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Philosophy E166: Ethical Theory

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Philosophy E166: Ethical Theory Week Fourteen: Kant s Categorical Imperative Imperatives There are two kinds of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical. – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Philosophy E166: Ethical Theory


1
Philosophy E166 Ethical Theory
  • Week Fourteen
  • Kants Categorical Imperative

2
Some Themes in Ordinary Moral Reasoning Kant
Tries to Capture
  • 1) Moral reasons are the most important reasons
    for acting and override other kinds of reasons
    for acting.
  • 2) The motive behind an action is the factor
    determining its moral worth.
  • 3) Each person deserves to be treated with
    dignity and respect.
  • 4) Its morally wrong to take advantage of others
    or make an exception of oneself What if
    everyone were to do that?

3
The Function of Reason Paragraphs 4-7
  • In 5, Kant puts forward a curious argument
    about the nature and purpose of reason
  • He contends that everything in nature has its
    place, and it has its place for a particular
    purpose
  • This is a thoroughgoing teleological conception
    of nature
  • Nature is organized in such a way that everything
    in it has its own special place and purpose

4
Paragraph 5
  • In the natural constitution of an organic
    beingthat is, of one contrived for the purpose
    of lifelet us take it as a principle that in it
    no organ is to be found for any end unless it is
    also the most appropriate to that end and the
    best fitted for it. Suppose that for a being
    possessed of reason and a will the real purpose
    of nature were his preservation, his welfare, or
    in a word his happiness. In that case nature
    would have hit on a very bad arrangement by
    choosing reason in the creature to carry out this
    purpose. If reason should have been imparted
    to this favored creature as well, it would have
    had to serve him only for contemplating the happy
    disposition of his nature, for admiring it, for
    enjoying it, and for being grateful to its
    beneficent Causenot for subjecting his power of
    appetition to such feeble and defective guidance
    or for meddling incompetently with the purposes
    of nature.?

5
Kants Point
  • Kant contends that the purpose of reason cannot
    be to attain happiness.
  • Since instinct would be much better than reason
    at achieving happiness, it cant be happiness
    that reason is directed at.
  • So then what is the purpose of reason?
  • Kant concludes that it must be to produce a good
    will.
  • But note that its not really clear how this
    conclusion is supposed to follow.

6
Assumptions
  • Notice the background assumptions, as Rawls
    points out, roughly
  • (i) that nature is purposive, and
  • (ii) that there is an author of nature, or, here
    it is called the beneficent Cause, whose
    purposes are the purposes we observe in nature

7
A Darwinian Response
  • If we are Darwinians, we might grant something
    like (i), but think about the adaptationists
    interpretation of Darwinism where the kinds of
    evolutionary explanations are in terms of
    adaptations
  • You can give an account of the thumb, e.g., in
    terms of an adaptation in particular
    environmental conditions
  • Adaptation does not require an author of nature

8
Adaptationism
  • Lets suppose we are adaptationists
  • We can grant (i) in that the explanations of
    nature are functional/purposive
  • If we have that kind of explanation, then every
    biological feature can be explained either
    directly (by giving an account like the thumb
    case) or indirectly (as a byproductgiven that
    there are direct adaptations, the thumb arose as
    a byproduct)
  • According to that kind of account, where does
    reason fit in?
  • Straightforwardly, reason then doesnt
    necessarily have a direct purpose
  • It might have arisen as a byproduct

9
Mills Contrary Idea
  • Even if we suppose that reason has a function,
    theres Mills idea
  • We have higher needs that are the products of
    reason and they separate us from animals
  • These higher needs are the concern of reason and
    not the subject of instinct
  • So it seems that what Kant is writing here is in
    direct conflict with Mills idea
  • I do not usually prefer Mill to Kant, but I do
    here
  • It seems that Kants conception of happiness here
    is hedonistic it seems that only hedonistic
    happiness could be instinctual in this way

10
7 The Distinction Between the Highest Good and
the Complete Good
  • The 7 distinction between the highest good and
    the complete good
  • Such a will need not on this account be the sole
    and complete good, but it must be the highest
    good and the condition of all the rest, even of
    all our demands for happiness.
  • He acknowledges that the good will is the highest
    good and the precondition of all other goods.
  • But it isnt the complete good other goods
    (such as happiness) must be added to the good
    will to attain this kind of good.
  • The highest good is the good will while the
    complete good is the good will plus the happiness
    appropriate to that good will

