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Enhanced Secure DNS: A Defense Against DDOS Attacks

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Enhanced Secure DNS: A Defense Against DDOS Attacks by David B. Wilkinson University of Colorado at Colorado Springs November 26, 2003 – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Enhanced Secure DNS: A Defense Against DDOS Attacks


1
Enhanced Secure DNSA Defense AgainstDDOS
Attacks
  • by
  • David B. Wilkinson
  • University of Colorado at Colorado Springs
  • November 26, 2003

2
DDOS - Distributed Denial of Service
  • DDOS attack - A flooding attack directed against
    one host by many computers across many networks
  • Attack consumes victims network bandwidth - site
    becomes very slow or is unavailable to users
  • Threat to Internet commerce In early 2000, DDOS
    attacks shut down Yahoo, eBay, Amazon, CNN.com,
    ETrade, Datek Online, Buy.com and the FBI
    website for up to a few hours, resulting in
    millions of dollars in lost revenue
  • October 2002 13 root DNS servers attacked
    (unsuccessful, but ...)

3
DDOS Attack Architecture
Attacker
...
Compromised systems
Handler
Handler
Handler
...
...
...
A
A
A
A
A
A
Packets sent to broadcast addresses of
intermediate networks
...
Replies to Victim
A Agent
Victim
4
Types of DDOS Attacks
  • SYN Flooding - The agents send out TCP SYN
    requests to the victim, but do not reply to the
    SYN-ACK. Large numbers of open connections
    quickly exhaust available memory Skoudis 2002.
  • Smurf Attack - Agents send to intermediate
    networks ICMP echo request (ping) packets that
    have source IP address of the victim victim gets
    replies
  • Fraggle Attack - Flood of datagrams (again with
    source address of victim) sent to UDP echo port 7
    of intermediate hosts echoes all sent to victim
  • SYN-ACK Attack - TCP SYN packets sent to random
    servers on Internet SYN-ACKs all go to victim

5
One Possible Solution Safe Network Security
Practices
  • Egress Filtering - Check source addresses of all
    packets leaving a network discard if
    illegitimate
  • Ingress Filtering - Check source addresses of all
    packets entering a network discard packets with
    127.0.0.1, 192.168.0.1, etc., as source address
  • Harden Computers - Close unnecessary ports (e.g.,
    echo port 7) remove services vulnerable to
    overflow security exploit install latest patches
  • Communicate risks of opening email attachments to
    employees

6
Another SolutionSecure Collective Defense
(SCOLD)
  • A network or consortium of participating entities
    that utilize new capabilities in the Domain Name
    System (DNS) software to keep an attacked member
    site available during the attack
  • New idea of Intrusion Tolerance - attacks will
    always happen so try to successfully work around
    them

7
Detail of DDOS attack
R
DNS
A
R
Net A
A
R
DNS
R
A
R
Net B
Victim
G
R
A
DNS
R
R
A
Net C
A Agent R Router G Gateway
R
R
8
SCOLD System Foils DDOS Attack
A Agent AG Alternate Gateway R Router PS
Proxy Server G Gateway
2
PS1
SCOLD Coordinator
R
A
Net A
R
1
A
R
3
Blocked by IDS
Victim
G
R
A
R
Net B
R
A
14
Client DNS
IP
IP
5
6
PS2
AG
4
7
A
9
10
8
R
Net C
R
Victim DNS Server
11
13
12
PS3
R
9
My task Enhance DNS Software, BIND, to meet the
needs of SCOLD
  • Three important areas of change in DNS BIND
    version 9.2.2
  • New program, nsreroute, that proxy server runs to
    send a DNS message to client DNS server
  • Enhancement of BIND server software for handling
    incoming nsreroute message. Includes using SSL
    for authentication between client DNS server and
    proxy server.
  • Enhancement of BIND server software for handling
    subsequent query for host in victim domain,
    including retrieval and caching of ALT data type

10
New DNS Functionality
  • 1) When victim detects attack, it issues alert to
    SCOLD coordinator, which tells proxy server to
    run nsreroute
  • 2) nsreroute sends messages to all client DNS
    servers for each client in list of input
  • 3) Client DNS server authenticates message sender
  • 4) Upon successful authentication, client DNS
    server writes zone for victims domain to disk,
    adds new entry to server configuration file, and
    reloads zones
  • 5) Client DNS server redirects next query for
    host in victim zone to victim DNS server through
    a SCOLD-aware proxy server via IP tunnel
  • 6) Subsequent queries for same host use cached
    results from previous query

