THE SAFE AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL HEALTH MANAGEMENT OF AIRTANKER AND LEAD AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN FIREBOMBING OPERATIONS

1
THE SAFE AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL HEALTH
MANAGEMENT OF AIRTANKER AND LEAD AIRCRAFT
INVOLVED IN FIREBOMBING OPERATIONS

• Presentation at 7th Annual Wildland Fire Safety
  Summit, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
• 19th July,2003
• Steve Hall (Celeris Aerospace Canada Inc.)
• Dick Perry (Sandia National Laboratory)
• Joe Braun (Systems and Electronics Inc.)

2
OVERVIEW

• Reasons for Structural Concerns Related to
  Aircraft Operating in the Firebombing Role
• Potential causes of structural problems
• Addressing the Structural Concerns
• Rationale behind the procedures and processes
  that need to be implemented with particular
  reference to fatigue and damage tolerance
• Understanding the loads imposed on firebombing
  aircraft
• Structural Health Management of Aircraft Involved
  in the Firebombing Role
• Short and longer term issues related to the safe
  and economic use of these aircraft
• Inspection, Maintenance and the Bottom Line
• Accumulating Knowledge
• Pending Activities
• Conclusions and Recommendations

3
SUMMER 2002 WING FAILURES

• C-130A
• Built 1957
• 21,900 hours total
• Both wings failed June 2002

• PB4Y-2
• Single Tail Liberator
• Built 1944/45 timeframe
• 8,200 Special Mission hours
• Failure one wing July 2002

4
REASONS FOR CONCERN

• Resulted in the formation of the Blue Ribbon
  Commission by the USDA/FS and BLM which reported
  in December 2002
• Number of recommendations/observations including
• Many of the aircraft involved in the firebombing
  role were not designed for this role
• Loads to which they have been subjected are
  largely unknown as is their current structural
  health status
• There is a need to harmonize the inspection and
  maintenance of firebombing aircraft with modern
  day certification approaches such as fatigue and
  damage tolerance
• Approach to funding, contracts and the ongoing
  and modernization of the fleet needs to be
  reviewed

5
ADVERSE OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

• C-130A and PB4Y-2 Fleets immediately grounded
• Loss of approx 10-12 Heavy Tankers
• Major concerns about USDA/FS Beech Baron Lead
  Aircraft
• Immediate need for replacement?
• Forest Service note that contracts will not be
  awarded to C-130A and PB4Y-2 aircraft
• Heavy airtankers operating with a 15 reduction
  in payload for the 2003 fire season
• Unanticipated expenses associated with additional
  inspection and maintenance actions
• Delayed contract award and operational
  availability

6
OVERVIEW OF FIREBOMBING AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
AND OPERATIONS
7
FIREBOMBING AIRCRAFT

• Heavy Air Tankers
• 2,200 3,000 gallons and above
• Translates to approximately 22,000 to 30,000 lbs
  retardant

• Air Tankers
• 800 1,200 gallons
• Translates to approximately 8,000 to 12,000 lbs

8
FIREBOMBING AIRCRAFT (cont)

• Lead Aircraft
• Initial Survey of Fire for Escape Routes
• Guide Heavy Tankers in over fire
• Ensure Fire Prevention Officer has view of drop
• Spend far more time over the fire than do the air
  tankers

9
AIR TANKER CONFIGURATION
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TYPES OF TANK

• Constant Flow
• One pair doors
• Computer controlled
• Aperture changes to ensure constant flow
• Consistent Coverage Level

• Sequenced Doors
• Two, four, eight or more
• Door sequence automatically selected
• Release percentage of load that is proportional
  to the number of doors
• Coverage Level not as consistent

11
TYPES OF LOAD

• Retardant or Foam
• Pre-mixed or mixed on board
• Drop as a barrier to the fire
• Water
• Dropping on the fire

