Title: European Commercial Aviation Safety Team (ECAST) Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) Generic Presentation
1European Commercial Aviation Safety Team
(ECAST)Future Aviation Safety Team
(FAST)Generic Presentation DraftMarch 2007
A European Safety Strategy Initiative (ESSI)
2PURPOSE
- Explanation
- JSSI/ESSI/ECAST context
- What is FAST?
- What its not
- Present FAST Method
- Provide overview of
- process results
3EXPLANATION
- HISTORY - JSSI TERMS OF REFERENCE
- FOCUS AREAS
- HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
- RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL
- FAST CHARTER
- ESSI/ECAST IS SUCESSOR OF JSSI
- SUMMARY OF FAST PRODUCTS
- PROBLEM APPOACH
- FUTURE AREAS OF CHANGE
- WHAT THE FAST IS AND IS NOT
4HISTORY JSSI Terms of Reference
- Reduce the annual number of accidents and
fatalities in each JAA member state and its
operators irrespective of the growth in air
traffic - Focused safety agenda with deliverables
- Partnership cooperation communication
implementation - Structured complementary approaches, leading for
- Historic FAA/CAST
- Prognostic JAA/JSSI
Reference JAA website http//www.jaa.nl/jssi/profi
le.html
5FOCUS AREAS
- JSSI
- Design Related
- Future Aviation Safety
- Occupant Safety Survivability
6HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Retrospective (Historic Diagnostic)
Predictive (Prognostic - FAST)
- Historic current operational data exist
- Expertise and experience exist
- Current analysis tools can
- Identify hazards
- Define their causal factors
- Establish frequencies (risk)
- Provide learning
- Establishes the baseline
- Provides validation for predictive risk
assessment techniques
- No operational data exist, but conclusions can be
drawn from current future trends - No experts or experience exist but domain experts
know what keeps them up at night - Qualitative hazard identification
- Predict likely hazards
- Identify possible causal factors
- Quantitative risk assessment adds
- Refinement of probable causal factors estimate
of frequencies - Bases for focused studies using computational
human-in-the-loop simulations
7RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL SUGGESTED BY FAST
INTERVENTIONINNOVATION - Design
- Operations - Investment - etc.
8FAST Charter
- Vision
- Identify possible future hazards to the safety of
aviation in order to prevent those hazards from
appearing within the future aviation system. - Mission
- Enable individuals or organizations and in
particular the ESSI/ECAST, to evaluate proposed
changes to the aviation system, identify hazards
that may be created by such changes and by
interaction effects, and subsequently develop
mitigating actions. - Goal
- To prevent aviation accidents by eliminating or
mitigating future hazards.
9ESSI by EASA has succeededto JSSI by JAA
- During the JAA EASA transition, EASA has begun
to build up the European Strategic Safety
Initiative (ESSI) in 2005 - ESSI foundation meeting took place on April 27
2006 and the JSSI-ESSI handover was performed on
June 28 2006
10The 3 ESSI Pillars
- 3 pillars
- Commercial Aviation (ECAST)
- Working with CAST
- Partnership
- Rotorcraft (EHEST)
- Working in IHST
- Partnership
- General Aviation (EGAST)
- Safety Committee
- Promotion
- Consistent approach to safety risk management
11ESSI / ECAST Construction
- 27 April 2006
- Foundation group Bring the parties together
- 13 July 2006
- Making a charter
- 12 October 2006
- Agree foundation documents
- 13 14 December 2006
- Establishing a work programme
- FAST reconducted as a Working Group of ECAST
- 2007
- Full schedule of activities
12Where FAST fits in ESSI
Open and Closed Forums
COORDINATION GROUP
ECAST COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY TEAM
EHEST HELICOPTER SAFETY TEAM
EGEST GENERAL AVIATIONSAFETY TEAM
FAST
WORKING GROUPS
WORKING GROUPS
Other WORKING GROUPS
13ECAST Process
1. Assess and Prioritise Accident Risks
and Causal factors in Europe (yearly revised)
2. Identify and Review Safety Programmes
3. Define Safety Performance Metrics
4. Define Safety Enhancement Objectives
5. Institute Safety Programmes
6. Make Recommendations for Safety
Enhancements
7. Perform Costs Benefits Analysis
8. Develop Action Plans
9. Implement Action Plans and Monitor
Implementation
10. Monitor Action Plans Efficacy to
Achieve Safety Objectives
Mid Term Programme Review - 2012
14FAST Summary of Results
- A structured methodology incorporated into a
formal handbook. - A prioritized list of Areas of Change AoC.
