Deconflicting Electronic Warfare in Joint Operations Col Art Huber, USAF COL Gary Carlberg, USA Col Prince Gilliard, USAF CAPT David Marquet, USN JCWS Class 06-04

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Deconflicting Electronic Warfare in Joint
OperationsCol Art Huber, USAFCOL Gary
Carlberg, USACol Prince Gilliard, USAFCAPT
David Marquet, USNJCWS Class 06-04
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Briefing Flow

• Background
• The Nature of the Problem
• How We Do It Today
• Some Ideas to Address the Challenge
• Summary

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Background

• Briefing developed from paper co-authored to
  satisfy Joint Professional Military Education
  Phase II requirements
• Joint Forces Staff College Faculty Advisors
• COL Tom Snukis, USA Mr. Karl Erickson
• Assignment was to research and write a paper
  covering a topic that is of current issue to the
  joint community
• Research methodology open literature survey,
  interviews and e-mail correspondence with subject
  matter experts
• Shortened version of paper submitted to Joint
  Forces Quarterly in hopes of publication

Disclaimer The views presented herein do not
necessarily reflect the official policy of the US
Government, the DoD, or any of its
agencies. Release The paper on which this
briefing is based was cleared by the Commandant
of the Joint Forces Staff College on 12 Oct 06.
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Introduction
It has become clear that in any future
fighting, a significant electronic battle will
also be taking place. Curtis E. LeMay, General,
USAF (Ret), 1946

• Like air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace, the
  electromagnetic spectrum has become a contested
  domain to attain the high ground for control of
  this medium
• Like combat involving kinetic weapons, EW is no
  less immune to the problem of fratricide
• More and more systems are vying for their place
  in an increasingly crowded frequency spectrum
• Constant pressure to transfer military bands to
  the public domain
• Low tolerance for interference
• Rush to field emitters without frequency
  certification

We must better manage and deconflict the EM
spectrum if EW is to remain a weapon of choice
for our warfighters.
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The Cocktail of EM Confusion

• Fratricide has been a problem since the dawn of
  EW
• EW fratricide has occurred even in operations
  involving the most modern equipment and
  well-trained, professional crews
• The problem extends to comm, sensors, data links,
  UAVs, etc.
• Two events from recent history serve to
  illustrate

On one occasion I was on orbit conducting jamming
operations, and we knew an EC-130E Commando Solo
aircraft was in the area putting out Psyops
broadcasts to Iraqi troops. But we didnt know
the frequencies or the times when it was
operating. A linguist misidentified a broadcast,
we targeted it and we ended up jamming it. We
discovered the mistake only after we
landed. Chris Bakke, EC-130H Compass Call
crewmember in Operation Desert Storm
Imagine trying to win an overseas air war where
target intelligence can be gathered only part of
the day, where aerial refueling is hampered by
inability to fly in close formation under
prevailing weather conditions, and where many
newly developed radio systems for air, sea, and
land forces dont work the way they did back in
the U.S. Sound unlikely? It isnt - these
constraints limited the U.S. forces ability to
operate to maximum efficiency during the Kosovo
campaign. Defense Science Board Task Force on
DoD Frequency Spectrum Issues, Nov 00
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The Cocktail of EM Confusion

• Experiences in Operations Enduring and Iraqi
  Freedom show the problem has only gotten worse

This is the first time that you and I have seen
electronic fratricide reach the point that it
has. When you take a look at data links and the
number of jammers in place and all the radios we
have out there, deconflicting becomes a very
difficult problem. We have a long way to go I
need to determine when and where Im going to
jam and how Im going to affect the electronic
medium. Lt Gen Walter Buchanan, former chief 9th
AF and CENTCOM Air Forces, Nov 05
The ground guys are throwing out energy, the
airborne guys are throwing out energy, and the
bad guys are throwing out energy. So its a
little hard to prevent guys from stepping all
over each other. Its a big problem when
the same frequency youre jamming on is the
frequency someone else is datalinking on and
someone else is trying to communicate on. Col
Rick Rankine, HQ AF/A5RE, Sep 06
So whats a warfighter to do?
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DoD Spectrum Dependence
100
MHz
Range Instrumentation
Surveillance/
ATC Radar, Telemetry
UAV
Data Link
UGV, Missile DL, Telemetry
MILSTAR,
Sensor
Surveillance/Search/
GBS
GBS
FC Radar
CDL, TCDL,
UAV
Trgt
Control
IFF,
Scoring
SCDL, WB
DLs
Search, Fire Control Radar
GPS L5
Challenge Athena
JTRS Clusters Implementation
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DoD Spectrum Dependence
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Observations on the Spectrum