12
OPERATIONAL PROFILE AIR TANKERS

• Transit to fire
• Depends on distance, if relatively close often
  below 2000 ft AGL
• Holding pattern around the fire
• Generally around 1,000 ft to 1,500ft around the
  fire
• Drop Zone
• 150 ft AGL (or 150ft parallel to terrain in
  mountainous drops)
• Airspeed around 110 120 knots
• Flap often required (typically 50, occasionally
  100)
• Want available power when retracted
• Load, usually dropped in 50 increments,
  occasionally 100
• Drop Time
• Of the order of 4 -10 seconds depending on
  coverage level

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Potential Causes of Structural Problems
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SPECIAL MISSION AIRCRAFT

• Aircraft that is operating in a role for which
  was not envisaged during its design
• Firebombing Aircraft
• ILS/VOR Calibration
• Pipeline/Geological Survey
• Crop-Spraying
• Atmospheric Research (Hurricane Hunters)
• Majority tend to operate in Low-level roles
• Low-level consistent use below 2,500 ft AGL
• Turbulent environment aircraft subject to an
  increased gust frequency
• Some roles involve increased manoeuvre spectrum
  for terrain avoidance
• Note that even when an aircraft has been designed
  for the environment, care is required regarding
  the source of the design loads
• Lots of data for low-level data is transit data
  and is not usually representative of consistent
  low-level operation

Low-level Roles
High-Level Role
15
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT SPECIAL MISSION SPECTRUM?

• Generally very little
• Limited number of health monitoring programs
  completed to define the loads
• NRCC/IAR Circa Mid 1970s - 1988
• Limited NASA Work (Reliability Issue)
• FAA Collecting Low-level data, yet to be collated
• However, from the limited data available some
  initial trends have been identified which
  indicate an urgent need for further work

16
LOADING MECHANISMS

• Two mechanisms that have to be considered
• High Load Exceedance or Overstressing the
  aircraft
• Over-g of the aircraft
• High Load at High Weight Concerns
• Long-term impact of cyclic loading
• Fatigue and Damage Tolerance
• Repetitions of cyclic loading and its accumulated
  impact
• A major focus of past analyses of special mission
  aircraft has been the high load exceedance
  aspects
• Part of the picture and something of which we
  have to be constantly vigilant
• However, it is by no means the full picture, nor
  the major reason for the structural failures that
  have occurred

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IDENTIFYING HARSH OR UNUSUAL USAGE
18
COMPARATIVE SEVERITY
19
ILS/VOR CALIBRATION
20
CROP-DUSTING
21
DC-6 DATA
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MILITARY DATA (ALL ROLES)
23
AIRCRAFT DESIGN vs FIREBOMBING
24
F-27 DATA SAMPLE 003
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F-27 DATA SAMPLE 004
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FATIGUE CONCEPTS
Alt Stress (Sa)
Max Stress (Smax)
Stress
Alternating Stress (Sa)
Sa1
Mean Stress (Sm)
Min Stress (Smin)
Different Mean Stress Levels (Sm)
N1
Time
Number of Cycles (N)
Miners Cumulative Damage Law
Smin Smax
R
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MAIN OBSERVATIONS

• Aircraft in Low-level Special Mission Roles see a
  much more severe spectrum than comparable
  aircraft operating in the roles for which they
  were originally designed
• Inordinate amount of relatively low-level loads
• Much more turbulent environment
• More Manoeuvres
• Control Aircraft
• Terrain avoidance
• Some high loads, but generally the majority of
  the structural damage can be attributed to the
  low level loads
• A large amount of accumulated world-wide flying
  in the original design role is a necessary, but
  not a sufficient condition for ongoing structural
  integrity in the special mission role
• Acceleration of damage in critical areas
• Damage being sustained in previously unknown areas

28
ADDRESSING THE STRUCTURAL CONCERNS
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SO WHAT?

• The previous slides have illustrated that the
  limited data available suggests that from a
  cyclic loading perspective (fatigue) firebombing
  usage is more severe than many operational roles,
  including the roles for which the majority of the
  aircraft were designed
• The next issue that has to be addressed is what
  are the implications of these loads for
  individual aircraft structures?

