLION EUROS
in the project and there was a danger that all
this would be wasted if the project could not be
taken further forward after the end of this year.
There seemed to be three possible options (1)
A further grant if a Member State was willing to
assume responsibility for future project
coordination (2) A contract between the system
provider and individual user Member States
covering software maintenance and a help-desk
function (3) In the longer term, the Commission
taking over responsibility for the system.
25
Item 6 (Secretary Generals Report)
  1. BELGIUM is using the system for transfers with
    the Netherlands and Germany.
  2. GERMANY explained that it was not using the
    system regularly due to some problems (for
    example, the transfer document can only be
    printed by the competent authority of the country
    of origin).
  3. FRANCE expected to start using the system during
    2013 and was arranging staff training with
    support from Belgium.
  4. ITALY indicated that it had tested the system and
    that training of staff at prefecture level was
    ongoing.
  5. PORTUGAL wants to use the system soon once the
    latest version had been installed. It would
    favour making a link with traceability.
  6. SWEDEN would like to join the system and has
    inquired about the costs of joining the project
    (13.800 euros per participating Member State).

26
Item 6 (Secretary Generals Report)
  1. FINLAND has not yet decided whether it would join
    the project. It had only a very limited number of
    transfers and the existing paper system works
    well.
  2. POLAND is ready to use the system, but would not
    do so until its neighbours did. It doubted
    whether an electronic system would be much
    quicker than a paper system and considered that a
    dual system of paper and electronic systems would
    be unduly burdensome. To be effective, the system
    should be made mandatory for all Member States.
  3. UK wants to use the system shortly. It saw the
    main advantage of the system as improved security
    as it was easier to check the validity of
    electronic documents.
  4. IRELAND is interested to use the system and has
    suggested that an impact assessment should be
    undertaken to assess the benefits compared with
    the existing approval system.

27
CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES

Compliance with essential safety
requirements Because of the specific nature of
explosives, the Commission services ( Juridical
Dept.) recommend to apply the relevant general
and specific essential safety requirements to all
ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES, whether they are placed
on the market or not.
28
CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (EU
Commissions Recommendation)

Compliance with essential safety requirements
(cont.) AFFIXING THE CE MARKING Pursuant to
Article 2.2 (DIR 93/15) if a company places an
explosive on the market, this explosive has to be
CE marked. Article 2.2 prescribes that Member
States shall take the necessary measures to
ensure that explosives falling within the scope
of this Directive may be placed on the market
only if they comply with on the provisions of
this Directive, are provided with the CE marking
described in Article 7 and their conformity has
been assessed in accordance with the procedures
referred to in Annex II (different approval
modules). Therefore, if a company places an
explosive on the market, this explosive has to be
CE marked.
29
CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (cont.)
  • Placing on the market is defined as any first
    disposal against payment or free of charge of
    explosives covered by this Directive with a view
    to their distribution and/or use on the Community
    market. According to the guide to the
    implementation of directives based on the new
    approach and the global approach, PRODUCTS BUILT
    FOR OWN USE ARE, GENERALLY, NOT CONSIDERED AS
    BEING PLACED ON THE MARKET.
  • The Commission therefore suggests the following
    distinction
  • In general, the explosives are placed on the
    market and have to be CE marked if the quarry or
    mine company is responsible for most aspects of
    the blasting operations while the explosives
    manufacturer for example only pumps the explosive
    down the holes and initiates the blast. In such a
    situation, the explosives are for the use of the
    quarry operator and therefore have been placed on
    the market

30
CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (cont.)
  • EXPLOSIVES ARE NOT DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN PLACED ON
    THE MARKET IF THE EXPLOSIVES COMPANY CARRIES OUT,
    AND HAS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR, THE BLASTING
    OPERATIONS. In this case, the explosives are for
    the use of the explosives company in the
    provision of blasting services, rather than for
    the use of the mine or quarry operator (although
    the quarry operator receives the benefit).
  • To use the industry expression the quarry
    operator buys 'rock on the floor / ground of the
    quarry'.

31
CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (cont.)
  • CONCLUSION
  • The general and the relevant special essential
    safety requirements should in all cases also
    apply to explosives manufactured on site which
    fall under the scope of the Explosives Directive.
    These explosives should also be CE marked except
    in the own use case as explained above, where
    the CE mark is not required.
  • As far as the CE mark is concerned, Article 7.1
    of the Explosives Directive gives the possibility
    to affix the CE mark on an IDENTIFICATION PLATE.
  • A practicable solution could therefore be to
    attach a REMOVABLE IDENTIFICATION PLATE to the
    mixing truck. It is also possible to carry the
    relevant documentation on the mixing truck.

32
WHICH NOTIFIED BODY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOWING
THE MANUFACTURER TO CE-MARK THE PRODUCT?
  • The affixing of the CE marking is also primarily
    the manufacturers
  • responsibility. However, when the CE marking
    appears on products
  • with an IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF A NOTIFIED BODY,
  • the notified body also assumes responsibility.
    The CE marking must
  • be affixed at the end of the production phase.
    The CE marking shall
  • only be followed by the identification number of
    the notified body if
  • the notified body is involved in the production
    phase. Thus, the
  • identification number of a notified body involved
    in conformity
  • assessment according to module B does not follow
    the CE marking.
  • It is therefore the notified body that carries
    out module C, D, E or F
  • (and whose identification number figures on the
    product together
  • with the CE marking) that assumes responsibility.

