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Title: Secure%20Pork%20Supply%20Board%20Update


1
Secure Pork Supply Board Update
2
Credit where credit is due!
  • Thanks to Dr. Jim Roth and Dr. Pam Zaabel
  • Center for Food Security And Public Health _at_ Iowa
    State University
  • and the SPS Planning Committee

3
Secure Pork Supply Plan
  • Center for Food Security and Public Health _at_ Iowa
    State CVM has received USDA funding to develop
    the plan.
  • Coordinating with the Center for Animal Health
    Food Safety _at_ University of Minnesota who also
    has USDA funding
  • Will cover movement of swine between production
    sites and processing plants

4
Secure pork supply (Patrick's Interpretation )
  • SPS is basically a club
  • The benefits that club members get the
    opportunity to move pigs sooner than non-club
    members in an outbreak.
  • This is because members agree to implement
  • a valid pre-harvest traceability program
  • standardized bio security practices
  • disease surveillance the level to achieve a
    defined status

5
Secure Pork Supply
  • Built on the experiences of
  • Secure Egg Supply
  • Move eggs in the event of HPAI
  • Plan has resulted in MOUs between IA, MN, NE and
    CO
  • Secure Milk Supply
  • Move milk in the event of FMD
  • Secure Turkey Supply
  • Move turkeys to harvest in the event of HPAI

6
Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee
  • First meeting October 11-12, 2011
  • Working Groups formed
  • Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak)
  • Surveillance (pre and post outbreak)
  • Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises
  • Data Collection, Management, and Sharing
  • Risk Assessments
  • Communications
  • Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow

7
Secure Pork Supply
  • First draft (completed May 2013) covers
  • Biosecurity
  • Pre-harvest traceability
  • Outbreak tomorrow plan
  • Data and information sharing agreements
  • Producers
  • State Vets
  • National animal health laboratory network
  • Packers and Processors

8
Secure Pork Supply
  • Parts still under development
  • Data management, risk assessments and disease
    surveillance are longer-term projects and will be
    incorporated in future drafts as they become
    available.

9
Secure Pork Supply
  • Groups provided the draft for review
  • State and Federal Animal Health Authorities
  • USDA FSIS
  • State Pork Producers Associations / Councils
  • Checkoffs Swine Health Committee
  • AMI / NAMA
  • AASVs FAD and Swine Health Committees
  • Packers and Processors

10
Secure Pork Supply
  • Next steps
  • Continue to bird-dog the process
  • Review Incorporate Comments
  • Focusing on getting the disease surveillance
    section completed
  • Engage industry leadership on compliance and
    verification issues
  • Program needs to be credible and workable
  • Need to consider how the industry can verify
    compliance

11
Secure Pork Supply
  • is a game of connect the dots
  • Many of the practices already occur
  • Needs to be documented and verified
  • Data information already exists
  • Sits in multiple private and government databases
  • A common denominator is necessary to link
    everything together
  • Standard Premises Identification Number

12
  • Data Collection, Management Sharing

13
  • Producers

14
Valid Pre-harvest Traceability
  • Identify all premises with the standard PIN
  • Industry is solidly behind PINs
  • Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain
    records in electronic format
  • Associates PINs with movements
  • Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary
    Inspection or electronic IMRs
  • Associate PINs with source and destination
  • Allow access to movement data by animal health
    officials

15
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16
Disease Surveillance
  • Maintain animal inventories by premises in an
    electronic format
  • Submit surveillance data and samples in
    accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan
  • Include validated PIN on all diagnostic
    laboratory submission forms

17
Validated PINs
18
Official PIN Tags
  • Sow Packer Requirement
  • Condition of sale by January 1st 2015 by various
    companies
  • Must be a USDA Approved Official PIN Tag
  • http//www.aphis.usda.gov/traceability/downloads/s
    wine_device_listing.pdf
  • Industry support for this _at_ Pork Forum

19
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20
Official PIN Tags
  • Only 2 companies currently have USDA approval to
    manufacture and are selling official PIN Tags
  • Destron Fearing
  • Allflex
  • Available in multiple colors
  • Some packers prefer pink

21
Official PIN Tags
  • The PIN on the Official Tag is the USDA allocated
    Standardized Premises Identification Number (PIN)
    and not the State allocated Location Identifier
    (LID)
  • When ordering the manufacturer will ask for the
    PIN so they can validate it to the address of the
    site

