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Mobile Device Security

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Title: Mobile Device Security


1
Mobile Device Security
  • Adam C. Champion and Dong Xuan
  • CSE 4471 Information Security

Based on material from Tom Eston (SecureState),
Apple, Android Open Source Project, and William
Enck (NCSU)
2
Organization
  • Quick Overview of Mobile Devices
  • Mobile Threats and Attacks
  • Mobile Access Control
  • Information Leaking Protection
  • Case Studies

3
Overview of Mobile Devices
  • Mobile computers
  • Mainly smartphones, tablets
  • Sensors GPS, camera, accelerometer, etc.
  • Computation powerful CPUs ( 1 GHz, multi-core)
  • Communication cellular/4G, Wi-Fi, near field
    communication (NFC), etc.
  • Many connect to cellular networks billing system
  • Cisco 7 billion mobile devices will have been
    sold by 2012 1

Organization
4
Organization
  • Quick Overview of Mobile Devices
  • Mobile Threats and Attacks
  • Mobile Access Control
  • Information Leaking Protection
  • Case Studies

5
Mobile Threats and Attacks
  • Mobile devices make attractive targets
  • People store much personal info on them email,
    calendars, contacts, pictures, etc.
  • Sensitive organizational info too
  • Can fit in pockets, easily lost/stolen
  • Built-in billing system SMS/MMS (mobile
    operator), in-app purchases (credit card), etc.
  • Many new devices have near field communications
    (NFC), used for contactless payments, etc.
  • Your device becomes your credit card
  • Much Android malware, much less for iOS
  • NFC-based billing system vulnerabilities

6
Mobile Device Loss/Theft
  • Many mobile devices lost, stolen each year
  • 113 mobile phones lost/stolen every minute in the
    U.S. 15
  • 56 of us misplace our mobile phone or laptop
    each month 15
  • Lookout Security found 2.5 billion worth of
    phones in 2011 via its Android app 16
  • Symantec placed 50 lost smartphones throughout
    U.S. cities 17
  • 96 were accessed by finders
  • 80 of finders tried to access sensitive data
    on phone

7
Device Malware
  • iOS malware very little
  • Juniper Networks Major increase in Android
    malware from 2010 to 2011 18
  • Android malware growth keeps increasing ()
  • Main categories 19
  • Trojans
  • Monitoring apps/spyware
  • Adware
  • Botnets
  • Well look at notable malware examples

8
iOS Malware
  • Malware, fake apps have hit iOS too
  • iKee, first iPhone virus, rickrolled jailbroken
    iDevices 25
  • Example fake/similar apps
  • Temple Run Temple Climb, Temple Rush, Cave Run
  • Angry Birds Angry Zombie Birds, Shoot Angry
    Birds
  • Not to mention walkthroughs, reference apps,
    etc.
  • Google Play banned such apps
  • iOS, Android hit with Find and Call app
  • SMS spammed contacts from central server
  • Removed from App Store, Google Play

9
Android DroidDream Malware
  • Infected 58 apps on Android Market, March 2011
  • 260,000 downloads in 4 days
  • How it worked
  • Rooted phone via Android Debug Bridge (adb)
    vulnerability
  • Sent premium-rate SMS messages at night ()
  • Google removed apps 4 days after release, banned
    3 developers from Market
  • More malware found since

10
Android Fake Angry Birds Space
  • Bot, Trojan
  • Masquerades as game
  • Roots Android 2.3 devices using Gingerbreak
    exploit
  • Device joins botnet

Source 20
11
Android Case Study SMS Worm
  • Students in previous information security classes
    wrote SMS worms, loggers on Android
  • Worm spreads to all contacts via social
    engineering, sideloading, etc.
  • Logger stored/forwarded all received SMS messages
  • Only needed SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS, READ_SMS
    permissions
  • Can send 100 SMS messages/hour
  • One group put SMS logger on Google Play (removed
    it)

12
Android Google Wallet Vulnerabilities (1)
  • Google Wallet enables smartphone payments
  • Uses NFC technology
  • Many new mobile devices have NFC
  • Some credit card info stored securely in secure
    element
  • Separate chip, SD card, SIM card
  • Unfortunately, other data are not stored as
    securely