33
CAN CERTIFICATES for the different modules BE
WITHDRAWN BY NOTIFIED BODIES, IF YES, AT WHICH
OCCASIONS AND HOW?
  • There are several aspects that need to be taken
    into account when considering the validity and
    the possibility of withdrawing certificates
  • notified bodies are obliged to maintain
    themselves updated as far as the
  • development of the state of the art is
    concerned
  • notified bodies allow manufacturers to make use
    of the certificates not
  • only for the date when the certificate was
    issued
  • the manufacturer has the obligation to inform
    the notified body of all
  • modifications where such changes may affect
    conformity with the
  • essential requirements and where therefore a
    further approval is needed.
  • This obligation is also part of the ongoing
    licence agreement between
  • notified body and manufacturer
  • according to national civil law certification
    bodies usually have an
  • obligation of due diligence vis-à-vis the
    validity of issued certificates.

34
CAN CERTIFICATES BE WITHDRAWN BY NOTIFIED BODIES,
if yes, at which occasions and how? (cont.)
In all cases it needs to be stressed that when a
Notified Body finds that requirements of the
Directive have not been met or are no longer met,
it has to restrict, suspend or withdraw
certificates, approvals or other relevant
conformity assessment results, taking into
account the principle of proportionality and the
risk involved, unless compliance is ensured
through the implementation of appropriate
corrective measures.
35
DUAL USE CONFLICT
In accordance with Article 1(3) first indent,
Directive 93/15/EEC does not apply to explosives,
including ammunition, intended for use, in
accordance with national law, by the ARMED FORCES
or the POLICE. How should this exclusion be
interpreted in the context of intra-EU transfers
to differentiate between commercial and military
explosives, for example in cases where a
commercial company supplies an explosive to
another company for further processing and/or
incorporation into a finished product destined
for MILITARY USE?
36
DUAL USE CONFLICT (cont.)
It should be first underlined that the exclusion
in Article 1(3) of the Directive refers to the
'intended use'. In that context a distinction
needs to be drawn between immediate use and
possible eventual use for military purposes. In
particular, the eventual intended use may not
always be evident so that in the example quoted
above the first company may be unaware of the
final use and may have no control over this or
the finished product placed on the market or know
the final consignee.
37
DUAL USE CONFLICT (cont.)
A basic starting point for determining whether
the explosive falls within the exclusion in
Article 1(3) would be whether or not the
explosive falls within the COMMON MILITARY LIST
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (the latest version of
which was adopted by the Council on 27 February
2012 (2012/C 85/01) (equipment covered by Council
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common
rules governing the control of exports of
military technology equipment). In principle such
explosives could be regarded as military
explosives. However the possibility of possible
dual use cannot be excluded and due regard should
also be paid as to who the consignee is. If the
immediate consignee is a commercial company, the
rules of the Directive should apply up to the
point that it becomes clear that the ultimate use
is military.

www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmam
ent/arms-export-control
37
38
DUAL USE CONFLICT (cont.)

If the explosive is not on the Common Military
List it should be regarded as a commercial
explosive and treated accordingly unless the
consignee is the armed forces or the police. If
the immediate consignee is a commercial company,
even if the explosive is expected to be for
military use, it should be regarded as falling
under the Directive until the point that it
becomes clear the final consignee is the military.
38
39
WHAT IS THE STATUS OF SHOCK TUBES UNDER THE
DIRECTIVE?
  • Shock tubes are used to deliver the ignition
    impulse over intermediate or short distances
    through a plastic tube, while the tube itself
    stays fully intact and does not rupture. Due to
    the low exterior effects of shock tubes upon
    ignition they are often excluded from class 1
    under Transport of Dangerous Goods Regulations
    since, when not attached to a detonator, they are
    non-hazardous. As such they cannot be used for a
    blasting purpose and do not show explosive
    properties and can be considered as similar to
    the lead wires of electric detonators.
  • It follows that shock tubes as such should not
    normally fall within the Directive's scope. When
    attached to the detonator to form a detonator
    assembly (as a non-electronic detonator, for
    example) they would however fall within the
    Directive's scope (for example the proper
    functioning between the shock-tube and the
    detonator cap would be part of the conformity
    assessment).

40
WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR ATTRIBUTING
MANUFACTURING SITE CODES TO NON-EU MANUFACTURING
SITES UNDER COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC, AS
AMENDED BY DIRECTIVE 2012/4/EU?
  • Where manufacturing sites are located outside
    the EU, the procedures of Article 3(5) of
    Commission Directive 2008/43/EC should be
    followed. However, in cases where the overseas
    manufacturer is also established in the EU, he
    could contact the national authority of the
    Member State in which he is established or of
    first import and obtain a single code for the
    manufacturing site to be used for all imports
    into the EU. The manufacturer established in the
    EU would assume responsibility for compliance
    with the Directive for all those imports,
    including in particular the obligations of
    undertakings in relation to record-keeping.