• The US is unique among nations in that it lacks a
  national spectrum policy
• In comparison to other countries, U.S. interests
  are not pursued in a coherent and harmonious
  manner
• U.S. frequency allocations within the RF spectrum
  are not necessarily mirrored around the globe
• Results in problems like refusal to allow some
  U.S. systems to operate within foreign national
  borders
• E.g., German restrictions on the Enhanced
  Position Location and Reporting System (EPLRS)
• Frequently, in the rush to field new systems,
  insufficient attention is put on securing
  frequency certifications

Frequency management is important because it sets
the bounds for the freedom one has to operate
within an EW environment
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The Nature of Todays Challenge

• How today is different
• Threat and countermeasure ubiquity
• Proliferation of spectrum users/systems
• Battlespace dynamics
• Highly non-linear, rapid in tempo, chaotic
• Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)
• Have garnered a massive US effort to develop
  Counter IED (C-IED) systems
• 3B allocated in FY06 378M spent on C-IED
  jammers since 2003
• Radio Frequency IEDs (RFIED) variant are numerous
  and varied
• Arming/detonation mechanisms include remote
  control toys, electronic keychains, garage door
  openers, radios, walkie-talkies, cell phones,
  satellite phones, and long range cordless phones

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RFIEDs Have Added a New Dimension to the
Fratricide Problem

• Use of IED jammers has resulted in kinetic and
  non-kinetic forms of fratricide
• Premature or inadvertent detonation killing or
  injuring insurgents but also civilians and
  friendly EOD personnel
• Interference with other friendly (primarily comm)
  systems
• Problem has been compounded by coalition context
• E.g., Israels Elisra-built EJAB (Electronic
  Jammer Against Bombs) system used by Polish
  forces

Elisra EJAB
Polish Troop Vehicle
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The Dilemmas in EW Deconfliction
The Warlock is a jamming device used to hunt up
and down radio frequencies searching for signals
that could detonate a bomb. The Army has worked
heroically with the makers to upgrade the short
range and limited capability of the Warlock. But
in the field, competing technologies kept getting
in the way. The Army uses a radio (called
SINCGARS) that also hops around frequencies. The
radio frequently interfered with the Warlock
jammer. Unable to communicate, troops began
turning off their jammers thereby exposing
themselves to IEDs. Newsweek, Mar 06
HMMWV equipped with C-IED Jammer
Warlock S
Warlock Green / Red
SINCGARS
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EW Deconfliction By the Book

• Bible is Joint Pub 3-51, Joint Doctrine for
  Electronic Warfare
• Joint Freq Mgt Office (JRMO) under COCOM J-6
• Establishes policy and procedures
• Develops and distributes spectrum-use plans
• Exercises frequency allotment and assignment
  authority
• Coordinates spectrum use with international/host
  nation authorities
• Prepares and updates the JRFL
• Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) is first
  line of defense
• A time- and geographically-oriented listing of
  functions, nets, and frequencies that must not be
  jammed or interfered with by friendly forces
• COCOM J-3 ultimate authority for frequency
  deconfliction

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EW Deconfliction By the Book

• EW part of Information Operations (IO) so EW
  Officer (EWO) typically assigned to IO cell
• Responsible for planning, synchronizing,
  coordinating, deconflicting EW
• Supervises EW planning and preparation of EW
  appendices in operations plans
• Monitors EW execution in on-going operations and
  exercises
• EW a form of fires so EWO also works with Fire
  Support Coordinator and Joint Targeting
  Coordination Board (JTCB)
• Tools available to the EWO include
• Databases (providing friendly and enemy EW
  related data)
• Planning process aids
• Graphics analysis tools (e.g., visualization
  models for electromagnetic propagation)