11
How to implement this?
  • Use GNU GDB debugger, with DDD GUI, to trace BIND
    code
  • Use nsupdate client program written by the
    Internet Software Consortium (ISC) as a starting
    point for creating nsreroute
  • Use OpenSSL to implement SSL and public key
    cryptography for server/sender authentication
  • Add a new resource record, ALT (99), to refer to
    proxy server IP addresses

12
New client program nsreroute
  • From command line, run
  • nsreroute input_file
  • where input_file contains
  • reroute client.clientnet1.com. victimDNSserver1.vi
    ctimnet.com. victimDNSserver2.victimnet.com.
  • ltvictim DNS1 addressgt ltvictim DNS2 addressgt
    ltproxy server1 addressgt ltproxy server2 addressgt
  • ltproxy serverN addressgt
  • reroute client.clientnet2.com. victimDNSserver1.vi
    ctimnet.com. victimDNSserver2.victimnet.com.
  • ltvictim DNS1 addressgt ltvictim DNS2 addressgt
    ltproxy server1 addressgt ltproxy server2 addressgt
  • ltproxy serverN addressgt
  • .
  • .
  • .
  • reroute client.clientnetX.com. victimDNSserver1.vi
    ctimnet.com. victimDNSserver2.victimnet.com.
  • ltvictim DNS1 addressgt ltvictim DNS2 addressgt
    ltproxy server1 addressgt ltproxy server2 addressgt
  • ltproxy serverN addressgt

13
Step 1 nsreroute gets all authoritative DNS
servers for client domain
Example input reroute client.clientnet.com.
victimdns1.victimnet.com. victimdns2.victimnet.com
. 128.198.60.190 128.198.60.191 202.40.60.81
144.85.20.14 162.112.11.72
DNS1
DNS2 (primary master name server)
Authoritative DNS servers for clientnet.com
Q Want NS records for clientnet.com
Proxy server
A DNS1, DNS2, DNS3
DNS3
Alert from victim
14
Step 2 nsreroute sends message (reroutemsg) to
each DNS server at DNS servers port 53
DNS1
53
TCP
DNS2 (primary master name server)
Authoritative DNS servers for clientnet.com
53
TCP
Proxy server
TCP
53
DNS3
15
DNS Message Format
Header
Question
Answers
Authority
Additional
16
Basic reroutemsg structure
reroutemsg
opcode 7
authority section
victim_dns
victim_dns2
victimdns1.victimnet.com
victimdns2.victimnet.com
list
list
rdataset
rdataset_proxy
rdataset2
rdataset_proxy2
type 1
type 99
type 1
type 99
private1
private1
private1
private1
rdata_victim
rdata_proxy0
rdata_victim2
rdata_proxy20
128.198.60.190
202.40.60.81
128.198.60.191
202.40.60.81
rdata_proxy1
rdata_proxy21
144.85.20.14
144.85.20.14
rdata_proxy2
rdata_proxy22
162.112.11.72
162.112.11.72
17
Step 3 client DNS server authenticates proxy
server via SSL over TCP using DNS server port
5300
  • Exchange certificates
  • Proxy server verifies authenticity of DNS server
    cert.
  • DNS server verifies proxy server certificate AND
    checks if proxy cert. is on a list of approved
    senders