41
WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR ATTRIBUTING
MANUFACTURING SITE CODES TO NON-EU MANUFACTURING
SITES UNDER COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC, AS
AMENDED BY DIRECTIVE 2012/4/EU?
  • In all other cases where the manufacturing site
    is located outside the EU, the importer of the
    explosives will have to obtain a code in
    accordance with the second subparagraph of
    Article 3(5) of the Directive.
  • To further reduce the administrative burdens,
    and also in cases where the overseas manufacturer
    is not established in the EU, the imports need
    not physically go through the location of the
    importer or of the EU legal entity of the
    manufacturer, but any point of entry, provided
    that they are handled in line with the single
    authorisation for simplified procedures
    (SASP)/centralised customs clearance used
    throughout the EU under customs legislation,
    whereby the import paperwork is submitted in one
    Member State, but the products can be shipped
    directly to another Member State or States (with
    the customs authorities there not requiring
    additional paperwork).

42
HOW SHOULD THE TERM 'END-USER' BE UNDERSTOOD FOR
THE PURPOSES OF COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC?
Chapter 3 of the Directive relating to data
collection and record-keeping provides that
undertakings in the explosives sector collect and
maintain data relating to each explosive in their
possession or custody throughout the supply chain
and life cycle until it is transferred to another
undertaking or used. The end-user would be the
last undertaking to take possession or custody
and to use the explosive, for example operating
blasting on site. In certain cases this could be
the sub-contracting company undertaking the
blasting. In other words, those responsible for
the last place of storage on a site prior to use
should keep records from the time they take
possession or custody of the explosive until it
is used.
42
43
HOW SHOULD THE TERM 'END-USER' BE UNDERSTOOD FOR
THE PURPOSES OF COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC
(cont.)?
It should not however normally be necessary for
records to be kept on the individual person, such
as the individual shot-firer, to whom the
explosive is given to use. The end-user would
not necessarily be the undertaking authorised to
carry out blasting on site. This would depend on
whether they have possession/custody when the
explosive is used. In cases where a subcontractor
is operating all the blasting process, including
the bringing out and taking back of explosives
from storage, that undertaking would be perceived
as the end-user and assume responsibility for
compliance.
43
44
MARKING OF VARIOUS EXPLOSIVES IN COMPLIANCE WITH
DIRECTIVES 2008/43 AND 2012/4/EU
ITEMS BIG ENOUGH TO FULLY MARK 2008/43 ARTICLE 4 SMALL ITEMS THAT CAN BE PARTIALLY MARKED 2008/43 ANNEX PARA 3 MARKING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 2012/4/EU FOR SMALL (8.5MM OR LESS IN DIAMETER) OR ODDLY SHAPED ITEMS THAT CANNOT EVEN BE PARTIALLY MARKED IN COMPLIANCE WITH 2008/43 ANNEX PARA 3
CARTRIDGED EXPLOSIVES Mark full unique identification on the cartridge and associated label on the case (outer box). No need to mark inner box. Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site code and electronic readable ID on the cartridge and associated label on the case (outer box). No need to mark inner box. Not included.
PLAIN DETONATORS Mark full unique identification on the detonator and associated label on the case (outer box). No need to mark wrapper or inner box. Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site code and electronic readable ID on the detonator and associated label on the case (outer box). No need to mark wrapper or inner box. Mark detonator with country ID letters and 3 digit site code. Mark full unique identification and number of items on the smallest packaging unit (wrapper). Close the smallest packaging unit with a seal so that disappearances in the supply chain can be easily noticed. N.B. In this case 'full unique identification' refers to the smallest packaging unit, not the individual detonator.
44
45
MARKING OF VARIOUS EXPLOSIVES
ITEMS BIG ENOUGH TO FULLY MARK 2008/43 ARTICLE 4 SMALL ITEMS THAT CAN BE PARTIALLY MARKED 2008/43 ANNEX PARA 3 MARKING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 2012/4/EU FOR SMALL (8.5MM OR LESS IN DIAMETER) OR ODDLY SHAPED ITEMS THAT CANNOT EVEN BE PARTIALLY MARKED IN COMPLIANCE WITH 2008/43 ANNEX PARA 3
BOOSTERS Mark full unique identification on the booster and associated label on the case (outer box). No need to mark wrapper or inner box. Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site code and electronic readable ID on the booster and associated label on the case (outer box). No need to mark wrapper or inner box. Mark booster with country ID letters and 3 digit site code. Mark full unique identification and number of items on the smallest packaging unit (inner box). Close the smallest packaging unit with a seal so that disappearances in the supply chain can be easily noticed. N.B. In this case 'full unique identification' refers to the smallest packaging unit, not the individual booster.
DETONATING CORD Mark full unique identification on the spool/bobbin/reel and on the cord every 5 metres. Associated label on case (box) if used. Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site code and electronic readable ID on the spool/bobbin/reel .On the cord repeat every 5 metres the minimum human readable part (no logistics information, no matrix/bar code). Associated label on case (box) if used. Mark full unique identification on the spool/bobbin/reel and the smallest packaging unit (box).
45
46
ASSOCIATED LABELS
What should be on an ASSOCIATED LABEL? If a
box contains 50 primers does the associated label
have to state the unique identifications for all
50 or can the label simply state something like
Contains 50 primers?
There is no need that the label contains all
numbers of the items in the box. The matrix/bar
code should suffice. The related information is
available in the systems / database of the
producer / distributor and is transferred to the
buyer via XML file. If police stopped a truck and
wanted to check a specific item number in
connection with the box, they should be able to
scan the box themselves or obtain information on
the number and unique identifications of the
items in the box from the manufacturer or
distributor. There should be no need to print all
item numbers on the box or the delivery
documents.
46
47
LABELLING OF SPUs
If the primers are less than 8.5 mm in diameter
and therefore the SPU needs to be labelled, do
all 50 unique identifications have to be marked
on the SPU? No!
47
48
MANUFACTURERS NAME ON UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION
Does the manufacturers name need to be in full
or can it be abbreviated (eg RHEMCO instead of
Rhinoceros and Hippopotamus Explosives
Manufacturing Co) to assist the marking of
smaller items? This has benefits and in any
event the Member State will be able to identify
the manufacturer from their records using the 3
digit site code. This is a matter for the
competent authorities in the Member State issuing
the code to judge on a case-by-case basis. If the
abbreviated name is a commonly known and
recognisable trade name, this should be
acceptable if the abbreviation makes it
impossible to identify the manufacturer it would
not be advisable.
48
49
THE TRANSFER OF EXPLOSIVES FROM ONE NON-EU
COUNTRY TO ANOTHER NON-EU COUNTRY THROUGH EUROPE.
Have products got to be marked?
If the products are in transit only, i.e. if
they do not enter the EU customs territory and
are kept under customs control (bonded
warehouse), the Directive clearly does not apply.
In other cases where the products are imported
into the EU customs territory, this would be
regarded as placing on the market and the
Directive's rules on marking would apply.
50
VISIBILITY OF APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS (AI)
FEEM has developed a Guidance Note for a
HARMONIZED STANDARD CODING SYSTEM in order to
minimise logistical problems throughout the
explosives supply chains in Europe. The Coding
System is primarily based on the GS1 STANDARD
using so-called Application Identifiers (AI). The
applied Application Identifiers will enable
harmonisation by recognising the format of a
database in which the information is being
received in. This enables the explosives code
structure to be flexible. Individual fields
within the overall code at different positions
with various lengths and combinations on alpha,
numeric and alpha-numeric characters are
possible. The Application Identifiers are not
normally visible within a code, but if they were,
they are recognised by being two, three or four
digit numbers within brackets. These technologies
are therefore recommended to enable each
individual explosives item to be allocated a
unique number for the purpose of tracing that
item throughout its life cycle.
51
VISIBILITY OF APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS (cont.)
In the Annex to the Track Trace concerning the
Human Readable Part of the Identification there
is no mention of Application Identifiers.
Actually the Directive is very clear in this
respect the requirement for the readable number
is an alphanumeric code containing details of the
country, site number and unique number. There is
no reference to any Application Identifiers being
readable. However, some of our member companies
print the AI on their labels in order to make it
easier for a human to read the label and to
facilitate key entry in the event that the symbol
cannot be scanned. Other members are not printing
the AI on the labels because they think that it
is illegal to do so because it is not mentioned
in the Directive.
52
VISIBILITY OF APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS
(cont.)
Is it illegal to print AI visibly on labels?
NO! In the text of the modified FEEM
Guidance Note we have added AI may optionally be
printed (i.e. visual) on the labels in order to
make it easier for a human to read the label and
to facilitate key entry in the event that the
symbol cannot be scanned.
53
REACH / LEAD COMPOUNDS