22
Official PIN Tags
  • According to the Swine ID Program Standards the
    PIN on the Tag should be the PIN of the breeding
    farm she was on prior to entering harvest
    channels
  • Works for systems that are not parity segregated
  • Parity segregated systems
  • Work with the State Vet to determine what PIN
    make the most sense
  • Producer records maintain the traceability

23
Official PIN Tags
  • One (or one set) and your done
  • Once identified with one PIN tag or a set of
    official tags with same PIN and production number
    then that is it. Producers do not need to put in
    a new one if the animal moves to another
    production site BUT they do need to record that
    movement in case of a traceback.

24
Official PIN Tags
25
Disease Surveillance
  • Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through
    the PINs associated with subsets of diagnostic
    samples to the NHALN for the express purposes of
    surveillance for foreign animal (and program
    diseases)
  • Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the
    PINs associated with diagnostic samples for the
    express purposes of surveillance for foreign
    animal (and program diseases).

26
Disease Surveillance
  • Allow access by state and federal animal health
    officials to the geospatial information stored in
    the National and State Premises Repositories for
    the express purposes of emergency preparedness
    and surveillance for foreign animal (and program
    diseases).

27
Recommendations (Not Required)
  • Annual Employee FAD Awareness
  • Separate PINs for epidemiological separate
    premises more than ¼ mile apart.
  • Provide annual premises updates to SAHO
  • Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine
    interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19)
  • A word on the Code

28
Sow / Boar Surveillance
29
Market Hog Surveillance
30
Veterinary Diagnostic Labs
31
Packer Received Pigs from SPS sites AA13579
on XX / XX /2012 BB24688 on XX / XX
/2012 ETC..
PIN-765432A Pork Packer
PIN-AA13579 Wean to Finish
PIN-1234567B Wean to Finish
What the State Vet can determine 1. Site is a
part of Secure Pork? 2. Valid traceability
system up and running? 3. Standardized
biosecurity in place? 4. Achieved a negative
disease status?
Permitted Movements
PIN-BB24688 Wean to Finish
PIN -123456A Sow Farm
PIN-1234567C Swine Finisher
32
E2E Proof-of-Concept Demonstration
Premises and Plants (SCS)
Producer (3rd Party S/W)
Testing Results (Diag. Lab)
Producer Census and Movement Data
State Premises and Plant Data
Testing Data
Show premises disease status and support the
decision on whether or not to move animals.
Show the day-to-day usefulness for monitoring
facility disease status.
33
  • Thank You!

34
Secure Pork Disease Awareness, Preparedness,
Response and Recovery
  • Dr. Patrick Webb
  • Director, Swine Health Programs

35
Secure Pork Supply PlanA Continuity of Business
Plan for the Swine Industry in the Face of a
Foreign Animal Disease
  • James A. Roth, DVM, PhD, DACVM
  • Center for Food Security and Public Health
  • College of Veterinary Medicine
  • Iowa State University

36
US Animal Agriculture is Highly Vulnerable to
Foreign Animal Diseases
  • US production animals have no immunity to FADs
  • Export markets will be lost
  • Prices will drop dramatically
  • Emergency vaccine stocks are far below what would
    be required to address a livestock dense state or
    multi-state outbreak
  • The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive
    movement inherent in the U.S. livestock
    industries will present unprecedented challenges
    in the event of a FAD outbreak

37
USDA APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness
and Response Plan
38
USDA FAD PReP FMD Response Plan

39
Common Components of Secure Food Supply Business
Continuity Plans
Secure Egg Supply (HPAI) Secure Turkey Supply
(HPAI) Secure Milk Supply (FMD)Secure Pork
Supply (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)
  • Voluntary pre-outbreak preparedness components
  • Biosecurity, surveillance, epidemiology
    questionnaires, movement permits
  • Risk assessments (completed and in process)
  • Plans must be based on current capabilities and
    will evolve with science, risk assessments and
    new capabilities
  • Guidelines only Final decisions made by
    responsible officials during outbreak
  • Outreach and training pre and post outbreak