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EVALUATING THE SIGNIFICANCE

• Identify areas in the structure that are likely
  to be adversely impacted by firebombing usage and
  assess exactly how they will respond
• Structural Analysis/Certification terminology
  these are termed critical areas, Principal
  Structural Elements (PSEs) or Structurally
  Significant Items (SSIs)
• To do this we need to understand the cyclic
  stresses experienced at each location
• Load is what is applied, stress is how the
  structure responds
• Typically we measure loads
• Mechanism of translating these to stresses (Use
  of Transfer Functions)
• Detail structural configuration
• Evaluate the structural health at each location
• Where are we starting from, ie what has happened
  in the past
• Where are we going, ie based on the starting
  point how fast is future usage consuming the
  health of the structure?

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COMPARISON ASW vs FIREBOMBING

• Data from Grumman Tracker (S2)
• Canadian Forces ASW
• OMNR Firebombing (Undulating)
• West Coast Firebombing (Mountainous)
• Assuming similar weights and Stress/g of between
  5ksi/g and 10ksi/g
• Firebombing is approximately 1.8 to 2.0 times as
  severe as ASW

32
CHALLENGES OF SPECIAL MISSION AIRCRAFT

• Generally older aircraft
• May or may not be supported by the OEM or a type
  certificate holder
• Frequently not supportive or consider it not
  cost-effective to generate data for this role
• Liability/Risk issues
• Engineering data is often limited
• Regular data collection and validation is not
  easy as aircraft are frequently geographically
  dispersed
• Frequently not equipped with a data-bus that
  facilitates the straightforward capture of many
  parameters

33
HOW DO YOU GO ABOUT EVALUATING THE ONGOING
STRUCTURAL HEALTH OF AN AIRCRAFT?
What do you measure, what criteria do you use?
34
ACTIONS INITIATED

• USDA/FS Sandia Laboratory inspection
  base-lining program
• Development of Structural Health Management Plans
  by some operators
• Including generic and specific parameters
• Instrumentation of a C-130A Aircraft and
  development of initial firebombing profiles
• Sponsored by the FAA and TBM/IAR
• Initial instrumentation and limited preliminary
  analysis of North American Based Airtankers
• Sponsored by the USDA/FS and Sandia Laboratories
• 2003 P2, P3, DC-7 and possibly CV-580
• 2004 Additional aircraft

35
BASELINE INSPECTION PROGRAM
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PURPOSE

• Reduce risk of major structural failure
• One time for 2003 season
• Enhanced Inspection Program
• Determine the condition of the fleet
• Basis for continuing program for long-term
  airworthiness
• Standardization among contractors and types
• Identify best practices

37
PROCESS

• Documentation search
• Historical information
• OEM and other user documents
• Site visits to all large air tanker contractors
• Inspection documentation
• Inspection practice
• Damage histories

38
SANDIA FINDINGS

• Damage Tolerance Assessment
• P-3
• US Navy missions most relevant to P-3C
• Full scale fatigue testing (P-3C, 2002-2003)
• P-2V
• No relevant data identified
• C-54-DC, DC-6, DC-7
• SID on DC-6 only
• 1992
• Based on service history

39
SANDIA FINDINGS (cont)

• Inspection Programs (AIPs)
• Wide variation in depth and detail of AIPs
• No FAA process for standardization or periodic
  review
• Wide variation in use of NDI beyond visual
  inspection

40
SANDIA FINDINGS (cont)

• Existing history data and inspection practice are
  less effective than true damage tolerance
  assessment as air tanker time builds in relation
  to prior mission time
• Flight environment and loads data are essential
  elements of a damage tolerance based continuing
  airworthiness program, for both current and
  future air tankers

41
IMPLEMENTING A STRUCTURAL HEALTH MONITORING
PROGRAM
42
Structural Health Management Plan Considerations
Critical Area Identification
Certified, Safe and Economically Viable Aircraft
Fatigue and Damage Tolerance Analysis
Inspection, Maintenance and Overhaul Intervals
43
PROGRAM SCOPE