54
REACH
  • On 20 August 2012 FEEM received a new LISTING OF
    LEAD COMPOUNDS on the ROI SVHC
  • (Registry of intention)
  • Lead Salt
  • Lead Tetroxide (Orange Lead)
  • Lead Salts C16-18
  • Trilead Dioxide Phosphonate
  • Diibasic Lead Phthalate (Phthalate(2-dioxotrilead)
    )
  • Pentalead Tetraoxide Sulphate
  • Dioxobis(stearato)trilead
  • Tetralead Trioxide Sulphate
  • Lead Oxide (Lead Monoxide)
  • Basic Lead Sulphate (Lead Oxide Sulphate)

55
REACH
  • In December 2012 additional lead-compounds
    mentioned in the ROI list have been added in the
    CANDIDATE LIST
  • LEAD MONOXIDE
  • LEAD TETROXIDE
  • LEAD DINITRATE
  • The date of inclusion was 19.12.2012 and the
    documentary support for inclusion is available at
    the Web of ECHA http//echa.europa.eu/candidate-l
    ist-table
  • These compounds commonly called LEAD PRIMARY
    EXPLOSIVES are used in pyrotechnical mixtures and
    in fuze heads and have been identified as
    substances meeting the criteria of Article 57 (c)
    of Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 (REACH). This
    identification has been based on their
    classification as toxic for reproduction.

56
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE SUBSTANCES AFTER THEY HAVE
BEEN ADDED TO THE REGISTRY OF INTENTION? The
authorisation process is divided into four stages
and the LEAD COMPOUNDS are now in the first stage
which is the Registry of intention (ROI). ECHA
has been compiling Annex XV dossiers for all the
substances and after completion, it was followed
by a Public Consultation in early September 2012.
Stakeholders only had 45 days to respond and that
is why it was critical to provide crucial
information that can be used during this and
other phases of the AUTHORISATION PROCESS.
From the LEAD COMPOUNDS 3 have already been
added into the Candidate List.
REACH

57
REACH
  • After the public consultation, comments received
    are sent to the MEMBER STATES COMMITTEE (MSC) and
    they will give an opinion as to whether a
    substance will be added to the candidate list
    based on scientific evidence available on whether
    the SVHC criteria are met. If there is a
    unanimous agreement by the MSC then we can
    envisage that the Pb compounds will be added to
    the candidate list between December 2012 and
    February 2013 and if there is no unanimous
    agreement the date will be August 2013 since the
    Commission will need to be involved.