40
SPS Partners
  • SPS Planning Committee
  • Federal and State officials
  • Representatives of all phases of the swine
    industry
  • NPB, NPPC, AASV
  • Academia
  • Iowa State University
  • University of Minnesota

41
FADs included in SPS plan
  • Foot and mouth disease
  • Swine, cattle, sheep, goats, deer
  • Classical swine fever
  • African swine fever
  • Swine vesicular disease

Foot and Mouth Disease 7 days post infection
PIADC
42
Disease Transmission(FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)
  • Not zoonotic
  • Direct contact and oral exposure are the most
    important routes of infection for swine (Pigs are
    relatively resistant to airborne infection by all
    4 FADs)
  • Indirect contact (fomites) also can play a lesser
    role for transmission
  • Pigs exhale large concentrations of FMDV, cattle
    are highly susceptible to aerosolized virus

43
Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee
  • First meeting October 11-12, 2011
  • Working Groups formed
  • Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak)
  • Surveillance (pre and post outbreak)
  • Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises
  • Data Collection, Management, and Sharing
  • Risk Assessments
  • Communications
  • Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow

44
  • Getting On the Same Page

45
North American Animal Agriculture Industry is
Unique
  • The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive
    movement inherent in the U.S. and North American
    livestock industries will present unprecedented
    challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak
  • Strategies for the response to, and management
    of, a FAD outbreak will change as the outbreak
    progresses and will depend upon the magnitude,
    location and other characteristics of the
    outbreak.

46
Phases and Types of FMD Response
http//www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-and-types-
of-an-fmd-outbreak
47
Phases of FMD Response
48
FMD Detection in the United States Types of an
FMD Outbreak
Six Types of FMD Outbreaks
48
49
Differentiating between Types of FMD Outbreaks
  Geographic Size of Outbreak Animal Movement Number of Premises Size of Premises Vaccine Assumptions Appropriate Strategies Minimum Time Required to Achieve FMD Free Status
Type 1-Focal FMD outbreak One state or small region No extensive animal movement Small number Relatively small Not applicable Stamping-out   3 months after the last case
Type 2-Moderate regional FMD outbreak Few focal areas in one region No extensive animal movement out of the Control Area Small to moderate number Small to medium Sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate designated animals Stamping-out Vaccinate-to-kill Vaccinate-to-slaughter Discontinue vaccination after the last case 3 months after the last case and slaughter of all vaccinated animals, or 6 months after last case or last vaccination if all vaccinated animals are not slaughtered
Type 3-Large regional FMD outbreak Multiple areas in a region No extensive animal movement outside of the region Moderate number Medium to large Sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate designated animals Vaccinate-to-live Vaccinate-to-slaughter Discontinue vaccination after the last case 12 months after the last evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD vaccine was administered
Type 4-Widespread or national FMD outbreak Widespread areas of infection Extensive animal movement Moderate to large number Medium to large Sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate designated animals Vaccinate-to-live Vaccinate-to-slaughter Continue vaccination after the last case FMD Free with Vaccination 18 months after the last case
Type 5-Catastrophic FMD outbreak Widespread areas of infection Extensive animal movement Large number Large Sufficient vaccine is NOT available to vaccinate designated animals Endemic FMD control program Vaccinate-to-live Continue vaccination after the last case FMD Free with Vaccination 2 years after the last outbreak
Type 6-North American FMD outbreak Widespread infection in Mexico / Canada/ US Extensive animal movement Large number Large Sufficient vaccine is NOT available to vaccinate designated animals Endemic FMD control program Vaccinate-to-live Continue vaccination after the last case FMD Free with Vaccination 2 years after the last outbreak
50
FMD Outbreak in IowaLarge Control Area
Source NASS, 2007
Number of Swine Affected 19,883,988 Number
of Bovines Affected 2,366,535 Number of
Operations Affected 110,727
50
51
Type 5 Catastrophic FMD Outbreak
  • Widespread areas of infection are detected
    involving a large portion of the United States.
    Sufficient vaccine and resources are not
    available to quickly vaccinate all designated
    susceptible animals in the affected regions. The
    number of vaccinated animals is too great to
    consider a vaccinate-to-kill or
    vaccinate-to-slaughter (only) policy. It becomes
    apparent that FMD is widespread, and will not be
    eradicated within a year.
  • Declare FMD to be an endemic disease and
    implement a program for long term eradication and
    control, including vaccinate-to-live

