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REGIONALISM IN WORLD POLITICS

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Title: REGIONALISM IN WORLD POLITICS


1
REGIONALISM IN WORLD POLITICS
  • Prof. Alexander SerguninDepartment of
    International Relations Theory HistorySt.
    Petersburg State UniversityRussiaSergunin60_at_mail
    .ru

2
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE
  • To examine the main theories of regionalism and
    regionalization,
  • To analyze the basic types of regionalism in the
    EU and Russia
  • To study the main trends in interregional
    cooperation in contemporary Europe.

3
Skills acquired from the course
  • To know the countries of the regions and basic
    information about their politics and economy
  • To operate with macro-, mezo- and micro-levels of
    regional studies, as well theories of
    integration, functionalism and neo-functionalism,
    interdependency
  • To be aware of the cases of regionalism in the
    Baltic Sea area, Arctic Area, Russia.
  • To understand the problems of contemporary
    regionalism, the balance of cooperation and
    competition.

4
THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL REGIONAL STUDIES (PRS)
  • Domestically-oriented approaches
  • The same as regional planning (economic
    geography) socio-economic and political
    development of a region
  • Region as a historical-cultural entity
    (antropological/socio-historical approach)
  • Region as a legal entity/sub-national unit
    (administrative unit, autonomy, member of a
    federation, overseas territory, etc.)
  • Political science complex approach (combination
    of the above approaches any kind of a region
    with a clearly identifiable centre of political
    power)

5
THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL REGIONAL STUDIES (PRS)
  • 2. Internationally-oriented approaches
  • International region in political geography
  • International region in economic geography
  • International region in International Relations
    Theory (IRT)

6
THE STATUS OF PRS IN THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
  • Inter-disciplinary

prs
7
THE STATUS OF PRS IN THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
  • Autonomous discipline with the subject and
    methods of its own

PRS
8
THE STATUS OF PRS IN THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
  • Part of political science (PS) with a specific
    subject
  • PS

PRS
9
THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS IN PRS
  • Macro-level meta-theories (paradigms) -
    political realism liberalism/globalism
    post-positivism/social constructivism
  •  
  • Mezo-level middle-range theories institutional
    approach (legal studies, comparativism) rational
    choice behavioural studies structural-functional
    approach discourse analysis
  •  
  • Micro-level specific research methods and
    techniques (applied, empirical)

10
The PS/IRT paradigms on regionalism 1
  • Political realists and geopoliticians the
    emergence of regions (both domestic and
    international), the world-wide process of
    regionalisation are the results of powers
    politics, struggle for re-distribution of spheres
    of influence. Regionalism is not valuable as
    such, it is a dependent variable

11
The PS/IRT paradigms on regionalism 2
  • The liberal institutionalists regionalism is a
    natural and useful process, the way to enhance
    international co-operation geoeconomics, instead
    of geopolitics. Importance of gate-way and
    pilot regions for the success of worlds
    regionalisation

12
The PS/IRT paradigms on regionalism 3
  • Globalists regionalism is another side of
    globalisation regionalisation and globalisation
    should be harmonised they both should be even
    and beneficial for all international actors
    regionalisation and globalisation as instruments
    of de-sovereignisation, erosion of state and
    creation of a global civil society

13
The PS/IRT paradigms on regionalism 4
  • Social constructivists identity-oriented
    approach to regionalisation multi-level
    regionalisation as a way to non-confronting
    identities focus on regions-in-the-making (the
    Baltic Sea, Barents Sea, Black Sea, Asia-Pacific
    regions, etc.)

14
TYPES OF FEDERALISM - I
  • 1. Legal Basis
  • Contractual/treaty-based (USSR, RSFSR, the
    Federative Treaty of 1992)
  • Constitutional/constitution-based (the Russian
    Constitution of 1993)

15
TYPES OF FEDERALISM - II
  • 2. Nature of a unit
  • Ethnic-based (USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,
    etc.)
  • Administrative-territorial (USA, FRG, etc.)
  • Mixed (the Russian Federation)

16
THE STRUCTURE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (83)
  • Regions (oblasts) - 46
  • Provinces (krays) - 9
  • National republic 21
  • Autonomous region (oblast) - 1
  • Autonomous districts (okrugs) - 4
  • Cities of federal subordination (Moscow and St.
    Petersburg)
  • Eight Federal Districts

17
FACTORS OF RUSSIAS REGIONALISATION - I
  • Domestic
  • the weakness of the federal centre
  • the collapse of the old vertical structure of
    political control
  • decentralization as a result of democratization
  • the lack of proper legal basis for separation of
    powers between centre and regions
  • the economic challenges of a period of transition
    (economic crisis, disruption of economic ties
    between different regions, the tendency to
    self-reliance of the regions)
  • the rise of regional elites
  • Russia's ethnic, religious, cultural and spatial
    diversity

