Philosophy of mind Module A: Mind and brain 2014-2015 Sandro Nannini University of Siena - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Loading...

PPT – Philosophy of mind Module A: Mind and brain 2014-2015 Sandro Nannini University of Siena PowerPoint presentation | free to download - id: 6bfd68-ZTY5M



Loading


The Adobe Flash plugin is needed to view this content

Get the plugin now

View by Category
About This Presentation
Title:

Philosophy of mind Module A: Mind and brain 2014-2015 Sandro Nannini University of Siena

Description:

Philosophy of mind Module A: Mind and brain 2014-2015 Sandro Nannini University of Siena Siena, mind and brain 2014-2015 Siena, 3 giugno 2010 Consciousness ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:77
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 73
Provided by: docentiLe1
Learn more at: http://docenti.lett.unisi.it
Category:

less

Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Philosophy of mind Module A: Mind and brain 2014-2015 Sandro Nannini University of Siena


1
Philosophy of mind Module A Mind and
brain 2014-2015 Sandro Nannini University of
Siena
2
Naive physics and scientific physics
One of the following statements is true 1)
Every breath you take contains at least an atom
that has been exhaled by Marylin Monroe. 2)
There are liquids that flow upward. 3) At the
top floor of a building you get older faster than
at the ground floor. 4) An atom can be in
several places at once .... 5) There is no law
of nature that speaks against the
possibility of time travels .... (Freely drawn
from M. Chown, Quantum theory cannot hurt
you,Faber and Faber, London 2007.).
3
Folk psychology and cognitive sciences
One of the following statements is true In
some cases you can confuse a rubber hand that
lies in front of you for your hand. Some
mentally ill people think they are dead. Some
people think after an accident that their wife
is actually a double, an impostor. We become
aware of what is happening around us with a delay
of about 500 ms. Our brain prepares all
voluntary movements 300 ms. earlier than we
consciously decide to execute them.
4
Naive physics and scientific physics
In fact all the above statements are true! 1)
Every breath you take contains at least an atom
that has been exhaled by Marylin Monroe (the
number of atoms) 2) There are liquids that flow
upward (syphons). 3) At the top floor of a
building you get older faster than at the ground
floor (the general theory of relativity). 4) An
atom can be in several places at once (quantum
mechanics) 5) There is no fundamental law of
nature that speaks against the possibility of
time travels (classical mechanics, quantum
mechanics, theory of relativity. (Freely drawn
from M. Chown, Quantum theory cannot hurt
you,Faber and Faber, London 2007.).
5
Folk psychology and cognitive sciences
In this case too all the previous statements are
true! In some cases you can confuse a rubber
hand that lies in front of you for your hand (see
e.g. Metzinger 2009) Some mentally ill people
think they are dead (Cotard delusion). Some
people think after an accident that their wife
is actually a double, an impostor (Capgras
delusion). We become aware of what is happening
around us with a delay of about 500 ms. (B.
Libet, Mind Time, 2004) Our brain prepares all
voluntary movements 300 ms. earlier than we
consciously decide to execute them (B. Libet,
Mind Time 2004).
6
The mind-body problem
  • mind
  • EE?P(M)?(D)?A
  • body
  • DS?....PS...?B........?R
  • EE external event DS distal stimulus
  • P perception PS proxy stimulus
  • M mental states B brain processes
  • D decision
  • A action R motor response

7
Ontological Dualism
  • Interactionism
  • Mind
  • P ?D
  • ? ?
  • SD ? SP?..BP? ??????D?...? R
  • Body
  • Objection Interactionism violates the first
    principle of thermodynamics.

8
Ontological Dualism
  • Parallelism (and neutral monism)
  • Mind
  • P ?D
  • SD ? SP?..BP? ?????D...? R
  • Body
  • Objection Parallelism can be explained only by
    old metaphysical hypotheses (Spinoza, Leibniz) or
    by a mere convention (Russell)

9
Ontological Dualism
  • Epiphenomenalism
  • Mind
  • P D
  • ? ?
  • SD ? SP?..BP ?.. BD?..N ? R
  • Body
  • Objection Ockhams Razor.