Very Persistent and very Bio-accumulative
Persistent Bioaccumulative and Toxic
58
REACH
LISTING OF LEAD COMPOUNDS ON THE ROI SVHC LEAD
TETROXIDE (Orange Lead) is being used in the
explosives industry in pyrotechnic mixtures. This
substance is mixed with silicon and other
chemicals in order to obtain a redox reaction
during use of these pyrotechnic mixtures. This
kind of mixture is used in delay elements in
civil electrical detonators around Europe and in
the entire world. PB3O4 and silicon react during
use of delay elements. After detonation, the
chemicals inside the delay system react and the
final products are silica (SIO2), metal lead (Pb)
and unreacted silicon (Si).
59
REACH
  • BACKGROUND
  • The FEEM HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP has
    reviewed the Annex XV dossiers submitted by the
    European Chemical Agency at the request of the
    European Commission, concerning the above
    mentioned substances. These substances are lead
    compounds having explosive properties and
    applications. Some of FEEM member company members
    produce these substances and every company has
    expert judgement on the production, storage,
    transport and use of these substances. These lead
    compounds are incorporated in explosive items and
    the final products (detonators, primers, etc) are
    only sold for industrial applications.

60
REACH
  • EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
  • The risk to workers during manufacture is reduced
    by risk management measures.
  • There is no exposure during handling and use of
    the final explosive items.
  • There is no release to environment during use.
  • There are no significant emissions or releases
    from the manufacture.
  • As a consequence of the above mentioned reasons,
    based on the criteria formulated in Article 58
    (3) REACH and the corresponding score system
    prioritization, the inclusion of these compounds
    in the candidate List (article 58) is not
    justified. These substances do not meet the
    criteria because
  • They are not PBT nor vPvB substances.
  • They have not wide spread dispersive uses.
  • Their production volumes are quite small.

61
REACH HOW FEEM REACTS!
  • Since the 1st publications of lead compounds in
    the ROI about 2 years ago FEEM had numerous
    contacts with representatives of ECHA, the MEMBER
    STATES COMMITTEE, the International Lead
    Association and CEFIC in order to prevent that
    lead compounds will be subject to the so-called
    CANDIDATE LIST or even worse that they will be
    subject for AUTHORIZATION with the consequence of
    a possible ban in the future.

62
REACH
REACH MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE After our last
meeting FEEM has drafted a letter to explain why
LEAD COMPOUNDS should not be subject to
AUTHORIZATION. This letter has been distributed
to the national members of the so-called REACH
MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE. A list of the names and
addresses of the relevant MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE
members had been handed-out to the FEEM Working
Group Members. All of our WG members contacted
their national MSC delegate.
63
REACH
This action has been an enormous success because
we have managed that ECHA has received numerous
comments either dircetley by FEEM MEMBER
companies or other European organisations or
through their national member of the so-called
Member State Committee Here is a list of
organisations which have actively supported our
proposal
64
REACH
  1. National Authority, RIVM, Netherlands
  2. Associação Técnica da Indústria de Cimento,
    Portugal
  3. Orica, Germany
  4. Gremi d'Àrids de Catalunya, Spain (1st letter)
  5. Individual, Belgium
  6. Maxam, Spain
  7. EPC, UK
  8. COMINROC, Spain
  9. ANEFA, Spain
  10. Industry Association, Spain
  11. Mineral Products Association, United Kingdom
  12. DynITEC GmbH, Germany
  13. Gremi d'Àrids de Catalunya, Spain (2nd letter)
  14. Individual, Belgium (excellent letter)

65
REACH
E.g. the responsible UK officer Gary Dougherty ,
wrote in a letter to ECHA that he thinks the lead
compounds issues in detonators was a done deal in
that it was very unlikely that these lead
compounds will be included in the next stage.
Apparently he had attended an ECHA meeting in
Helsinki where the lead issue was raised and it
was suggested that they be excluded on the
grounds of the small quantities involved, which
gives rise to a low score careful control during
manufacture which also gives a low score and the
small quantities of oxides of lead produced after
detonation were widely distributed and unlikely
to cause harm. There was no adverse reaction to
this suggestion from the other member states who
attended.
66
REACH
The results of the prioritization should be
available sometime in June 2013 and unless there
are drastic changes to the conditions of
manufacture or use of these compounds in the
future it is highly likely that will be excluded
for the foreseeable future 10 years or more.
67
REASONS FOR NO-INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST
  • THERE IS NO WIDESPREAD DISPERSIVE USE
  • 2) THE QUANTITIES USED ARE VERY LOW
  • 3) NO SUBSTANCE CONTACT OF SUBSEQUENT USERS OF
    EXPLOSIVE ITEMS AND NO EXPOSURE DURING HANDLING
    AND USE OF FINAL EXPLOSIVE ITEMS
  • NO SIGNIFICANT EMISSIONS OR RELEASES FROM THE
    MANUFACTURE
  • WORKER HEALTH RISKS ARE MINIMIZED AND CONTROLLED
    BY REGULAR EXAMINATIONS
  • THE REPLACEMENT OF EXPLOSIVE LEAD COMPOUNDS IN
    CURRENT PRODUCTS IS VERY COST-INTENSIVE AND
    REQUIRES A LOT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

68
CONCLUSION
  • NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST AND NO
    REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION
  • According to prioritization criteria included in
    Article 58 (3) for Inclusion of Substances in the
    Candidate List of Substances Subject to
    Authorisation, the priority shall be given to
    substances with
  • PBT or vPvB properties, or
  • Widespread dispersive use, or
  • High volumes.