18
FACTORS OF RUSSIAS REGIONALISATION - II
  • External
  • Global developments
  • New geopolitical situation
  • Strategic-military determinants
  • Economic considerations
  • Territorial and ethnic disputes
  • Migration
  • Cultural and religious factors

19
METHODS OF REGIONS PARADIPLOMACIES
  • Specialists distinguish two main forms of the
    regions paradiplomaciesdirect (developing
    external relations of their own) and indirect
    (influencing federal foreign policies).

20
DIRECT METHODS -I
  • Creating a regional legislative base. Negative
    experiences Constitutions of Tatarstan and
    Bashkortostan of 1992. Positive experiences
    Novgorod legislation on taxation and protection
    of investment (1994), Nizhny Novgorod legislation
    on international agreem-making. In the 1990s, the
    Russian regions concluded more than 300
    international agreements. They used to be
    prepared with the Foreign Ministrys assistance.
    However, some agreements were signed bypassing
    Moscow. For example, the Foreign Ministry
    expressed its concerns about the agreement
    between Kabardino-Balkariya and Abkhazia that
    formally is a part of Georgia. In 1995 Moscow
    even annulled the trade treaty between
    Kaliningrad and Lithuania because it came into
    collision with the federal legislation.ents of
    members of the Russian Federation. (1995).
  • Making international treaties

21
DIRECT METHODS -II
  • Attracting foreign investment. Most successful
    regions Moscow, St Petersburg, Novgorod, Samara.
    For example, Novgorod the Great 49 of oblast's
    GDP is derived from foreign investment. In
    investment dollars per capita Novgorod is second
    only to Moscow, and is rated third for its
    economic development over the past six years.
    There are about 200 foreign or joint-venture
    enterprises in Novgorod which play a major
    economic role. They provide 20,000 with jobs and
    account for 62 per cent of the regional
    industrial output. Firms with foreign capital
    provide half the taxes paid to the region.
  • Creating a regions positive image. To attract
    foreign investors many regions launch dynamic PR
    campaigns.
  • Co-operation with international organisations.
    For example, Tatarstan co-operates with UNESCO,
    UNIDO, the European Congress of Municipal and
    Regional Governments, and Council of Europe. The
    north-west regions of Russia co-operate with the
    Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the
    Hanseatic League and the Barents/Euro-Arctic
    Council (BEAC). It should be noted that
    co-operation with international organisations is
    important for regions not only in terms of
    getting an additional leverage in the
    power-struggle with Moscow but also in terms of
    opening up them for the world-wide processes of
    globalisation and regionalisation.

22
INDIRECT METHODS -I
  • Influencing the federal legislation. The local
    legislation not only legitimises the external
    relations of the regions but also affects the
    federal legislation. For example, the comments
    made by the Nizhny Novgorod regional legislature
    on the drafts of the federal laws on
    international treaties of the Russian Federation
    (1995), state regulation of foreign trade (1995),
    visa regime (1997), foreign policy powers of the
    Federation and its members (1999) have been taken
    into account by the State Duma.
  • Taking part in the federal diplomacy. Since the
    federal law envisages regions participation in
    international treaty-making their representatives
    used to be included into official delegations and
    consulted as regards the content of agreements.
    For example, the representatives of Karelia and
    the Krasnodar province assisted the Foreign
    Ministry in preparing treaties with Finland and
    Cyprus, respectively. The representatives of the
    Far Eastern regions attended Sino-Russian summits
    and took part in talks on demarcating the border
    between the two states. This was quite helpful
    for harmonising federal and regional interests.

23
INDIRECT METHODS -II
  • Conflict prevention and resolution. With time,
    the federal authorities realised that
    regionalisation can serve as an instrument for
    problem-solving with respect to Russia's
    relations with neighbouring countries. For
    example, Kaliningrad's close co-operation with
    Lithuania, Poland and Germany prevented the rise
    of territorial claims on their part, and dampened
    their concerns over excessive militarisation of
    the region. Co-operation between Finland and
    Karelia also eased Finnish-Russian tensions on
    the Karelia issue. The cross-border co-operation
    between the Kuriles, Sakhalin and Japan led to a
    quiet Russia-Japan dialogue on the disputed
    territory.