10
Identity Theory
  • SD ? SP?..BP ?.. BD ...? R
  • Body
  • P BP D BD
  • P and D are only redescriptions of BP and BD in
    psychological terms.
  • Objection Such a reduction seems to be
    impossible. Phenomenal consciousness seems to be
    nonreducible.

11
Functionalism 1) Mind-computer analogy
EE ?P(M)?(D) ? A Key board ?
Computer ? Screen
12
Functionalism
2) Marrs Cascade Computer Computation
Problem ? Procedure (.) ?
Solution Algorithm
Input ? Software ? Output Implementation
Key board ? Hardware ? Screen
Objection you take the risk to completely
separate cognitive psychology from neurosciences
Human being Common sense EE--gtP(M)--gt(D)--gtA
Explanation ???????Interpretation
? Cogn. Psychol EE--gt(Flowchart)--gtMO--gtA
Implementation?????Interpretati
on? Neurosc. DS--gt(B1 or B2 or....)--gtR)
13
Flowcharts in cognitive psychology An example
14
Eliminativism
P and D are substituted by new concepts (BP and
BD) drawn by neurosciences. Coevolution of
cognitive psychology and neurosciences with the
help of philosophy.
15
Perception and sensory-motor coordination
  • Animals acquired the ability to perceive some
    features of the external world and of their own
    body in order to execute movements apt to
    increase the probability to survive (e.g. by
    catching preys or avoiding plunderers).

16
Perception and sensory-motor coordination
  • Human senses and human sensori-motor coordination
    are the result of biological evolution.

Biological evolution
17
Perception and sensory-motor coordination Represe
ntation-Action Theory (RAT)
  • Perceptions can be conscious or unconscious in
    both cases they are mental representations of the
    internal and external world.
  • Human beings construct a representation of the
    external world in order to move and act in it.

18
The computational brain
  • According to the RAT the brain acquires by means
    of the senses a certain amount of information
    about some regularities of the external world as
    regards the distribution of matter and physical
    events in space and time and changes the format
    of such information step by step until a pattern
    of motor neurons activity able to trigger a right
    motor response is produced.

19
Styles of brain computation
No!!!
Symbolic representations
A Brooks robot
Unlikely!
No representations
May be!
Subsymbolic representations
20
Naturalising perceptions according to the RAT
  • Functional reduction
  • A perception is functionally reducible to an
    intermediate step in the information processing
    of sensori-motor coordination
  • Therefore it is similar to the activity pattern
    of hidden units in an artificial neural network
    and is describable as a vector in a state space.

21
Naturalising perceptions according to the RAT
  • Neural implementation
  • Perceptions as vectors in a space state are
    biologically implemented by the dynamics of brain
    processes.

22
A reply to 3c the 1-eaters and the 2-eaters
10002000000100000002001000000000012222000000100000
00200100000000001222??????????????????????????????
100020000001000 000020010000000 000122220000001 00
0000020010000 0000001222????? ??????????????? ????
??????
1000200000 0100000002 0010000000 0001222200 000010
0000 0020010000 0000001222 ?????????? ?????????? ?
?????????
Which is the right representation?
It depends on what you eat!
23
A reply to (3c) frogs and flies
  • A frog recognizes flies as food only if they are
    moving.
  • We human beings instead recognize flies as flies
    independently of their movements.
  • Therefore, the representation that an animal has
    of its environment is functional to the actions
    that it is able to execute in that environment.

24
A reply to (3c) frogs and flies
  • It is not the case that we human beings see flies
    as they are, frogs instead see them as they
    appear to them.