11
8-9 The Concept of Duty
  • The rest of Chapter One is taken up with our
    conception of duty and its link to GW
  • Kant later refers to a second proposition (on
    p. 67) and a third proposition
  • The first proposition, according to Paton and
    Rawls, maps out a connection between good will
    and the motive of duty, but there is no passage
    in which Kant sets out a first proposition and
    there is nothing highlighted, italicized, etc.,
    as if its one

12
The First Proposition
  • This is what Paton says (on p. 18 and 19 in his
    analysis)
  • A human action is morally good, not because it
    is done from immediate inclinationstill less
    because it is done from self-interestbut because
    it is done for the sake of duty.
  • Paton takes that to be the first proposition.
  • What Rawls takes to be the first proposition
  • A good will is a will the actions of which
    accord with duty, not from inclination, but from
    duty (out of duty). (LHMP, p. 152)

13
What Rawls Takes to Be the First Proposition
  • When Rawls gives that reading, he cites this
    passage in Kant (at the end of 11 in
    Groundwork)
  • It is precisely in this that a man who was cold
    and indifferent might still find in himself a
    motive for helping others that the worth of
    character begins to showa moral worth and beyond
    all comparison the highestnamely, that he does
    good, not from inclination but from duty

14
Four of Five Types of Actions
  • 1. Actions contrary to duty
  • 2. Actions for the sake of duty
  • 3. Actions
  • (a) which are in accord with duty but
  • (b) for which men have no immediate inclination
    and
  • (c) perform them only because theyre impelled
    to do so by some other inclination (i.e.,
    self-interest)
  • 4. Actions
  • (a) which are in accord with duty but
  • (b) the subject has in addition an immediate
    inclination to the action

15
A Fifth
  • A fifth type, for completeness
  • 5. Actions neither in accord with duty nor
    contrary to duty
  • Kant doesnt include, but if we must if we want a
    complete list
  • It is a type of action that is neutral with
    respect to duty (e.g., brushing your teeth)

16
Kants Goal Actions of Type (1)
  • Kants goal here is to elucidate the concept of
    duty
  • Since the good will involves duty, getting clear
    about duty will also shed light on the concept of
    the good will
  • In regard to (1), Kant says (in the ninth
    paragraph) that he wont discuss actions contrary
    to duty. He says these wont tell us anything
    about acting for the sake of duty

17
Type (2) the Shopkeeper Example
  • In regard to actions of type (2), Kant provides
    his shopkeeper example.
  • Consider a shopkeeper who gives a fair price to a
    child but does it because of self-interest rather
    than duty or immediate inclination.
  • The concern is his reputation not his duty
  • Nevertheless he acts in conformity with duty
  • The thought is that his action doesnt express a
    good will, since its out of self-interest.
  • See the last sentence in 9.

18
(No Transcript)
19
Does Kant Go Too Far?
  • Kant seems to overstate his point here.
  • He appears to suggest that if one acts out of
    self-interest, then it cant be out of duty as
    well.
  • But that just seems wrong.
  • Why not think that multiple motives could be
    involved in ones actionduty as well as
    self-interest?
  • Perhaps the thought is that if self-interest is
    sufficient to explain the motivation for the
    action, then theres no need to think that any
    other motive was present.

20
Recognition
  • But Kant makes the point as a point about
    recognition
  • It is easy to decide whether the action which
    accords with duty has been done from duty or from
    some purpose of self-interest. This distinction
    is far more difficult to perceive when the action
    accords with duty and the subject has in addition
    an immediate inclination to the action.
  • Thus this is not a conceptual issue. We can make
    the distinctions conceptually instead, it is
    recognizing the cases in everyday dealings that
    is the problem for Kant (and moreover agents
    recognizing cases in themselves)
  • A reoccurring discussion in Kant is the granting
    of our ability to understand and recognize
    distinctions a priori on the basis of reason
    alone, but nevertheless having difficulty
    applying the distinctions empirically

21
Temptation
  • Notice that the one time when duty really does
    seem to be present as a motive for ones action
    is when theres some temptation to act against
    duty
  • But on the other hand, Kant seems to be correct
    that if ones action is in accordance with duty
    and if one also feels some inclination or has
    some self-interest, then we have a hard time
    determining whether duty is also active in
    producing the action