24
INDIRECT METHODS -III
  • Verbal diplomacy. To influence federal foreign
    policies the regional leaders often make
    statements on particular international issues.
    For example, in the 1990s Yevgeny Nazdratenko,
    the Governor of the Maritime Province, vigorously
    objected the transfer of some Russian lands to
    China in accordance with the Sino-Russian Treaty
    of 1991. Yuri Luzhkov, the Moscow mayor,
    protested against the division of the Black Sea
    Fleet between Russia and Ukraine and insisted on
    the Russian jurisdiction over Sevastopol and
    Crimea. This became less possible under the
    Putins rule.
  • Unfortunately, the verbal diplomacy has
    often demonstrated not only the growing influence
    of the regions over Russias international
    strategy but also the lack of political culture
    among the regional elites. In other words, this
    diplomacy had rather contradictory implications
    for to the Russian national interests.

25
INDIRECT METHODS -IV
  • Exploiting the parliament. The regions use the
    legislature to lobby their foreign policy
    interests at the federal level. The Council of
    the Federation, the upper chamber of the
    parliament, made up of the regional
    representatives is the most popular vehicle for
    the regional lobbying. For example, the Novgorod
    Governor Mikhail Prusak, being in the 1990s a
    chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
    Council of the Federation and the Vice President
    of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
    Europe, often used his official position to
    promote Novgorods interests.
  • Capitalising upon the federal infrastructure. To
    influence federal foreign policy the regions use
    the institutional structure created by Moscow in
    the periphery. For example, the Foreign Ministry
    has established a special unit on inter-regional
    affairs. The Foreign Ministry, Ministry of
    Commerce, Customs Committee, Federal Border
    Service have offices in those regions engaged in
    intensive international co-operation.
    Theoretically, these agencies should co-ordinate
    and control regions international contacts.
    However, they often serve as a regions
    instrument of pressure upon Moscow rather than
    the centres leverage. The problem is that these
    agencies are dependent on local authorities in
    terms of housing, salaries and professional
    career. They are usually staffed by the locals
    with close connections to the regional elites.

26
INDIRECT METHODS -V
  • Exploiting international organisations. To put
    pressure on Moscow the regions managed to use not
    only federal institutions but also international
    organisations. For instance, to get a more
    privileged status (special economic zone,
    visa-free regime with Lithuania and Poland)
    Kaliningrad quite skilfully exploited venues such
    as the CBSS (Council of the Baltic Sea States)
    and the EU Northern Dimension. The northern areas
    of Russia are represented at the Regional Council
    of the BEAC (Barents-Euro-Arctic Council) and
    develop direct ties with the neighbouring regions
    of Finland, Norway and Sweden. With the help of
    the OSCE, Council of Europe and the Red Cross,
    Ingushetiya managed to increase the flow of the
    humanitarian assistance to the refugees from
    Chechnya.
  • It should be noted that in the real life the
    regions combine both direct and indirect methods
    because they are complimentary rather than
    mutually exclusive.

27
The levels of paradiplomacies - I
  • Operationally, there are three main levels of
    regions international activities bilateral
    co-operation with foreign countries co-operation
    between the inter-regional associations and
    foreign partners and cross-border and
    trans-regional co-operation.
  • Bilateral (sistership) co-operation between
    sub-national units of foreign countries ranges
    from economic, social, environmental and cultural
    matters to security issues. For example, Nizhny
    Novgorod has rather close relations with North
    Rhine-Westphalia, Italian Lombardy, and the
    French Buche-du-Rhone, the regions that have much
    in common with the profile of the Nizhny Novgorod
    economy.

28
The levels of paradiplomacies - II
  • The second level of international co-operation
    (in case of Russia) are external relations of the
    Russian inter-regional associations. There is a
    number of inter-regional associations or blocs
    such as the Northwest Association, Greater Volga
    Association, Chernozem Association, Ural
    Association, and the Siberian Accords Association
    which mainly deal with economic and social
    issues. The members of these associations meet
    several times each year to discuss issues of
    common interest which need co-ordination, such as
    transport, communication, food and fuel supplies,
    and joint projects. However, along with domestic
    affairs, these blocs are increasingly engaged in
    international relations. For example, the
    Northwest Association led by St Petersburg
    co-ordinates foreign economic relations of its
    members with the Baltic/Nordic countries. At its
    February 2000 meeting, the Siberian Accords
    Association (19 members) discussed the prospects
    for constructing a highway to China and improving
    border controls on the Russian-Mongolian
    frontier. The association is a driving force for
    the Russian-Byelorussian integration. Its members
    account for 20 of the Russian trade with Minsk.
    Moreover, the association initiated a Siberian
    youth movement Russian-Byelorussian Union.