25
Brain-Wise
  • Patricia Smith Churchland
  • Brain-Wise Studies in Neurophilosophy
  • The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002

26
Preface
  • Brain sciences (neurosciences and cognitive
    science) and philosophy
  • The history of science and the immaturity of
    neurosciences
  • The history of philosophy
  • Acknowledgements Francis Crick, Antonio and
    Hannah Damasio, Paul Churchland, Roderick
    Corriveau, Rick Grush, Terry Sejnowski, Rama
    Ramachandran.

27
Introduction
  • Core questions
  • 1) There is no soul (p. 1)
  • 2) Consciousness is a coordinated pattern of
    neuronal activity serving various biological
    functions (p. 2)
  • The mind-body problem and neurosciences
  • Neurophilosophy predicts that philosophy of mind
    conducted with no understanding of neurons and
    the brain is likely to be sterile (p. 3)

28
Introduction Natural philosophy
  • Philosophy and sciences in the history of
    philosophy from natural philosophy to distinct
    empirical sciences
  • From 'physics' and metaphysics to the
    contemporary cognitive sciences (especially
    cognitive neuroscience).

29
Introduction Reductions and coevolution in
scientific domains
  • Reductive explanation a reduction has been
    achieved when the causal powers of the
    machrophenomena are explained as a function of
    the physical structure and causal powers of the
    microphenomena (pp. 20-21)
  • - Example 1 temperature in a gas was reduced to
    mean molecular kinetic energy (p. 21).
  • Reductive explanation does no imply identity of
    meaning.
  • G. Frege Bedeutung und Sinn (reference and
    meaning) Morning Star and Evening Star
  • Example 2 visible light turned out to be
    electromagnetic radiation (p. 23)
  • Example 3 (more complex) phenotypic traits and
    genes (p. 23).

30
Introduction Reductions and coevolution in
scientific domains (2)
  • The coevolution of two scientific theories (p.
    24)
  • Reduction and mathematics (p. 25).
  • A criticism on functionalism (p. 25-28)
  • The reduction of mental life to brain activity
    does not imply that mental life goes away (p.
    28).
  • Reductive explanation is not necessarily a
    direct explanatory bridge between macrophenomena
    and microphenomena (pp. 28-29).
  • Self esteem and reductionism (pp. 29-30).

31
Introduction Concluding remarks
  • Hypotheses
  • 1 - Mental activity is brain activity. It is
    susceptible to scientific methods of
    investigation.
  • 2 - Neuroscience needs cognitive science to know
    what phenomena need to be explained.
  • 3 - It is necessary to understand the brain, and
    to understand it at many levels of organization,
    in order to understand the nature of the mind.
  • 2 and 3 are mutually dependent (coevolution of
    cognitive sciences and neurosciences) (p. 31)
  • Theories about ourselves (Freuds concepts in
    psychology and Aristotles concepts in physics.)
  • Neurosciences and old philosophical problems

32
Metaphysics Introduction
  • - Metaphysics the Book after the Physics
  • - .. Aristotle did not suppose that the topics
    in Metaphysica were beyond the methods of science
    or different in kind from the questions of the
    particular sciences (p. 38)
  • - Pure metaphysics and the development of
    empirical sciences in modern times.
  • - .. metaphysics, as construed by the purists,
    is probably misguided (p. 39) S. Peirce and
    W.v.O. Quine there is no first philosophy (p.
    39).
  • - ... either we abandon metaphysics as
    misguided, or we break with purists and update
    our characterization of the subject matter (p.
    39).
  • - Metaphysics science in an immature stage (pp.
    39 ff.).
  • - Biological evolution and epistemology ...
    an important job of cognition is to make
    predictions that guide decisions.

33
Metaphysics Introduction(2)
  • Introduction (2)
  • - - There is no suprascientific, metaphysical
    faculty (p. 40 ff.)
  • - Feelings of certainty, however, are no
    guarantee of truth (p. 42).
  • - ... we abandon romantic notions when their
    wheels fall off (p. 42).
  • - From the pragmatists perspective, we shall
    explore questions about consciousness, free will,
    and the self as questions about the mind/brain,
    and we will see that a young science is
    discovering things about the nature of the
    mind-body that we could never have discovered
    through reflection and introspection alone (p.
    43).
  • - Note that there is a mind-body problem only if
    the mind is nonphysical and the body is physical.
    if the mind is activity in the brain then
    that particular problem, at least, does not exist
    . (p. 43).