22
10-11 The Motive of Duty
  • In paragraphs 10 and 11, Kant considers actions
    of type (3)those done in conformity with duty,
    and where there is immediate inclination
  • First case there is a duty to preserve ones
    life, but theres also an immediate inclination
    to preserve it as well
  • Ergo, theres no moral worth to actions that aim
    to preserve ones life just on the basis of this
    sort of inclination
  • Is it there is no acting from duty at all, or
    that we could not recognize acting from duty? The
    first

23
Avoiding Suicide
  • He then varies the example
  • Assume we have a person who has lost all will to
    live
  • Hes miserable but decides to preserve his life
    anyway
  • In this case, Kant says that such an action would
    have moral worth, because it would be done not
    out of inclination but duty
  • But what would this sort of duty look like?
    Thats not so easy to figure out, as least not
    for me
  • I dont know what it means for somebody to
    preserve his or her life only for the sake of
    duty
  • That kind of case, while easy perhaps to
    understand conceptually, doesnt seem to exist in
    reality

24
Benevolence, or a Helping Character
  • In 11, he considers another example someone who
    helps another who is in need, but he does it not
    because of self-interest or a feeling of duty,
    but just because he likes doing this sort of
    thing
  • Kant thinks that even if this is a good thing, it
    has no genuine moral worth
  • A Humean, of course, would object to this view
  • The Humean would say that this is precisely the
    sort of action that has moral value that it
    shows that one has a good character

25
The Example Revised
  • Kant goes on to revise the example now imagine
    that this beneficent man has fallen on hard times
    and no longer has any desire to help others,
    because hes so absorbed with his own troubles.
  • But now suppose that despite his lack of
    inclination to be helpful, he helps someone out
    of a sense of duty anyway.
  • Then, Kant thinks, his action would have moral
    worth.

26
Kants Passage
  • Suppose then that the mind of this friend of man
    were overclouded by sorrows of his own which
    extinguished all sympathy with the fate of
    others, but that he still had power to help those
    in distress, though no longer stirred by the need
    of others because sufficiently occupied with his
    own and suppose that, when no longer moved by
    inclination, he tears himself out of this deadly
    insensibility and does the action without any
    inclination for the sake of duty alone then for
    the first time his action has its genuine moral
    worth. (I11)

27
Why Think Hes Acting From Duty?
  • Why might Kant think that such a man is now
    acting out of duty?
  • Presumably the idea is that if youre completely
    robbed of all inclination to do f, then its only
    duty that can step in to motivate you to do f
  • What else could possibly motivate you to act in
    accordance with duty if not duty itself?

28
Nice People
  • This passage seems pretty strange (off the mark)
    to a lot of people.
  • It would seem to many that nice people are people
    of moral worth, and one who has lost his niceness
    but only does an action out of duty has no moral
    worth in his action
  • Kants view is the reverse
  • Niceness doesnt offer anything more (or,
    strictly speaking, anything at all) to moral
    worth, according to Kant

29
Consider a Possible Counterexample to Kant
  • Consider a case in which a child is in grave
    danger of dying and his father decides to undergo
    an operation that will help save his son but also
    lead to his own death
  • It seems tempting to say that if he did it merely
    on the basis of duty and not out of some
    spontaneous paternal love then his action would
    be lacking in moral worth in some way

30
The Second Proposition
  • At the bottom of Paton, p. 67 14
  • 1 An action done from duty has its moral
    worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it,
    but in the maxim in accordance with which it is
    decided upon
  • 2 it depends therefore, not on the realization
    of the object of the action, but solely on the
    principle of volition in accordance with which,
    irrespective of all objects of the faculty of
    desire, the action has been performed.

