Title: Perspectives on the Back-end of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Present and Future
1Perspectives on the Back-end of the Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Present and Future
- John Kessler, Program Manager, HLW Spent Fuel
Management (jkessler_at_epri.com 704-595-2249) - DOE Fission-Fusion Hybrid Workshop, Gaithersburg
MDOctober 1, 2009
2Projected US Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel (CSNF)
Inventory (assumes all existing plants run for 60
years)
Current Yucca Mountain legal CSNF capacity limit
(63,000)
3Dry Interim Storage High Burnup and Extended
Storage
EPRI data and models are the basis for
enabling Dry storage of spent fuel with burnup
gt45 GWd/MTU Dominion, Duke Energy,
Constellation, Dry storage license extended
from 20 to 60 years First license renewal Surry
site Conclusion Long(er)-term storage can give
us time to introduce new technologies
4EPRI Yucca Mountain and Generic Disposal Program
- Yucca Mountain-specific
- Pre- and post-closure
- Transportation
- Generic disposal
- Compare post-closure doses from alternative fuel
cycle waste forms - Need for a second repository?
5DOE Yucca Mountain Repository Design
6DOE TSPA Results
- 10,000-year results
- Mean peak dose rate to the RMEI 0.2 mrem/yr
- 0.1 of background
- 1 of dose limit
- Dominated by (relatively) early failure of
DOE/Defense wastes - 1,000,000-year results
- Mean peak to RMEI 2 mrem/yr
- 1 of background
- 10 of dose limit
- Dominated by commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF)
7EPRI TSPA Results (CSNF only)
- 0.04 mrem/y
- 0.01 of background
- 0.2 of dose limit
- 1/50th of DOE estimate
- Why are EPRI estimates lower?
- Reduction of conservatisms
EPRI, 2006, Report 1013444, Fig. 6-3
8The Peak Dose is NOT Dominated by the Most
Radiotoxic Species
- The geology takes care of the more radiotoxic
species - Example relatively low solubility of many
actinides (including Pu) - Sorption on geologic media impedes many
radionuclides from movement - Conclusion inappropriate to use radiotoxicity
as a measure for potential technical improvements - Closing the fuel cycle
- Fission-fusion hybrids,
- Only a handful of radionuclides contribute to
long-term dose (not usually minor actinides)
9Yucca Mountain Peak Dose Estimates Have Been
Decreasing. Why?
- Additional data
- Removal of initial conservatisms
- Improved (lower) Np solubility estimates
dramatically decreased importance of Np-237 - EPRI drip shield example (next slide)
10Example of Over-conservatism Drip Shields are
not Necessary
What did DOE do to make it think it needed Drip
Shields?
- Overestimated the amount of net infiltration
- Overestimated the fraction of the repository
experiencing seepage into the open drifts - Overestimated seismic energy and rockfall
- Overestimated damage to the TADs due to seismic
and rockfall events - Overestimated the rate at which Alloy 22 will
degrade - Cladding performance was neglected
- Waste form alteration time was underestimated
11Which is Cheaper, Faster, and Easier to Lower
Dose Estimates for Disposal
- Additional work to remove conservatisms in dose
estimates? - Drip shield example even saves money and time!
- Introduce a major technological fix (e.g.,
fission-fusion hybrids)?
12Several Benefits of Making Yucca Mountain
Capacity Larger than the Current Legal Limit
- Nuclear industry interested in building new
plants - Opponents will point out there isnt enough
disposal space for existing plants - Delays or even eliminates the need for a second
repository - Provides sufficient time buffer for introduction
of advanced fuel cycles - RD time to get closed fuel cycles into
commercial operation 30-50 years
13Yucca Mountain Capacity Options the EPRI Team
Analyzed
- Option 1 Expanded repository footprint
- Option2 Multi-level repository
- Option 3 Grouped, single-level emplacement
drifts - Determine the range in expansion factor
attributable to each option - Combinations of options
14EPRI-Projected Yucca Mountain Technical Capacity
is Much Higher Than the Legal Limit
EPRIs projected technical capacity
range (260,000-570,000 MTU, 4 to 9 times current
legal limit)
Current legal limit (63,000 MTU)
15Feasibility of Direct Disposal of Dual-Purpose
Canisters (DPCs, licensed for storage and
transportation only)
- Motivation
- Industry currently using DPCs
- Avoids need to repackage
- DPC capacity 1.5x DOEs Transportation, Aging,
and Disposal canisters (TADs) - Considerations
- DPC versus TAD diameter it still fits
- Added decay heat effects (hydrothermal,
thermomechanical) Yucca Mountain can handle it - Post-closure dose no effect
- Criticality still wont happen
16Need for Advanced Fuel Cycles for Waste Disposal
Minimization? NO!
- Yucca Mountain doses are already very low (lt1 of
background) - True for all other repository system estimates
- Yucca Mountain technical capacity is big enough
for decades to come - Why trade off near-term, certain increase in dose
to lower very long-term hypothetical dose? - Need to compare source terms from the entire fuel
cycle not just what is headed to disposal - Which is cheaper and faster, introducing
fission-fusion hybrids or doing some more work to
eliminate conservatisms in disposal dose
estimates? - Radiotoxicity is an inappropriate measure
- Therefore, introduce advanced fuel cycle for
reasons other than reducing waste disposal needs - Economics, resource utilization, energy
independence,
17Yucca Mountain (and Most Other Repository
Systems) can Help Keep our Options Open for
Decades to Come
- Use them as temporary storage until advanced fuel
cycle(s) are ready - Co-locate storage, reprocessing, fuel
fabrication, and disposal? - No need to move spent fuel twice if no nuclear
advancement - Conclusion Judicious use of repositories will
support realistically-paced advanced fuel cycle
development
18TogetherShaping the Future of Electricity