34
Metaphysics Metaphysics and the mind
  • - Mind/brain causal interaction and the law of
    conservation of mass-energy (p. 43)
  • - Against dualism the degeneration of neurons
    causes the degeneration of cognitive functions
    (p. 44)
  • - The disconnection effect (p. 44 ff.)

35
Metaphysics Metaphysics and the mind (2)
  • - Descartes identified the mind with the
    conscious mind. However, there is overwhelming
    evidence in favour of unconscious cognition (p.
    48 ff)
  • 1) Language
  • 2) The dilation of pupils
  • 3) Inattentional blindsight
  • 4) Subthreshold stimuli
  • 5) Eye movements

36
Metaphysics Causation
  • Causal connections and mere correlations
  • Necessary connection between cause and effect
    Humes criticism (p. 55) and answers to Hume
  • 1) true causal relations are covered by natural
    laws Objection the concept of natural law is
    difficult to define as it is the concept of
    cause
  • 2) necessity is not in the world but in the mind
    I. Kant Objection statements about causal
    relations are statements about the world, not
    about our mind.
  • Brains have evolved the capacity to infer
    causality from certain patterns of regularity
    observed in experience - Objection this does
    not explain what is causality in the world (p.
    57).
  • Causation as a metaphysical issue remains an
    unsolved problem - Better to put it aside
    (pragmatic approach) (p. 57)

37
Memory and self in common sense (2)
  • Self this is a philosophical concept about which
    common sense offers only vague intuitions.
    However, the idea that each human being has an
    intuition of herself based on a sentiment of
    freedom and agency is deeply rooted in our
    culture.

38
Self as soul or mind
  • The Socrates who is now conversing and arranging
    the details of his argument is really I (Platon,
    Phaedo) - I am my soul.
  • Cogito, ergo sum (Descartes) - I am a thinking
    thing, I am my being conscious of myself I am my
    mind

39
Self as memory of himself or herself
  • But he, now having no consciousness of any of
    the Actions either of Nestor or Thersites, does,
    or can he, conceive himself the same Person with
    either of them? (Locke, Essay)- I am the
    continuity of myself through the conscious
    recollection of my past perceptions, thoughts,
    and actions.
  • My Self ? my soul. I am no substance that has
    mental states but a relation between mental
    states.
  • Descartes/Locke I am my thinking / I am a
    relation between the contents of my past and
    present thoughts.

40
The bundle theory of the mind The
non-existence of a perception of myself
  • () what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap
    or collection of different perceptions, united
    together by certain relations, and supposd, tho
    falsely, to be endowd with a perfect simplicity
    and identity (D. Hume, Treatise). - The bundle
    theory of the mind.
  • I never can catch myself at any time without a
    perception, and never can observe anything but
    the perception (D. Hume, Treatise). - I have no
    intuition of myself (against Descartes) I can
    know myself only through the empirical knowledge
    of the association relations that connect the
    contents of my perceptions ( mental states).

41
Self and Self-Knowledge The internal-Model
Solution
  • What is the problem?
  • Descartes I am a nonphysical conscious thing (p.
    58).
  • D. Hume I am a flux of mental states (p. 58).
    The self is no thing (p. 61).
  • The self as a thing enduring through time is a
    construction of the brain (p. 61).
  • The self is something like a squadron of
    capacities flying in loose formation The
    fundamental capacity, however, probably consists
    in coordinating needs, goals, perception, and
    memory with motor control (p. 63).

