Philosophy E156: Philosophy of Mind - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Loading...

PPT – Philosophy E156: Philosophy of Mind PowerPoint presentation | free to download - id: 662c4a-YjYwN



Loading


The Adobe Flash plugin is needed to view this content

Get the plugin now

View by Category
About This Presentation
Title:

Philosophy E156: Philosophy of Mind

Description:

Philosophy E156: Philosophy of Mind Week Nine: More Approaches to Mind & Body, & Some Concepts of Consciousness Functional State Identity Theory Representational ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:11
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Date added: 25 January 2020
Slides: 47
Provided by: McConnell
Category:
Tags: e156 | mind | philosophy

less

Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Philosophy E156: Philosophy of Mind


1
Philosophy E156 Philosophy of Mind
Week Nine More Approaches to Mind Body,
Some Concepts of Consciousness
2

Is your mind your brain, or is it something different?
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain?
3
Functional State Identity Theory
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different?
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain?
4
Functional State Identity Theory
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain?
5
Functional State Identity Theory
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states
6
Four Sources of Functionalism
  • (1) Concerns about multiple realizability
  • (2) Attempts to give topic-neutral analyses of
    mental concepts
  • (3) The computer model of the mind
  • (4) Lewiss influential use of Ramsification in
    An Argument for the Identity Theory

7
Four Sources of Functionalism
  • (1) Concerns about multiple realizability
  • Already discussed
  • (2) Attempts to give topic-neutral analyses of
    mental concepts
  • (3) The computer model of the mind
  • (4) Lewiss influential use of Ramsification in
    An Argument for the Identity Theory

8
Four Sources of Functionalism
  • (1) Concerns about multiple realizability
  • Already discussed
  • (2) Attempts to give topic-neutral analyses of
    mental concepts
  • (3) The computer model of the mind
  • (4) Lewiss influential use of Ramsification in
    An Argument for the Identity Theory
  • I will omit because its technical, its
    complicated and Heil mentions it but really does
    not discuss it

9
Four Sources of Functionalism
  • (1) Concerns about multiple realizability
  • Already discussed
  • (2) Attempts to give topic-neutral analyses of
    mental concepts
  • Next
  • (3) The computer model of the mind
  • (4) Lewiss influential use of Ramsification in
    An Argument for the Identity Theory
  • I will omit because its technical, its
    complicated and Heil mentions it but really does
    not discuss it

10
Four Sources of Functionalism
  • (1) Concerns about multiple realizability
  • Already discussed
  • (2) Attempts to give topic-neutral analyses of
    mental concepts
  • Next
  • (3) The computer model of the mind
  • After discussing (2)
  • (4) Lewiss influential use of Ramsification in
    An Argument for the Identity Theory
  • I will omit because its technical, its
    complicated and Heil mentions it but really does
    not discuss it

11
Second Source for Functionalism Topic Neutrality
  • Youll recall that Smarts response to dualism
    requires topic neutrality concepts that pick
    out mental states without being committed to
    whether they are physical or nonphysical.
  • Like behaviorism, functionalism can be used to
    give topic-neutral analyses of mental concepts.
  • Define pain, for example, with a definition of
    the following form pain is the state (1) which
    is caused by such-and-such external causes (such
    as perceptions), (2) which causes such-and-such
    external effects (behaviors), and (3) which is
    related as cause or effect to such-and-such other
    mental states.
  • That definition is topic-neutral, since it can
    be satisfied by a physical state as well as by a
    nonphysical state.

12
Smarts Treatment of Objection 3 The Fregean
Objection
13
(No Transcript)
14
(No Transcript)
15
Smarts Objection 3
Smart asks Now how do I get over the objection
that a sensation can be identified with a brain
process only if it has some irreducibly mental
phenomenal property, not possessed by brain
processes, whereby one-half of the identification
may be, so to speak, pinned down? (Page 64.)
16
(No Transcript)
17
Smarts Topic-Neutrality Solution
  • When a person says, I see a yellowish-orange
    after-image, he is saying something like this
    There is something going on which is like what
    is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake,
    and there is an orange illuminated in good light
    in front of me, that is, when I really see an
    orange.
  • Notice that the italicized words, namely there
    is something going on which is like what is going
    on when, are all quasi-logical or topic-neutral
    words.
  • This explains why the ancient Greek peasants
    reports about his sensations can be neutral
    between dualistic metaphysics or my materialistic
    metaphysics.

18
(No Transcript)
19
(No Transcript)
20
Smarts Caveat (at the end of Objection 3)
The strength of my reply depends on the
possibility of our being able to report that one
thing is like another without being able to state
the respect in which it is like. I am not sure
whether this is so or not, and that is why I
regard Objection 3 as the strongest with which I
have to deal.
21
Smarts Problem Not a Problem
  • The strength of my reply depends on the
    possibility of our being able to report that one
    thing is like another without being able to state
    the respect in which it is like. I am not sure
    whether this is so or not, and that is why I
    regard Objection 3 as the strongest with which I
    have to deal.
  • Thats not a problem, since clearly I can report
    that this pain is like that pain without being
    able to report the respect in which it is like.