13
Android Google Wallet Vulnerabilities (2)
  • Some information can be recovered from databases
    on phone 21
  • Name on credit card
  • Expiration date
  • Recent transactions
  • etc.
  • Google Analytics tracking can reveal customer
    behavior from non-SSL HTTP GET requests
  • NFC alone does not guarantee security
  • Radio eavesdropping, data modification possible
    22
  • Relay attacks, spoofing possible with libnfc 23

14
Android Sophisticated NFC Hack
  • Charlie Millers Black Hat 2012 presentation
    Nokia, Android phones can be hijacked via NFC
    24
  • NFC/Android Beam on by default on Android 2.3,
    Android 4.0
  • Place phone 34 cm away from NFC tag, other
    NFC-enabled phone
  • Attacker-controlled phone sends data to
    tag/device, can crash NFC daemon, Android OS
  • For Android 4.04.0.1, can remotely open device
    browser to attacker-controlled webpage

15
Device Search and Seizure
  • People v. Diaz if youre arrested, police can
    search your mobile device without warrant 26
  • Rationale prevent perpetrators destroying
    evidence
  • Quite easy to break the law (overcriminalization)
    27
  • Crime severity murder, treason, etc. vs. unpaid
    citations
  • Tens of thousands of offenses on the books 26
  • Easy for law enforcement to extract data from
    mobile devices (forensics) 28

16
Organization
  • Quick Overview of Mobile Devices
  • Mobile Threats and Attacks
  • Mobile Access Control
  • Information Leaking Protection
  • Case Studies

17
Mobile Access Control
  • Very easy for attacker to control a mobile device
    if he/she has physical access
  • Especially if theres no way to authenticate user
  • Then device can join botnet, send SMS spam, etc.
  • Need access controls for mobile devices
  • Authentication, authorization, accountability
  • Authentication workflow
  • Request access
  • Supplication (user provides identity, e.g., John
    Smith)
  • Authentication (system determines user is John)
  • Authorization (system determines what John
    can/cannot do)

18
Authentication Categories
  • Authentication generally based on
  • Something supplicant knows
  • Password/passphrase
  • Unlock pattern
  • Something supplicant has
  • Magnetic key card
  • Smart card
  • Token device
  • Something supplicant is
  • Fingerprint
  • Retina scan

19
Authentication Passwords
  • Cheapest, easiest form of authentication
  • Works well with most applications
  • Also the weakest form of access control
  • Lazy users passwords 1234, password, letmein,
    etc.
  • Can be defeated using dictionary, brute force
    attacks
  • Requires administrative controls to be effective
  • Minimum length/complexity
  • Password aging
  • Limit failed attempts

20
Authentication Smart Cards/ Security Tokens
  • More expensive, harder to implement
  • Vulnerability prone to loss or theft
  • Very strong when combined with another form of
    authentication, e.g., a password
  • Does not work well in all applications
  • Try carrying a smart card in addition to a mobile
    device!

21
Authentication Biometrics
  • More expensive/harder to implement
  • Prone to error
  • False negatives not authenticate authorized user
  • False positives authenticate unauthorized user
  • Strong authentication when it works
  • Does not work well in all applications
  • Fingerprint readers becoming more common on
    mobile devices (Atrix 4G)

22
Authentication Pattern Lock
  • Swipe path of length 49 on 3 x 3 grid
  • Easy to use, suitable for mobile devices
  • Problems 30
  • 389,112 possible patterns (456,976 possible
    patterns for 4-char case-insensitive alphabetic
    password!)
  • Attacker can see pattern from finger oils on
    screen

23
Authentication Comparison
Passwords Smart Cards Biometrics Pattern Lock
Security Weak Strong Strong Weak
Ease of Use Easy Medium Hard Easy
Implementation Easy Hard Hard Easy
Works for phones Yes No Possible Yes
Deeper problem mobile devices are designed
with single-user assumption
24
Our Work DiffUser (1)
  • Current smartphone access control focus 1 user
    (admin)
  • Hard to achieve fine-grained mobile device
    management
  • Control app installation/gaming
  • Parental controls
  • Lend phone to friend
  • We design DiffUser, differentiated user access
    control model 31
  • Different users use smartphone in different
    contexts
  • User classification admin, normal, guest