42
Self and Self-Knowledge The internal-Model
Solution (2)
  • Self-Representational Capacities What are
    representations?
  • Representations are states of the brain, such as
    patterns of activity across groupes of neurones,
    which carry information (p.64).
  • Thus a brain might have a representational model
    of the body or of ones hunting territory or of
    ones clan and the pattern of social
    relationships within it. A brain can also have
    models of its own processes higher order
    neuronal activity may represent the integration
    of many lower-order representations (p. 64).

43
Self and Self-Knowledge The internal-Model
Solution (2)
  • Self-Representational Capacities (2)
  • Autobiography and self Auto-biographical memory
    is NOT the self (p. 65 ff.).
  • Depersonalisation phenomena
  • Parietal cortex lesions e.g. limb denial,
    anosognosia
  • The dementias Alzheimers disease
  • Anorexia nervosa
  • Conclusion self-representation is
    multi-dimensional (p. 70).

44
Self and Self-Knowledge The internal-Model
Solution (2)
  • Self-Representational Capacities (2)
  • Autobiography and self Auto-biographical memory
    is NOT the self (p. 65 ff.).
  • Depersonalisation phenomena
  • Parietal cortex lesions e.g. limb denial,
    anosognosia
  • The dementias Alzheimers disease
  • Anorexia nervosa
  • Conclusion self-representation is
    multi-dimensional (p. 70).

45
Self and Self-Knowledge The internal-Model
Solution (3)
  • Self as Agent

46
Self and Self-Knowledge The internal-Model
Solution (3)
  • Self as Agent
  • Coordination can only be performed by neurons,
    since there is no intelligent extraneuronal
    mini-me inside who puts it all together (p.
    71).
  • Internal milieu, needs, and goals
  • maintaining a costant internal milieu means that
    the nervous system has to know, in some sense,
    what the internal set points should be (p. 73).
  • By making some effects pleasant and some not,
    the nervous system directs the animals choices.
    Emotions are the brains way of making us do and
    pay attention to certain things (p. 73).
  • Moving, causing, and surviving (p. 76 ff.) The
    transformation of visual coordinates in motor
    coordinates. The emulators (p. 77 ff.).

47
Self and Self-Knowledge The internal-Model
Solution (3)
  • Self as Agent

48
Self and Self-Knowledge The internal-Model
Solution (3)
  • Self as Agent
  • Moving, causing, and surviving
  • Sensori-motor coordination

49
Self and Self-Knowledge The internal-Model
Solution (3)
50
Self and Self-Knowledge The internal-Model
Solution
  • Efference copy In short, the brain makes a
    prediction about a change of scene based on the
    eye-movement command, which hitherto has always
    been followed by real eye movement. When the
    prediction fails, the brain grabs the best
    explanation (p. 85).
  • Crows and ravens The ravens used body-image
    manipulation in causal problem solving. As
    Heinrich argues, 'The simplest... hypothesis is
    that the birds anticipated at least some
    consequences of the behaviors before overtly
    executing them (p. 87).
  • Covertly practicing a golf swing (p. 87).
  • The difficulty of tickling yourself (p. 87).

51
Inner Models of Body, Self, and Others
  • Sensory systems representing the body somatic
    s.s. and autonomous s.s.
  • The somatic sensory system. The body-to-brain
    wiring keeps the brain informed about what is
    happening to the body, while the brain-to-body
    wiring allows the brain to control the body (p.
    91)
  • Mirror neurons (p. 101 ff.)
  • Visceral feelings (p. 104)
  • ... the autonomic system because of the
    centrality of its role in coordinating vital
    functions, biasing behavior choice, and giving
    emotional color to ongoing experience
    constitutes the core of what makes an animal a
    coherent biological entity (p. 105)
  • The neural self (p. 105)

