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Security and Privacy in Sensor Networks: Research Challenges

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Title: Security and Privacy in Sensor Networks: Research Challenges Author: Radha Poovendran Last modified by: Radha Poovendran Created Date: 10/19/2004 6:38:49 AM – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Security and Privacy in Sensor Networks: Research Challenges


1
Security and Privacy in Sensor Networks Research
Challenges
  • Radha Poovendran
  • University of Washington
  • http//www.ee.washington.edu/people/faculty/radha

2
Outline
  • Panda-Hunter Game
  • Sensor Network Security
  • How is it different?
  • Incomplete List of challenges
  • Problem 1- Problem 5

3
Panda-Hunter Game Model
  • A generic asset monitoring sensor network
    application
  • Panda-Hunter Game
  • Sensor Network monitors Panda
  • Hunter observes Panda_Here messages and go after
    Panda
  • Pandas Challenge
  • Want Location Privacy
  • Hunters Challenge
  • Want valid message
  • Want the network to work reliably
  • Detect any faulty or compromised sensor
  • Both need different services

Data Sink Sensor Node
4
Sensor Network Security
  • What do we mean by sensor network security?
  • Conventional view of security from cryptography
    community cryptographically unbreakable design
    in practical sense
  • Network Reality very few security breaches in
    practice are to exploit flaws in cryptographic
    algorithms side channel attacks
  • Malicious versus selfish (DoS vs. resource
    gobbler)
  • Security v.s. robustness, fault tolerance,
    resiliency
  • Security is not a black/white world, it is
    progressive
  • We must secure entire networked system, not just
    an individual component
  • Solutions must be robust/adapt to new threats as
    much as possible

5
How is it Different?
  • Wireless Sensor networks have NO clear line of
    defense
  • Each node is a host as well as a router
  • Security solutions in wired or cellular networks
    may leverage the networking infrastructure
  • Secure Network/service infrastructure has to be
    collaboratively established
  • Wireless channel is easily accessible by both
    good citizens and attackers
  • Resource constraints on portable devices
  • Energy, computation, memory, etc.
  • Some devices may be compromised
  • Heterogeneity prevents a single security
    solution

6
Capability based Abstraction of a Heterogeneous
Network
Capability-based Abstraction
Processing Capabilities
Network Granularity
BN-Backbone node RN-Regular Node
BN
BN
RN
BN
RN
RN
RN
RN
RN
A
B
7
Incomplete List of Challenges
  • Resource-Efficient Secure Network Services
  • Network Initialization, single/multihop neighbor
    discovery
  • Multihop path establishment Routing
  • Supporting application services
  • Cryptographic services
  • Broadcast authentication
  • Key management
  • Security mechanisms for fundamental services
  • Clock synchronization
  • Secure location discovery and verification of
    claims
  • Location privacy
  • Secure aggregation and in-network processing
  • Cluster formation/cluster head election
  • Middleware (will not discuss further)

8
Incomplete List of Challenges
  • Modeling vulnerabilities
  • VERY POOR state of understanding
  • Needed by services and applications
  • Cross-layer design techniques
  • Routing/location-aware protocols that are also
    robust!
  • Incorporating semantics such as geometry, radio
    model and range for context-based security
  • Functionality instead of optimality

9
Problem 1 Robust Designs
  • Attacks and compromise of network are reality
  • Misconfiguration cannot be fully eliminated
  • Maybe we can never enumerate
  • Software bugs are 1 cause for all possible
    attacks
  • Not every device can implement maximum-strength
    solutions
  • Shift from prevention to tolerance
  • Building trustworthy system out of untrustworthy
    components
  • Ability to detect, and function, even in the
    presence of problems
  • Similar analogy to IP
  • building reliable system out of unreliable
    components
  • How? Can be application specific

10
Problem 2 Adaptive Security
  • Adaptation to handle many dimensions of dynamics
  • Adaptive to user requirements
  • Differential security services used in government
    and military
  • Adaptive to user devices
  • Adaptive to channel dynamics
  • Partial connectivity, disconnectivity, full
    connectivity
  • Adaptive to mobility
  • Cross-domain service for roaming users
  • Adaptive to dynamic membership
  • Node join, leave, fail

11
Problem 3 Joint Design of QoS and Security
  • Incorporating network metrics and security
    scalability, communication overhead, computation
    complexity, energy efficiency, device capability,
  • Different performance metrics may be in (partial)
    conflict
  • Probably the most secure system is of minimal
    usability
  • Example energy efficiency/computation complexity
    versus cryptography strength
  • Many conventional security solutions take a
    centralized approach

12
Problem 4 Evaluation of Design
  • Current designs have an explicit threat model in
    mind
  • NOT Realistic
  • Real trace analysis for practical attacks?
  • Benchmarking ?
  • Other areas in computer systems have well defined
    benchmarks SPEC CPU, TPC-C
  • Analytical tools
  • Current effort game theory, graph theory

13
Problem 5 Securing the Chain
  • The system is only as secure as the weakest link
  • Many supporting components DNS, ARP, DHCP,
  • Other supporting protocols bootstrapping,
    discovery, time synchronization
  • How to secure these supporting components
  • Often ignored
  • Secure the entire system chain
  • Build multiple fences
  • Each fence is built based on a components
    resource constraint
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