Mandatory and voluntary measures taken to deter attack of Somali Based Pirates in the high risk area and their effectiveness

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Mandatory and voluntary measures taken to deter
attack of Somali Based Pirates in the high risk
area and their effectiveness

• Author Paraskevi Papasimakopoulou
• Maritime Economist MBA TQM
• DPA CSO at Oceanfleet Shippinng ltd

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Purpose of the research

• To take into account all measures currently in
  place for combating Somalia based piracy in the
  high risk area and evaluate their effectiveness
  in the long run.

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Piracy Activity in the high risk area

• The High Risk Area is an area bounded by Suez and
  the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10South and 78
  East. Pirates attacks have taken place at most
  extremities of the high risk area.

• The level of pirate activity varies within the
  High Risk Area due to changing weather conditions
  and activity by Naval / Military forces.

• Pirates activity generally reduces in areas
  affected by the South West monsoon, and increases
  in the period following the monsoon. When piracy
  activity is reduced in one area of the High Risk
  Area it is likely to increase in another area

• According to official statistics, since 2009 to
  date, 123 vessels have been seized by pirates in
  a total of 549 attacks.

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Indian Ocean High risk area source www.mschoa.org
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How did the Somali based piracy start?

• the root cause of the Somali based piracy was the
  presence of illegally placed foreign fishermen in
  the Somali coast since the early nineties.

• Increasing number of Somali fishermen started to
  sail further offshore and begun to chase away
  illegal foreign fishing vessels. After the year
  2005, Somali attacks took a different form and
  began to go after any vulnerable vessel (fishing
  or not) that moved in Somali waters.

• The eagerness of the earliest victims to pay
  rising fines helped encourage the rising trend
  of 'ransom piracy', reaching record levels around
  2008/2009. 

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Why piracy in the Somali region is different?

• Pirates attack the ship, mainly to capture it and
  its crew for ransom, but also for robbery of
  belongings and equipment onboard. Thus any
  successful acts of piracy will inevitably result
  in a protracted period of captivity for the crew
  onboard.

• Somali pirates consider the act of piracy as a
  business, and recognize that unnecessary harm or
  injury to the crew is counter-productive and may
  harm their negotiations or the amount of ransom
  received. To date, the level of violence against
  ships crews is relatively low when compared to
  other regions around Africa.

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Company and Master planning procedures according
to the Best Management Practices

• The latest version of Best Management Practices
  4, dated August 2011, contains all the Suggested
  Planning and Operational Practices for Ship
  Operators and Masters of Ships Transiting the
  High Risk Area.

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Prior to transit the High Risk Area, ship
operators and Masters should carry out a thorough
Risk Assessment to assess the likelihood and
consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel, by
considering mainly the following factors

• crew safety

• Vessels freeboard

• speed

• Sea state

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Company planning procedure

• Registration with the MSC HOA prior to vessels
  transit

• Review of Ship security Assessment (SSA) and SSP
  by the CSO

• provide guidance to Master with regards to the
  recommended route, plan and Ship protection
  measures to be taken.

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Ships Master planning procedure prior to
entering the high risk area

• Crew briefing on security measures and their
  duties,
• conduct of security drill and ssas testing
• preparation of an emergency communication plan
• cross checking with the company that the vessel
  movement registration form is submitted to the
  MSC HOA.

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Ships Master planning procedure upon entering
the high risk area

• it is mandatory to ensure that a UKMTO Vessel
  Position Reporting Form - Initial Report is sent
  by Master.

• Vessels are strongly encouraged to report daily
  to the UKMTO by email at 0800 hours GMT whilst
  operating within the High Risk Area

• maintenance and engineering works should be
  reduced to minimum and any work outside of
  accommodation should be strictly controlled

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Gulf of Aden transit and the use of International
Recommended Transit Corridor

• In case of transiting through the Gulf of Aden,
  It is strongly recommended that ships navigate
  within the IRTC, where Naval/Military forces are
  concentrated. The IRTC consists of east bound and
  west bound corridors. The East bound corridor
  starts at 45 East between 1153 1148North
  and terminates at 53 East between 1423
  1418 North. The West bound corridor starts at
  53 East between 1430 1425 North and
  terminates at 45 East between 1200 1155
  North.

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International recommended transit corridor source
www.shipping.nato.int
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Gulf of Aden Group transits

• Group Transits have been developed after analysis
  of GOA pirate activity and are designed to
  exploit the additional protection and assurance
  that can be gained from grouping vessels together

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Ship protection measures according to the Best
Management Practices

• Increased watch keeping and enhanced vigilance

• Enhanced bridge protection

• Control of access to bridge accommodation and
  machinery spaces

• The use of physical barriers such as razor wire

• The use of water spray and foam monitors

• In case of attack evasive maneuvering at
  increased speed

• The establishment of a safe Muster point- CITADEL

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The use of Privately contracted unarmed and armed
security Guards

• The use, or not, of Private Maritime Security
  Contractors onboard merchant vessels is a matter
  for individual ship operators to decide following
  their own voyage risk assessment and approval of
  respective Flag States

• Since 2012, the use of Privately Contracted
  Security Guards either armed or unarmed remains
  the most popular additional measure to prevent
  vessels from being hijacked. According to
  statistics, those measures taken by ship
  operators together with the increasing presence
  of EU NAV forces in the area were proven to be
  effective as the number of vessels being pirated
  has been significantly reduced in 2012 only to 5
  vessels against 25 vessels in the previous year

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Table 3 Somali based Piracy statistics source
www.eunavfor.eu
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Suggested selection criteria of Security Company

• The vessel operator in order to select a reliable
  company and thus mitigate the risk of unnecessary
  escalation should take into consideration first
  of all the profile of the members of security
  team they should preferably have ex navy and
  Special Forces military background and great
  experience. They must be well trained with
  regards to the use of weapons and to the
  implementation of the isps code and duly
  certified with regards to STCW, yellow fever and
  first aid.

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Suggested selection criteria of Security Company

• Most flag administrations also require that the
  selected private security services provider
  operates according to an operation manual
  approved by the flag state.

• The selected company should be also able to
  provide evidence that the weapons used are
  legally bought and used

• Flag administrations request that a Private
  Maritime Security Company has a clear policy and
  set of rules on the use of force consistent with
  an international model set of standards and has
  issued specific operating procedures, as agreed
  between the PMSC, ship-owner, and Master, to
  PCASP operating for them on the use of force.

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Major Conclusions

• Nowadays the shipping industry is in recession
  and under huge cost pressure. Ship operators pay
  high insurance premiums every time a vessel is
  transiting the high risk area.

• The most effective counter-measures against
  Somalia based pirates have proven to be the use
  of physical barriers (such as razor wire),
  evasive maneuvering, speed, the use of Citadels
  and last but not least the presence of armed
  security guards

• there have been many unreported incidents where
  armed guards thought of local fishermen for
  pirates and attacked them. Therefore, it is of
  utmost importance the selection of a reliable
  security company to avoid unnecessary use of
  force and attacks to innocents.

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Major Conclusions

• The reduced number of seized vessels does not
  guarantee future reducing trend either, as the
  pirates keep evolving they are changing their
  tactics, have increased their fire power, they
  attack in larger groups and in case targeted
  vessels anti piracy measures are proved to be
  weak, they are more persistent in order to
  capture the vessel

• Root cause must be understood and addressed in
  order for the Somali based piracy to be
  successfully combated. The use of all previously
  mentioned measures actually faces the consequence
  but the previously referred root cause still
  remains and should be eliminated in order to
  resolve this problem.

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• Thank you for your attention!