69
CONCLUSION
  • NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST AND NO
    REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION
  • It is absolutely clear that Explosive Lead
    Compounds do not meet anyone of these priority
    criteria.
  • Therefore, FEEM does not support the inclusion of
    Lead Explosive Compounds in the List of
    Authorisation Substances.
  • Finally FEEM requested ECHA to give the lowest
    possible priority to Lead Azide, Lead Styphnate,
    Orange Lead and Lead Picrate, because these
    substances represent no risks to workers, users,
    and the releases to environment are
    quantitatively negligible during manufacture,
    storage and transport.

70
  • NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST AND NO
    REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION
  • Last week FEEM has distributed another letter to
    ECHA and the INTERNATIONAL LEAD ASSOCIATION with
    technical information and comments concerning the
    non-inclusion of Orange Lead and explaining why
    the use of this substance in the explosive sector
    should not be prioritized by ECHA for inclusion
    in the Annex XIV (Authorisation List) of REACH.
    Even if Orange-lead is included in the future in
    the mentioned Annex, we propose that the use as
    ingredient for delay elements in explosive
    production should be specifically included under
    the heading Exempted categories of use of the
    Annex XIV.

71

Lead Compounds FEEM would like to acknowledge
the excellent contribution from the Working
Groups and its members. Special thanks go to Jose
Castresana from Maxam who has contributed
72
Transport of ANFO (UN 0331) in 30 m³ tank trucks
and other changes in 2013 ADR
73
TRANSPORT OF UN 0331 (ANFO 1.5D) IN ROAD TANKERS
The BAM proposal to the UN PANEL FOR DANGEROUS
GOODS (WP 15) to legalize transport of ANFO 1.5d
(UN 0331) in tanks has been accepted and has been
incorporated into the new 2013 ADR. However, the
original proposal to carry up to 30 m³ ( 24
tons) was not accepted. The volume is now limited
to 16 tons. You can find detail under chapter
4.3 UN 0331 EXPLOSIVE, BLASTING, TYPE B in
S2.65AN tanks. The transport is subject to
special provisions according to 4.3.4.1.3.

74
TRANSPORT OF UN 0331 (ANFO 1.5D) IN ROAD TANKERS
  • The EUROPEAN EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY has started a
    discussion process whether it could be worthwhile
    to investigate if there is a chance to increase
    the transport volumes of Class 1 products in
    general. The views of our members are
    controversial.
  • Initiated and financed by one of our members
    BAM, Germany has started research work based on
    ANFO / TNT equivalents to support the increase of
    ANFO volumes in tanks above the 16 ton tier.

75
OTHER CHANGES IN 2013 ADR MEMUs
  • CHAPTER 6.12
  • The requirements for bursting disks/pressure
    relief devices in 6.12.3.1.2 and 6.12.3.2.2 have
    been reworded so that they only apply to tanks
    for ammonium nitrate UN 1942 or 3375, not for the
    fuel oil. Also it is the Competent Authority of
    the country of use that must now approve the
    bursting discs. New transitional measure 1.6.5.14
    allows continued use of tanks approved before 1
    July 2013 according to the previous requirements.

76
OTHER CHANGES IN 2013 ADR MEMUs
  • CHAPTER 9
  • There have been editorial corrections to include
    reference to MEMUs
  • in the definitions of AT vehicles and ADR
    approval. EN 152072006
  • has been added to the reference standards for
    electrical connectors.
  • EX/III VEHICLE FIRE PROTECTION A new Section
    9.7.9 has
  • been inserted to require that EX/III vehicles
    carrying tanks are
  • equipped with automatic fire extinguisher systems
    for the engine
  • compartment and the load is protected from tire
    fires by metal
  • thermal shields. As no specific transitional
    measure has been
  • inserted, the standard six month transitional
    period will apply.

77
Coffee Break
30 Minutes
78
ITEM 8SECURITY ISSUES AT EU LEVEL by
Julian Foley
79
ITEM 9IME Report by Chris Ronay
80
  • FEEM WORKING GROUPS
  • Item 10
  • THE FEEM WORKING GROUPS

81
  • FEEM WORKING GROUPS
  • 4 FEEM Working Groups have
  • been active in 2012
  • HEALTH AND SAFETY
  • TRANSPORT
  • BLASTING PRACTICES
  • TRACK TRACE TECHNICAL WG

82
HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP
  • Members
  • Francois-Xavier Dugres, Davey Bickford, France
  • Jean-Paul Reynaud, Titanobel, France
  • Maurice Delaloye, SSE, Switzerland
  • Martin Klein, DynaEnergetics, Germany
  • Jaroslav Konarik, Austin Detonators, Czech
    Republic
  • Hans Karlström, Kimit, Sweden
  • Jose Castresana, Maxam, Spain
  • Pablo Guisante, Maxam, Spain
  • Walter Panchyrz, Orica, Germany
  • Thierry Rousse, EPC, France
  • Janusz Drzyzga, Nitroerg, Poland
  • David White, EPC, U.K.
  • Matti Vähäpassi, Forcit, Finland