31
The Idea
  • The idea seems to be that an action cannot get
    its moral worth from
  • (i) its purpose,
  • (ii) its end or motive, or
  • (iii) its effect
  • (i) (iii) give no unconditioned moral worth
  • What does that leave?
  • Only the principle of the will as the source of
    moral worth
  • Once that move is made, then its a pretty quick
    step to the categorical imperative

32
The Third Proposition
  • The so-called third proposition is in the
    middle of p. 68 of Paton (15)
  • Duty is the necessary to act out of the
    reverence for the law.
  • How does the third proposition follow from the
    first and second? It is unclear
  • What is important here is the important role that
    reverence plays
  • Respect here is for the respect for duty (for the
    moral law).
  • Duties are all-important
  • In the order of the things which are supposed to
    move us, duty is always at the top
  • It is by seeing this order and duty on the top
    that we have an attitude of reverence

33
16 The Derivation of the Categorical Imperative
  • What relation to duty is morally worthy? Is it
    fear, or is it reverence? Kant believes that it
    is reverence, but it is hard to grasp precisely
    what Kant means by this.
  • We do know that it is a respect for the law.
    But what sort of law?
  • This law is the categorical imperative But what
    kind of law can this be the thought of which,
    even without regard to the results expected from
    it, has to determine the will if this is to be
    called good absolutely and without qualification?
    Since I have robbed the will of every inducement
    that might arise for it as a consequence of
    obeying any particular law, nothing is left but
    the conformity of actions to universal law as
    such, and this alone must serve the will as its
    principle. That is to say, I ought never to act
    except in such a way that I can also will that my
    maxim should become a universal law.

34
Imperatives
  • There are two kinds of imperatives hypothetical
    and categorical.
  • Think of imperatives as commands expressing
    reasons for action. The imperative is not itself
    a reason for action but rather an expression of a
    reason for action.
  • Example If you want to stay dry, bring an
    umbrella is not a statement, but a command.
    However, it expresses much the same idea as You
    ought to bring an umbrella if you want to stay
    dry, which states a reason for action.

35
Hypothetical Imperatives
  • These are conditional imperatives, sentences of
    the form If such-and-such, then do so-and-so.
    e.g., If you want a good reputation, dont
    cheat people.
  • If the condition is not one that everyone wants,
    it is problematic. For example, If you want to
    stay dry, take an umbrella.
  • If this condition is one that everyone wants, it
    is assertoric. For example, If you want to stay
    healthy, eat well.
  • When the condition is one that everyone wants
    i.e., when the hypothetical imperative is
    assertoric we often dont mention the condition
    explicitly. Then the imperative appears to be
    unconditional.

36
Two Sorts of Hypothetical Imperatives
  • Hypothetical imperatives link means with ends.
  • If you want to stay dry, bring an umbrella
    expresses as a reason for action the carrying out
    of a means (bringing an umbrella) in order to
    effect an end (staying dry).
  • There are two sorts of hypothetical imperatives
  • 1) Rules of skill (with a variety of possible
    ends)
  • If you want to cure this man, use this
    prescription.
  • 2) Counsels of prudence (with, according to Kant,
    only one end happiness)
  • If you want to be happy, then exercise.

37
Categorical Imperatives vs. Hypothetical
Imperatives
  • Categorical imperatives, unlike hypothetical
    imperatives, do not have if-clauses.
  • For example Dont lie. There is no if about
    it.
  • A categorical imperative should not be confused
    with counsels of prudence expressed without
    if-clauses (because the end is understood).
  • Thus, these are truly unconditional imperatives.
  • The order always bestows a reason for action.
  • For example, the command Dont lie expresses a
    straightforward reason for acting You oughtnt
    lie.
  • Such an imperative would govern all rational
    beings at all times and all similar circumstances.

38
Are there any categorical imperatives?
  • However, the question is Are there any
    categorical imperatives?
  • Kants answer is Yes, because rationality tells
    us to act according to the form of a categorical
    imperative
  • If I conceive a categorical imperative, I know
    at once what it contains. For since besides the
    law this imperative contains only the necessity
    that our maxim should conform to this law, while
    the law because unconditional contains no
    condition to limit it, there remains nothing over
    to which the maxim has to conform except the
    universality of a law as such and it is this
    conformity alone that the imperative properly
    asserts to be necessary. (Paton, p. 88 Ak 421)

39
A Single Categorical Imperative
  • Thus, he says, there is only a single
    categorical imperative
  • It is this Act only on the maxim through which
    you can at the same time will that it should
    become a universal law.
  • This formula captures at least two of the
    elements of reasoning I set out
  • The motive determining actions moral worth
  • The wrong of making an exception of oneself

40
The Single Imperative Thesis
  • There are thus various morally justified commands
    of morality for example, Dont lie! Dont
    break promises! Dont make lying promises!
    that Kant calls imperatives of duty.
  • But Kant seems to hold that at bottom there is
    only one categorical imperative -- the
    Categorical Imperative.
  • If thats right, its not clear what at bottom
    means.
  • Idea seems to be that all imperatives of duty
    might be derived from this one imperative as
    their principle.
  • Perhaps it is like saying that for utilitarians
    there is at bottom only one principle the
    Principle of Utility and that any other moral
    principle (or rule) is a special case of the
    Principle of Utility and justified by it.