29
The levels of paradiplomacies - III
  • The third level of international co-operation,
    used to be cross-border (i.e., co-operative
    projects between regions in neighbouring
    countries) and transregional (i.e., collaboration
    with and within multilateral organisations).
  • In case of Russia, the coordination role can be
    played by the system of Federal Districts

30
The special case of Kaliningrad
  • Due to its unique geopolitical and geo-economic
    locations almost all forms and levels of
    paradiplomacy are present direct and indirect
    bilateral, inter-regional associations
    international activities, cross-and trans-border
    cooperation

31
THE MAP OF THE KALININGRAD REGION
32
LEVELS OF COOPERATION ON KALININGRAD
  • Country-to-supranational organisation (Russia-EU)
  • Country-to-international organisation
    (Russia-CBSS, Nordic Council, etc.)
  • Country-to-country (bilateral)
  • Local government-to-local government
  • (Pilau Baltijsk Klaipeda)

33
KALININGRADS PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROREGIONS
  • The Baltic Euroregion (1998) local governments
    from Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia
    and the Kaliningrad Region
  • The Saule Euroregion (1999) local governments
    from Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia and the
    Kaliningrad Region
  • The Neman Euroregion (2002) local governments
    from Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and the
    Kaliningrad Region
  • Lyna-Lava Euroregion (2003) local governments
    from Poland and the Kaliningrad Region
  • Šešupe Euroregion (2004) local governments from
    Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the Kaliningrad
    Region

34
EuroregionBaltika
35
PRIORITIES FOR THE BALTIC EUROREGION
  • Development of a comprehensive and long-term
    strategy for the Euroregion.
  • Water resources monitoring of the current
    situation and further reduction of water
    pollution.
  • Establishing of innovation centers to support
    small and medium-size businesses.
  • Development of rural areas, including
    introduction of new technologies and development
    of the transport infrastructure.
  • Introduction of information technologies and
    improvement of communication systems. Under this
    subproject TACIS provides the local authorities
    with equipment, software and expert assistance.
    For example, with the TACIS help a new website
    was developed for the Baltiysk national
    secretariat.

36
The administrative structure of the Baltic
Euroregion
NATIONAL SECRETARIATES
37
EuroregionSAULE
38
EuroregionNEMAN
39
EuroregionŠešupe
40
EUROREGIONKarelia
41
The Novgorod Region
42
LESSONS FROM THE EURORGIONS EXPERIENCE
  • With exception of the Baltic and Karelia
    Euroregions they are semi-dormant, do not work
    properly
  • Basically reduced to the bureaucratic tourism
  • A lot of overlapping, the lack of coordination
    and a proper division of labor
  • It is unclear whether each Euroregion should
    specialize on particular freedoms or cover all
    4Fs?
  • Unhealthy competition for funds/sponsors
  • Are the Euroregions sustainable without or with a
    minimal support (financial, administrative,
    moral) of Moscow, EU, IFIs, etc.?

43
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
  • The existing and future Euroregions with Russias
    participation should become one of the
    locomotives of the EU-Russia co-operation on
    CES/FTA business. While general rules are
    established at the national/supranational level
    the implementation of concrete projects should be
    done by local companies and governments. It is
    advisable that the creation of the CES and
    promotion of the 4Fs should become the main
    priority for the Euroregions.
  • The Euroregions also can contribute to
    facilitation of the movement of people and goods
    in the sub-region by building new and developing
    the existing border crossings and the transport
    infrastructure in the area. Currently, local
    governments prefer to shoulder this
    responsibility on the federal budget. However,
    with providing local government with more powers
    in taxation the local authorities will feel
    themselves more responsible for this business (on
    the one hand) and get more funds for implementing
    projects (on the other).
  • A better division of labour should be established
    between the Euroregions. While the Baltic and
    Karelia Euroregion could keep its current
    specialisation on sub-regional economic planning,
    support of private entrepreneurship, environment
    protection and home and justice affairs
    (particularly, fighting organised crime), Saule
    Euroregions could focus on cross-border trade and
    developing the transportation infrastructure. The
    Neman, Lyna-Lava and Sesupe Euroregions could pay
    more attention to development of people-to-people
    contacts, education, culture and cooperation
    between NGOs. In addition, the Neman Euroregion
    could focus on engaging Belarus (which is
    becoming an important priority for the ENP) in
    sub-regional co-operation. Border crossings
    development could be a joint sphere of
    responsibility for all Euroregions.

