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European Commercial Aviation Safety Team (ECAST) Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) Generic Presentation

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Title: European Commercial Aviation Safety Team (ECAST) Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) Generic Presentation


1
European Commercial Aviation Safety Team
(ECAST)Future Aviation Safety Team
(FAST)Generic Presentation DraftMarch 2007
A European Safety Strategy Initiative (ESSI)
2
PURPOSE
  • Explanation
  • JSSI/ESSI/ECAST context
  • What is FAST?
  • What its not
  • Present FAST Method
  • Provide overview of
  • process results

3
EXPLANATION
  • HISTORY - JSSI TERMS OF REFERENCE
  • FOCUS AREAS
  • HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
  • RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL
  • FAST CHARTER
  • ESSI/ECAST IS SUCESSOR OF JSSI
  • SUMMARY OF FAST PRODUCTS
  • PROBLEM APPOACH
  • FUTURE AREAS OF CHANGE
  • WHAT THE FAST IS AND IS NOT

4
HISTORY JSSI Terms of Reference
  • Reduce the annual number of accidents and
    fatalities in each JAA member state and its
    operators irrespective of the growth in air
    traffic
  • Focused safety agenda with deliverables
  • Partnership cooperation communication
    implementation
  • Structured complementary approaches, leading for
  • Historic FAA/CAST
  • Prognostic JAA/JSSI

Reference JAA website http//www.jaa.nl/jssi/profi
le.html
5
FOCUS AREAS
  • JSSI
  • Design Related
  • Future Aviation Safety
  • Occupant Safety Survivability

6
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Retrospective (Historic Diagnostic)
Predictive (Prognostic - FAST)
  • Historic current operational data exist
  • Expertise and experience exist
  • Current analysis tools can
  • Identify hazards
  • Define their causal factors
  • Establish frequencies (risk)
  • Provide learning
  • Establishes the baseline
  • Provides validation for predictive risk
    assessment techniques
  • No operational data exist, but conclusions can be
    drawn from current future trends
  • No experts or experience exist but domain experts
    know what keeps them up at night
  • Qualitative hazard identification
  • Predict likely hazards
  • Identify possible causal factors
  • Quantitative risk assessment adds
  • Refinement of probable causal factors estimate
    of frequencies
  • Bases for focused studies using computational
    human-in-the-loop simulations

7
RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL SUGGESTED BY FAST
INTERVENTIONINNOVATION - Design
- Operations - Investment - etc.
8
FAST Charter
  • Vision
  • Identify possible future hazards to the safety of
    aviation in order to prevent those hazards from
    appearing within the future aviation system.
  • Mission
  • Enable individuals or organizations and in
    particular the ESSI/ECAST, to evaluate proposed
    changes to the aviation system, identify hazards
    that may be created by such changes and by
    interaction effects, and subsequently develop
    mitigating actions.
  • Goal
  • To prevent aviation accidents by eliminating or
    mitigating future hazards.

9
ESSI by EASA has succeededto JSSI by JAA
  • During the JAA EASA transition, EASA has begun
    to build up the European Strategic Safety
    Initiative (ESSI) in 2005
  • ESSI foundation meeting took place on April 27
    2006 and the JSSI-ESSI handover was performed on
    June 28 2006

10
The 3 ESSI Pillars
  • 3 pillars
  • Commercial Aviation (ECAST)
  • Working with CAST
  • Partnership
  • Rotorcraft (EHEST)
  • Working in IHST
  • Partnership
  • General Aviation (EGAST)
  • Safety Committee
  • Promotion
  • Consistent approach to safety risk management

11
ESSI / ECAST Construction
  • 27 April 2006
  • Foundation group Bring the parties together
  • 13 July 2006
  • Making a charter
  • 12 October 2006
  • Agree foundation documents
  • 13 14 December 2006
  • Establishing a work programme
  • FAST reconducted as a Working Group of ECAST
  • 2007
  • Full schedule of activities

12
Where FAST fits in ESSI
Open and Closed Forums
COORDINATION GROUP
ECAST COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY TEAM
EHEST HELICOPTER SAFETY TEAM
EGEST GENERAL AVIATIONSAFETY TEAM
FAST
WORKING GROUPS
WORKING GROUPS
Other WORKING GROUPS
13
ECAST Process
1. Assess and Prioritise Accident Risks
and Causal factors in Europe (yearly revised)
2. Identify and Review Safety Programmes
3. Define Safety Performance Metrics
4. Define Safety Enhancement Objectives
5. Institute Safety Programmes
6. Make Recommendations for Safety
Enhancements
7. Perform Costs Benefits Analysis
8. Develop Action Plans
9. Implement Action Plans and Monitor
Implementation
10. Monitor Action Plans Efficacy to
Achieve Safety Objectives
Mid Term Programme Review - 2012
14
FAST Summary of Results
  • A structured methodology incorporated into a
    formal handbook.
  • A prioritized list of Areas of Change AoC.
  • Two applications/tests of the methodology
  • Recommendations resulting from the study of the
    AOC Increasing Crew Reliance on Cockpit
    Automation, e.g. related to the Air Ground Space
    System AGS
  • Results from the study of future hazards
    generated by the concept of operations for
    2011developed by EUROCONTROL.
  • A FAST website

