Title: July 1: What is the role of international organizations and do they really matter?
1July 1 What is the role of international
organizations and do they really matter?
- Abbot, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why
States Act through Formal Organizations. Journal
of Conflict Resolution 423-32.
2Last class take-home point
- Analytical tool
- Time inconsistent preference problem
- A.K.A. (also known as)
- Commitment problem
- Present bias
3Do IOs matter?
4Dramatic action
- United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions
on Libya - International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspectors in North Korea - United Nations (UN) peacekeepers in the Middle
East - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
Bosnia - The Uruguay Round the World Trade Organization
(WTO) the dispute settlement mechanism
5Ongoing action
- Global health policy (the WHO)
- Development (the World Bank)
- Monetary policy (the International Monetary Fund)
- Participation reduces the chances of war among
members - Participation increases the chances of democracy
6Various sizes
- From
- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) -
2 million budget (pays for their annual
meeting?) - To
- European Union (EU) - verging on a sovereign
state - World Bank - gt10,000 employees from 160 countries
(2/3 in Washington) - IMF (Aug. 2008 341 billion)
7Specialized agencies
- ILO
- http//www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/lang--en/inde
x.htm - ICAO
- http//www.icao.int/icao/en/howworks.htm
- FAO
- http//www.fao.org/about/about-fao/en/
- Others
- UNEP
- http//www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default
.asp?DocumentID43 - EBRD
- http//www.ebrd.com/about/index.htm
8Finding research on IOs
- Google Scholar!!! http//scholar.google.com/
- ISI Web of Science http//isiknowledge.com/
9IOs allow for
- CENTRALIZATION
- A concrete and stable organizational structure
and an administrative apparatus managing
collective activities - May allow for immediate action (UN Security
Council) - Or for specialization (OECD has gt200 working
groups) - May have flexible design (IMF voting structure)
or be rigid (UN Security Council) - INDEPENDENCE
- The ability/authority to act with a degree of
autonomy within defined spheres
10Rational choice perspective
- LEADERS found/use IOs when benefits of
cooperation outweigh (sovereignty) costs - IOs produce collective goods in PD settings
solve coordination problems - Coordination problems?
- E.g., Battle of the sexes game
11PD settings?
- Prisoner's dilemma
- http//www.youtube.com/watch?vED9gaAb2BEwfeature
related - http//www.youtube.com/watch?vp3Uos2fzIJ0
12Prisoner's Dilemma
- A non-cooperative, non-zero-sum game. (Mixed game
of cooperation and conflict.) - Individual rationality brings about collective
irrationality.
13- Example
- You're reading Tchaikovsky's music on a train
back in the USSR. - KGB agents suspect it's secret code.
- They arrest you a "friend" they claim is
Tchaikovsky. - "You better tell us everything. We caught
Tchaikovsky, and he's already talking"
14- You know that this is ridiculous they have no
case. - But they may be able to build a case using your
testimony and "Tchaikovsky's." - If you "rat" out your "friend" they will reduce
your sentence. - If not, they will throw the book at you.
15Player 2
Player 1 Cooperate w/friend Defect (rat)
Cooperate w/friend -3, -3 -25, -1
Defect (rat) -1, -25 -10, -10
16- The same situation can occur whenever "collective
action" is required. - The collective action problem is also called the
"n-person prisoner's dilemma." - Also called the "free rider problem."
- "Tragedy of the commons."
- All have similar logics and a similar result
- Individually rational action leads to
collectively suboptimal results.
17Is cooperation ever possible in Prisoner's
Dilemma?
- Yes ?
- In repeated settings
- Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. The Evolution of
Cooperation. New York Basic Books.
18- So, IOs facilitate cooperation by coordinating
states on superior equilibria/outcomes - And lower the transaction costs of doing so
19Alternatives to the rational-institutionalist
perspective
20Realist theory
- States do not cede to supranational institutions
the strong enforcement capacities necessary to
overcome international anarchy - Thus, IOs and similar institutions are of little
interest - They merely reflect national interests and power
and do not constrain powerful states - Does realism rational choice?