44
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
  • To support Euroregion activities the
    interoperability of various EU co-operative
    programs and instruments should be improved in
    the new institutional framework of the EU-Russia
    common spaces. In short, it is essential that
    flexibility remains a central tenet of the EU
    approach. Some steps have already been taken by
    the European Commission over the last five years
    to ensure better co-ordination between the
    different programs such as PHARE, TACIS and
    INTERREG. The ENPI seemingly aims at the same
    direction. This work should be completed in the
    process of implementation of the four roadmaps.
  • The very nature of the existing (semi-dormant)
    Euroregions should be changed. Not only municipal
    officials should be participants of exchange
    programs, other actors such as local businessmen,
    NGOs, journalists, students and teachers should
    be involved. To strengthen cooperation within the
    Euroregions and its institutional basis joint
    structures ventures, chambers of commerce,
    professional associations, NGOs, education
    institutions, etc. should be developed. The
    local actors should not wait for Moscows
    permission and should be more proactive and
    initiative-minded. By the way, even the current
    Russian legislation allows local actors to
    establish links to the similar actors in the
    foreign countries (the Russian Foreign Ministry
    only asks for information about these contacts,
    visits and joint projects). The main problems are
    the lack of finance and psychological inertia
    that was inherited from the Soviet time. However,
    with coming of a more sustainable economy and
    increase in living standards as well as
    overcoming the Soviet-type mentality (through
    civic activism and growing international
    contacts) these problems could be successfully
    solved.

45
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
  • Establishment of a proper legal basis for the
    Euroregions should also be an important priority
    for Russia. Moscow ratified the European
    convention on border co-operation as late as in
    2003. Russia does not have border treaties with
    Latvia and Estonia. There is a clear need in
    passing a federal law on Euroregions because
    several Russian regions experience difficulties
    in this area.
  • On the organisational/administrative note both
    Russian and EU representative bodies in the
    Russian north-western regions should initiate a
    series of meetings, expert seminars and workshops
    (with participation of local governments from
    countries and regions concerned) to discuss the
    future of the existing Euroregions and the
    prospects for the creation of other Euroregions.

46
City-twinning a conceptual dimension
  • Related concepts
  • connected cities
  • border-crossing cities
  • trans-border cities
  • partnership cities
  • bi-national cities
  • sister cities
  • sputnik-cities

47
Defining the concept of twinning
  • Twin-cities city-pairs that do not just aim at
    bridging and intensified international
    cooperation as border cities or connected
    cities but also at creating in varying degrees
    communality and joint space

48
Typical characteristics of twin-cities
  • They should harbour a joint history as cities
    that have existed as administrative units in the
    past, prior to national borders separating them.
  • Although previously separated by borders, this
    delimiting should have been traded for open
    borders.
  • A preferable case consists of cities where a
    river both separates and connects the cities
    facing each other across the river (and, for this
    reason, they are called bridge towns).
  • There should be connecting factors and features
    conducive to cooperation such as ethnic
    minorities as well as command of the neighbours
    language.
  • There should be a certain level of
    institutionalization of cooperation between the
    twins in terms of unified administrative
    structures and common urban planning.
  • The most advanced twin towns purport themselves
    as Euro-cities in emphasizing their European
    rather than national identity.

49
City Twins Association (2006)
  • Imatra-Svetogorsk
  • Narva-Ivangorod
  • Frankfurt (Oder)-Slubice
  • Görlitz-Zgorzelec
  • Tornio-Haparanda
  • Valga-Valka
  • Ciezyn-Cesky Tiesin
  • Candidates Kirkenes-Nikel

50
Tornio-Haparanda
51
Tornio-Haparanda(aerial photo)
52
Tornio-Haparanda Eurocity cooperative projects
  • joint rescue and ambulance service
  • joint tourist service
  • joint employment information agencies
  • joint schools and educational facilities
  • common circle bus line
  • joint postal service
  • common library
  • Provincia Bothniensis (joint development body)
  • joint city core (including shopping centre)

53
Tornio-Haparanda joint shopping and recreational
area
54
Narva-Ivangorod A Case of Partition
55
Narva-Ivangorod cooperative projects
  • Baltic Welcome Centre (tourism, recreation)
  • SuPortNet
  • City Twin
  • Narva River Water Routes (water tourism)
  • Est Rus Fort Tour (joint tourist route covering
    the two fortresses on the Narva River)
  • Historical promenade

56
Imatra-Svetogorsk
Imatra hydroelectric plant
Svetogorsk Paper Combine
57
Imatra-Svetogorsk cooperative projects
  • Air quality in the Imatra-Svetogorsk region
  • Development of fisheries in the Vuoksi River,
    Svetogorsk (Phare/Tacis  ??? TSP 36/97)
  • Program for the development of the Svetogorsk
    energy system and cooperation with Imatra (???
    TSP 29/97)
  • Developing tourism in Svetogorsk (Russia) and
    Imatra (Finland)  (??? TSP/RL/9803/037).
  • Centre for Business Partnership in Svetogorsk
  • Twin-Cities Day

