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Regionalization railway passenger traffic in Switzerland: more performance

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Title: Regionalization railway passenger traffic in Switzerland: more performance


1
Regionalization railway passenger traffic in
Switzerland more performance without
competition. An example for France?
  • Christian Desmaris University of Lyon
    Laboratory of Transport Economics
  • July 2013

2
Why this paper ?
  • The regional passenger traffic in France has been
    strongly reshaped over the ten past (2002), but
    this reform appears today as unfulfilled, both in
    a financial and institutional bind
  • Institutional. French law does not actually open
    the possibility of bidding in contrast with the
    European laws which open the competition in the
    next future (OSP, 2007-2019) and Fourth railway
    package (2013).
  • Financial. SNCF production costs are high and
    rise much and and regularly. (Crozet and
    Desmaris, 2011).
  • Our suggestion the Swiss reform of regional
    passenger rail transport can it serve as a model
    in France? Many reasons
  • Institutional. The Swiss railway regionalization
    ended the monopoly of historical operator and
    provides good results for taxpayers and
    travelers.
  • A Similar regional railway reform agenda
    1995/1996 vs 1995/1997-2002. But in France,
    unfinished reform.
  • The Size. In France, the regions are PAT.
    Switzerland is similar with one of great French
    regions in terms of population and surface.

3
Our four questions
  • 1. What is this switzerland rail reform design?
  • 2. What are their impacts on public finances and
    on travellers welfare?
  • 3. How to understand the dynamics in the regional
    and local traveller railway transport reform in
    Switzerland?
  • 4. What learning lessons from Switzerland
    passenger railway reform for policy makers in
    France?

4
1. The Swiss railway reform (1)
  • 1. First step in 1995/96 a regional traffic
    reform
  • Three axes
  • Regionalisation cantons as full responsible for
    the order of regional transport services but
    FOT co-signs the agreements.
  • Net-cost contract Unplanned deficits will no
    longer be covered by the State. Very incentive.
    Two years contracts.
  • Liberalisation regional traffic. No more SBB
    monopoly Possibility of tendering for rail
    regional transport services.
  • Regionalisation paradox more potentail
    competition and more need of traffic coordination
    (FOT)

5
1. The Swiss railway reform (2)
  • 2. Second step in 1998/1999 a new regulatory
    framework very near European pattern (first and
    second package)
  • A significantly renewed SBB organization and its
    business model (01/01/1999)
  • Independence from the political and
    administrative powers, but special status of a
    public limited company - quadri-annual contract
  • Confederation has accepted to erase SBB debts
  • Activities have been divided into four distinct
    branches Passenger Traffic, Cargo,
    Infrastructure and Real Estate
  • Sovereignty tasks have been transferred to the
    FOT

6
1. The Swiss railway reform (3)
  • 3. Third step 2009/ a highly controversial and
    unfulfilled reform in 2013
  • Three particularly controversial points
  • The tendering procedures in regional passenger
    transport (train / bus) optional or compulsary?
  • The respective share of the Confederation and the
    Cantons for the financing of infrastructure
  • The choice of the optimal architecture for the
    infrastructure management - Swiss rail system is
    vertically integrated (as Japan)
  • Swiss railway pattern reform so specific
  • Pragmatic reform step by step
  • Various and conflictual objectifs quality vs
    productivity and rentability more rail share vs
    more efficiency in using publics funds
  • Competition in the law. but specific public
    governance in fact

7
2. Significant performance gains
  • 1. An inverse of the public compensation trend (1)

Grants allowed by the Confederation to the
regional traffic operated by SBB
8
2. Significant performance gains
  • 1. An inverse of the public compensation trend (2)

Grants allowed by the Regional authorities for
the regional traffic operated by SNCF
9
2. Significant performance gains
  • 2. More faster train and more distance in train
    Rail 2000

    1994 2000 2005 2010 Var
Distances per day in km Car 21.3 23.6 23.7 23.8 11.7
Distances per day in km Train 4.2 4.7 5.6 7.1 69.0
Distances per day in km All 31.3 35 35.2 36.7 17.3
Travel times per day in minutes Car 32 35.3 34.6 33.2 3.8
Travel times per day in minutes Train 4.6 4.9 5.2 6.4 39.1
Travel times per day in minutes All 77.5 84.5 88.4 83.4 7.6
Speeds in km/hour Car 37 35.5 36.2 38.6 4.3
Speeds in km/hour Train 49.8 53.5 60.9 61.4 23.3
OFS (2012). Mobility in Switzerland - Results of
the micro-census Mobility and Transports 2010.
10
2. Significant performance gains
  • 3. A large development of the total SBB supply
    train-km