41
A Single Categorical Imperative but Multiple
Versions
  • Another wrinkle Kant thinks that the
    Categorical Imperative can be formulated in a
    number of ultimately equivalent ways what we
    usually call versions differing, we might
    say, in which aspects of our moral thinking they
    emphasize Paton sets out five
  • The Formula of Universal Law (set out earlier)
  • The Formula of the Law of Nature
  • Act as if the maxim of your action were to
    become through your will a universal law of
    nature. (Paton, p. 89 Ak. 421)
  • The Formula of the End in Itself
  • Act in such a way that you always treat
    humanity, whether in your own person or in the
    person of any other, never simply as a means, but
    always at the same time as an end. (Paton, p.
    96 Ak. 429)
  • The Formula of Autonomy
  • The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends

42
Maxims
  • An end is a state of affairs.
  • An action is a means to an end.
  • The agent of action a is the person who does a.
  • A maxim is what Kant calls a subjective
    principle of action i.e., a statement of the
    form I am to do X in circumstances C in order
    to bring about Y unless Z. (Rawls, p. 168.)
  • The agents maxim is the maxim that the agent of
    action a had in mind in doing a.

43
The Categorical Imperative Procedure
  • John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4
    steps (pp. 167ff)

44
The Categorical Imperative Procedure
  • John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4
    steps
  • 1) Formulate a subjective maxim in the form of a
    hypothetical imperative I am to do X in
    circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless
    Z. It's a first-person rule of skill or counsel
    of prudence.

45
The Categorical Imperative Procedure
  • John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4
    steps
  • 1) Formulate a subjective maxim in the form of a
    hypothetical imperative I am to do X in
    circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless
    Z. It's a first-person rule of skill or counsel
    of prudence.
  • 2) Convert the maxim into a principle. Change the
    personal pronoun 'I' to 'Everyone' Everyone is
    to do X in circumstances C in order to bring
    about Y unless Z. The maxim is now a principle.

46
The Categorical Imperative Procedure
  • John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4
    steps
  • 1) Formulate a subjective maxim in the form of a
    hypothetical imperative I am to do X in
    circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless
    Z. It's a first-person rule of skill or counsel
    of prudence.
  • 2) Convert the maxim into a principle. Change the
    personal pronoun 'I' to 'Everyone' Everyone is
    to do X in circumstances C in order to bring
    about Y unless Z. The maxim is now a principle.
  • 3) Convert the principle into a law of nature
    Everyone always does X in circumstances C in
    order to bring about Y unless Z.

47
The Categorical Imperative Procedure
  • John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4
    steps
  • 1) Formulate a subjective maxim in the form of a
    hypothetical imperative I am to do X in
    circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless
    Z. It's a first-person rule of skill or counsel
    of prudence.
  • 2) Convert the maxim into a principle. Change the
    personal pronoun 'I' to 'Everyone' Everyone is
    to do X in circumstances C in order to bring
    about Y unless Z. The maxim is now a principle.
  • 3) Convert the principle into a law of nature
    Everyone always does X in circumstances C in
    order to bring about Y unless Z.
  • 4) Contemplate a world in which (3) is true.

48
Step 4 The Adjusted Social World
  • Rawls description of Step 4 We are to adjoin
    the as-if law of nature at step (3) to the
    existing laws of nature (as these are understood
    by us) and then think through as best we can what
    the order of nature would be once the effects of
    the newly adjoined law of nature have had
    sufficient time to work themselves out.
  • He goes on to explain Step 4 in this way It is
    assumed that a new order of nature results from
    the addition of the law at step (3) to the other
    laws of nature, and that this new order of nature
    has a settled equilibrium state the relevant
    features of which we are able to figure out. Let
    us call this new order of nature an adjusted
    social world. Lets also think of this social
    world as associated with the maxim at step (1),
    and impute to the agent a legislative intention,
    an intention as it were to legislate such a
    world. (LHMP, Rawls, p. 169.)