Smartphone Privileges Smartphone Privileges Admin Normal Guest
Personal Info SMS ? ? ?
Personal Info Contacts ? ? ?
Resource Access WiFi ? ? Limit?
Resource Access GPS ? ? Limit?
Resource Access Bluetooth ? ? Limit?
Apps App Install ? Limit ?
Apps Sensitive Apps ? Limit ?
Source 31, Table 1.
25
Our Work DiffUser (2)
  • Implement our system on Android using Java
  • Override Androids Home Activity for multi-user
    authentication, profile configuration

Source 31, Figure 2. From left to right
normal user screen user login and
authentication user profile configuration.
26
Organization
  • Quick Overview of Mobile Devices
  • Mobile Threats and Attacks
  • Mobile Access Control
  • Information Leaking Protection
  • Case Studies

27
Mobile Device Information Leakage
  • Types of mobile device information sources
  • Internal to device (e.g., GPS location, IMEI,
    etc.)
  • External sources (e.g., CNN, Chase Bank, etc.)
  • Third-party mobile apps can leak info to external
    sources 32
  • Send out device ID (IMEI/EID), contacts,
    location, etc.
  • Apps ask permission to access such info users
    can ignore!
  • Apps can intercept info sent to a source, send to
    different destination!
  • Motives
  • Monitor employees activity using accelerometers
    (cited in 32)
  • Ads, market research (include user location,
    behavior, etc.)
  • Malice
  • How do we protect against such information
    leakage?

28
Information Flow Tracking (IFT)
  • IFT tracks each information flow among internal,
    external sources
  • Each flow is tagged, e.g., untrusted
  • Tag propagated as information flows among
    internal, external sources
  • Sound alarm if data sent to third party
  • Challenges
  • Reasonable runtime, space overhead
  • Many information sources

trusted
untrusted
Information leakage on mobile devices
29
TaintDroid
  • Enck et al., OSDI 2010 32
  • IFT system on Android 2.1
  • System firmware (not app)
  • Modifies Androids Dalvik VM, tracks info flows
    across methods, classes, files
  • Tracks the following info
  • Sensors GPS, camera, accelerometer, microphone
  • Internal info contacts, phone , IMEI, IMSI,
    Google acct
  • External info network, SMS
  • Notifies user of info leakage

Source 33
30
TaintDroid (2)
  • Uses a 32-bit tag structure
  • Set bit indicates an information flow (or sensor
    in use)

Bit Tracks
3116 Unused
15 History sent out
14 Google account sent out
13 Device serial sent out
12 ICCID (SIM card ID) sent out
11 IMSI (subscriber ID) sent out
10 IMEI (device ID) sent out
9 SMS sent out
8 Accelerometer in use
7 Camera in use
6 Last location sent out
5 Data sent out over network
4 GPS location sent out
3 Phone sent out
2 Microphone in use
1 Contacts sent out
0 Location sent out
31
TaintDroid (3)
  • Tested 30 popular Android apps (Internet
    permission)
  • 37/105 flagged network connections were
    legitimate
  • 15/30 apps leaked data to ad/market research
    firms, (admob.com, flurry.com, etc.) not obvious
    to user

Source 33
32
Our Work D2Taint (1)
  • Motivation
  • Mobile device users access many information
    sources, e.g.
  • Online banks (like Chase)
  • Social networking (like Facebook)
  • News websites (like CNN)
  • Different info sources different sensitivity
    levels
  • Applications diverse variable access patterns
    challenge tag propagation
  • Users info source access patterns change over
    time
  • Need to track many information flows with
    moderate space, runtime overhead