83
HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP
  • The Group has met two times since the 2012 AGM
  • on 26 September 2012 in Prague, Czech Republic
  • on 13 March 2013 in Brussels, Belgium

84
HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP
  • The main subjects which were discussed are
  • Trace Track Directive
  • Hard Software solutions in production
    application
  • The IPPC process the impact on explosives sites
  • Elaborating the Best Available Techniques
    Reference (BREF) documents concerning HS
  • Feedback on impact consequences of IPPC to the
    production sites
  • New environmental requirements for IPPC
    production sites
  • REACH Lead Issue
  • Learnings from incidents unusual occurrences
  • Obligations of a producer under the new CLP
    regulations
  • Near misses unusual occurrences
  • Exchange of experiences Learnings

85
  • BLASTING PRACTISE WORKING GROUP
  • MEMBERSHIP
  • Robert Farnfield EPC UK
  • Nello Contardi Orica, Belgium
  • Frank Hammelmann Orica, Germany
  • Marcos Perena Maxam, Spain
  • Knut Tanbergmoen Forcit, Norway
  • as of September 2013

86
BLASTING WORKING GROUP
  • The Blasting Practice Working Group has met
    twice since the last AGM 2012
  • On 27 September 2012 in Prague, Czech Rep.
  • On 14 March 2013 in Brussels, Belgium


87
BLASTING PRACTISE WORKING GROUP
  • The main working subjects were
  • Finalization of a new Technical Bulletin Safe
    Operation on the Bench
  • Learnings from blasting related near misses
    unusual occurrences.

88
TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP
  • Membership
  • Bengt Folkesson (Chairman), EPC Group, Sweden
  • Marlies Becker, Orica Europe, Germany
  • Francois-Xavier Dugres, Davey Bickford, France
  • Marcin Slimak, Nitroerg, Poland
  • Jon Jones, Austin International, UK
  • Ivana Jakubkova, Austin Detonators, CZ
  • Javier Lopez Amigo, Maxam, Spain
  • Martin Klein, DynaEnergetics, Germany
  • Jean-Paul Reynaud, Titanobel, France
  • Janusz Drzyzga, Nitroerg, Poland
  • Maurice Delaloye, SSE, Switzerland

89
TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP
  • The FEEM Transport and Storage Working Group has
    met
  • two times since the last AGM in 2012.
  • on 25 September 2012 in Prague, Czech Rep.
  • on 12th March 2013 in Brussels, Belgium

90
TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP
  • The main working subjects were
  • Directives 93/15 2008/43 and its impact on the
    Supply Chain Processes
  • FEEM Guidance Note XML fields ISO Code
  • Modifications to XML File Structure
  • Modification of sub-levels of packaging in the
    FEEM Standard Code
  • Marking of Intermediates
  • Requirement for Transporters to Maintain Records
  • CLP Process related Directives and Regulations
  • Learnings from transport related incidents and
    accidents


91
ITEM 11 2012/13 Financial Report Statistics
92
THE 2012 MEMBERSHIP
  • 4 MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES
  • AUSTIN POWDER
  • EPC GROUPE
  • ORICA EMEA
  • MAXAM GROUP

93
THE 2012 MEMBERSHIP
  • 15 INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES
  • DAVEY BICKFORD, France
  • DYNAENERGETICS, Germany
  • EURENCO, Sweden
  • EXPLOSIA, Czech Republic
  • KEMPHOS OY, Finland
  • KIMIT AB, Sweden
  • NITROERG SA , Poland
  • MSW Chemie, Germany
  • OY FORCIT, Finland
  • POUDRERIE DAUBONNE, Switzerland
  • PRAVISANI SPA, Italy
  • SOCIETE SUISSE DES EXPLOSIFS, Switzerland
  • SPREWA, Germany
  • TITANOBEL, France
  • WEATHERFORD, Romania

94
THE 2011 MEMBERSHIP
  • 2 Federations
  • 1 AFFILIATE EASSP (European Association for
    Study of Safety Problems in the Production and
    Use of Propellant Powders)
  • 1 ASSOCIATE IME (Institute of Makers of
    Explosives)

95
FEEM 2012 RESULTS

96
2012 Finances 2012 Finances
Income 2011 Budget 2012 Actual 2012
Membership fees 159.200 152.700 156.000
Other income 2.148 2.300 1.290
Total 161.348 155.000 157.290

Expenses
CEFIC Affiliation FEE 15.000 15.000 15.000
Working Groups General Administration 116.109 120.000 118.542
AGM Expenses 19.850 20.000 21.450
Total 150.959 155.000 154.992

Current year result ( 2.298)

97
2012/2013 Finances 2012/2013 Finances
INCOME BUDGET 2013 ACTUAL 2012
Membership fees 152.700 156.000
Other income 2.300 1.290
Total 155.000 157.290

Expenses
CEFIC Affiliation FEE 15.000 15.000
Working Groups General Administration 120.000 118.542
AGM Expenses 20.000 21.450
Total 155.000 154.992

Current year result ( - 0,00)

