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DOE Response to Radiological Release from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant

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Title: DOE Response to Radiological Release from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant


1
DOE Response to Radiological Release from the
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant
2
BWR Design
  • Fuel rods in the reactor vessel create heat
  • Steam-water mixture is separated at the top of
    the reactor vessel
  • Steam turns the turbine
  • Water is pumped out of the condenser and
    re-circulated through the reactor vessel
  • Water is condenser cooled by sea water in Japan

3
Mark I Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
4
Overview of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant
  • 6 Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) plants
  • Fuel Type UO2
  • Output (MWe)
  • Unit 1 460
  • Unit 2-5 784
  • Unit 6 1,100
  • Years of commercial operation 32-38
  • Plant status on March 11
  • Unit 13 In operation since Fall 2010
  • Unit 4-6 Refueling Outage

Spent Fuel Pools 1 2 3 4 5 6
of Spent Fuel Assemblies 292 587 514 1331 946 876
of New Fuel Assemblies 100 28 52 204 48 64
Water Volume (m3) 1,020 1,425 1,425 1,425 1,425 1,497
5
Statement of Problem
Source Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
(NISA)
6
(No Transcript)
7
Accident Summary
http//www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/image
s/f12np-gaiyou_e_1.pdf
8
Root Cause of Damage
Source Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
(NISA)
9
Core Damage Sequence
www.nuceng.ca/refer/japan/FukishimaEvent-FPLSummar
y.ppt
Core Uncovered
Fuel Overheating
Fuel melting - Core Damaged
Containment pressurizes. Leakage possible at
drywell head
Releases of hydrogen into secondary containment
Core Damaged but retained in vessel
Some portions of core melt into lower RPV head
10
Unit 4 Fuel Pool - June 29

TEPCO Photo provided by Genn Saji
11
Summary of Fukushima Dai-ichi Damage (Courtesy of
AMS)
Unit 2
12
1
2
3
4
13
Unit 3
Unit 4
14
Unit 3
15
Unit 4
16
Estimated Releases
Nuclide NISA1 NSC2 Chernobyl
I-131 1.6X1017 Bq 1.5X1017 Bq 1.8X1018 Bq
Cs-137 1.5X1016 Bq 1.2X1016 Bq 8.5X1016 Bq
1 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (June 6, 2011 Press Release) 1 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (June 6, 2011 Press Release) 1 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (June 6, 2011 Press Release) 1 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (June 6, 2011 Press Release)
2 Japan Nuclear Safety Commission 2 Japan Nuclear Safety Commission 2 Japan Nuclear Safety Commission 2 Japan Nuclear Safety Commission
17
Public Protection Measures
  • March 12 Government of Japan established
    mandatory evacuation zone for people living
    within a 20 km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi
    NPP and recommended shelter-in-place for people
    living within 20-30 km
  • March 13 US Embassy issued an advisory
    restricting travel US citizens within 80 km of
    the Fukushima NPP
  • March 16 US Embassy and US Forces Japan (USFJ)
    authorized voluntary departure for dependents

18
DOE Support to Operation Tomodachi
  • Mission
  • Assess the consequences of releases from the
    Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP)

19
Deploy Assets to Operation Tomodachi
  • Objectives
  • Assist the State Department mission to advise
    American citizens on protective action and
    evacuation guidelines
  • Assist DoD in its mission to safely conduct
    humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
    operations and to provide advice on
    departure/return of military dependents
  • Partner with the Government of Japan (GOJ)
    through the State Department to aid in developing
    guidelines for protection of the public
    potentially affected by the releases

20
DOE/NNSA Radiological Incident Response
  • Capabilities
  • Predictive modeling
  • Data collection
  • Measurements
  • Air
  • Ground
  • Samples
  • Data assessment
  • Data interpretation/ communication
  • Resources
  • Fixed
  • Nuclear Incident Team (NIT)
  • National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
    (NARAC)
  • Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT)
  • Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training
    Site (REAC/TS)
  • Radiological Triage
  • Deployed
  • Aerial Measuring System (AMS)
  • Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT)
  • Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)