• Limited Survey and assume representative of fleet
  usage
• Loads Environment Stress Survey (LESS)
• Most severe Safety Factors
• Finite Commitment
• Repeat periodically to assess validity
• LESS plus limited Individual Aircraft Tracking
  (IAT) program
• Representative IAT aircraft to confirm LESS data
  remains valid
• Safety Factors not as severe
• Ongoing commitment
• Repeat LESS when significant change in usage
  occurs
• LESS program plus full IAT program
• Generally subset of LESS parameters on IAT
  aircraft
• Least severe safety factors
• Ongoing commitment
• Repeat LESS when significant change in usage
  occurs

Initially Required for Firebombing as
representative usage may not exist
44
SELECTING PARAMETERS

• Principle 1
• Minimize parameters to be monitored
• Even though cost of additional channels and
  sensors relatively cheap
• Avoid If we are not sure lets monitor it
  syndrome
• AKA More data has to be better

45
IDENTIFYING PARAMETERS

• Requirements
• New requirements
• Service History
• Testing
• Use of Existing or Development of Transfer
  Functions
• Stress Analysis, Test Data, etc.
• Durability/Reliability in Operational Environment
• If you cannot reliably measure it or if robust
  sensor cannot be installed, the parameter is of
  little use
• Integration with aircraft systems
• Avoid impact on critical systems or structure
• Do not want airworthiness or certification issues
• EMI/EMC has to be considered
• Components themselves
• Installed in aircraft

46
GENERIC vs SPECIFIC PARAMETERS

• Generic parameters are universal parameters
  that characterize the phenomena being measured
• Vertical Centre-of-Gravity Acceleration (Nzcg)
• Specific parameters are parameters which
  represent the actual response of the structure to
  the phenomena
• Strain gauge readings measured at specific
  locations on a structure
• Location specific
• Ideally, require as many generic parameters as
  practicable
• Practice Require a combination of both

47
SIGNIFICANT PHASES OF FLIGHT?
HEAVY
TAXI/TAKE-OFF
BOMBING RUN
LIGHT
LANDING
48
DATA CAPTURE REQUIREMENTS
49
HOW/WHERE WILL IT BE OBTAINED?

• For each parameter you need to know
• Measured
• Direct reading?
• Computed on Aircraft or Post-Flight?
• Constant Recording or Discrete Signal
• What triggers/toggles recording on/off?, eg
• Application of Aircraft Power
• Weight-on-Wheels
• Airspeed below a certain value for a certain time
• Derived from data on Aircraft Bus
• Computed on Aircraft or Post-Flight?
• Derived from Ground (Meta) Data
• Interrogation of hard-copy data from form?
• Interrogation of electronically stored data?
• Will data be obtained from a central location or
  from geographically dispersed locations?

50
POTENTIAL PARAMETERS

• Continuous
• Airspeed
• Centre-of-Gravity Acceleration (Nzcg)
• Roll acceleration
• Pressure Altitude
• Radar Altitude
• Flap Position
• Aileron Position
• Elevator Position
• Float Position ( Continuous Flow)

• Discrete
• Weight-on-wheels
• Firebomb door sequencing (weight)
• Supplementary Data
• Fuel Load (Average Fuel Burn rate)
• Flying Hours
• Configuration
• Expansion
• 4-8 channels to address type related issues if
  required
• Probably with strain gauges

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COMMUNICATION POTENTIAL
Maintenance/ Overhaul Depot
Life-Cycle Manager
Flight Operations
OEM
ISP
ISP
ISP
ISP
Internet
ISP
ISP
ISP
Contractors
Field Service Reps
Operational Bases
53
SENSORS

• Are they capable of capturing (sampling) the
  required signal?
• Can be challenging if higher frequency dynamic
  response involved
• Environment
• Reliability in operational environment
• Bonding of strain gauges
• Back-up gauges do not necessarily back you up!!
• Temperature compensation
• How will I know if I switch sensors?
• Calibration curves
• Transfer functions
• How can a faulty sensor be detected?
• What action should be taken when it is found?
• What is the volume of data I anticipate?
• Is the capability of existing aircraft sensors
  sensitive enough for my requirements
• Sink speed from incremental changes in altitude