53
DNS1
TCP
5300
SSL
DNS2 (primary master name server)
TCP
53
Proxy server
Authoritative DNS servers for clientnet.com
5300
SSL
TCP
53
SSL
DNS3
5300
18
Step 4 After successful authentication, DNS
server creates new zone file (db.victimnet.com)
for victimnet.com domain and loads it into memory
_at_ IN SOA clientdns.clientnet.com.
root.clientnet.com. ( 1 Serial 3h
Refresh after 3 hours 1h Retry after 1
hour 1w Expire after 1 week 1h Negative
caching TTL of 1 hour ) IN
NS victimdns1.victimnet.com. IN
NS victimdns2.victimnet.com. victimdns1.victimne
t.com. 86400 IN A 128.198.60.190 victimdns1.victim
net.com. 86400 IN ALT 202.40.60.81 86400 IN ALT
144.85.20.14 86400 IN ALT 162.112.11.72 victimd
ns2.victimnet.com. 86400 IN A 128.198.60.191 victi
mdns2.victimnet.com. 86400 IN ALT
202.40.60.81 86400 IN ALT 144.85.20.14 86400
IN ALT 162.112.11.72
19
New behavior for client DNS server for handling
query for victim domain
Without rerouting zone, query goes to root
Referral to closer DNS server
Query eventually goes to victims flooded main
gateway
. . .
1
2
G
4
Victim DNS Server
3
Slow
client.clientnet.com
Q
DNS
Fast
IP tunnel
A
c
a
IP tunnel
PS
AG
With rerouting zone, query goes to an ALT address
b
(Set up IP tunnels)
ALT 202.40.60.81
G Gateway AG Alternate Gateway PS Proxy
Server
SCOLD Coordinator
20
Query also requires retrieval and caching of new
ALT data type
First query for victim after victim zone
installed on client DNS server
client.clientnet.com
Victim DNS Server
Q
Q
Q
DNS
. . .
. . .
A
A
A
Answer contains ALT records retrieved from zone
database
Cache ALT records
Answer contains ALT records included in victim
DNS server message
Subsequent queries for victim
client.clientnet.com
Q
DNS
Victim DNS Server
A
Answer contains ALT records retrieved from cache
database
Not needed
21
Time (in seconds) for proxy server and client DNS
server to process reroutemsg
Client DNS Server
Proxy Server
Trial
2.55
2.97
1
2.22
2.36
2
2.17
2.33
3
2.16
2.30
4
2.15
2.38
5
2.15
2.33
6
2.17
2.29
7
2.15
2.35
8
2.19
2.31
9
2.19
2.29
10
Tproxy server TNS lookup Tsending to client
DNSTclient DNS Tns_reroute_start() to
reroutedone_action()
22
Time (in seconds) for query for host in
targetnet.csnet.uccs.edu zone. Client DNS server
does not have victims zone.
Time
Trial
0.62
1
root DNS server
edu DNS server
2.53
2
Q2
R2
2.41
3
Q1
R1
2.26
4
uccs.eduserver 128.198.1.250
Q3
4.44
5
client DNS server 128.198.61.52
R3
14.50
6
Q4
csnet.uccs.edu server 128.198.60.194
0.28
7
R4
Q5
Answer
0.45
8
4.40
9
targetnet.csnet.uccs.edu server 128.198.60.190
12.32
10
Q Query R Referral
23
Time (in seconds) for query for host in victim
zone. Client DNS server has victims reroute zone.
Time
Trial
0.33
1
Client DNS server 128.198.61.52
0.29
2
0.15
3
0.13
4
Query
Answer
0.22
5
0.22
6
0.22
7
targetnet.csnet.uccs.edu server 128.198.60.190
0.22
8
0.14
9
0.22
10
24
Lessons Learned
  • Understanding ISCs BIND code
  • Tracing named daemon process
  • must attach to process, not run process
  • Default timeouts hamper tracing
  • Clock skew problems
  • made installation take much longer than necessary
  • interfered with authentication
  • corrected with ntpdate function in crontab file
  • Result of caching NS 128.198.60.194
  • subsequent queries to gandalf failed
  • Trying to fork in server
  • Problems with reliability of my authentication
    code
  • In the end, everything works correctly, every time

25
Future Work
  • Perform more comprehensive tests involving other
    aspects of DNS (TSIG, DNSSEC, DNS dynamic update,
    using different views, using other kinds of data
    types, etc.)
  • Try to reduce connection time between reroutemsg
    sender and client DNS server
  • Fork in client DNS server
  • Implement incremental zone reloading
  • Send reroutemsg to only SOA server and then do
    zone transfer to other DNS servers compare total
    elapsed times

26
Conclusions
  • New Enhanced BIND v. 9.2.2 has some great
  • features
  • nsreroute program that remotely installs victim
    zones on client DNS machines
  • New zones help clients communicate with another
    member of the SCOLD consortium that is under
    attack
  • Intrusion tolerance works
  • New ALT data type results in faster queries over
    multiple dynamic paths
  • Multiple-path routing capability results in
    larger aggregate bandwidth for the server
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