Statistics from UIC
11
3. The 3 keys of the Swiss rail reform success
  • Key 1. A very responsible public governance (1)
  • A) A collective choice in favor of a long-term
    rail infrastructure investment planning

12
3. The keys of the Swiss rail reform success
  • Key 1. A very responsible public governance (2)
  • B) A cap on public operating contributions in
    favor of infrastructure funding

13
3. The keys of the Swiss rail reform success
  • Key 1. A very responsible public governance (3)
  • C) A larger involvement of the regional
    authorities in decision-making and funding

2003 2010 Structure 2003 () Structure 2010 () Variation in million CHF Variation en
Confederation 570.2 545.4 65.1 51.4 - 24.8 -4.3
Cantons 298.0 513.7 34.0 48.4 215.7 72.4
Communes 7.3 1.9 0.8 0.2 - 5.4 -74.0
Total of public contributions (millions CHF) 875.5 1 061.0 100.0 100.0 185.5 21.2
  • 1. La stratégie des pouvoirs publics
  • Un transfert de la responsabilité financière et
    de la commande de lEtat aux cantons
    (régionalisation)

14
3. The keys of the Swiss rail reform success
  • Key 1. A very responsible public governance (4)
  • D) A really incentive and empowering SBB
    corporate governance
  • An absolute financial constraint imposed to the
    Swiss Railways by the Confederation

Agreements Total amount (CHF million) Annual average (CHF million Index base 100 annual average 1999-2002
1999-2002 5 840 1 460 100.0
2003-2007 6 020 (5 602) (a) 1 505 (1 400) (a) 103.1
2007-2010 5 880 1 470 100.7
2011-2012 3 322 1 661 113.8
2013-2016 6 624 1 656 113.4
(a) After reduction due to savings programs.
15
3. The keys of the Swiss rail reform success
  • Key 2. An historical operator capable of great
    increasing productivity and managerial
    innovations (1)
  • A) To obtain significant labor productivity gains
    (1)

  1980 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 Variation en Variation en
  1980 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 1980-1995 1995-2011
Passenger-kilometres in million (1) 9 167 11 712 12 835 13 830 17 513 17 749 27.8 51.6
Tonne-kilometre in million (2) 7 220 8 156 10 658 8 571 13 111 12 346 13.0 51.4
Staff (3) 38 367 33 529 28 272 25 943 25 356 25 840 -12.6 -22.9
Labor productivity in traffic unit million (1 2) / (3) 0.43 0.59 0.83 0.86 1.21 1.16 38.7 96.6
Our calculations from Historical statistics of
railways (UIC).
16
3. The keys of the Swiss rail reform success
  • Key 2. An historical operator capable of great
    increasing productivity and managerial
    innovations (2)
  • A) To obtain significant labor productivity gains
    (2)

Train-Km / emlpoyee ( 1000)
Our calculations from Historical statistics of
railways (UIC).
17
3. The keys of the Swiss rail reform success
  • Key 2. An historical operator capable of great
    increasing productivity and managerial
    innovations (3)
  • B) To increase the railway company earnings

(CHF million) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2011
Passengers 113.7 93.4 152.2 78.6 193.7 276.8 213.9
Freight -96.1 -33.1 -2.8 -165.7 -37.3 -29.9 -45.9
Infrastructure 106.5 0.3 43.7 17.4 91.8 30.4 72.4
Real Estate - -4.6 15.2 21.0 27.8 3.3 2.4 (a)
Real Estate before internal balances - 152.1 184.6 219.6 229.8 291.6 182.5
Group-level units -136.4 -34.3 -164.2 -123.2 -20.5 68.8 96
Eliminations - 3.2 -1.4 5.6 4.0 -4.6 0
Total SBB -12.0 24.9 42.6 -166.3 259.4 345.0 338.7
18
3. The keys of the Swiss rail reform success
  • Key 3. More numerous and more satisfied
    passengers (1)
  • A) A constant strong growth in the Swiss
    passenger traffic

