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Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Division of Nuclear Installation Safety

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IAEA SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME FOR NPPS WORLDWIDE Mamdouh El-Shanawany Head of Safety Assessment Section Department of Nuclear Safety and Security – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Division of Nuclear Installation Safety


1
Department of Nuclear Safety and
SecurityDivision of Nuclear Installation Safety
  • IAEA SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME FOR NPPS
    WORLDWIDE
  • Mamdouh El-Shanawany
  • Head of Safety Assessment Section

2
Hierarchy of the Safety Standards
Under its mandate the IAEA has developed a
logical framework of objectives and principles of
nuclear reactor safety.
  • Safety Fundamentals
  • Set out general principles for protecting people
    and the environment
  • Safety Requirements
  • Establish requirements what has to be done
    (shall) to apply these principles in meeting
    objectives
  • Safety Guides
  • Set out recommended ways (should) of meeting
    the requirements

3
Examples of Safety Standards
  • Fundamental Safety Principles
  • SF-1
  • The IAEA Safety Assessment for Facilities and
    Activities Requirements
  • GS-R-Part4
  • The Safety of Nuclear Power Plant Design
  • NS-R-1

4

Specific Safety Requirements
General Safety Requirements
Part 1 Governmental and Regulatory Framework
1. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations
Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety
2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 2.1 Design
and Construction 2.2 Commissioning and Operation
B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants
Part 3 Radiation Protection and Safety of
Radiation Sources
Part 4 Safety Assessment
3. Safety of Research Reactors
Part 5 Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste
4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
5. Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities
Part 6 Decommissioning and Termination of
Activities
6. Safe Transport of Radioactive Material
Part 7 Emergency Preparedness and Response
5
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
  • IAEA has statutory obligation to develop
    international standards of safety
  • Article III.A.6 of Statutes
  • To establish or adopt standards of safety for the
    protection of health and minimization of danger
    to life and property
  • To provide for the application of these standards

6
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
  • Safety Standards represent international
    consensus on the best practices to achieve a high
    level of safety

7
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
  • Utilization by Member States
  • Formally adopted (i.e. China, Netherlands)
  • Direct use of standards to establish regulation
    (i.e. Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, India,
    Korea, Russian Federation)
  • Used as reference for review of national
    standards (by all States also by Industry).

8
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
  • Peer reviews performed upon request of Member
    States.
  • Assess compliance with Safety Standards and
    provide recommendations for improvements.
  • Results publically available (unless formally
    requested by Member State).

9
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
  • Guidelines based on best international practices
    and feedback from long experience
  • Phased approach
  • Self assessment
  • Preparatory mission
  • Main mission
  • Follow-up mission
  • Modular approach to meet needs of Member States

10
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
  • Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
  • International Probabilistic Safety Assessment
    Review Team (IPSART)
  • Review of Accident management Program (RAMP)
  • Safety Assessment and Design Safety Review
    Service (SADRS)
  • Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR)
  • International seismic safety centre Services
    (ISSC)
  • Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)
  • Peer Review of Operational safety Performance
    Experience (PROSPER)
  • Safety aspects of Long Term Operation (SALTO)
  • Safety Culture Assessment Review Team (SCART)
  • Integrated safety Assessment of Research Reactors
    (INSARR)
  • Safety assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities during
    operation (SEDO)

11
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
  • Customers of safety review services
  • 50 Regulators
  • 50Industry

12
OSARTobjectives of the OSART programme
  • to provide the host country (regulatory
    authority, plant/utility management and
    governmental authorities) with an objective
    assessment of the status of the operational
    safety with respect to international standards of
    operational safety and performance
  • to provide the host plant with recommendations
    and suggestions for improvement in areas where
    performance falls short of IAEA Safety Standards
    and international best practices

13
Objectives of the OSART programme
  • to provide key staff at the host plant with an
    opportunity to discuss their practices with
    experts who have experience of other practices in
    the same field
  • to provide all Member States with information
    regarding good practices identified in the course
    of the review
  • to provide experts and observers from Member
    States and the IAEA staff with opportunities to
    broaden their experience and knowledge of their
    own field.