- Two applications/tests of the methodology
- Recommendations resulting from the study of the
AOC Increasing Crew Reliance on Cockpit
Automation, e.g. related to the Air Ground Space
System AGS - Results from the study of future hazards
generated by the concept of operations for
2011developed by EUROCONTROL. - A FAST website
15PROBLEM APPROACH
Has it caused an accident?
Discovery Processes
Intervention Processes
Does it exist yet?
Is it known?
0 0 0
Prognostic e.g. Emergent, FAST, etc.
Prognostic Design of new Aviation System
components or practices
0 0 1
1 0 0
Diagnostic e.g. ASAP, COSP, ISDSR, LOSA, FOQA,
ISDSR, ASRS, SRB. ECCAIRS, ODA etc.
1 0 1
1 1 0
Historic e.g. Accident Investigation
Historic
1 1 1
1 yes, 0 no
e.g. Regulation, Product Improvement, CAST,
ECAST, company safety (e.g. SRP) processes,
FSF/ALAR tool kit, Human factors tool kit etc.
16FUTURE AREAS OF CHANGE
AoC a phase out of Gen I transports
AoC b
AoC c
Introduction of UAVs
AoC d
Spectrum and Magnitude of Areas of Change
Affecting the Future Aviation System
AoC e
AoC f
AoC g
AoC h
AoC i
AoC j
AoC k
advent of very-light jets AoC l
t
NOW
2010
2015
2020
Past
17IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFYINGAREAS OF CHANGE
- The future is not necessarily a direct
extrapolation of the past. - Present and near-term safety interventions that
are intended to prevent future accidents caused
by previously known hazards may not be enough to
prevent new types of accidents from happening in
the future.
A mid-1990s study by a major manufacturer looked
at accidents in which airplane systems were
involved in an accident or where they could have
prevented the event and did not. It was found
that in approximately 70 of the accidents
involving airplane systems, the original design
assumptions were inadequate for the situation
existing at the time of the accident due to
changes in - the aviation system - airplane
operational usage - personnel demographics -
evolving infrastructure or other considerations.
18CHANGING NATURE OF ACCIDENTS
Technological innovations are changing both
aircraft and the airspace in which they operate.
Cumulatively, these technological changes aim to
increase reliability throughout the aviation
system and vastly improve safety in the skies.
These changes include systems designed to move
aircraft more efficiently in the air and on the
ground, methods for providing pilots and ground
controllers with better information about traffic
and weather conditions, and improvements in
aircraft components and design. The growth in
aircraft system complexity is exponential in many
areas, with the most significant trend being the
inter-connectedness of systems.
Current-generation aircraft operate as highly
integrated systems with extensive cross-linking.
As system complexity grows, so does the concern
about hidden design flaws or possible equipment
defects. Accidents involving complex systems and
events present investigators with new and
different failure modes that multiply the number
of potential scenarios they must consider. The
historically common causes of accidents are
occurring less frequently, leaving more
challenging accidents to diagnose. - Safety
in the Skies Personnel and Parties in NTSB
Aviation Accident Investigations-Master Volume,
Chapter Three Emerging Aviation Trends
Potential Impact on Aircraft Accident
Investigations, By Liam P. Sarsfield, William
Stanley, Cynthia C. Lebow, Emile Ettedgui, Garth
Henning, published in 2000
19Areas of Change Some Principles
- Changes must be understood as broadly as
possible. - To bring consistency and coherence to the
process, Areas of Change are grouped by
categories. - The diagram on the next sheet illustrates the
eleven broad categories of Areas of Change
affecting aviation identified by the FAST
20FAST AREAS OF CHANGE CATEGORIES
- Count Category
- 29 Aircraft
- 11 Maintenance, Repairs, Overhaul
- 19 Operations
- 21 Crew
- 7 Passenger
- 10 Organization
- 12 Authority
- 22 Air Navigation System
- 7 Airport
- 35 Environment
- 5 Space Operations
- ___
- 179 Total Areas of Change
- as of 24 February 2006
AIRCRAFT
MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, OVERHAUL
SPACE OPERATIONS
ENVIRONMENT
GLOBAL AVIATION SYSTEM
OPERATIONS
AIRPORT
CREW
AIR NAVIGATION SYSTEM
PASSENGER
ORGANIZATION
AUTHORITY
The FAST continuously solicits submission of new,
candidate AoCs via the process shown in Backup
Charts. Submissions should be made to Rudi den
Hertog, Chief Engineer, Fokker Services, FAST
Co-chair, rudi.denhertog_at_stork.com
21What is an Area of Change
- The Global Aviation System (GAS) is in fact a
"system of systems." - Examples of "systems" include
- airplanes,
- air traffic control systems,
- company processes, and
- regulatory systems.