22
The Deeper Problem the Functionalists
Topic-Neutral Solution
  • The deeper problem is that because of the
    possibility of inverted spectra and absent
    qualia, the topic-neutral property that Smart
    posits to pick out the mental state on the mental
    side of the psychophysical identity cannot do its
    work
  • The property of being whatever goes on in me
    which is like what is going on when I have my
    eyes open, am awake and there is an orange
    illuminated in good light in front of me, that
    is, when I really see an orange can pick out a
    brain state associated with bluish appearances
    instead of orangish ones, or in the absent qualia
    case, associated with an absence of color
    appearances
  • But the functionalist thinks adding associations
    to other mental states eliminates inverted
    spectra and absent qualia

23
The Third Source for Functionalism The Computer
Model of the Mind
  • Computationalism
  • Heil refers to it, but does not formally set it
    out. The best he does is this
  • Suppose you thought of minds in roughly the way
    you might think of computing machines. A mind is
    a device capable of performing particular sorts
    of operation. States of mind resemble
    computational states, at least to the extent that
    they could occur, in principle, in many different
    kinds of material (and perhaps immaterial, a
    qualification I shall henceforth omit) system
    (p. 90)

24
Machine-State Functionalism
  • It was on the basis of this way of thinking that
    Hilary Putnam introduced machine state
    functionalism in the 1960s
  • Minds and Machines in 1960
  • The Nature of Mental States in 1967

25
A Machine Description
  • Ned Block in his article What Is Functionalism?
    introduces the following automaton

S1 S2
1 "Odd" S2 "Even" S1
   
26
Blocks Description of the Machines States
  • This automaton has two states, S1 and S2 and
    two outputs, Odd or Even. It only has one
    input, 1, though of course it can get no input
    at all. The table describes two functions, one
    from input and state to output, and another from
    input and state to next state. Each square
    encodes two conditionals specifying the output
    and next state given both the current state and
    input. The left box says that if the machine is
    in S1 and sees a 1 , it says Odd (indicating
    that it has seen an odd number of 1s) and goes
    to S2. The right box says, similarly, that if the
    machine is in S2 and sees a 1, it says Even
    and goes back to S1. This machine intuitively
    serves the purpose of telling us whether it
    has seen an odd or even number of 1s.

27
What Is a Machine State Such as S1?
  • Suppose we ask What is S1?
  • This is the answer Block gives
  • Being in S1 being in the first of two states
    that are related to one another and to inputs and
    outputs as follows being in one of the states
    and getting a 1 input results in going into the
    second state and emitting Odd and being in the
    second of the two states and getting a 1 input
    results in going into the first and emitting
    Even.

28
The Computationalist Account of Mental States
  • The computationalist gives a similar sort of
    answer to questions of the form What is mental
    state M1?
  • Being in M1 is, roughly, being in a state that
    is
  • caused by inputs I1, I2, etc. and
  • causes output O1, if already in Mi, etc., or
  • causes other mental state Mj, if already in
    Mj1,, etc.
  • Notice the resemblance to the functional
    definition of mental-state terms like pain.

29
Functional State Identity Theory
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states
30
Functional State Identity Theory Representational Theory of Mind
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states
31
Functional State Identity Theory Representational Theory of Mind
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral Your brain
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states
32
Functional State Identity Theory Representational Theory of Mind
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral Your brain
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states All mental states are representational states
33
Functional State Identity Theory Representational Theory of Mind Dennetts Intentional Stance
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral Your brain
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states All mental states are representational states
34
Functional State Identity Theory Representational Theory of Mind Dennetts Intentional Stance
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral Your brain Instrumentalist matter of how we usefully see ourselves
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states All mental states are representational states
35
Functional State Identity Theory Representational Theory of Mind Dennetts Intentional Stance
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral Your brain Instrumentalist matter of how we usefully see ourselves
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states All mental states are representational states Talk of mental states is talk of states that we regard our-selves and other creatures as having in order to make sense of their pursuing ends
36
Functional State Identity Theory Representational Theory of Mind Dennetts Intentional Stance Eliminative Materialism
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral Your brain Instrumentalist matter of how we usefully see ourselves
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states All mental states are representational states Talk of mental states is talk of states that we regard our-selves and other creatures as having in order to make sense of their pursuing ends
37
Functional State Identity Theory Representational Theory of Mind Dennetts Intentional Stance Eliminative Materialism
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral Your brain Instrumentalist matter of how we usefully see ourselves There is no mind
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states All mental states are representational states Talk of mental states is talk of states that we regard our-selves and other creatures as having in order to make sense of their pursuing ends
38
Functional State Identity Theory Representational Theory of Mind Dennetts Intentional Stance Eliminative Materialism
Is your mind your brain, or is it something different? Functionalism topic neutral Your brain Instrumentalist matter of how we usefully see ourselves There is no mind
Are your experiences just physical aspects of your brain, or are they something beyond the physical aspects of your brain? Topic neutral mental states are whatever are caused by inputs, cause outputs, and are causally related to other mental states All mental states are representational states Talk of mental states is talk of states that we regard our-selves and other creatures as having in order to make sense of their pursuing ends Talk of experience mental talk generally refers to nothing at all it is false folk psychology
39
Concepts of Consciousness
40
Concepts of Consciousness
  • Three hypotheses about the word consciousness
  • The Platonism Hypothesis There is a single
    meaning to the word, and it is used with that
    meaning in a variety of ways.
  • Socrates example in Republic of justice, the one
    thing all just things supposedly have in common
    by virtue of which they are all just
  • The Ambiguity Hypothesis The word has several
    different meanings, and these different meanings
    explain in part the different ways it is used.
  • Blocks example of velocity, ambiguous between
    meaning average velocity and instantaneous
    velocity
  • The Cluster Concept Hypothesis The word
    expresses a concept by way of a prototype or
    paradigm, even though various instances might be
    missing important aspects of the prototype or
    paradigm.
  • Wittgensteins example of a game Putnams
    example of a disease Blocks example of a
    religion