33
Our Work D2Taint (2)
  • Differentiated and dynamic tag strategy 34
  • Information sources partitioned into
    differentiated classes based on arbitrary
    criteria
  • Example (criterioninfo sensitivity level)
  • Classes highly sensitive, moderately
    sensitive, not sensitive
  • Sources Chase ? highly sensitive Facebook ?
    moderately sensitive CNN ? not sensitive
  • Each classs sources stored in a location info
    table
  • Source indices (0, 1, ) ? source names
    (chase.com, )

34
Our Work D2Taint (3)
  • D2Taint uses fixed length tag (32 bits)
  • Tag includes segments corresponding to classes
  • Each segment stores representations of
    information sources in its class
  • Representation info sources class table index
  • Note source table grows over time
  • Information source representation does not
    uniquely ID source

35
Our Work D2Taint (4)
  • Tag dynamics
  • Users access information sources via time-varying
    patterns
  • Class size, representation size can be adjusted
    as different kinds of sources are accessed
  • Can switch tag schemes using pre-configured, on
    the fly options
  • Variable operations require merging tags with
    different schemes

D2Taint system architecture
36
Our Work D2Taint (5)
  • D2Taint implemented on Android 2.2, Nexus One
    smartphones
  • Evaluate D2Taint 84 popular free apps from
    Google Play
  • 71/84 leak some data to third parties
  • E.g., Android system version, screen resolution
  • Often, third parties are cloud computing services
  • TaintDroid cannot detect external data leakage
  • 1 bit in tag for network
  • Cannot track multiple external sources at once
  • 12/84 leak highly sensitive data, e.g., IMEI/EID
    (detected by both D2Taint, TaintDroid)
  • D2Taint has overhead similar to TaintDroids

37
Organization
  • Quick Overview of Mobile Devices
  • Mobile Threats and Attacks
  • Mobile Access Control
  • Information Leaking Protection
  • Case Studies
  • iOS
  • Android

38
iOS System Architecture (1)
  • Boot sequence
  • Bootloader, kernel, extensions, baseband firmware
    all have cryptographic signatures
  • Root of trust burnt into boot ROM at the factory
  • Each components signature is verified
  • If any signature doesnt match, the connect to
    iTunes screen is shown

Icons from Double-J Design, IconBlock
39
iOS System Architecture (2)
  • Software updates
  • Cannot install older version of iOS on an
    iDevice e.g., if device runs iOS 5.1.1, cannot
    install iOS 4
  • Device cryptographically measures components,
    sends to Apple install server with nonce, device
    ID
  • Nonce value used only once
  • Prevents attacker from replaying the value
  • Server checks measurements if allowed, server
    adds device ID to measurements, signs everything

40
iOS Apps and App Store
  • All iOS apps signed by Apple (not developer)
  • Third-party apps signed only after
  • Developer ID verification (individual, company)
  • Review bugs, work correctly (program analysis)
  • Each app sandboxed in its own directory
  • Cannot communicate with other apps
  • Apps need signed entitlements to access user
    data
  • Further app protection
  • Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) for all
    apps
  • ARM eXecute Never (XN) bit set for all memory
    pages

41
iOS Data Protection Measures
  • Each iDevice has hardware-accelerated crypto
    operations (AES-256)
  • Effaceable Storage securely removes crypto keys
    from flash memory
  • Erase all content and settings wipes user data
    using Effaceable Storage (locally or remotely)
  • Interact with mobile device management (MDM),
    Exchange ActiveSync servers
  • Developers can use APIs for secure file, database
    storage
  • Passcodes
  • Admins can require numeric, alphanumeric, etc.
  • Wipe device after 10 failed login attempts

42
iPhone Configuration Utility
43
Miscellaneous iOS Security
  • Built-in support for SSLv3, TLS, VPNs
  • Extensive administrative controls
  • Password policies
  • Disable device features, e.g., camera
  • Disable Siri
  • Remote wipe
  • Apps can access contacts without permission
    (fixed in iOS 6)

Source 8
44
iOS Jailbreaking
  • Circumvents Apples iOS security mechanisms
  • Violates iDevices terms of use
  • Allows installation of apps from alternative app
    stores, e.g., Cydia
  • Removes app sandbox
  • Usually replaces kernel with one accepting
    non-Apple signatures
  • Tools redsn0w, Absinthe, etc.
  • Legal in U.S. under DMCA 2010 exemption