52
  • Outbreak Tomorrow

53
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54
Controlled Movement of Swine in an FMD Outbreak
  • At the beginning of an outbreak
  • No new movements initiated from the FMD control
    area
  • 625,000 pigs on the road each day
  • Some will have come from the control area
  • 400,000 to 500,000 hogs and sows slaughtered
    daily
  • Restarting movement
  • Depends on the type of outbreak

55
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
  • Swine may be infected with FMD virus before
    showing any clinical signs or testing positive by
    PCR
  • It is not possible to prove freedom from FMD
    infection in a herd, or in an individual animal.
    It is only possible to establish that there is
    lack of evidence of infection
  • Therefore, all pork from a processing facility
    that has received swine from the FMD Control Area
    will be considered to potentially contain the FMD
    virus

56
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
  • FMD is not a public health or food safety problem
  • Animals which pass ante-mortem and post-mortem
    inspection by USDA FSIS are safe for human
    consumption, even if they may be in the
    pre-clinical stage of FMD infection
  • Regulations regarding feeding garbage to swine
    must be strictly enforced.

57
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
  • At the beginning of an FMD outbreak (Phase 1)
  • Packing plants should continue to process all
    swine in the plant and in transit to the plant
    which cannot be turned back or euthanized while
    in transit
  • During a large FMD outbreak (Phase 2, Type 3 or
    greater)
  • Market ready hogs and sows, from herds in the
    Control Area with no evidence of infection should
    be sent to slaughter as quickly as possible

58
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
  • Processing of swine should continue, even if it
    is known that FMD infected animals have been in
    the plant
  • Federal and State Officials (Incident Command
    Post) would need to agree to this
  • Packing facility owners/managers would also need
    to agree to this

59
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
  • Modern packing facilities process thousands of
    swine daily. At any point in time, there may be
    thousands of live animals in lairage awaiting
    slaughter.
  • If any animals are incubating the virus, and the
    processing of swine is stopped, the virus will
    rapidly multiply in the swine in lairage.
  • The thousands of animals that are in transit to
    slaughter facilities will not be able to be
    unloaded if the processing of swine at the plant
    is not continued.

60
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
  • Processing of all healthy animals in the
    slaughter facility and in transit to the facility
    is the fastest way to dispose of those animals
    and presents the lowest risk of spreading FMD
    infection
  • It also reduces the need for carcass disposal and
    preserves high quality protein for human
    consumption

61
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
  • Finished products from any processing plants that
    received swine from the Control Area must be
    considered to potentially contain FMD virus
  • Processed product should be quarantined and
    placed in cold storage until a decision is
    reached by Incident Command on allowable uses for
    the product
  • If the outbreak is quickly controlled by stamping
    out, the product should be destroyed
  • If it becomes apparent that the outbreak is
    extensive, the product should be released for
    domestic sale

62
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
  • Packing plant employees, service personnel, and
    truck drivers must observe proper biosecurity
    protocols to avoid transmitting the FMD virus
    when they leave the plant
  • All potential fomites leaving the plant must be
    cleaned and disinfected
  • This will be difficult to implement on an
    emergency basis
  • Ideally, an emergency plan for implementing
    biosecurity will be in place before an outbreak
  • Biosecurity measures will be needed whether the
    plant receiving FMD infected animals continues or
    halts processing of healthy animals

63
Problems to Address
  • Will the pork consuming public accept the
    product?
  • Will Packers be willing to continue to process
    animals from an FMD control area in a large
    outbreak?
  • Will the economics make sense for the Packers?
  • Cold storage facilities for excess pork in the
    first months of an outbreak?
  • Disposition of herds that have recovered from
    infection?

64
  • Data Collection, Management Sharing

65
  • Producers

66
Valid Pre-harvest Traceability
  • Identify all premises with the standard PIN
  • Industry is solidly behind PINs
  • Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain
    records in electronic format
  • Associates PINs with movements
  • Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary
    Inspection or electronic IMRs
  • Associate PINs with source and destination
  • Allow access to movement data by animal health
    officials

67
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68
Disease Surveillance
  • Maintain animal inventories by premises in an
    electronic format
  • Submit surveillance data and samples in
    accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan
  • Include validated PIN on all diagnostic
    laboratory submission forms

69
Validated PINs
70
Disease Surveillance
  • Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through
    the PINs associated with subsets of diagnostic
    samples to the NHALN for the express purposes of
    surveillance for foreign animal (and program
    diseases)
  • Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the
    PINs associated with diagnostic samples for the
    express purposes of surveillance for foreign
    animal (and program diseases).