41
Ned Block Embraces the Ambiguity Hypothesis
  • Block writes that the word consciousness
    connotes a number of different concepts and
    denotes a number of different phenomena.
  • He calls the concept a hybrid or better, a
    mongrel concept
  • Thus, he says, We reason about consciousness
    using some premises that apply to one of the
    phenomena that fall under consciousness, other
    premises that apply to other consciousnesses
    and we end up in trouble.
  • Ambiguity in this case can be verified by
    reflection alone, unlike claims about natural
    kinds (such as the claim that cancer is not a
    natural kind).
  • He claims that one can make up ones mind about
    whether there is ambiguity by finding
    equivocation hard to deny.

42
Blocks Four Concepts of Consciousness
  • Phenomenal consciousness, or P-consciousness
  • Access-consciousness, or A-consciousness
  • Self-consciousness
  • Monitoring consciousness

43
How Block Characterizes Phenomenal Consciousness
  • Phenomenal consciousness is experience
  • What makes a state phenomenally conscious is
    that there is something it is like to be in
    that state
  • Identifying phenomenal consciousness with
    experience looks odd if consciousness is the
    property a mental state has of being conscious,
    since it would not seem to be true that
    experience is a property of being conscious we
    use the word experience differently
  • I cannot define P-consciousness in any remotely
    non-circular way i.e., in any reductive way
  • The best one can do for P-consciousness is in
    some respects worse than for many other things
    because really all one can do is point to the
    phenomenon
  • How should we point to P-consciousness?
    Via rough synonyms and examples

44
How Block Characterizes Access Consciousness
  • A representation is A-conscious if it is
    broadcast for free use in reasoning and for
    direct rational control of action (including
    reporting)
  • An A-state is one that consists in having an
    A-representation
  • Put crudely, A-conscious content is
    representational
  • It is of the essence of A-conscious content to
    play a role in reasoning, and only
    representational content can figure in reasoning
  • The paradigm A-conscious states are
    propositional attitude states like thoughts,
    beliefs and desires. (E.g., the thought that
    grass is green.)
  • I see A-consciousness as a cluster concept in
    which
  • reportability is the element of the cluster that
    has the smallest weight
  • even though it is often the best practical guide
    to A-consciousness

45
Self-Consciousness
  • Block writes I mean the possession of the
    concept of the self and the ability to use this
    concept in thinking about oneself
  • Mirror behavior
  • Chimps try to wipe off spots painted on their
    foreheads and ears
  • Monkeys do not
  • Neither do human babies until after 18 mos.
  • Dogs treat their mirror images as strangers,
    unlike higher primates
  • If we take monkeys and dogs and young infants are
    thus lacking in self-consciousness, we do not
    correspondingly deny they have pain or deny there
    is something it is like for them to see
    themselves in the mirror
  • Thus P-consciousness differs from
    self-consciousness animals might lack the
    latter and have the former

46
Me-ishness
  • Block claims that P-consciousness often seem to
    have what he calls a me-ishness to them
  • What exactly does he mean?
  • He writes that the phenomenal content often
    represents the state as a state of me.
  • He means that the phenomenal content of a
    P-conscious state of mine represents the state as
    a state of me.
  • But the experiences of two qualitatively
    different P-conscious states e.g., red and
    green can nevertheless be the same in
    self-orientation.
  • Thus, P-consciousness cant reduce to
    self-consciousness.
About PowerShow.com