52
Inner Models of Body, Self, and Others
  • Myself among other things
  • Guided by its rich postnatal experience, the
    brain constructs a systematic representation of
    the external world. Much of learning consists
    of constructing a causal map of ones world.
    Especially in gregarious creatures like ravens,
    wolves, monkeys, and humans, the brain also comes
    to understand and represent the complex social
    world in which it finds itself (pp. 106-107).
  • The comprehension of others To a first
    approximation, the brain is now representing the
    representational activities of brains in general
    it is now capable of representing, at least to
    some degree, its own activities as a
    representational system (p. 107).
  • Representing conspecifics as other minds (p. 107)

53
Inner Models of Body, Self, and Others
  • Myself among other things
  • Sellars representing other minds and scientific
    theories (p. 108 ff.)
  • The brain and social cognition (p. 110)
  • Sellars theory theory shows that it is
    necessary for philosophers to look outward to
    psychology, neuroscience, and biology in general
    to try to understand how the brain represents its
    own acitivities and capacities (p. 112)
  • By 16 months, still before they acquire their
    first spoken words, children comprehend what
    someone is trying to do and can screen out what
    is accidental in an action (p. 112)
  • The candy-pencil experiment false belief
    experiments (p. 113).

54
Inner Models of Body, Self, and Others
  • Myself among other things
  • ... the animals are not merely responding to
    specific cues but are also making use of
    representations of what others can see, want,
    intend, and feel (p. 113)
  • On this hypothesis, autism is a kind of mind
    blindness (p. 116)
  • Human beings have the capacity of representing
    representations of representations etc. (within
    certain limits). It is not determined to which
    extent non human animals enjoy this capacity.
  • Although the capacity for self-reflection is
    important, it is not, on the Grush emulator
    hypothesis, the fundamental platform of the sense
    of self. The platform, as I have suggested, is
    first and foremost a matter of body regulation
    and body representations against dualism again
    (p. 117).

55
Knowing Oneself a Philosphical Problem
  • Descartes believed that the (conscious) mind,
    and only the mind, is directly known. He used
    the alleged epistemic specialness of the mind
    (directness) to defend the metaphysical
    specialness of the mind (the thing known).
    But all knowledge involves some neural
    processing prior to conscious recognition that
    something is an a or a b There is no such
    thing as unprocessed perception (pp. 117-118).
  • The mind is not identical to consciousness. This
    is against dualism Once the nonconscious
    processing point is on the table, the case for a
    metaphysically special stuff to handle direct
    knowledge is enfeebled (p. 119).
  • The alleged infallible knowledge of the mind (p.
    119 ff.). Some things are better recognized not
    for metaphysical reasons but for survival (p.
    120). Moreover I recognize my subjective states
    better than anyone else only because they happen
    in my brain!

56
Knowing Oneself a Philosphical Problem
... there are abnormal conditions where I err
in my noninferential judgements about my
conscious states (p. 120). Other errors with
regard to ones own conscious states Antons
syndrome (p. 122). These patients have lost the
very mechanisms for knowing whether one is seeing
or not. Since the brain has no information to
indicate otherwise, it goes with the standard
state of affairs (p. 122). Conclusions The
brain makes us think that we have a self. Does
that mean that the self I think I am is not real?
No, it is real as any activity of the brain. It
does mean, however, that ones self is not an
ethereal bit of ,soul stuff (p. 124) I prefer
to maintain the Absent Conductor Theory
57
The Absent Conductor Theory

58
Illusion of continuity
Short term memory
B2
B1
Time cause/effect
59
Consciousness
  • Introduction What is consciousness? the
    pragmatic attitude and the mysterian attitude
    (pp. 127-128).
  • Definitions and Science
  • In everyday use, the term consciousness can
    describe a range of somewhat different things
    (p. 129)
  • Terms may change their range of application as
    new discoveries are made (p. 129). 1st example
    the concept of fire (pp. 129-130) 2nd example
    Ptolomaeus and Newton about superlunar realm and
    sublunar realm (pp. 130-131)
  • The more general lesson is this theories about
    certain things and definitions as to what in the
    world count as those things evolve together (p.
    133) T. Kuhn
  • Kinds of conscious states sensory perceptions,
    somatic sensory perceptions remembering,
    knowing, imagining, attending to, wondering
    whether, surprise, emotional states (fear, anger
    etc.), drive states (hunger, thirst etc.),
    capacities (dispositions vs exercise of those
    dispositions).