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EW Deconfliction By the Book

• The EW Coordination Center (EWCC)
• An ad hoc staff coordination element often formed
  to facilitate the EW coordination function
• Managed by the J-3 EWO and includes other EWOs
• If the Task Force involves a coalition,
  participants include EW officers from supporting
  allied and/or coalition forces
• Identifies conflicts between the JRFL and
  friendly electronic attack operations and
  requests changes
• Joint Spectrum Center (JSC)
• Serves as DoD center of excellence for
  electromagnetic spectrum management matters
• Supports COCOMs, Military Departments, and
  Defense agencies
• Manages Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution
  program

The EWCC and JSC have become absolutely critical
to the EWO to get the deconfliction job
accomplished
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The Process in Action

• When exercised properly, the process can work
  well

One of the first tasks given was denying
enemy C2 while at the same time limiting
collateral damage. The electronic warfare assets
could have jammed the GPS Global Positioning
System signals. Fortunately, the Director of
Space Forces recognized the potential for EW
fratricide. He worked with the EW coordination
cell, mission planners of all services and
implemented an EW energy management scheme to
preclude the GPS interference. The bottom line
was a successful attack to bring in fire on
sniper positions and navigate through the city of
Fallujah. General Lance Lord, former Commander,
Air Force Space Command, describing an instance
of successful EW deconfliction in OIF
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Freeing Up the Jam

• Our suggestions for improvement
• Develop better mechanisms to formulate and pursue
  national spectrum policy
• Adopt a resource perspective for the frequency
  spectrum and apply the joint strategic planning
  process to its management
• Adhere with greater discipline to doctrine and be
  creative within its confines as regards existing
  joint frequency management processes
• Insert relevant technological improvements
• Hold acquisition efforts accountable to secure
  allocation approval for desired operating
  frequencies and to best practices for
  characterizing new systems through testing

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Develop a National Spectrum Policy

• A national spectrum policy would
• Better balance U.S. security and safety
  requirements with new commercial uses of the
  frequency spectrum
• Work to ensure military spectrum needs are
  protected and interests advanced to meet
  burgeoning reqts to achieve information
  dominance
• Account for both domestic and international
  environments as well as government and commercial
  considerations
• Build new mechanisms to promote unity of effort
  between the
• State Dept (lead for international spectrum
  allocation negotiations)
• Commerces National Telecommunications and
  Information Administration (charged with federal
  government allocations)
• FCC (administers non-federal government and
  civil/commercial uses)
• Orchestrate a single, consistent voice at
  international forums (e.g., the International
  Telecommunications Union and World
  Radiocommunication Conference) which govern
  international spectrum allocations

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Apply Joint Strategic Planning to Spectrum
Management

• Warfighters have a process to prepare for and
  conduct military operations known as Joint
  Strategic Planning
• Process provides
• Authoritative direction
• Assignment of missions, tasks, forces and
  resources
• Assumptions and objectives
• Operational limitations including rules on the
  use of force and rules of engagement (ROE)
• Policies and concepts to be integrated into
  subordinate or supporting plans
• Frequency Spectrum is NOT currently treated as a
  resource within this framework
• Instead, spectrum is treated like a logistics
  commodity
• Results in JSC having a role like DLA
• Needs greater priority and visibility

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Apply Joint Strategic Planning to Spectrum
Management

• If frequency spectrum was treated like other
  strategic resources in the joint planning
  process, then it would
• Assign spectrum to the COCOMs for use during
  peacetime in the Forces for Unified Commands
  memorandum issued by the Secretary of Defense
• Apportion spectrum to the COCOMs through the
  Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan issued by the
  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for use in
  developing operational plans
• Allocate spectrum to the COCOMs for use in actual
  operations
• Benefits that would then accrue might include
• Proactive ID of potential and actual theater
  spectrum conflicts
• Pre-conflict reservation of spectrum blocks and
  system reprogramming
• Detailed planning for spectrum order of battle
  (in time and space)
• Institution of a frequency tasking order (FTO) to
  enable enhanced situational awareness and
  tracking of spectrum use
• Better ID of shortfalls for translation into
  acquisition requirements