54
RECORDERS

• Can the recorder sample the data from the sensors
  at suitable rate to preserve the essence of the
  signal?
• EMI/EMC considerations
• Cost, robustness and processing capabilities
• Download independent of aircraft power
• How much, if any onboard processing should be
  carried out?
• Will the memory provide convenient downloading
  periods?
• Recorder environment
• If not in cabin, will warm-up etc. miss
  significant data?

55
RECORDERS (cont)

• What happens if the recorder fills-up before a
  scheduled download?
• How will the data be removed from the recorder
  and transferred to a central location?
• Onerous workload on maintenance personnel?
• Dont force people to make decisions for which
  they are not trained
• Calibrating black-box processing algorithms
• Many standard processing algorithms
• Rainflow, Peak-Valley etc.
• Check accuracy and response against known data
• Hook up recorder to a test

56
DATA PROCESSING TRADE-OFFS

• Onboard versus Post-Flight Processing
• Onboard is processing of the data by the
  recorder such that the raw data is discarded
• Post-Flight is any processing which is based on
  raw data to which there is still access.
• Issue is Data Transparency
• Solution is somewhere between total onboard
  processing and no onboard processing
• The decision is a trade-off reduced data-volume
  versus
• impact of not being able to reconstruct anomalous
  events
• risk of failure to identify errors

57
DEALING WITH ERRORS

• Principle 2 Obtaining continuous, valid data
  is critical to the success of the program
• Basis for all predictions
• Valid data is a costly and valuable commodity
• Greatest Costs associated over the life of a
  program are the data acquisition and processing
  costs and the cost of not having or being able to
  access reliable data when it is needed
• Cost of acquisition, validation, processing,
  storage and analysis
• Recorder Manufacturers generally only validate
  data based on Built-in-Tests (BIT) which
  primarily validate integrity of electronics
• Dont validate the engineering/scientific
  reasonableness of the data
• Sometimes there is a capability to program
  additional data validation capability into the
  recorder

58
SOURCES OF DATA ERROR

• Hardware
• Faulty Recorders and or Sensors
• Sensor installation problems
• Incorrect recorder initialization procedures
• Software
• Incorrect data downloading and/or transcription
• Incorrect configuration tracking
• Universal implementation of fleet-wide
  modifications
• Inappropriate application of Fill-in data

59
TYPES OF DATA ACQUISITION ERROR

• Two general classifications
• Logical Errors - Errors that can easily be
  identified as right or wrong
• Range checks
• Event response frequency
• Potential Errors - Errors which only become
  apparent over time and/or require detailed
  analysis by skilled personnel
• Strain gauge drift

60
FINAL DATA VALIDATION

• Confirming initial (logical error) checks
  performed at operational bases
• Evaluating potential error checks
• Strain gauge drift
• Over time, implicit need for historical data
• Have to compare like data, implicit need to track
  data by configuration
• Tracking initialization readings a good first
  start
• Statistical Validation
• Beware of self-fulfilling prophecy
• Look for change in usage
• Value of Exceedance curves and other tools

61
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

• Primary requirement is to provide a minimal
  increase in operational workload
• You will not get the data you require if
• Acquisition equipment requires
• Too much hand holding
• Takes too much time to download
• Is not straightforward to use
• Cannot easily be maintained or supported
• Benefits of collecting data you do not require!!!