60
Consciousness
  • Experimental strategies
  • The direct approach (a mechanism for
    consciousness, p. 135)
  • Cricks assumption There must be brain
    differences in the following two conditions (1)
    a stimulus is presented and the subject is aware
    of it, and (2) a stimulus is presented and the
    subject is not aware of it (p. 136). Examples
  • What is binocular rivalry? (pp. 136-148)
  • Loops and conscious experience - ... loops
    (also referred to as re-entrant pathways and as
    back projections) are essential circuitry in the
    production of conscious awareness (G. Edelman)
    (p. 148).
  • Artificial neural network (ANN) indicates that
    many of the consciousness-related functions
    STM, attention, sensory perception, meaning are
    handled most powerfully and efficiently by
    networks with recurrent projections (p. 149).

61
Consciousness
  • Loops and conscious experience (2)
  • Experimental evidence is beginning to come in to
    support this idea For example, Pascual-Leone and
    Walsh exploited the fact that transcranial
    magnetic stimulation (TMS) of cortical visual
    area area V1 will cause the subject to experience
    small flashes of light, while stimulation of
    cortical visual area MT will produce flashes of
    light that move (p. 151).
  • A methodological question about neural correlates
  • From correlation to identification (p. 154 ff.)
  • An analogy light electromagnetic wave. This
    identification needs a background Maxwell's
    theory of electromagnetism (p. 155).
  • Also the identification of consciousness to its
    neural correlates needs a theoretical framework
    (p. 156).
  • Examples are limited to vision here (p. 156).

62
Consciousness
  • The Indirect Approach
  • A theory of brain function in general (p. 157).
  • Consciousness is connected to attention but it
    cannot just be attention (p. 157).
  • While you ar reading a text you are not aware of
    the very short span of words your attention is
    directed to (pp. 157-158).
  • If you want to suppress a noise that is
    disturbing your performance, purposefully paying
    attention to it is a bad strategy! (p. 158).
  • Consciousness as global workspace (p. 158 ff.)
  • Conscious states are more broadly accessible than
    unconscious states (Dennett and Baars) (p. 159).
    A criticism the hypothesis is unclear from a
    neurological point of view.

63
Consciousness
  • The Indirect Approach
  • Self, subjectivity, and consciousness (p. 164
    ff.)
  • A. Damasio the capacity for consciousness is
    the outcome of high-level self-representational
    capacities. Thus nervous systems have
    integrative organizations for ranking goals,
    making behavioral decision, and evaluating
    relevant perceptual signals in the context of
    specific behavioral plans (p. 164)
  • An internal model The Grush emulator (p. 164).
    an inner representation of the body in relation
    to its environment (p. 164).
  • At some stage, new circuitry enabled a neuronal
    population to represent the internal model
    itself (p. 165).

64
Consciousness
  • The Indirect Approach
  • Life and Conscious experience
  • Life and consciousness are their physical
    correlates (p. 171 ff,) against vitalism
  • Objections against reductionism
  • I cannot imagine that mental states are brain
    processes. Reply Ignorance says nothing positive
    (p. 174-175).
  • The Zombies (p. 176 ff.). Reply Logical
    possibility does not imply real possibility!
  • The problem is too hard. Reply the fallacy of
    arguments from ignorance (p. 179).
  • The inverted spectrum. Reply same reply as
    against Zombies.

65
Consciousness
  • The Indirect Approach
  • Connecting qualia and neuronal organization
  • The vision of colours

66
(No Transcript)
67
Consciousness naturalized

Albert H. Munsell (1858-1918)
68
Consciousness naturalized

69
(No Transcript)
70
(No Transcript)
71
(No Transcript)
72
(No Transcript)
About PowerShow.com