49
The Categorical Imperative Procedure
  • John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4
    steps
  • 1) Formulate a subjective maxim in the form of a
    hypothetical imperative I am to do X in
    circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless
    Z. It's a first-person rule of skill or counsel
    of prudence.
  • 2) Convert the maxim into a principle. Change the
    personal pronoun 'I' to 'Everyone' Everyone is
    to do X in circumstances C in order to bring
    about Y unless Z. The maxim is now a principle.
  • 3) Convert the principle into a law of nature
    Everyone always does X in circumstances C in
    order to bring about Y unless Z.
  • 4) Contemplate a world in which (3) is true.
  • We are permitted act from the maxim (as laid out
    in 1) only if

50
The Categorical Imperative Procedure
  • John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4
    steps
  • 1) Formulate a subjective maxim in the form of a
    hypothetical imperative I am to do X in
    circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless
    Z. It's a first-person rule of skill or counsel
    of prudence.
  • 2) Convert the maxim into a principle. Change the
    personal pronoun 'I' to 'Everyone' Everyone is
    to do X in circumstances C in order to bring
    about Y unless Z. The maxim is now a principle.
  • 3) Convert the principle into a law of nature
    Everyone always does X in circumstances C in
    order to bring about Y unless Z.
  • 4) Contemplate a world in which (3) is true.
  • We are permitted act from the maxim (as laid out
    in 1) only if
  • a) We are able to act with consistency from 1 in
    4, and

51
The Categorical Imperative Procedure
  • John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4
    steps
  • 1) Formulate a subjective maxim in the form of a
    hypothetical imperative I am to do X in
    circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless
    Z. It's a first-person rule of skill or counsel
    of prudence.
  • 2) Convert the maxim into a principle. Change the
    personal pronoun 'I' to 'Everyone' Everyone is
    to do X in circumstances C in order to bring
    about Y unless Z. The maxim is now a principle.
  • 3) Convert the principle into a law of nature
    Everyone always does X in circumstances C in
    order to bring about Y unless Z.
  • 4) Contemplate a world in which (3) is true.
  • We are permitted act from the maxim (as laid out
    in 1) only if
  • a) We are able to act with consistency from 1 in
    4, and
  • b) We are able to will 4, i.e. to determine that
    4 be brought into being.

52
The Moral Complexity Problem
53
The Moral Complexity Problem
  • Rawlss description of the Categorical Imperative
    Procedure invites a question

54
The Moral Complexity Problem
  • Rawlss description of the Categorical Imperative
    Procedure invites a question
  • With all this complexity, how could we ever use
    the Categorical Imperative Procedure as the basis
    of a moral decision?

55
The Moral Complexity Problem
  • Rawlss description of the Categorical Imperative
    Procedure invites a question
  • With all this complexity, how could we ever use
    the Categorical Imperative Procedure as the basis
    of a moral decision?
  • For Kant, an answer is complicated by the fact
    that he claims only to describe our moral
    intuitions

56
A Solution to the Moral Complexity Problem
57
A Solution to the Moral Complexity Problem
  • A solution comes from seeing that we can
    abbreviate the C.I.P. by asking,

58
A Solution to the Moral Complexity Problem
  • A solution comes from seeing that we can
    abbreviate the C.I.P. by asking,
  • What if everybody were to do that?

59
A Solution to the Moral Complexity Problem
  • A solution comes from seeing that we can
    abbreviate the C.I.P. by asking,
  • What if everybody were to do that?
  • Separating Steps 1 4 from the two tests

60
A Solution to the Moral Complexity Problem
  • A solution comes from seeing that we can
    abbreviate the C.I.P. by asking,
  • What if everybody were to do that?
  • Separating Steps 1 4 from the two tests
  • To pass the What if ? question is to pass the
    two tests

61
A Solution to the Moral Complexity Problem
  • A solution comes from seeing that we can
    abbreviate the C.I.P. by asking,
  • What if everybody were to do that?
  • Separating Steps 1 4 from the two tests
  • To pass the What if ? question is to pass the
    two tests
  • Comparing Mills solution to the counterpart
    problem from Bentham

62
Perfect and Imperfect Duties
63
Kants Illustration of Applying the First Formula
to a Perfect Duty to Oneself
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