58
Valga-Valka Divided by Nationness
In the left part of the picture is the
Estonian-Latvian boundary post no. 190H-2. The
number is actual 190H, and "-2" is actually
telling the number of meters to the position of
the actual boundary, namely 2 metres. The actual
boundary here is the ditch north of where it
stands, at the traffic sign. 120 Võru street is
located in the middle of this photo.
59
Valga city centre map
60
Valka map
61
Valga-Valka cooperative projects
  • spatial planning
  • cross-border bus line
  • tourism
  • education
  • healthcare
  • culture
  • sports
  • joint secretariat

62
Kirkenes-Nikel Catching a Second Wind of
Twinning?
63
Polar city-pair
Nikel
Kirkenes
64
The areas of cooperation
  • Support for small and medium-size business
  • Establishment of a joint Business Cooperation
    Centre in Nikel
  • Environment protection
  • Health care (including direct cooperative schemes
    between municipal hospitals)
  • Education (direct links between elementary and
    secondary schools)
  • Training programs for municipal officials
  • Tourism
  • Cultural festivals and exhibitions
  • Library and museum cooperation
  • Mass media cooperation
  • Women and youth cooperation
  • Sports

65
Conclusions (on twinning)
  • Although the legacies tend to pertain to the
    existence of rather divisive borders and despite
    a number of other obstacles, city twinning has
    more recently turned into an established form of
    crossing and doing away with the divisive effects
    of borders.
  • The model of cities re-imagining their borders
    and pooling resources does not merely impact the
    local landscapes but has broader consequences as
    well.
  • Moreover, it does not seem to be restricted to
    some cases located at the edges of Europe but is,
    instead, conducive to the creation of cooperative
    borderlands in Europe at large (City Twins
    Association).

66
Implications of paradiplomacy for a
nation/federative-state
  • Regionalisation of (unstable) federative states
    does have negative consequences further
    disintegration of the single economic, financial
    and cultural space degradation of the party
    system and the rise of interest group politics
    answering to parochial interests regionalisation
    and privatisation of security services and armed
    forces inconsistency of the international
    strategy caused by the regional elites
    intervening the decision-making process and the
    rise of separatism and secessionism, which could
    result in disintegration of the country.

67
Positive Implications of Regionalization
  • First and foremost, regionalisation encourages
    further democratisation of the political system,
    including managing the external relations of the
    regions.
  • Regionalisation has also helped to discredit the
    top-down model of federalism and replace it
    with the bottoms-up process with very lively
    grass-roots.
  • Moreover, international co-operation has helped
    many regions-particularly remote and border
    regions-to survive the transition period in many
    post-Socialist countries.
  • Devolution of power in post-Socialist countries
    boosted foreign relations of the regions and made
    them real international actors.
  • Finally, regionalisation serves as an instrument
    for problem-solving with neighbouring countries.

68
The Baltic Sea Region
69
The BSR Institutional Network
  • EU Strategy for the BSR (2009)
  • Northern Dimension (1997 reorganized 2007)
  • Nordic Council of Ministers (1971)
  • Nordic Council (1952)
  • Council of the Baltic Sea States (1992)
  • HELCOM (Helsinki Commission)
  • BSSSC (Baltic Sea States Subregional
    Co-operation) (1993)
  • Union of the Baltic Cities
  • The Baltic Development Forum (1998)
  • International Financial Institutions (EIB, EBRD,
    NIB, etc/)

70
CBSS Long-Term Priorities
  • environment
  • economic development
  • energy
  • education and culture
  • civil security and the human dimension

71
Priorities for the Russian CBSS Presidency,
2012-2013 (according to Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov)
  • 1. Development of cooperation in the field of
    modernization and innovation with a focus on
    clusters of growth
  • 2. Establishment of a network of public-private
    partnerships as a platform for sustainable growth
    and setting up a regional private equity fund
  • 3. Promotion of the traditions of tolerance as a
    means of combating tendencies of radicalism and
    extremism.
  • 4. Promotion of people-to-people contacts,
    facilitating the visa regime

72
The Arctic Region
73
Categorization of Arctic actors coastal states
  • Russia
  • Canada
  • United States
  • Norway
  • Denmark (Greenland)

74
Categorization of Arctic actors sub-Arctic
countries
  • Finland
  • Iceland
  • Sweden

75
Categorization of Arctic actors non-regionals
with Arctic ambitions
  • China
  • Japan
  • South Korea
  • India
  • UK

76
The Arctic Region an Institutional Framework
  • Arctic Council (1996)
  • Barents-Euro-Arctic Council (1993)
  • Nordic organizations (Nordic Council of
    Ministers, Nordic Council, NEFCO, NIB, etc.)
  • Newcomers EU, NATO
  • UN and its specialized units (Commission on
    Continental Shelf, etc.)