14
Standard OSART review scope 9 areas
  • Management, organization and administration (MOA)
  • Training and qualification (TQ)
  • Operations (OP)
  • Maintenance (MA)
  • Technical support (TS)
  • Operational experience feedback (OE)
  • Radiation protection (RP)
  • Chemistry (CH)
  • Emergency planning and preparedness (EPP)
  • ( Commissioning COM for pre-operational OSART)

15
Customized OSART review scope
  • Customized review scope core areas selected
    optional areas
  • New optional areas in development
  • Long Term Operation
  • Transition from Operations to Decommissioning
  • Probabilistic Safety Assessment Applications
  • Accident Management

16
OSART missions 2006, 2007
  • 2007
  • Finland, Loviisa
  • Korea, Yongwang
  • Belgium, Tihange
  • Germany, Neckarwestheim
  • Ukraine, Khmelnitsky
  • France, Chinon
  • 2006
  • Lithuania, Ignalina
  • Slovakia, Mochovce
  • Ukraine, S. Ukraine 3
  • France, St. Laurent

17
OSART missions 2008, 2009
  • 2008
  • Sweden, Forsmark
  • Russia, Balakovo
  • USA, Arkansas
  • France, Cruas
  • Ukraine, Rovno 3,4
  • 2009
  • Japan, Mihama
  • Sweden, Oskarshamn
  • France, Fessenheim
  • Spain, Vandellos 2
  • Ukraine, S. Ukraine 1,2
  • China, Ling Ao 3,4
  • Limited scope
  • Pre-operational

18
OSART PROGRAMME 2006-2009
21 OSART missions Western Europe 9 Central
Europe 3 Eastern Europe 5 Asia
3 North America 1 South America 0 Africa
0
19
OSART Missions for Russian NPPs
  • A number of OSART missions were requested by
    Russian NPPs during the period 19891993, which
    are listed below
  • Plant Reactor type Year
  • Gorky (Pre-operational) district heating NP 1989
  • Novovoronezh 3/4 VVER 440/179 1991
  • Kola 1/2 VVER 440/ 230 1991
  • Smolensk 3 RBMK 1000 1993
  • All of these missions were combined review of
    design and operational safety, not the current
    standard OSART programme.

20
OSART missions for Russian NPPs
  • More recently, the Russian NPPs management
    requested full OSART and follow up for two more
    plants
  • Plant Reactor type OSART OSART FU
  • Volgodonsk VVER-1000 2005 2007
  • Balakovo VVER-1000 2008 2010

21
OSART missions for Russian NPPs
  • The following points were noted from overall
    assessment of the results of OSART missions to
    Volgodonsk and Balakovo NPPs
  • Evidence of significant efforts were spent by the
    plants to prepare for the OSART
  • Relatively low number of areas for improvement
  • Most areas for improvements are suggestions, only
    a few recommendations
  • Relatively high number of good practices
  • During the OSART Follow-up missions the team
    observed that
  • A high ratio of issues fully resolved, the rest
    progressing satisfactorily towards completion,
    with no issues having insufficient progress
  • The plants responded with corrective actions not
    only to recommendations and suggestions but also
    to encouragements, which is the lowest category
    of advice
  • The corrective actions were applied not only at
    the plant hosting the OSART but across the fleet
    of Rosenergoatom.

22
OSART missions for Russian NPPs
  • Future plans for OSART missions in Russia are
    being considered. There is an agreement with the
    utility Rosenergoatom to organize an OSART
    mission to a Russian NPP site every three years
  • Plant Reactor type Year
  • Smolensk RBMK 2011
  • Kola VVER 440/213 2014
  • By completing these reviews the OSART programme
    will then have cover all major reactor designs
    operated in Russia.