- The future GAS will be fundamentally different
than what exists today because changes affecting
the GAS will continuously occur as the system
evolves into the future. - The ongoing process of change including both
evolutionary and sudden, disruptive events or
paradigm shifts must be considered for effective
safety risk management.
22- Distributed multi agent system
- Free routing/free flight
- New airspace classification
- 4-D dimensional trajectories
Air Ground Space System
- Civil aerospace challenges
- Increased aerospace capacity
- Better respect of the environment (sustainable
growth approach) - improved safety
- 2020 situation
- Integrated Air Ground Space System
- Operates during all phases of flight
- Communicates through data link
23Importance
- It is important that aviation practitioners who
are designing future systems have foreknowledge
of potential future hazards. - A change to any one system could affect other
systems. Interactions of future changes to
several systems could likewise affect the whole. - These changes could have adverse impacts on the
safety of the Global Aviation System. - The goal of "discovering" future hazards is to
eliminate, avoid or mitigate hazards in the
future that may arise as a result of the changes.
This will reduce the risk of future incidents and
accidents.
24WHATS FAST?
- OBJECTIVES
- WHATS SO SPECIAL?
- WHAT FAST IS AND WHAT NOT
- COMPOSITION
- CORE TEAM
25OBJECTIVES of the FAST method
- Studying potential future changes in the
Aerospace System in order to - Identify relevant Areas of Change AoC either
within or external to the aviation system - Identify Hazards, both inherent to the AoC as
well as those arising from interaction with other
AoCs - Develop recommendations to eliminate hazards or
mitigate their effects, such as - Tools to analyze and mitigate the hazards
including studies and simulations to quantify the
risks of identified hazards - Providing probable hazard information to
influence entities that shape the future
26DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS
- Concept of considering a comprehensive set of
Areas of Change affecting aviation safety - Using a broad representation of domain experts
representing diverse affected organizations
within an Expert Team hazard-discovery setting
looking for direct and indirect hazards - Direct- as well as Indirect hazard(s)
identification, with indirect hazards resulting
from interaction among AoCs within a novel
future operational scenario - identifies hazard
catalysts not ammenable to computational modeling - Maintaining and providing to the aviation
community an up-to-date repository of AoCs,
possible aviation futures, Technology Watch Items
hazards. - Offering a Future Hazard Analysis method that can
be used universally by any organization - Having a FAST Core Team ready to assist Customers
using its Future Hazard Analysis method
27What the FAST is and is not
- The FAST process is a systematic approach to
identification of - Wide range of changes affecting aviation safety
(AoCs) - Systemic vulnerabilities and hazards within
highly integrated systems - Boundary aspects not only within aviation but
external to it that may be the catalysts for
future hazards including common cause factors and
interactions - The FAST process is not a risk assessment method
- that is, it doesnt estimate relative frequency
of hazards. - The FAST generally does not recommend or develop
safety interventions - FAST can feed Risk
Assessment and Risk - Management processes in which safety
interventions are developed and implemented, and
action efficacy is monitored. These are best left
to the customers.
28COMPOSITION
- MEMBERS from
- DGAC, CAA-UK, CAA-NL, ENAC, EASA,
- Civil Aircraft Inspection Board of Poland,
- ASD, EC/Joint Research Centre, EUROCONTROL,
- ERA/EASYJET, IFALPA/SAS Norway, IAPA, IFA, Air
Transport Association of Canada, NASA - Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, Fokker, Rockwell
Collins - CORE TEAM is driving force, meeting approximately
quarterly
29FAST METHOD
- DEFINITIONS
- CUSTOMERS
- STAKEHOLDERS
- EXPERT TEAMS
- TECHNOLOGY WATCH ITEMS
- PROCESS FLOWS
30DEFINITIONS
- CUSTOMERS are organizations that have authority
to either recommend or implement changes to the
Global Aviation System - STAKEHOLDERS are organizations that may be
impacted by an envisioned change to the Global
Aviation System - EXPERT TEAM
- Drawn from Customer Stakeholder organizations
- Selected by FAST and Customer collaboratively
based on the envisioned future being considered - Must have specific expertise associated with the
future being evaluated - No experience with FAST method required
initiate changes
affected by changes
31DEFINITIONS, cont.