77
The Arctic Region Problematic Areas
  • Degradation of environment
  • Climate change
  • Challenges to indigenous people
  • Maritime safety
  • Growth of competition between different nations
    because of the Arctic natural resources and sea
    routes

78
Climate Change Positive Implications
  • Fisheries. Climate change might bring increased
    productivity in some fish stocks and changes in
    spatial distributions of others. New areas may
    become attractive for fishing with increased
    access due to reduced sea ice coverage.

79
Climate Change Positive Implications
  • Hydrocarbons. Retreating ice opens up new
    commercial opportunities for gas and petroleum
    activities. New industrial development in the
    High North will not only take place offshore.
    There is a huge potential also for new onshore
    activity in connection with the gas/petroleum
    industry.

80
Climate Change Positive Implications
  • Transport. Retreating ice opens up new
    opportunities for shipping as well with a more
    intensive use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and
    North-West Passage (NWP).

81
The Northern Sea Route
82
Two conflicting approaches to the Northern Sea
Route in the Russian geopolitical thinking
  • 1. NSR is Russias possession and valuable asset,
    part of the Russian Arctic Zone (RAZ). Russia
    should resist any foreign encroachments on the
    NSR
  • 2. NSR (as a part of Arctic) belongs to the
    humankind at large. Russia is responsible for its
    smart exploitation, protection and sustainable
    development

83
  • Pluses
  • Shorter than the route via Suez canal by distance
    (by 34) and time (two weeks)
  • May become the main way for shipping energy
    resources from the Russian Arctic Zone
  • May become the main way for supplying the Russian
    RAZ territories (coastal and inland) by fuel,
    equipment, consumer goods and services
  • Safer than the southern routes (no pirates)

84
Southern and Northern Routes a Comparison
85
Ice-class tankers Varzuga and Indiga
86
The Polarcus Alima 3D seismic X-bow vessel first
to travel the Northern Sea Route in 2011
87
Minuses (for international partners)
  • Tanker speed is problematic 21-24 nautical miles
    p/h for southern routes and 14 nautical miles p/h
    for the NSR (because of the drifting ice and -
    potentially - icebergs)
  • Fuel consumption and savings are not calculated
    properly
  • Dependence on the Russian ice-breaker escort
  • The lack of experienced crews to navigate in
    Arctic
  • The lack of proper port, navigation,
    communication, search and rescue infrastructure
  • International insurance companies are unfamiliar
    with the nature of risks in the region and may
    increase fees
  • The risk of environmental hazards

88
Some preliminary recommendations on the revival
of the NSR
  • To develop the port, navigation and communication
    infrastructure
  • To build liquid-gas production plants
  • To build further the ice-breaker fleet (3 nuclear
    powered and 5 diesel ice-breakers by 2020)
  • To develop ice-class tanker fleet (some 60
    vessels by 2020)
  • To develop the Arctic search and rescue system
    (10 SR centres by 2015)
  • To train crews for the Arctic conditions
  • To increase language skills of both vessel crews
    and coastal services

89
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90
Climate Change Positive Implications
  • Tourism. Climate change could expand
    opportunities for development of the
    tourist/recreation industry which is a relatively
    new business in the region.

91
Climate Change Negative Implications
  • Fisheries. For some of the Arctic high seas
    waters there is not yet an international
    conservation and management regime in place. This
    might lead to unregulated fisheries and, hence,
    conflicts because of that.

92
Climate Change Negative Implications
  • Hydrocarbons race may increase competition
    between the five coastal states for control over
    continental shelf and maritime zones as well as
    invite another conflict between the Arctic-5
    and non-coastal states (such as Finland, Sweden,
    UK, China, Japan, South Korea, India, etc.) who
    would like to participate in exploitation of the
    Arctic natural resources. The role of
    international legal regimes (especially UNCLOS)
    and bodies (UN Commission on the Limits of the
    Continental Shelf) are particularly important in
    this regard.

93
Continental Shelf Limits
94
Delimitation of the Norwegian-Russian maritime
border in the Barents Sea (2010)
95
Climate Change Negative Implications
  • The growing availability of the Arctic sea routes
    may increase competition between coastal and
    non-coastal states for the control of these
    passages and, at the same time, emphasize the
    need for new legal regimes and transport and
    search/rescue infrastructures. China, Japan and
    South Korea (the nations that are most interested
    in exploitation of these sea routes) insist that
    the NSR and NWP are the humankinds assets or
    commons and should be available for everyone and
    hence - internationalized.