23
IAEA Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR)
May 2010
24
Nuclear Installation Safety Generic Reactor
Safety Reviews (GRSR)
  • The IAEA is assisting Member States in their new
    reactor design assessments by carrying out
    reviews of reactor design safety cases with focus
    on completeness and comprehensiveness of the
    safety case using selected and applicable IAEA
    Safety Fundamentals and Requirements.

.
25
Generic Reactor Safety ReviewObjectives
  • The aims of the review are to
  • Determine whether the reactor design safety case
    follows the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles,
  • Determine whether the selected safety
    requirements defined in GS-R-4 and NS-R-1 are
    being addressed in the design safety case and
    identify any that have been omitted,
  • For those requirements that are addressed, form a
    view on whether they are being addressed in a way
    that is consistent with the spirit of the IAEA
    requirements,
  • For the safety requirements that are not being
    addressed or are partially addressed, form a view
    on their relative significance and highlight
    their importance to safety.
  • Identify if the supplied documentation includes
    proper references/evidence as technical
    supporting information.

26
Generic Reactor Safety ReviewArea and Scope
  • The review focuses on
  • A. Completeness
  • Does the documentation provide a complete
    overview of the safety case or are there gaps?
  • if so are these made explicit and is there any
    indication of what is being done to fill them (NB
    this applies to both the safety of the design and
    the safety case itself)?
  • Is evidence provided that substantiates the
    safety claims and arguments being made?
  • B. Comprehensiveness
  • Are all modes of operation covered, e.g. outages,
    refuelling, maintenance, start-up, shutdown?
  • Are all features of the facility included e.g.
    fuel stores, spent fuel storage, auxiliary
    systems, steam turbines?
  • Are lifetime issues covered e.g. ageing
    management provision for maintenance, repair,
    replacement with respect to radiological
    risks/doses decommissioning radioactive waste
    minimisation in maintenance, repair and
    replacement?

Assisting Member States to implement the IAEA
safety standards
27
Generic Reactor Safety Review Safety
Fundamentals and Safety Requirements
Safety Standards used in IAEA generic evaluation
of safety of new reactor designs
Fundamental Safety Principles, SF-1
Safety Standards against which the reviews are
conducted
Safety Assessment Requirements, GS-R-4
Design Safety Requirements NS-R-1
Supporting guidance documents
Design Safety Guidelines
Safety Assessment Guidelines
28
IAEA Safety Requirements andGeneric Reactor
Safety Review
LICENSING
FUTURE STATE
MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
LICENSING
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS REQUIREMENTS
REVIEW
REVIEW
MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
HARMONIZING SAFETY ASSESSMENTS
GLOBAL NUCLEAR SAFETY REGIME
REVIEW
FUTURE MDEP CONTRIBUTION
MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
REVIEW
LICENSING
LICENSING
29
Generic Reactor Safety Review Report Contents
  • The Executive Summary
  • General Reporting
  • Description of the reviews scope, objectives,
    implementation, and safety requirements selected
    for the review
  • Review Results
  • General comments on the quality and completeness
    of the documents screened
  • A review of selected design features with
    observations and recommendations highlighting
    specific findings on technical topics (e.g.
    safety functions, reactor core and associated
    features, reactor coolant system, containment,
    IC, human factors defence in depth, use of PSA
    and DSA, etc.)
  • Review Sheets for each Safety Requirement
  • Detailed screening comments on each requirement
    and sub-paragraph of GS-R-4 and NS-R-1 reviewed

