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Title: Data Sharing Between Academia and Industry: Drug Companies have a Conscience Too


1
Data Sharing Between Academia and Industry Drug
Companies have a Conscience Too
  • Wes Van Voorhis
  • Professor of Medicine
  • Adjunct Professor of Pathobiology and
    Microbiology
  • wesley_at_u.washington.edu

2
Overview of LectureCould be retitled The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly
  • Intro to Issues in Industry Interactions
  • Case Histories
  • My own case Help pharma to do the right thing
  • Ben Hall Ph.D. UW Value of patents and in
    discernment of industry agreements
  • Bruce Psaty, M.D. Ph.D., UW Be wary of industry,
    they may try to slay the messenger
  • Betty Dong, PhD, UCSF Nightmare at publication
    time
  • Lessons learned from the cases

3
Introduction to Issues in Industry Interactions
  • Industry and Academics
  • Generally different values
  • Ethical principle that academics should
    participate in patents and industry?
  • One view We owe it to the people who pay for our
    research, i.e. the US public that funds most of
    our research
  • Industry transforms intellectual property into
    goods and services used by the US public
  • Need to convert our ideas to products
  • If you publish without patent protection, may
    have destroyed the ability to convert the idea
    into a usable product

4
Introduction to Issues in Industry Interactions
  • Who owns federally-funded research (intellectual
    property) performed at UW
  • The researcher
  • The U.S. Government
  • The WA State Government
  • The University of Washington
  • Washington Research Foundation

5
Introduction to Issues in Industry Interactions
  • Who owns federally-funded research (intellectual
    property) performed at UW
  • The University of Washington

6
Introduction to Issues in Industry Interactions
  • Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
  • Prior to 1980, U.S. Government owned intellectual
    property (IP) from Federally-sponsored research
  • US Govt had little incentive to patent inventions
  • IP generally went into public domain w/out patent
  • Problematic w/out patent protection, Industry
    will not invest in development of an idea
  • lt5 of patents were licensed to companies for
    commercial applications

7
Introduction to Issues in Industry Interactions
  • Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
  • After 1980, IP became property of universities
    where work was performed
  • Inventors share a portion of return
  • Universities have to report IP to Federal Govt.
  • In theory, U.S. Govt. maintains right to patent
    anything Univ. refuse to patent
  • Huge explosion in patent applications from
    federally-sponsored research
  • Offices of Technology Transfer (OTT) generally
    charged with examining IP, licensing out
    technology, agreements with industry,
    materials-transfer agreements, confidentiality
    agreements
  • Became a profit center for some universities

8
Wes Van Voorhis MD, PhDCase history Help Pharma
to do the right thing
  • Interested in drug development for the Developing
    World
  • Malaria
  • Trypanosomes
  • African Sleeping Sickness
  • American Trypanosomiasis (Chagas Disease)

Crump TDR/WHO
National Geographic
Manning UCI
9
Difficulties in Creating New Drugs for Infectious
Diseases in the Developing World
  • Incentive for Pharma small
  • Pharma looking for 100 million/year or better
    for new drugs developed
  • Market in developing countries is limited
  • Annual health expenditure per capita often lt5
    USD / year
  • Travelers military market is limited

10
Difficulties in Creating New Drugs for Infectious
Diseases in the Developing World
  • Most of drug-development expertise in Pharma
    (private sector)
  • Solutions
  • Pharma
  • Special research units
  • Devote effort to Devel. Country Diseases
  • e.g. GSK (Tres Cantos), Novartis (Singapore)
  • Public-Private Partnerships
  • Funding through MMV, DNDi, iOWH

11
Medicines for Malaria Venture
  • MMV Nonprofit Foundation (about 60 Gates
    Foundation Funding)
  • Mission discover, develop and deliver new
    affordable antimalarial drugs through effective
    public-private partnerships

12
Medicines for Malaria Venture Portfolio 4th Q 2006
Exploratory Discovery Preclinical Development Regu
latory
Lead Lead Identification Optimization Phase
I Phase II Phase III
OZ Next Generation
PSAC antagonists
OZ PQP RBx11160 Piperaquine Tablet, Pediatric
and Intravenous RBx11160
Chlorproguanil -dapsone (Lapdap) - artesunate
(CDA)
Novel Liver Stage Antimalarials
Pf enoyl-ACP reductase (Fab I)
Immucillins
New dicationic molecules
Enantioselective 8-aminoquinoline NPC1161
Pediatric Coartem
Cameroonian Medicinal Plants
4(1H)-pyridones Back ups
Dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine DHA PQP
Isoquine (an improved aminoquinoline)
TDR22093 Series
Falcipain (cysteine protease)
Pyronaridine Artesunate PYRAMAX
4(1H)-pyridone GW308678
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases
Collaboration
Novel Macrolides
Broad Institute of MIT/Harvard Genzyme
Collaboration
17 Projects 6 New Projects to be added 3
mini-portfolios
Dihydrofolate reductase (DHFR)
Natural Products Whole-Cell HTS
Dihydroorotate dehydrogenase inhibitors
Natural Products as New Prototypes
R. Rabinovich, BM Gates FDN
13
Piggy-backing To Select Drug Targets
  • Drug development is difficult starting from
    scratch
  • Look for promising drug targets where a lot of
    development has already been performed
  • See if the existing drugs show promise against
    malaria, thus piggy-back onto existing efforts
  • Mike Gelb, Fred Buckner,
  • Christophe Verlinde, Erkang Fan