- Realism focuses on state interests - ignores
microfoundations (leader incentives, domestic
politics)
21Constructivist theory
- Where to ideas and preferences come from?
- Focus on norms, beliefs, knowledge, and (shared)
understandings - IOs are the result of international ideas, and in
turn contribute towards shaping the evolution of
international ideas - Vital for the understanding of major concepts
such as legitimacy and norms
22Abbot Snidal
- States use IOs to
- Reduce transaction costs
- Create information, ideas, norms, and
expectations - Carry out and encourage specific activities
- Legitimate or delegitimate particular ideas and
practices - Enhance their capacities and power
23Principal-Agent framework
- IOs are thus "agents"
- Their (biggest) members are the "principals"
- Agency slack? ?
- "bureaucratic" perspective
24The principal-agent problem
- The agent works for the principal
- The agent has private information
- The principal only observes an outcome
- Must decide to reelect/pay/rehire/keep the agent
- If standards are too low, the agent shirks
- If standards are too high, the agent gives up
- We need a Goldilocks solution set standards
just right. - We may have to accept some an information rent
- Either pay extra or accept agency slack
(corruption?)
25(No Transcript)
26- If reelection criteria are too high, the
government will not supply effort when exogenous
conditions are bad. - If reelection criteria are too low, the
government will not supply effort when conditions
are good. - What should you do?
- Intuition It depends on the probability of
good/bad conditions on the difference in
outcomes when conditions are good/bad
27Solution?
28Public choice/Bureaucratic theory
- IOs are like any bureaucracy
- Allow governments to reward people with cushy
jobs - The bureaucracy is essentially unaccountable
- Seek to maximize their budgets
- Look for things to do
29Back to rational-institutionalist view
30What do IOs do for their members?
- Pooling resources (IMF/World Bank, World Health
Organization) - share costs, economies of scale - Direct joint action - e.g., military (NATO),
financial (IMF), dispute resolution (WTO)
31LAUNDERING
- Allow states to take (collective) action without
taking direct responsibility (or take
responsibility with IO support) - Examples
- The IMF does the dirty work
- UN Security Council resolutions - a form of
laundering? - When an IO legitimates retaliation, states are
not vigilantes but upholders of community norms,
values, and institutions - Korean War - The United States cast essentially
unilateral action as more legitimate collective
action by getting UN Security Council approval
32Neutrality
- Providing information
- Really? http//www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jrv24/I
MFforecasts.html - Collecting information
- Really! http//www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jrv24/t
ransparency.html - Example
- Blue helmets
- http//www.youtube.com/watch?vO0n2-YpwPWYfeature
PlayListpBBF5269792FC9ED6playnext1playnext_f
romPLindex15
33Community representative
- ? Legitimacy
- Articulate norms? http//goodliffe.byu.edu/papers/
catcascade2.pdf - Universal Jurisdiction (more than a norm - a
legal standard) The CAT - Honduras and the OAS??
34Enforcement?
- The problem of endogeneity
- 100 Compliance may mean the IO is doing
nothing - Be careful what conclusions we draw from
observations - Compliance is meaningful only if the state takes
action it would not take in the absence of the IO - IMF/World Bank CONDITIONALITY
35Answers to today's question
- IO's reduce transaction costs - costs of doing
business coordinate on superior equilibria - Enabling members to have
- LAUNDERING
- Neutrality
- Community representative
- Enforcement
- Legitimacy - shared beliefs that coordinate
actors regarding what actions should be accepted,
tolerated, resisted, or stopped - To these ends IOs are created centralized
independent
36Analytical tools
- Time inconsistent preference problem / Commitment
problem / Present bias - Research networking
- Prisoners dilemma
- Principal-Agent framework
- Realist theory
- Constructivist theory
- Public choice/Bureaucratic theory
37Thank you