30
Generic Reactor Safety Review 2006-2009
Activities
ACR 1000 - AECL AP1000 - Westinghouse EPR -
AREVA ESBWR GE Hitachi ATMEA 1 AREVA
MHI APR1400 KHNP
31
Generic Reactor Safety Review 2006-2009
Activities
2006-2007 - Concept Development and Planning
2007-2009 GRSR Reviews Conducted
  • UK HSE Screening of Four New Reactor Safety
    Cases submitted for the consideration of the
    UK Health and Safety Executive/ NII against
    DS348 ACR1000, AP1000, ESBWR, EPR
  • (initiated September 2007 completed March
    2008)
  • ATMEA1 Screening of Conceptual Design Safety
    File and its innovative features against
    DS348 and NS-R-1 of new AREVA-MHI Reactor ATMEA1
  • (initiated 10 December 2007 completed June
    2008)
  • AP1000 Screening of AP1000 Safety and
    Environmental Report and its innovative
    features against DS348 and NS-R-1
  • (initiated 13 February 2008 completed January
    2009)
  • APR1400 Screening of KHNP APR1400 Safety and
    Environmental Report against GS-R- Part 4 and
    NS-R-1
  • (initiated 15 October 2008 completed August
    2009)
  • Projects in the planning stages
  • APR1000 Screening of the Korean APR1000 has been
    requested and initial discussions with KEPCO
    are ongoing.

32
  • IAEA
  • INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY CENTRE
  • (INSC)

33
BACKGROUND
  • There are 436 nuclear power reactors in operation
    worldwide, and over 50 reactors are under
    construction.
  • Large number of countries without any previous
    nuclear experience considers implementation of
    nuclear power programmes in the next decade.
  • Safety assessment capacity is the primary means
    for decision-making in support of design,
    licensing and operation activities.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
34
  • Safety Assessment provides the foundation for
  • SUCCESSFUL DESIGN,
  • LICENSING, AND
  • OPERATION
  • The development of an efficient and competent
    safety infrastructure in all Member States with
    nuclear power programmes or planning deployment
    of nuclear power system for the first time is a
    must!
  • A significant element of the safety
    infrastructure is the safety assessment
    capability
  • there is no safety without safety assessment!

Safety cannot be assured without robust safety
assessment
35
  • Hence comes the need to increase global safety
    assessment capacity for new nuclear power plant,
  • and the need to assist Member States in the
    applications of integrated safety assessment
    approach in order to reach informed safety
    decisions based on IAEA safety standards.
  • The IAEA is establishing the International
    Nuclear Safety Centre (INSC).

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
36
OBJECTIVES of INSAC 1/2
Implementing integrated and harmonized methods
and approach to safety assessment of nuclear
installations and to assist in its
applications. The INSC framework and platforms
will be used to 1. Support safety standard
preparation through providing for technical
bases 2. Provide comprehensive IAEA advisory
and review services
Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
37
OBJECTIVES of INSAC 2/2
3. Support Member States in safety capacity
building, maintenance and knowledge
management 4. Provide networking systems and
facilitate effective knowledge and information
sharing and collaboration.
Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
38
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39
EXPECTED RESULTS
  • The INSAC will harmonise safety assessment
    competency and capacity building efforts.
  • It will provide leadership and management of
    safety assessment methodologies based on an
    integrated structured approach.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
40
Examples PERFORMANCE MEASURES
  • The number of developed Technical Documents and
    Guides related to the interpretation of safety
    assessment requirements. Development and
    application of Generic Reactor Safety Review
    methodology,
  • Development and application of methods/guidance
    documents for- Integrated Risk Informed
    Decision Making process,- Safety Performance
    Indicators and applications, - Safety Goals
    and its applications.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
41
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
  • Implementation of integrated safety review
    services of safety assessment approach developed.
    Number of advisory service conducted per year
  • Development of safety assessment knowledge
    requirement implementation of capacity
    building. Number of training courses and
    workshops prepared and conducted per year
  • Development and use of e-platform such as CASAT.
    To foster collaboration and network platform
    promoting harmonization of nuclear safety
    assessment concepts and approaches worldwide in
    operation. Web-bases system setup for
    collaboration and networking, data base for
    training and methods validation.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety
Assessment
42
Concluding Remarks
  • The IAEA is willing and ready to support safety
    enhancements through the establishment and
    application of Safety Standards, Safety Review
    and Advisory Services and International
    Instruments.
  • The IAEA is successfully performing safety
    assessments of new reactor designs using the
    current Safety Standards.
  • Current Safety Standards are a first basis for
    harmonization.
  • All IAEA publications are available at
  • http//www- pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/pub
    lications.asp
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