62
PRELIMINARY CHARACTERIZATION OF FIREBOMBING
ROLETBM/IAR/FAA C-130A FLARE PROGRAM(YUMA
ARIZONA February, 2003)
63
C-130A AIRCRAFT (3,000 gallon)

• Flight Test at U.S Army Test Range in Yuma
  Arizona
• End February 2003
• Defined Profiles (No Fire)
• Calibration Flights
• Typical Firebombing Terrain
• Level and Mountainous
• Twelve Continuous Parameters
• Accelerations
• Strains
• Control Positions
• Eight Discrete Parameters

64
REMOVABLE TANK INSTALLATION
65
RECORDER HARDWARE
66
CONTROL POSITIONS
67
door closed
door open
68
door closed
door open
69
door closed
door open
70
door closed
door open
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OPERATIONAL DATA ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES2003 FIRE
SEASON
74
OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES - 2003
TBM DC-7B Tanker 66 Approx 30 hrs Operational Data
IAR C-130A Tanker 31 (Spain) Approx 50 hrs
Operational Data
Aero Union P3-A Tanker 55 (Final Stages
Instrumentation)
Minden Aircraft P2-V7 Tanker 55 (Final Stages
Instrumentation)
75
SEI CUMULATIVE FATIGUE RECORDER (CFR) MODEL A1002

• The analog signals will be 12 high level and 12
  low level signals. The low level signals will be
  capable of accepting strain gauge type signals
  (millivolts).
• The recorded flight data will be stored on a 32
  megabyte PCMCIA card.
• The weight of this unit is less than 3 pounds.
• It is designed to DO-160 for environmental and
  EMI.

• The CFR Model A1002 made by SEI is capable of
  recording 24 analog signals, 16 digital signals
  and global positioning as an option

76
AIRCRAFT DATA ACQUISITION PROCESSING AND
TRACKING (ADAPT) (Secure Web-based Download and
Analysis)
77
WORLD-WIDE DATA MANAGEMENT AND ACCESS
78
INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS

• Preliminary Aircraft Survey
• Three to four days
• Production of Survey/Installation Report and
  approval by Local Regulatory Agencies (eg
  FAA/FSDO)
• One Week to ??????
• Manufacture and Distribution of Installation Kits
• Six to Eight weeks
• Initial Running of Wires and Equipment (Operator
  Personnel)
• About one week of continuous effort
• Connection of equipment and validation of
  operation (SEI/Celeris Aerospace Personnel)
• Connection of Sensors Continuity Checks etc.
  (approximately 1 day)
• Ground Calibration Checks (approximately 1 day)
• Flight Checks (approx 2 hours flying with some
  simulated drops using water)
• Training of Operational Crews on Data Upload
  System (approx 1 day, undertaken in conjunction
  with calibration process

79
Zero-g Strain Calibration
e 422nZ 454 59 me (95)
e 366nZ 445 49 me (95)
80
C-130A SPANISH DATA
81
C-130A SPAIN (High G Flaps Down Global View)
82
C-130A SPAIN (High G Flaps Down Detail View)
83
EXAMPLE WING LOCATIONS - TBM DC-7
Vertical c.g and Roll Accelerations Control
Position transducers Discrete Signals to
delineate flight phases Strain Gauges 3 Wing
Locations (Matching Left and Right 1 Horizontal
Stabilizer 1 Vertical Stabilizer
Up
Inboard
Strain Gauge Location
Centre-Spar Close View Left (Port Side) Wing,
Looking Aft
84
DC-7B CALIFORNIA FIRES(Steep Descent High G
Flaps Down)
85
DC-7B CALIFORNIA FIRES(Two Sequential Drops
Global View)
86
DC-7B CALIFORNIA FIRES(Two Sequential Drops
Detail View)
87
P-3A INSTALLATION
Left Aileron Position Transducer (String-Pot)
Cumulative Fatigue Recorder and Synchro to
Analogue Converter
Left Wing Lower spar Cap Strain Gauge (Looking
Aft)
Airspeed and Altitude Transducers (Interface with
Aircraft Pitot-Static System)
Up
Inboard
88
LESSONS LEARNED - IMPLEMENTATION