- TECHNOLOGY WATCH ITEMS
- A repository of tell-tale advances in technology
and other relevant factors that may indicate
which possible aviation future is unfolding and
thereby signal if postulated direct hazards
and/or indirect hazards (interaction hazards) are
coming about. - To be revisited after significant events
(incidents accidents) and be part of risk
assessment plans. - Maintained for the benefit of the worldwide
aviation community similar to the CAST Problem
Statements.
32FAST Methodology / Process
1. Responsible Party Proposes Change(s) to Global
Aviation System recognizes need for systematic
prediction of hazard(s) associated with changes
and need to design potential hazards out of
system or avoid or mitigate hazard(s)
33OVERVIEW of PROCESS RESULTS
- Work progressed in phases
- Phase I (Oct/99-Sep/00) Established methodology,
identified 157 changes affecting the aviation
system. - Phase II (Nov/00-July/01) Prioritised Areas of
Change - Phase III (Oct/01-Jan/04) Analysed highest
priority Area of Change Increasing Reliance on
Flight Deck Automation - Phase IV (Feb 05-Mar06) Re-check/update AoC
list, develop Process Handbook/Generic
Presentation/Public Website, - Phase V (Mar 06-July 06 ConOps 2011 analysis
ANS-1.
34OVERVIEW OF RESULTS
- TOP 4 AREAS OF CHANGE
- SYNTHESIS FROM TOP 20 AoC
- PHASE III OUTPUT
- ConOps 2011 ANS-1 ANALYSIS
35TOP 4 AREAS OF CHANGE
- PRIORITISED CATEGORIZED FROM CURRENT LIST OF
179 - Increasing Crew Reliance on Flight Deck
Automation (Aircraft) - Emergence of New Concepts for Airspace Management
(Air Navigation System) - Introduction of New Technologies with Unforeseen
Human Factors Aspects (Crew) - Proliferation of Heterogeneous Aircraft with
Widely-varying Equipment and Capabilities
(Aircraft)
36SYNTHESIS FROM TOP 20 AREAS OF CHANGE
- Introduction of new air, ground, and
satellite-based automated systems - Increased heterogeneity of aircraft types
flight capabilities, equipage software,
airspace utilization approaches, and development
directions timelines for airborne, ground, and
space-based aviation support systems - Increase in absolute numbers of aviation
operations and corresponding reduction in safety
margins as a result of increased demand,
decreased separation and more frequent operation
in or near adverse weather conditions - Ensuring adequate maintenance of air- and
ground-based systems in an environment of
increased outsourcing of work, increased
complexity of hardware, firmware software, and
a shortage of qualified maintenance personnel
Common threads as they appeared within the 2001
top 20 AoC synthesis.
37PHASE III OUTPUT
- Analysis of highest priority AoC Increasing Crew
Reliance on Flight Deck Automation - Identification/prioritisation of hazards
- Development and prioritisation of recommendations
addressing most important hazards - Introduction of Technology Watch Items
- Present the methodology used and lessons-learned
38Eurocontrols FAST ConOps Workshops
- ConOps is the Eurocontrol Concept of Operation
for 2011 - FAST was tasked to identify future hazards in
ConOps - Two workshops held (6-9 June and 17-20 July 2006)
with European and US experts
39CONOPS 2011 - CONTENT
- Concept of Operations 2011
- Description of the ATM System in 2011 - the Main
Changes - The ATM Components, OIs and System Enablers
- The ATM Operational Model
- The Key Enablers SWIM, the Network Operations
Plan and - Collaborative Decision Making
- The Principles of the Layered Planning Process
- High-Level System Capabilities
- Business Impact Statements
- Annexes
- The Actors Roles and Responsibilities
- Operational Scenarios and Use cases
40FAST ConOps Evaluation From EUROCONTROL final
comments
- Lessons learned
- Very useful exercise
- Hazards identified may allow improving ConOps
- Pass results to SESAR, maybe a FAST customer
- FAST methodology requires further development
- Subsequent development
- FAST Handbook upgraded
- Clarification of AoC use for
- Hazard Identification / Enrichment
- Mitigations
- Link to classical Risk Assessment Methods
- Transferable methodology
41FAST Website
http//fast.jrc.it/ Under development
http//fast.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ Final URL
42An essential element of a safety strategy
- Future hazards can not be entirely extrapolated
from the past - There is a need to address future changes and
hazards in safety today - FAST offers a method of worldwide interest
43THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
For FAST Output Status see
http//fast.jrc.it
44BACKUP CHARTS
45Acronyms
- ADREP ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting
System - AoC Area of Change developed by FAST
- AGS Air Ground Space System
- ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider
- ATC Air Traffic Control
- AWOS Automatic Weather Observation System
- CAST Commercial Aviation Safety Team (North