21
DOE Timeline
  • March 11
  • DOE/NNSA activated the following assets
  • Nuclear Incident Team (NIT) in Washington, DC
  • DOE/NNSA Consequence Management expertise on the
    US Agency for International Development (USAID)
    Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in
    Tokyo
  • National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
    (NARAC) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
    (LLNL)
  • Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) at Remote
    Sensing Laboratory (RSL) with outreach to Sandia
    National Laboratory (SNL), LLNL, and Los Alamos
    National Laboratory (LANL)
  • The Radiation Emergency Assistance
    Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) in Oak Ridge, TN

22
DOE Timeline (contd)
  • March 14, 2011
  • At White House direction, DOE deployed a tailored
    CMRT and AMS capability via military airlift to
    Yokota Air Base

23
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24
Hangar 1503 DOEs home at Yokota AB
Tent in background is AFRATs lab
25
Field Team
  • Attributes
  • Composition
  • Experienced operate in a unique mission space.
  • Interdisciplinary address all aspects of
    mission.
  • Adaptable dynamic environment and non-standard
    measurement platforms.
  • Communicate risk to partners and decision-makers.
  • Small field footprint with large capability
  • 33 personnel to Yokota AB
  • 12 scientists of many disciplines (nuclear, GIS,
    environmental, 5 PhDs, 2 CHPs)
  • Technicians with a diverse skill set
  • 1 DOE HQ liaison to US embassy, Tokyo

26
F RMAC
27
Distribution of responsibilities
  • Field
  • monitoring and sampling
  • preliminary data assessment
  • product development
  • CMHT
  • detailed assessment
  • coordination of sample analysis
  • response to requests for information/assistance
  • NIT
  • initial command and control of deploying assets
  • coordination and communication for field assets
    and headquarters elements
  • Embassy
  • assessment interpretation for Ambassador
  • coordination of bilateral monitoring and
    assessment activities

28
DOE Timeline (contd)
  • March 16 CM Assets arrive at Yokota AB and fly
    first AMS Test flight
  • March 17 First aerial measurement activities
    over plant conducted first field monitoring
    mission completed
  • March 22 Initial data published on DOE website

29
Bilateral activities
30
Stakeholders
  • United States
  • Japan
  • Department of State
  • American Embassy
  • Department of Defense
  • US Forces Japan (USFJ)
  • Department of Energy (DOE)
  • National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
  • Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  • Advisory Team for Environment , Food and Health
  • Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)
  • Nuclear Safety Commission
  • Ministry of Defense (MOD)
  • Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
  • Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)
  • Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
    Technology (MEXT)
  • Nuclear Safety Technology Center (NUSTEC)
  • Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
    (MAFF)
  • Ministry of Health, Labour Welfare (MLHW)

31
Coordination Advisory Activities
  • DOE aviation support requirements with USFJ
  • Radiological consequence management advice for US
    Ambassador
  • Planning, operations, and assessment with
    applicable Ministries and agencies of the
    government of Japan
  • Field expedient early warning system for US
    Embassy and USFJ to be used while reactors were
    considered unstable

These activities aided key leaders in
decision-making and informed DOE monitoring and
assessment efforts
32
Aerial measuring SYSTEM activities
33
Aerial Monitoring
  • What was done
  • Why it was done
  • Fixed wing and helicopter
  • Up to 3 aircraft per day
  • Surveys over US bases
  • Joint DOE GOJ survey
  • Map ground deposition out to 80 km from FDNPP
  • Support evacuation, relocation, agricultural
    decisions

34
AMS on USAF Aircraft
35
Typical flight path
36
Typical Results
37
Summary of Activities
  • Daily aerial measuring missions over US
    installations and in the area around the FDNPP
  • gt 85 flights
  • gt 490 flight hours
  • Orientation on flying aerial measuring missions
    for USFJ and GOJ assets