http//www.ed.arizona.edu/ward/Design-Plane/piggyb
ack.jpg
14
Engaging Pharma Difficulties
  • Asking Pharma for their most valuable resource,
    their compounds
  • Impede future use of compounds for more lucrative
    markets
  • Endanger patents for compounds by disclosure of
    compounds in research results
  • Reveal the range of their compound holdings for
    competitor advantage

15
Engaging Pharma Difficulties
  • Academic researchers using Pharma drugs/compounds
  • Might find a liability/toxicity not described for
    a compound
  • Results may be artifact, no Pharma control
  • Could hold up launch of drug
  • Millions at stake

16
Engaging Pharma Difficulties
  • Concern that identification of a drug for a
    developing world use will
  • Make drug company look bad for charging a lot for
    the drug
  • Make the drug company look bad for having a
    two-tiered pricing scheme expensive for US,
    cheap for Dev. World
  • Cheap drugs from abroad might contaminate the
    US market
  • Might engender generic off-shore production
    before patent has expired

17
Piggy-backing Antiparasitic Drug Targets at UW
Two Examples
  • Protein Farnesyltransferase
  • Target for oncology, in Phase III trials
  • Effective leads from Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS),
    others donated by Schering-Plough, Merck,
    others
  • Inhibitors cure rodent malaria
  • Optimizing Pharmacokinetics
  • Glycogen Synthase Kinase
  • Target for mania, Alzheimers, diabetes
  • Leads from Serono Inc., negotiating with Glaxo
    Smith Klein (GSK)
  • Inhibitors kill malaria and trypanosomes
  • Testing in animal models

18
Engaging Pharma Lessons Learned
  • Talk to scientists, not lawyers
  • Realize the value of Pharmas compounds
  • Concede Phamas due rights to fruits of research
  • Read agreements carefully
  • Pass all agreements through the Office of
    Technology Transfer
  • Do not sign anything that will impede your
    (eventual) right to publish (OTT wont let you)
  • They cannot own the IP from your lab results but
    can get non-exclusive rights to use of results
    (OTT watches for this)

19
Ben Hall Ph.D.Case Study The Value of Patents
and in Discernment of Industry Agreements
  • Professor of Biology and Genome Sciences
  • Patents for yeast production of protein and
    HepBsAg for immunization
  • Discovered and characterized 18S and 28S rRNAs at
    Harvard for PhD
  • Interested in yeast transcription and translation
    in 1980s
  • Prevailing view at time by many academics
    Patents are very time consuming and produce
    nothing for the academic researcher or the public

20
Ben Hall Ph.D.
  • Studying alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH1) promoter
    of yeast for protein expression
  • Collaborate with Genentech early 1981
  • First obtained a written agreement with Genentech
    to not use ADH1 promoter for other genes without
    Halls consent
  • Alpha-interferon great production by ADH1
  • Genentech sent consulting agreement
  • Any subsequent inventions in the Hall lab would
    become property of Genetech
  • Hall has lawyer review doesnt sign

21
Ben Hall Ph.D.
  • HepBsAg Key to immunization against hepatitis B
  • Huge effort in early 1980 to produce recombinant
    HepBsAg in E. coli fails
  • E. coli becomes sick and chews up protein

22
Ben Hall Ph.D.
  • Suitably tailored ADH1 promoter and yeast strain
    Key to highly competitive race for rHepBsAg
  • Hall UCSF collaborators
  • First production of rHepBsAg
  • Filed for patent in 1981 not granted until 1988
  • Dated and signed lab records critical
  • Had Genetech been able to use ADH1 constructs,
    they would have been first
  • Letter that they could not use ADH1 constructs to
    express other genes was the key to stopping them

23
Ben Hall Ph.D.
  • Revenue stream from patents substantially funds
  • Office of Tech Transfer
  • Royalty Research Fund
  • Dr. Hall has never written a grant since 1994
  • Patent revenues fund lab expenses
  • Scientific freedom