  1980 1995 2011 Variation () 1980-1995 (a) Variation () 1995-2011 (a)
Passenger-kilometres (in billion) 9.2 11.7 17.7 27.2 (1.5) 51.3 (2.6)
Passengers (in million) 216.3 253.2 356.6 17.1 (1.0) 40.8 (2.2)
Trains-km (in billion) 66.9 90.4 136.0 35.1 (1.9) 50.4 (2.6)
(a) In parentheses average annual variation
19
3. The keys of the Swiss rail reform success
  • Key 3. More numerous and more satisfied
    passengers (3)
  • B) The country where the demand for rail remains
    the highest in the world

20
3. The keys of the Swiss rail reform success
  • Key 3. More numerous and more satisfied
    passengers (4)
  • C) Indicators of overall traveler satisfaction
    for the SBB clients

SBB Management Report 2011 (2012), p. 21.
21
4. Three lessons and propositions for the French
Railway Policy (1)
  • First lesson the rail transport high quality has
    a major cost for the Community
  • A financial cost
  • Rail quality production requires huge and
    continuous investments (ECMT, 1999)
  • Very high rail public subsidies per capita 800
    in Swiss vs 170 in France (Prudhomme, 2009)
  • A political cost
  • State as to be the "major assembler" of the all
    public transport system.
  • FOT key rule of a potential "network manager"
    (Genoud, 2000).
  • A managerial cost
  • The Swiss governments fully assume their role as
    owners a strategic management of the the
    incumbent operator.
  • An exceptional stability of the leaders in charge
    (SBB, Ministries).

22
4. Three lessons and propositions for the French
Railway Policy (3)
  • Third lesson the regional rail transport high
    success results of a global triangular governance
  • More implication of regional public authorities
  • A radically overhauled of the organization and
    management of the incumbent railway operator SBB.
  • Large public transport users and citizen support.
  • Some doubts about sustainability of these dynamic
    of progress
  • Critical strategy of systematic savings
    disinvestment and social access more difficult
    (Nahrath and al.. 2008) .
  • Increase in traffic versus more infrastructure
    maintenance (Leuenberger. 2010)
  • Limits of the quest for the more efficient use of
    public funds slight increase in public
    contributions for regional transport.

23
4. Three lessons and propositions for the French
Railway Policy (2)
  • Second lesson performance gains without market
    competition - The secret of a successful railway
    governance
  • The core of the reform to impose a "performance
    constraints" to public transport companies
  • via generalizing contractual agreements net cost
    contract.
  • Regional rail passenger traffic is an exemplary
    illustration.
  • Tendering is legally possible, but no real case
    in the railway domestic sector
  • "Competition for the market" is possible...
  • Yardstick competition a significant role in the
    performance? FOT and benchmark regulation 26
    cantons and plurality of domestic private
    networks.

24
4. Three lessons and propositions for the French
Railway Policy (4)
  • Three challenges for the French railway actors
    for more progress
  • First proposal SNCF-RFF/ government accept the
    establishment of a strong regulation based on
    contractualized goals, productivity and service
    gains vs increased investments in network and put
    SNCF at the head of all public railway system.
  • 2nd proposal SNCF/Regions as TA more
    productivity and transparency vs limited and
    graduated competition.
  • Third proposal involves SNCF/Customers better
    quality of service (punctuality, information) vs
    extra financial contribution from the rail users
    themselves.
  • Does all actors want these new equilibrium? Does
    SNCF and government able to do that?

25
As conclusion Transferability to other
countries to study. Probably very difficult
A strike can hide another strike
26
Bibliography
  • Bovy P.H. (1992), "Le modèle ferroviaire suisse 
    un modèle à suivre ?", CST, 25, 47-66.
  • Carron N. (2004), "La politique ferroviaire dans
    le cadre de la politique générale des transports
    en Suisse", Rail International, 17-29.
  • Crozet Y., Desmaris C. (2011). Le transport
    ferroviaire régional de voyageurs un processus
    collectif dapprentissage. Recherche Transports
    Sécurité, 27, 3.
  • Finger M., Rosa A. et al., 2012. Governance of
    competition in the Swiss and European railway
    sector, Final report for SBB, Florence School of
    Regulation.
  • Genoud C. (2000), La régionalisation des
    transports publics implications de la nouvelle
    loi sur les chemins de fer à l'exemple des
    cantons de Berne, Zurich, Neuchâtel et Jura,
    Lausanne, Cahier 188, IDHEAP.
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    Switzerland A BLS perspective. Railway Gazette
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  • Meyer A., Meier B. (2011). Switzerland, pp.
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    impacts de la régionalisation et de la
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