45
Organization
  • Quick Overview of Mobile Devices
  • Mobile Threats and Attacks
  • Mobile Access Control
  • Information Leaking Protection
  • Case Studies
  • iOS
  • Android

46
Android Security (1)
  • Android built on Linux kernel, which provides
  • User permissions model
  • Process isolation
  • Each app is assigned unique user/group IDs, run
    as a separate process ? app sandbox
  • System partition mounted read-only
  • Android 3.0 enables filesystem encryption using
    Linux dmcrypt (AES-128)
  • Device admins can require passwords with specific
    criteria, remote wipe devices, etc.

47
Android Security (2)
  • Android device administration (3.0)
  • Remote wipe
  • Require strong password
  • Full device encryption
  • Disable camera

48
Android Security (3)
  • Other protection mechanisms
  • Android 1.5 stack buffer, integer overflow
    protection double free, chunk consolidation
    attack prevention
  • Android 2.3 format string protection, NX, null
    pointer dereference mitigation
  • Android 4.0 ASLR implemented
  • Android 4.1 ASLR strengthened, plug kernel
    leaks
  • Capability-based permissions mechanism
  • Many APIs are not invoked without permission,
    e.g., camera, GPS, wireless, etc.
  • Every app must declare the permissions it needs
  • Users need to allow these permissions when
    installing app

49
Android Security (4)
  • All Android apps need to be signed by the
    developer, not Google
  • Google Play app store less regulated
  • Apps available rapidly after publishing
  • Bouncer service scans for malware in store 11

Google Play permissions interface
50
Android Device Diversity (1)
  • Android runs on various devices
  • Different devices run different OS versions
  • Device manufacturers often add their own custom
    UIs, software
  • Mobile operators add their own software
  • Not all devices are updated to latest Android
    version!
  • Security challenges

Android devices accessing Google Play, August
2012. Some devices are not always updated to the
latest version. These devices tend to have
security vulnerabilities targeted by
attackers. Source 12
51
Android Device Diversity (2)
  • Notice many Android devices are orphaned
    without major updates 13
  • Android developers need to secure their apps for
    many different devices

52
Android Device Diversity (3)
The OpenSignalMaps Android app sees almost 4,000
types of device clients. Source 14
53
Rooting Android Devices
  • Android device owners can often get root access
    to their devices
  • Process can be as simple as unlocking bootloader
  • Sometimes, exploit bugs to get root
  • Result install OS of choice, bypass
    device/operator restrictions
  • Legal under 2010 DMCA exemption
  • Security problems
  • Voids device warranty (usually)
  • Circumvents app sandbox root can modify any
    apps files
  • Malware can root and own your device!

54
Thank You
  • Questions/comments?

55
References (1)
  1. Cisco, Cisco Visual Networking Index Global
    Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 20112016,
    14 Feb. 2012, http//www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions
    /collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ ns705/ns827/white_p
    aper_c11-520862.html
  2. Samsung, Exynos 5 Dual, 2012,
    http//www.samsung.com/global/business/semiconduct
    or/ product/application/detail?productId7668iaId
    2341
  3. Nielsen Co., Two Thirds of All New Mobile Buyers
    Now Opting for Smartphones, 12 Jul. 2012,
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    artphones/
  4. K. De Vere, iOS leapfrogs Android with 410
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  6. Wikipedia, iOS, updated 2012,
    http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/iOS
  7. Apple Inc., iPhone Developer University
    Program, http//developer.apple.com/iphone/progra
    m/university.html
  8. Apple Inc, iOS Security, http//images.apple.com
    /ipad/business/docs/ iOS_Security_May12.pdf
  9. Android Open Source Project, Android Security
    Overview, http//source.android.com/tech/ securit
    y/index.html

Presentation organization inspired by T. Eston,
Android vs. iOS Security Showdown,
2012, http//www.slideshare.net/agent0x0/the-andro
id-vs-apple-ios-security-showdown
56
References (2)
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57
References (3)
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58
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