38
Field monitoring activities
39
Ground monitoring
  • What was done
  • Why it was done
  • Mobile monitoring
  • In-situ measurements
  • Exposure rate measurements
  • Air sampling
  • Soil samples
  • Swipes
  • Calibrate aerial measurements
  • Define Isotopic mix
  • Characterize the inhalation component of
    integrated dose
  • Assess vertical and horizontal migration of
    deposited material

40
Mobile monitoring
41
In SITU
42
Exposure rate measurements
43
Air sampling
44
Soil sampling
45
Core Sampling
46
Summary of Activities
  • Daily monitoring activities at the U.S. Embassy,
    U.S. military installations, and in support of
    ground truth measurements for AMS.
  • gt 590 air samples
  • gt 110 in situ spectra
  • gt 95 soil samples

47
(No Transcript)
48
Assessment Activities
49
Assessment Activities
  • Field
  • Preliminary evaluation of raw data
  • Ground level exposure rate from aerial
    measurement
  • Deposited activity by isotope
  • Activity concentration in air
  • Referenced to protective action measures
  • Inform future mission planning
  • CMHT
  • Detailed analysis of raw monitoring and sampling
    data
  • Trend analysis and quality control
  • Integrated dose assessment
  • Analysis of postulated scenarios to inform future
    planning

50
Representative results
51
Sources of Data
  • DOE/NNSA aerial measurements
  • DOE/NNSA field monitoring (measurements and
    samples)
  • US Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT)
    monitoring (measurements and samples)
  • Monitoring by USFJ assets in-country (US Army,
    Navy, Marine Corps)
  • MEXT aerial measurement results
  • Japanese sensor data

52
Maiden Aviation Voyage
Maiden Aviation Voyage
53
Joint Survey Final Results
54
(No Transcript)
55
(No Transcript)
56
(No Transcript)
57
Seawater Map
Water Deposition Map
58
Then and now

59
Field Team Activity Successes
  • DOE was able to perform on-the-fly analysis to
    deal with multiple  ongoing releases, unknown
    source terms, challenging terrain as well as
    non-technical pressures.
  • DOE Scientists developed customized products for
    U.S. military (data products, InField Monitoring
    System).
  • DOE scientists embedded with Japanese scientists
    to create joint data products.

60
Activity to date
  • Daily aerial measuring system missions over US
    installations and in the area around the FDNPS
  • gt80 flights
  • gt450 flight hours
  • Daily monitoring activities at the U.S. Embassy,
    U.S. military installations, and in support of
    ground truth measurements for AMS.
  • gt590 air samples
  • gt 110in situ spectra
  • gt95 soil sample

61
Assessment
  • An assessment of measurements gathered through
    April 20 continues to show
  • Radiation levels continue to decrease
  • No measurable deposit of radiological material
    since March 19
  • US bases and facilities all measure dose rates
    below 32 microrem/hr (32 millionths of a REM) a
    level with no known health risks
  • Agricultural monitoring and possible intervention
    will be required for several hundred square
    kilometers surrounding the site
  • Soil and water samples are the only definitive
    method to determine agricultural countermeasures
  • Ground monitoring can give better fidelity to
    identify areas that require agricultural sampling

62
End State
  • USFJ and Government of Japan to continue
    monitoring activities as needed
  • Japanese trained equipped to fly DOE AMS
  • Japanese equipped with an enhanced laboratory
    analysis capability
  • USFJ trained equipped to fly contigency AMS
  • DOE continues to support Japanese and USFJ from
    Home Team

Resilience following a nuclear catastrophe
63
Miscellaneous HP gear in Hangar 1503
64
Miscellaneous detectors in Hangar 1503
65
Soil core sample in situ
In situ AMS overhead
66
(No Transcript)
67
Summary of Damage
Unit 2
68
BACKUP SLIDES
69
(No Transcript)
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