98

2012 Finances
As budgeted and forecasted the 2012 financial
situation is again healthy and balanced.
Consequently, the Executive Committee has
decided that the membership fees will remain
unchanged in 2013.
99
Statistics 2012
ITEM 12 OF THE AGENDA
100
Explosives Detonator Statistic 2012
For several years FEEM has managed a confidential
statistics service for its members. It acts as a
trustee company in compliance with competition
laws. In order to estimate accurate annual sales
per product in Europe we need from you all your
best sales estimates from all the countries your
are represented in. We will consolidate your data
and give global figures of the European sales
estimate per product only to those companies
which provided figures. The numbers are based on
FEEM members input and represent the arithmetic
average of the reported country numbers.
101
Explosives 2012
102
Explosives Statistic 2012
  • The volume of explosives consumed (not
    manufactured!) in Europe (EU27 Norway
    Switzerland) in 2012 amounted to
  • 553.000 tons
  • This is 11,5 lower compared to 2011.

103
TOTAL EXPLOSIVES EUROPE IN 2011/ 2012 (1.000 TONS)
- 11,5
104
EXPLOSIVES DEVELOPMENT 1995 2012 (1.000 TONS)
105
EXPLOSIVES MARKET 2012 BY SHARES
106
Explosives Consumption 2012 by Countries
107
Total Explosives 2012 by Countries Deviation
108
NG Products 2011/2012 (1.000 tons)
109
NG Products 2012 by Countries ()
110
Bulk Emulsions (1.000 tons)
111
Pumped Explosives 2011 by Countries ()
112
Cartridged Emulsions / Water Gels 2012 (1.000
tons)
113
Cartridged Emulsions / Water Gels 2012 by
Countries ()
114
ANFO 2012 / 2012 (1.000 tons)
0,6
115
ANFO by Countries 2012 ()
116
Others 2011/2012 (Ammonites, Permissibles, Black
Powder et cetera) ()
117
Detonators 2012
118
Explosives Statistic 2012
  • The amount of detonators consumed (not
    manufactured!) in Europe (EU27 Norway
    Switzerland) in 2012 amounted to
  • 61.132 units
  • This is 18 lower compared to 2011.

119
Total Detonators Europe 2012 (1.000 units)
120
Total Detonators Europe 2012 (1.000 units)
121
Total Detonators Europe 2012 by shares
122
All Detonators by Countries 2012 (1.000 units)
123
ELECTRIC DETONATORS 2011/ 2012 (1.000 UNITS)
124
Electric Detonators by Countries 2012 (1.000
units)
125
Electric Detonators 2011/2012 ()Deviation from
2011
126
Non-Electric Detonators 2011 /2012 (1.000 units)
127
Non-electric Detonators by Countries 2012 (1.000
units)
128
Non-electric Detonators by Countries 2012 ()
Deviation from 2011
129
ELECTRONIC DETONATORS 2011 / 2012 (1.000 UNITS)
130
ELECTRONIC DETONATORS BY COUNTRIES 2010 (1.000
UNITS)
131
Detonating Cords 2012
132
Boosters Primers 2012
133
Explosive Production Sites Staff 2012
134

Item 13 of the Agenda ELECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE
135
ELECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
  • The FEEM President CARL-ANDERS LINDGREN from
    Austin Explosives has stepped down from the
    Committee for personal reasons. Austin has
    suggested co-opting OTTA GREBEN from Austin
    Detonators to the Executive Committee according
    to Article 7.2 of FEEMs Constitution (CO-OPTION
    TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE). The Executive
    Committee has agreed to this process at their
    meeting on 27 February 2013 in Brussels.
  • According to the Constitution Otta Greben has to
    step down at this meeting and is offering himself
    for election at this meeting.

136
ITEM 14Any other business ?
137

NEW FEEM HOMEPAGE FEEM has started into 2013
with a new, up-dated web site. It is
professional, has got a modern design and web
architecture and looks very nice. It is easy to
operate and to navigate. You find the site
under www. feem-europe.com feem-europe.eu
feem-europe.org feem.info
138

NEW FEEM HOMEPAGE Hit Counter (22.05.13)
Hits Today Last 24h Last 7d Last 30d Total
Visitors 34 95 326 1.443 2.602
More than 50 countries have visited our
homepage. Surprisingly China and Ukraine are on
the hit list. But also countries like India,
Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Iran and many African
countries are regular visitors.
139

NEW FEEM HOMEPAGE
Countries Amount
US 465 18
Germany 272 11
China 251 10
Ukraine 222 9
CZ 194 7
Spain 119 5
UK 115 4
France 108 4
Australia 101 4
140
DATE AND PLACE OF THE NEXT ANNUAL GENERAL
MEETINGinWarsaw, Poland(in conjunction with
the XVIII SAFEX Congress)onWednesday, 21 May
2014a Gala Dinner on Tuesday, 20 May 2014at
Warsaw Marriott  HotelAl. Jerozolimskie 65/79
00-697 Warsaw, Poland Tel 48 22 630 5240 Fax
48 22 630 7332 Email lukasz.samiczak_at_marriottho
tels.com Web WarsawMarriott.com
ITEM 15
141
Item 16 on the Agenda
  • CLOSURE OF THE MEETING
  • by our President
  • DANIEL ANTILLE

142
2013 AGM Brussels
  • Thank you very much for your kind attention and
    see you next year in Warsaw again!
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