America) - CICTT CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
- ConOps In FAST context Eurocontrols Concept of
Operations for - 2011
- ConOps General air traffic providers concept of
operations - ESSI European Safety Strategy Initiative
- ECAST European Commercial Aviation Safety Team
(EuroCAST) - ECCAIRS European Co-ordination Centre for
Aviation Incident - Reporting Systems
46Acronyms - continued
- FAST Future Aviation Safety Team
- GTG Gate-to-Gate
- ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
- JAA Joint Aviation Authorities (Europe)
- JSSI JAA Safety Strategy Initiative
- JSAT Joint Safety Analysis Team (CAST)
- JSIT Joint Safety Implementation Team (CAST)
- JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office (part
of NGATS in - USA)
- NGATS Next Generation Air Transportation
System (USA) - SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research Programme
- TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System
- TAWS Terrain Avoidance Warning System
47FAST Contribution to CAST Safety Plan
Introducing and integrating the Prospective
component of safety
Accident Analysis JSATS Historic
Accident JSITs
Safety Enhancements
CAST Plan
CAST Plan Revision
Master Contributing Factors
Safety Metrics
JIMDAT Process
Incident Analysis Process Historic
Emerging Risk
Remaining Risk JSA/IT
Enhancements
Operational Data Analysis (NASA
ISDSR) Diagnostic
Changing Risk
Aviation System Changes
Yes
Develop Contributing Factors (new or emerging)
Predictive Analysis (FAST FST) Prognostic
No
Present In Master Factors?
Identify Causal Factors
External Changes
Identify Future Hazards
B. Smith 2/7/06
48Area of Change (AoC) Submission Process
Continuous Call For New Aocs
Refine Wording Add Descriptive Comments
Candidate AoC
External Group or Individual
FAST Core Team
Comparison with Existing AoC List
Review for FAST Consistency
New?
Okay?
yes
no
no
yes
Evaluate for Potential to Enrich Existing AoCs
Concatenate to Existing AoC List
49(No Transcript)
50Examples of global Air Ground Space system
Technology Watch ItemsTheme I
- Development of system using Artificial
Intelligence (e.g. neural nets, fuzzy logic). - Development of intelligent aircraft (with
systems of smart sensors, microprocessors and
adaptive control that monitor operator
performance, environment and automatically avoid
hazardous situations) - Emergence of computational capabilities and
monitoring systems that could replace
conventional air traffic control functions - Development of intelligent vehicles (e.g.
smart cars) as cross fertilisation may affect
aviation - Collaborative decision making (CDM) Computer
Support to Cooperative Work (CSCW) - eSafety of road and air transport and eHealth,
Multimodal Interfaces, Semantic-based knowledge
systems, technology-enhanced learning
51Example of how Customer Vision of Future would
have beenused in past
- If at some point in the past, a study of the
potential future hazards related to Reduced
Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) had been
conducted, the Expert Team performing the
analysis would likely have needed to generate the
following description of the potential
consequences of implementation of RVSM in order
to extract potential future hazards - "Assuming that each airplane has physical
enhancements and each crew has procedures to
properly manage vertical separation less than
current rules, we believe that increased
collision hazard is not likely. There however is
a slight hazard increase due to wake turbulence
descending from overhead airplanes and causing
loss of control of encountering aircraft. We
therefore recommend that there a study be done of
all existing airplanes to determine the
likelihood of a strong cruise wake descending to
flight levels occupied by other aircraft, minus
the altitude uncertainty. Altitude uncertainty
must be considered and quantified in the study
however, because actual separation may be much
less than the candidate reduced value. We also
recommend review of TCAS/ACAS protection with the
FAA to ensure that the TCAS will not
significantly contribute to collision likelihood.
We want to avoid TCAS causing an accident. We
hear however that the Military will be fielding
new navigation technology, GPS, which if applied
to civilian airplanes, will significantly
increase the lateral precision with which
airplanes will fly intended airways. Airplanes
will then be closer to each other vertically and
laterally. In this case, collision and/or wake
vortex upset risk may significantly increase.
If you see intentions to adopt GPS technology for
civil transport navigation (watch item), then we
recommend that studies are conducted and the
Industry agrees to mitigating practices such as
intentional cross-track stagger. Care should be
taken when doing so to ensure that wind direction
is considered in the study."
- purely hypothetical not representative of
FAST recommendations