24
Ben Hall Ph.D.Lessons learned
  • Enter industry consultations with written
    agreements about scope of work
  • Get a good lawyer to review documents
  • Think twice about consultancy agreements
  • Work with Office of Technology Transfer to secure
    patent protection for your work

25
Bruce Psaty, M.D., Ph.D.Case Study Be wary of
industry, they may try to slay the messenger
  • Professor of Medicine, Epidemiology and Health
    Services, UW
  • Investigator, Center for Health Studies, Group
    Health Cooperative of Puget Sound
  • Renowned for his work on drug safety
  • UW Public Service Award 2005
  • Responsible for recognizing problems with Ca
    Channel Blockers for high blood pressure and
    increased heart disease vs. older (cheaper)
    medicines

26
Bruce Psaty, M.D., Ph.D.
  • Am. Heart Asscn. Meeting, 1995
  • Dr. Psaty presents study examining association
    between
  • Incidence of heart attacks (myocardial
    infarction, MI)
  • Types of high blood pressure medications
  • Ca Channel Blockers use were asscd with 60
    increased risk of MI compared with less expensive
    generic drugs such as diuretics or beta blockers
  • A news release was prepared by AHA
  • Front page coverage
  • Psatys office flooded by calls from upset
    patients and doctors

27
Bruce Psaty, M.D., Ph.D.
  • Aftermath of press coverage
  • Psaty gets requests from several pharmaceutical
    companies for documents, tables, manuscripts
  • Freedom of Information Act cited by one company
  • Huge request of all documents of Psaty and
    collaborators
  • University forced to negotiate a response, after
    several months of work, the company withdraws the
    request
  • Academic Consultants to companies making Ca
    channel blockers issue
  • Blistering critiques
  • Emphasize dubious harms of cheaper generics
  • Publicly question Psatys integrity
  • Most often dont disclose their ties to companies
  • Companies making Ca channel blockers try to block
    publication of paper with Psatys results
  • Go as far as to protest to the Dean of UW

28
Bruce Psaty, M.D., Ph.D.Lessons Learned
  • Be wary of industry, they may try to slay the
    messenger
  • Psaty was scrupulous in eschewing support from
    industry
  • He felt then would stand up to public scrutiny
    during the accusations of industry and academic
    consultants
  • Industry-sponsored research
  • May be tainted by not asking the right questions
  • Need to stand up to industry for research
    integrity and freedom
  • Less-believed by the public than public-sponsored
    research

29
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.Case Study Nightmare at
publication time
  • Professor of Clinical Pharmacy, UCSF
  • Respected researcher in endocrinology,
    cardiovascular, and HIV pharmacology
  • Contracted by Boots (later, Knoll)
    Pharmaceuticals to study bioequivalence of
    Synthroid vs. other preparations synthetic
    thyroid hormone

UCSF faculty website
30
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • Up to the time of Dr. Dongs study(1987-1990),
    Synthroid (levothyroxine, Boots) was felt to have
    superior bioavailability (amount of effective
    drug from a pill)
  • Thus, dissimilar bioequivalence to other
    cheaper/generic sources of levothyroxine
    preparations
  • Physicians tended to continue to prescribe
    Synthroid, introduced in 1958, rather than switch
    to cheaper generics
  • Switching would supposedly require re-titration
    of the patients dose to a therapeutic level,
    following TSH and clinical outcome
  • Boots (later Knoll) pharmaceutical company
    dominated the 600 million/yr market of
    levothyroxine

31
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • Dr. Dong conducted a randomized cross-over trial
    (patients took one for a while, then another,
    etc) of 4 preparations of synthetic thyroid
  • Measured effective blood levels of thyroid
    hormones and thyroid stimulating hormone
  • Boots visited UCSF site 3x/yr to convince work
    was being done right, no signs of any major
    problems
  • Study found no differences in any measurement for
    4 preparations studied including Synthroid of
    Boots/Knoll, it was clear all 4 were bioequivalent

32
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • Over the next 4 years Boots campaigned to
    discredit the study
  • Dr. Dong sent Boots numerous drafts of a
    manuscript
  • Boots refused publication cited numerous
    deficiencies including
  • Failure to carry out procedures not in the
    protocol
  • Deficiencies in patient selection criteria
  • Assay reliability
  • Statistical analysis
  • Unspecified ethical problemsdemanded disclosure
    of conflict of interest, present, past, future

33
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • Over the next 4 years Boots campaigned to
    discredit the study
  • Boots sent letters of complaint to UCSF officials
  • Two UCSF investigations failed to find any wrong
    doing by the investigator
  • Conclusion was that the study was rigorously
    conducted as per the protocol with only very
    minor deviations as are acceptable and expected
    in a clinical trial
  • UCSF characterizes Boots handling of Dr. Dong as
    harassment and deceptive and self-serving
  • UCSF suppression of the manuscript was an
    unprecedented infringement on academic freedom
  • Dong et al. decided they would publish