71
Disease Surveillance
  • Allow access by state and federal animal health
    officials to the geospatial information stored in
    the National and State Premises Repositories for
    the express purposes of emergency preparedness
    and surveillance for foreign animal (and program
    diseases).

72
Recommendations (Not Required)
  • Annual Employee FAD Awareness
  • Separate PINs for epidemiological separate
    premises more than ¼ mile apart.
  • Provide annual premises updates to SAHO
  • Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine
    interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19)
  • A word on the Code

73
  • National Animal Health Laboratory Network

74
Data Collection
  • Request premises identification numbers (PIN) on
    all swine diagnostic specimens submitted as a
    part of the surveillance component of the SPS
    plan
  • Use either separate forms or have an area on
    current form to indicate the samples submitted
    are for the surveillance component of the SPS plan

75
Process Surveillance Submissions
  • Receive surveillance samples with accompanying
    producer information submitted for SPS plan
  • Scan validated PINs into the LIMS and associate
    with the accession/case
  • Pass through PINs with diagnostic samples for
    surveillance for FADs (and program diseases)
  • Conduct routine testing on samples and report out
    results to producers / veterinarians

76
Data Sharing
  • Coordinate transfer of FAD surveillance results
    with PINs into SPS information reporting system
    prior to and during an outbreak
  • Follow current NAHLN protocols for reporting FAD
    testing data related to the SPS plan including
    reporting to state and federal animal health
    officials

77
Recommendations (Not Required)
  • Add a statement to the diagnostic submission form
    reminding producers of what participation means
  • I agree to the steps outlined in the document
    titled secure pork supply step for producers
    participation

78
  • Packers and Processors

79
Pre-harvest traceability
  • Develop ability to capture and associate PINs of
    sending premises with normal business information
  • Develop a mechanism to record information
    regarding conveyances for each group / lot
  • Develop a mechanism to share the following
    information associated w/ each group / lot
  • Sending premises, conveyance identification,
    group lot number or animal identification, date
    of shipment, number of head

80
Biosecurity
  • Develop plan with USDA for implementation and
    verification plant biosecurity standards in the
    Packer / Processor FAD strategy document

81
Disease Surveillance
  • Develop and test a mechanism to associate PINs
    with diagnostic samples collected at the plant
  • Develop protocols to deliver diagnostic samples
    to laboratories using common shipping methods or
    plant employees
  • Pass through PINs associated with diagnostic
    samples for the express purpose of surveillance
    for FADs (and program diseases) prior, during and
    after an outbreak

82
Recommendations (Not Required)
  • Implement awareness training for employees
  • Develop and implement plans for reporting suspect
    FADs
  • Develop policies for plant operations in the
    control area based on the Packer / Processor FADs
    Strategy Document
  • Categorized products into trade categories as
    outlined in the Packer / Processor FADs Strategy
    Document

83
  • State Animal Health Officials

84
Pre-harvest traceability
  • Issue separate PINs for epidemiologically
    separate premises separated by more than a
    quarter-mile
  • Accept electronic formats of CVIs and interstate
    movement reports that include validated PINs for
    sending and receiving premises participating in
    an SPS plan

85
Disease surveillance
  • Access geospatial information stored in the
    State/National premises repository for the
    express purposes of emergency preparedness and
    surveillance for foreign animal (and program)
    diseases

86
Communication
  • Communicate with NAHLN labs concerning FAD
    testing results using current reporting channels
    for samples submitted through the SPS plan
  • Communicate with SAHOs in surrounding states
    concerning compliance with SPS plans
  • Premises information, approved biosecurity
    audits, test results for samples submitted under
    the surveillance component of the SPS plan

87
Communication
  • Communicate with other SAHOs and the incident
    command any adverse findings, noncompliance with
    SPS standards or protocols, results of site
    evaluations and regulatory actions taken