96
Climate Change Negative Implications
  • Migration. Climate change leads towards migration
    of both indigenous population because of the
    radical restructuring of its economy and way of
    life and work force which is occupied in the
    gas/petroleum industries, transport and military
    sectors. These developments dictate the need for
    large-scale socio-economic programs to adapt the
    local population to such a radical change.

97
Climate Change Negative Implications
  • Remilitarization. The increasing competition for
    trade routes, maritime zones and natural
    resources has already led and continues to lead
    to a military build-up of particular coastal
    states and intensification of NATO military
    activities in the region. In contrast with the
    Cold war era, the current military efforts aim at
    protection of economic interests of the Arctic
    states and assertion of their national
    sovereignty over the maritime zones and trade
    routes rather than global confrontation between
    two superpowers or politico-military blocs.

98
Venues for Cooperation in the Arctic
  • Environment protection
  • Climate change monitoring
  • Joint exploration and exploitation of vast Arctic
    natural resources
  • Search and rescue operations
  • Fighting oil spills
  • Preservation of traditional cultures and
    economies of indigenous people

99
In Lieu of Conclusion
  • World regionalism and globalization are two sides
    of the same coin

100
Recommended Literature
  • Browning C., Joenniemi P. Regionality Beyond
    Security? The Baltic Sea Region after
    Enlargement. Copenhagen Danish Institute for
    International Studies, 2003.
  • Henningsen B., Etzold T. (eds.). The Political
    State of the Region Report 2012. Copenhagen
    Baltic Development Fund, 2012.
  • Joenniemi P., Sergunin A. Laboratories of
    European Integration City-Twinning in Northern
    Europe. Tartu Peipsi Center for Transboundary
    Cooperation, 2012.
  • Kaliningrad in Europa Nachbarcchaftliche
    Perspektiven nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges.
    Wiesbaden Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010.
  • Konyshev V., Sergunin A. The Arctic at the
    crossroads of geopolitical interests // Russian
    Politics and Law, 2012. Vol. 50, ? 2. P.
    34-54
  • Oldberg, Ingmar. Soft Security in the Baltic Sea
    Region . Stockholm Swedish Institute of
    International Affairs, 2012.
  • Sergounin A. External Determinants of Russias
    Regionalization. Working Paper No. 3. Zurich
    Center for Security Studies and Conflict
    Research, 2001. http//cms.isn.ch/public/docs/doc_
    319_290_en.pdf
  • Sergunin A. Russias Baltic policy new
    horizons? // Baltic Rim Economies, 2012. ? 2.
    P. 34
  • Zagorsky A. (ed.). The Arctic A Space of
    Cooperation and Common Security Moscow, 2010.

101
Recommended Literature
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    ?.?. ?????????. (???????????? ??????????).
    ?????? ???????????? ????????? ??????? ?????????
    ? ????????????? ????????? ???, 2011.
  • ??????? ?.?. ??????????????. ?. ??????-?????,
    2007.
  • ??????? ?.?., ????????? ?.?. ??????????????.
    ?????? ?????????, 2002.
  • ????? ?.?. ???????? ????????????, ??????????????
    ? ??????????? ?????? ??????????? ????. ???.,
    2008.
  • ??????? ?.?., ???????? ?.?. ??????? ?
    ????????????? ???????? ?????????????? ???
    ?????????????? ?????? ?????????? ????????
    ?????????????? ????????????, 2011.
  • ??????? ?.?., ???????? ?.?. ????????? ????????? ?
    ??????? ? ?????? ???????? ?? ???????????????? //
    ??????? ? ?????, 2012. ? 8. ?. 4-26
  • ????????? ?.?. ?????????? ????? ??????????
    ?????? ??? ???????????? ?????? // ?????
    (???????????? ????????????). 2000. ? 5. ?. 81
    97.
  • ???????? ?.?. ???????????? ??????????????.
    ?????? ?????????, 2002.
  • ?????????? ???????. ???????????? ? ??????????????
    ?????????????? ? ????? ????? ???????????
    ?????????? ??????. ?????? ??????-???????????????
    ????? ?? ????????????? ?????????? , 2002.
  • ?????? ??? ??????? ???????? ? ????????????
    ????????? / ??? ???. ?.B.?????????. ? ????,
    2000.
  • ????????? ?.?. ??????????????? ??????? ?
    ?????????? ???????? (?? ??????? ??????) // ?????
    (???????????? ????????????). 2011. ? 2. ?. 99
    117.
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