34
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • Study by Dong et al. submitted to JAMA 4/1994
  • Reviewed by 5 reviewers, revised, accepted
    11/1994, publication scheduled 1/25/95
  • Dr. Dong withdraws Ms 1/13/95
  • Cites impending legal action
  • Discloses 5/88 protocol/contract has a clause
    Data obtained by the investigator while carrying
    out this study is considered confidential and is
    not to be published or otherwise released without
    written consent

35
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • Why did Dr. Dong sign restriction on publication?
  • She considered it routine for contracts
  • Before 1993, UCSF had no mandatory review of
    contracts
  • Why did she go so far with publication?
  • First lawyer at UCSF felt academic freedom
    trumped clause in contract and Boots would
    probably not take legal action if Dong published

36
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • Why did Dr. Dong withdraw the publication?
  • Dr. Dong threatened with lawsuit twice if sales
    of Synthroid dropped
  • Boots/Knoll denies this
  • First lawyer left UCSF, new lawyer felt Boots
    would take legal action
  • Boots considered for purchase loss of revenue
    from blockbuster Synthroid would decrease value
    of company (Company bought by BASF for 1.4
    billion in 3/96 Div. of Knoll Pharma)
  • Dr. Dong might not get legal protection from UCSF
    because of contract she signed

37
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • Publication of Dr. Dongs data by Boots
  • Dr. Gilbert Mayor, employee of Boots, publishes
    Dong et al. data in 1995
  • No acknowledgement of primary researchers
  • Reanalyzes the data of Dong et al. using
    different (flawed) algorithms
  • Finds opposite result of Dong et al.
  • Other preparations of levothyroxine are
    therapeutically inequivalent
  • Favors Boots marketshare
  • Published in new journal, Am. J. Therapeutics
  • Dr. Mayor Associate Editor

38
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • Came to attention of public 4/25/96
  • Wall Street Journal Article by Ralph King
  • Bitter Pill How a drug company paid for a
    university study then undermined it
  • Boots/Knoll position summarized by President of
    Knoll, Carter Eckert, I stopped a flawed study
    that would have put millions of patients at risk

39
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • FDA involvement
  • FDA warns Boots 1994
  • Cited misleading information on labeling and
    product info
  • Boots studies insufficient data that other
    levothyroxine preparations are different (lack
    bioequivalence w/Synthroid)
  • After publication of Wall Street Journal article,
    11/96, FDA concluded that Knoll had violated the
    Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
  • Misbranded Synthroid based on lack of
    bioequivalence of other preparations
  • Noted Knoll was in possession of data from Dong
    et al. which came to the opposite conclusion

40
Betty Dong, Pharm.D.
  • Knoll relents 11/96
  • Negotiates with UCSF, allows publication of Dong
    et al. paper in JAMA
  • Comes out in 4/97
  • Unchanged from original accepted paper from 1/95
  • Knoll publishes in same JAMA
  • letter of apology
  • letter objecting to the papers conclusions

41
Betty Dong, Pharm.D. Lessons learned
  • Read and understand all that you sign
  • Have agreements reviewed by Office of Technology
    Transfer (OTT)
  • Be wary of studies that can only come out in
    favor of companies product
  • If they do not, the company may vigorously fight
    to suppress the findings

42
Summary of Concepts
  • Academics should participate in patenting and
    technology transfer to industry
  • Work with OTT to secure patents
  • Otherwise goods and services wont be created
  • The University owns the Intellectual Property
    (IP)
  • Disclose IP early to UW, dont delay publication
  • Consult OTT for direction for IP issues
  • Talk to industry scientists, not lawyers

43
Summary of Concepts
  • Read agreements carefully
  • Pass all agreements through OTT
  • Do not sign anything that will impede your
    (eventual) right to publish
  • Realize the value of industry materials
  • Concede industrys due rights to fruits of
    research
  • Industry cannot own the IP from your lab results
    but can get non-exclusive rights

44
Summary of Concepts
  • Be wary of industry, they may try to slay the
    messenger
  • Carefully consider consultancy agreements
  • May create apparent conflict of interest later

45
Acknowledgements
  • John DesRosier PhD
  • Ben Hall PhD
  • Lee Huntsman PhD
  • Eric Larson MD
  • Bruce Psaty MD, PhD
  • Ari Santander, UW OTT
  • Rob Gillespie
  • Debra Jarvis
  • Rennie Drummond, 1997 Thyroid Storm JAMA
    2771238
  • Richard Deyo, Bruce Psaty, Gregory Simon, Edward
    Wagner, and Gilbert Omenn. 1997 The messenger
    under attack Intimidation of researchers by
    special interests groups NEJM 3361176
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