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Discipline and Creativity within Doctrine

• A survey of recent history uncovers lapses in
  application of doctrinal precepts for EW
  deconfliction
• Coordination between freq mgt entities has been
  overlooked
• JRFLs have been violated
• EW environment analyses were incorrect having
  used obsolete data
• Standup and continuous manning of EWCCs on
  combatant commander and task force staffs were
  neglected
• Those assigned EW duties lacked training and/or
  expertise
• Poorly planned personnel rotations have
  degenerated handoffs and increased spin-up times

Disciplined adherence to doctrine and best
practices will improve EW deconfliction mission
accomplishment
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Discipline and Creativity within Doctrine

• Doctrine provides plenty of leeway for new ideas
  on how to best execute the deconfliction process
• Example 1 CENTCOMs new EW Concept of Operations
• Delegates EW Coordination Authority to the Joint
  Forces Air Component Commander (1st time placed
  in a single commander)
• Creates Combined Theater EW Coordination Cell
  (CTEWCC)
• Charged to integrate and satisfy reqts for
  pre-planned operations
• Develops and synchronizes plans to employ EW
  assets
• Explicitly charged with mitigating EW fratricide
• Example 2 Joint Fires Board employed by Combined
  Joint Task Force 76 (Afghanistan)
• Charged with ensuring unity of effort and
  synchronizing fires
• Coordinated efforts of task force staff/cells
  using ATO as baseline
• Increased knowledge of EW
• Provided forum for discussion of deconfliction
  issues

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Technology Can Help Too

• Improvements in environment spectrum mgt tools
• Current primary tool is JSCs SPECTRUM XXI
• Limited network integration
• Cant facilitate frequency assignments for time
  slots lt 24 hours
• Proposed replacement is GEMSIS
• Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information
  System
• Will integrate spectrum mgt on the Global
  Information Grid (GIG)
• Will enable spectrum on demand, real-time
  deconfliction in time and space
• Improvements in system capabilities
• Expanded transmit/receive bands
• Expanded hardware and software (re)programmability
  
• Digitally modulated waveforms
• Channel sharing via multiplexing and frequency
  sniffing
• Precision (cleaner signals and electronically
  steerable arrays)

But never forget advanced technologies must be
accompanied by complimentary TTPs and training!
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If You Want It Bad

• The record shows a number of developmental and
  upgrade programs have failed to secure
  certification for their operating frequencies
• This problem is quite prevalent with systems
  procured in an urgent and compelling manner
• Testing that would uncover frequency issues is
  often short-circuited or has failed to provide
  warnings and caveats to system operators

At least 89 telecommunications systems were
deployed within the European, Pacific, and
Southwest Asian theaters without proper frequency
certification and host-nation approval. 1998 DoD
IG Audit Report
For the longest time we couldnt get the names of
the C-IED systems, let alone what frequency
they were operating on. We need someone to
work out these frequency conflicts before the
equipment comes into country. CDR Kevin Robinson,
officer assigned to Task Force Paladin in OEF
Disciplined adherence to acquisition process
rules and the frequency certification process
will help avoid spectrum conflicts
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The Need to Be Resolute

• EW has made incredible strides since Gen LeMay
  made his prophetic remarks to become
  indispensable to modern combat
• The benefits of new technologies have come with a
  price growing reliance on spectrum-dependent
  systems
• We have recognized the complexities inherent in
  our current situation and have created mechanisms
  and processes to cope
• However, We often fail to do what we know must
  be done to succeed!

If we are to slay the demon of EW fratricide
i.e., stop being our own electronic enemy we
must not only understand the trends and develop
appropriate responses, but be ruthless in our
follow-through
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Parting AdmonitionEW Deconfliction is Critical!
Proper coordination of systems like this
IED Countermeasure Equipment (ICE)
Scopes of Radars Jammed by other Radars
Helps prevent this!
HMMWV Destroyed by IED