88
Animal Movement
  • Allow swine already in transit to cross state
    borders according to the controlled movement
    component of the SPS plan at the beginning of an
    FAD outbreak
  • Allow swine across state borders according to the
    controlled movement component of the SPS plan
    when movement is restarted after beginning of an
    outbreak

89
Recommendations (Not Required)
  • Work with producers to develop swine production
    health plans for routine interstate swine
    movements of feeder pigs with no change of
    ownership as established by 9 CFR 71.19

90
  • Biosecurity

91
Biosecurity Lines On Production Sites
  • Lines are imaginary or real barriers to reduce
    risk of pathogen exposure to pigs
  • Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)
  • Outer control boundary set up around the
    perimeter of the site to limit access of the
    outside world to close contact with animal
    buildings
  • Interior Clean-Dirty Line (ICD)
  • Established to isolate pigs on the clean side of
    the production site from sources of infection on
    the dirty side of the production site

92
Biosecurity Lines on Production Sites
  • Criteria for each line addresses risk mitigation
    measures for swine, people and fomites
  • Producers would work with herd veterinarians to
    establish lines and protocols.

93
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94
Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site
Biosecurity Lines
  • Restricting Entry into the PBA
  • Access control
  • Ingress / egress
  • People
  • Routing, designated parking
  • Animals
  • Animal disposal, feral swine prevention, other
    livestock
  • Fomites
  • Area for cleaning and disinfection, feed routing

95
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96
Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site
Biosecurity Lines
  • Crossing the ICD line
  • People
  • Biosecurity protocols
  • Animals
  • Prevention of non-swine animal exposure
  • Fomites
  • Biosecurity protocols for delivery of equipment
    feed etc.

97
Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site
Biosecurity Lines
  • Crossing the ICD line
  • Load outs
  • Portable chutes, common load outs, animal flow
    etc.
  • Carcass removal
  • Movement of carcasses and people
  • Weather

98
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99
Biosecurity Protocols
  • Broken into Level I Level II
  • Level I is the default for day-to-day practice
  • Level II is a heightened protocol for after an
    FAD event
  • Producers can choose to operate in level II on a
    day-to-day basis which would shorten the time for
    transition and verification in the event of an
    FAD

100
Visitor Biosecurity
  • Two levels and each addresses
  • Limiting visitors
  • Requiring sign in
  • Following biosecurity protocols
  • Cleaning of equipment

101
Employee Biosecurity
  • Two levels and each addresses
  • General employee guidelines
  • Employee entry
  • Employee movement between sites
  • Facility entry

102
Production Site Biosecurity
  • Two levels and each addresses
  • Access deterrents
  • Buildings
  • Pest wildlife control
  • Crossing the ICD line for operating procedures
  • Carcass removal
  • Loose pigs

103
Loadout Biosecurity
  • Two levels and each addresses
  • Drivers
  • Each load-out area
  • Load-out procedures

104
  • Surveillance

105
Natl Surveillance Program Streams
106
PIN Tag Pilot
107
What is next?
108
Iowa E2E Project
109
  • Communications

110
Communications
  • Cross Species FMD Communications Team
  • Developed messaging for FMD outbreaks to reassure
    the consumer about the safety of pork, beef and
    milk.
  • Currently studying consumer perceptions regarding
    vaccine
  • Working on an educational strategy to raise
    retailer awareness (ounce of prevention)
  • http//www.fmdinfo.org/

111
  • Monitored Premises Compartmentalization

112
Setting a High Bar
113
  • Risk Assessment

114
What is an acceptable risk?
115
SPS Enrolment /Compliance / Verification
  • We will be addressing the issue this year
  • Goal is to develop a workable, credible and
    affordable solution
  • Could develop it as a part of PQA plus

116
  • Putting it all together!

117
Packer Received Pigs from SPS sites AA13579
on XX / XX /2012 BB24688 on XX / XX
/2012 ETC..
PIN-765432A Pork Packer
PIN-AA13579 Wean to Finish
PIN-1234567B Wean to Finish
What the State Vet can determine 1. Site is a
part of Secure Pork? 2. Valid traceability
system up and running? 3. Standardized
biosecurity in place? 4. Achieved a negative
disease status?
Permitted Movements
PIN-BB24688 Wean to Finish
PIN -123456A Sow Farm
PIN-1234567C Swine Finisher
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