• Preferable to do the installation in the
  off-season
• Should be starting now for 2004
• Funding for these type of activities can be
  challenging
• Need for consistency in approval process
• Depending on experience of local regulatory
  authorities approval can take anywhere from one
  to ten plus weeks
• Central area in regulatory agencies with
  expertize in the installation of structural
  health monitoring systems
• Remote support capability for troubleshooting is
  essential
• Take advantage of inherent remote support
  capabilities of Windows XP
• Regular Data downloading essential
• Every one to two days when active on fire as
  large amounts of significant structural activity
• Essential to make this a bullet proof and
  straightforward process with minimal data
  footprint (slower modem connection compressed
  files)

89
LESSONS LEARNED PRELIMINARY DATA

• G-Levels limits particularly with flaps down are
  exceeded on a frequent basis
• Appears to be during or after drop
• However, CORRESPONDING STRAIN/STRESS LEVELS ARE
  NOT THAT HIGH
• G has traditionally been used as a proxy for
  strain
• Transport aircraft conservative but OK
• Firebombing where large instantaneous change in
  weight it may be inappropriate
• For Firebombing harsh or unusual usage should be
  based on combined G and strain criteria?
• Should ensure safe operation but minimize
  unnecessary in-field inspections and or
  change-out of aircraft
• Better feel for this aspect once additional data
  has been collected during the 2004 fire season

90
OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO LONGER-TERM ISSUES
91
THREE PRONGED APPROACH
STRATEGIC FIREBOMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN (Ten Year
Sliding Window)
ONGOING SAFE AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT OF CURRENT
FLEET
TRANSITIONING TO REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT
REGULATORY AND CERTIFICATION ISSUES
92
FLEET REPLACEMENT

• Based on current financial and practical
  limitations current fleet replacement is
  realistically five to seven and more likely ten
  years away
• Implies have to address issues related to current
  aircraft as there is no short-term fix
• Two Implications
• There is a need to monitor the existing fleet as
  it is going to be around for some time
• Efforts devoted to doing this will not be wasted
  as the data collected will both help to ensure
  ongoing safety and provide a basis of selection
  for future firebombing aircraft
• Prior to conversion and usage

93
REGULATORY AND CERTIFICATION ISSUES

• Regulatory and Certification Authorities have to
  be involved in the process as ultimately they
  determine the airworthiness criteria against
  which the aircraft will be evaluated
• Direct impact of their cost and economic
  viability
• There are a number of issues which need to be
  addressed with the industry to ensure safe,
  economic and practical provision of firebombing
  services
• Change Product Rule (CPR)
• Impact/Implications on future aircraft
  conversions
• Pending NPRM on evaluation basis of operational
  aircraft over the next ten years
• Impact/Implications for existing firebombing
  fleet
• Access to engineering and support data
• In the light of liability/risk concerns versus
  potential revenue streams
• Relevance of this data from an aging aircraft
  perspective
• Agreed Firebombing Certification Methodology?
• Based on a recognition of the unique and
  challenging demands of this role

94
TRANSITIONING TO REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT

• Fleet Replacement
• Suitable Aircraft
• Capability to carry/deliver the retardant
• Evaluating the ability of the structure to
  perform in the firebombing role
• Development of a firebombing specification ??
• Economic Basis
• Investment in alternate aircraft
• Ongoing monitoring of firebombing aircraft
• Fatigue and Damage Tolerance Basis
• Maintenance and Inspection Intervals
• Delivery and Payment Models

Significant re-thinking of these issues as it
would appear that the costs associated with the
Blue Ribbon panel recommendations are not
compatible with the current levels of funding
95
ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

• Addressing all the issues related to the ongoing
  safe and economic operation of firebombing
  aircraft is a task for which no one organization
  would appear to have sufficient resources
• Although this environment is a competitive one,
  there are significant economic benefits to
  collaboration on issues that effect everyone
• Common recorder usage
• Common data collection and validation
• Combined efforts for fatigue and damage tolerance
  analysis of similar aircraft types
• Now that the USDA/FS and SNL have developed the
  Infrastructure they are prepared to let other
  organizations can take advantage of this
  infrastructure on a cost recovery basis
• Cost-effective way of implementation that allows
  everybody to benefit from generic data and trends
• Coordination of efforts and regular exchange of
  information between regulatory agencies, client
  organizations and operators
• Wealth of experience distributed through a
  variety of forums
• Can a system of meetings and working groups be
  set-up to disseminate information and develop
  policies and procedures that would be beneficial
  to all?

96
THE MISSING LINKS

• Predominantly focused on large airtankers
• Other aircraft involved in firebombing operations
  may be just as critical as they all work in a
  similar environment
• Smaller multi-engine and single engine airtankers
• Lead Aircraft
• Spotter (Bird-dog?) aircraft
• Rotary Wing Aircraft

97
PENDING ACTIVITIES

• Collect data from existing instrumented aircraft
  and hopefully instrument more aircraft during the
  2004 fire season
• Funding Provisions are a challenge more
  reliance on inter-agency collaboration?
• These activities need to be commenced within the
  next month
• Develop a consistent and coherent certification
  and operational monitoring mechanism in
  collaboration with regulatory agencies and
  operators
• Make best use of resources
• Avoid frustration
• Develop a certification and fatigue/damage
  tolerance template using data from the existing
  program
• Confidence and consistency of approach
• Cost-Effective as approval of a plethora of
  approaches will not be required
• Develop collaborative efforts with other North
  American and non North American Agencies
• Benefits of accumulating data to characterize the
  firebombing role quicker
• Shared lessons learnt improve both safety and the
  cost-effectiveness of implementation

98
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

• There is an urgent safety and economic need to
  fully characterize the loads experienced in the
  firebombing role
• Existing Aircraft
• Develop specifications for future aircraft
• Due to the variability of operation, individual
  aircraft (total fleet) tracking systems should be
  implemented as soon as possible
• Initial data acquisition should be expanded to
  lead aircraft as soon as possible
• Appear to experience the most severe usage and
  yet are currently not monitored
• Programs to assess how best lower capacity
  multi-engine aircraft, single engine aircraft and
  rotary wing aircraft can best be monitored should
  be explored as soon as possible
• A consistent and coherent certification and
  evaluation mechanism should be developed between
  contracting agencies, regulatory agencies and
  operators as soon as practicable
• Validation through a template based on analysis
  of one or more existing aircraft types
• The establishment of a Strategic Firebombing
  Structural Health Management Plan (Rolling Ten
  Year Window) for the Acquisition and Ongoing
  Operation of all Fixed and Rotary-wing Aircraft
  Involved in Firebombing Roles is essential if the
  ongoing safe and economic operation of current
  and existing fleets is to be ensured
• Reflect, current and future requirements together
  with associated funding levels
• It is hard to envisage how the approaches
  recommended by the Blue Ribbon panel as a
  consequence of the 2002 heavy airtanker accidents
  can be implemented within the current funding
  structure
• Inter-agency and International collaboration for
  the assessment of aircraft in the firebombing
  role will provide the quickest and
  most-cost-effective method of addressing the many
  common challenges that are faced by all agencies
  using aircraft in this role

99
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

• TBM, IAR who have initiated and supported a lot
  of this recent work
• Woody Grantham/Fritz Wester (IAR)
• Norm Stubbs (TBM)
• FAA, USDA/FS and Sandia Laboratories for their
  ongoing support of the recent work
• John Howford, Tom Defiore, Carl Gray, Todd Martin
  and Steve Edgar of FAA
• Tony Kern and Ron Livingston of USDA/FS
• Staff members at Celeris Aerospace and SEI who
  have established an infrastructure for
  structural health monitoring of heavy airtankers
  and lead aircraft in an incredibly short
  time-frame

100
CONTACTING THE PRESENTER

• Celeris Aerospace Canada Inc.
• 880 Taylor Creek Drive
• Orleans, Ontario
• CANADA, K1C 1T1
• Tel [phone]
• FAX [phone]
• Internet
• Steve Hall - halls_at_celeris.ca
• Webpage - http//www.celeris.ca