15
PROBLEM APPROACH
Has it caused an accident?
Discovery Processes
Intervention Processes
Does it exist yet?
Is it known?
0 0 0
Prognostic e.g. Emergent, FAST, etc.
Prognostic Design of new Aviation System
components or practices
0 0 1
1 0 0
Diagnostic e.g. ASAP, COSP, ISDSR, LOSA, FOQA,
ISDSR, ASRS, SRB. ECCAIRS, ODA etc.
1 0 1
1 1 0
Historic e.g. Accident Investigation
Historic
1 1 1
1 yes, 0 no
e.g. Regulation, Product Improvement, CAST,
ECAST, company safety (e.g. SRP) processes,
FSF/ALAR tool kit, Human factors tool kit etc.
16
FUTURE AREAS OF CHANGE
AoC a phase out of Gen I transports
AoC b
AoC c
Introduction of UAVs
AoC d
Spectrum and Magnitude of Areas of Change
Affecting the Future Aviation System
AoC e
AoC f
AoC g
AoC h
AoC i
AoC j
AoC k
advent of very-light jets AoC l
t
NOW
2010
2015
2020
Past
17
IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFYINGAREAS OF CHANGE
  • The future is not necessarily a direct
    extrapolation of the past.
  • Present and near-term safety interventions that
    are intended to prevent future accidents caused
    by previously known hazards may not be enough to
    prevent new types of accidents from happening in
    the future.

A mid-1990s study by a major manufacturer looked
at accidents in which airplane systems were
involved in an accident or where they could have
prevented the event and did not. It was found
that in approximately 70 of the accidents
involving airplane systems, the original design
assumptions were inadequate for the situation
existing at the time of the accident due to
changes in - the aviation system - airplane
operational usage - personnel demographics -
evolving infrastructure or other considerations.
18
CHANGING NATURE OF ACCIDENTS
Technological innovations are changing both
aircraft and the airspace in which they operate.
Cumulatively, these technological changes aim to
increase reliability throughout the aviation
system and vastly improve safety in the skies.
These changes include systems designed to move
aircraft more efficiently in the air and on the
ground, methods for providing pilots and ground
controllers with better information about traffic
and weather conditions, and improvements in
aircraft components and design. The growth in
aircraft system complexity is exponential in many
areas, with the most significant trend being the
inter-connectedness of systems.
Current-generation aircraft operate as highly
integrated systems with extensive cross-linking.
As system complexity grows, so does the concern
about hidden design flaws or possible equipment
defects. Accidents involving complex systems and
events present investigators with new and
different failure modes that multiply the number
of potential scenarios they must consider. The
historically common causes of accidents are
occurring less frequently, leaving more
challenging accidents to diagnose. - Safety
in the Skies Personnel and Parties in NTSB
Aviation Accident Investigations-Master Volume,
Chapter Three Emerging Aviation Trends
Potential Impact on Aircraft Accident
Investigations, By Liam P. Sarsfield, William
Stanley, Cynthia C. Lebow, Emile Ettedgui, Garth
Henning, published in 2000
19
Areas of Change Some Principles
  • Changes must be understood as broadly as
    possible.
  • To bring consistency and coherence to the
    process, Areas of Change are grouped by
    categories.
  • The diagram on the next sheet illustrates the
    eleven broad categories of Areas of Change
    affecting aviation identified by the FAST

20
FAST AREAS OF CHANGE CATEGORIES
  • Count Category
  • 29 Aircraft
  • 11 Maintenance, Repairs, Overhaul
  • 19 Operations
  • 21 Crew
  • 7 Passenger
  • 10 Organization
  • 12 Authority
  • 22 Air Navigation System
  • 7 Airport
  • 35 Environment
  • 5 Space Operations
  • ___
  • 179 Total Areas of Change
  • as of 24 February 2006

AIRCRAFT
MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, OVERHAUL
SPACE OPERATIONS
ENVIRONMENT
GLOBAL AVIATION SYSTEM
OPERATIONS
AIRPORT
CREW
AIR NAVIGATION SYSTEM
PASSENGER
ORGANIZATION
AUTHORITY
The FAST continuously solicits submission of new,
candidate AoCs via the process shown in Backup
Charts. Submissions should be made to Rudi den
Hertog, Chief Engineer, Fokker Services, FAST
Co-chair, rudi.denhertog_at_stork.com
21
What is an Area of Change
  • The Global Aviation System (GAS) is in fact a
    "system of systems."
  • Examples of "systems" include
  • airplanes,
  • air traffic control systems,
  • company processes, and
  • regulatory systems.
  • The future GAS will be fundamentally different
    than what exists today because changes affecting
    the GAS will continuously occur as the system
    evolves into the future.
  • The ongoing process of change including both
    evolutionary and sudden, disruptive events or
    paradigm shifts must be considered for effective
    safety risk management.

22
  • Distributed multi agent system
  • Free routing/free flight
  • New airspace classification
  • 4-D dimensional trajectories

Air Ground Space System
  • Civil aerospace challenges
  • Increased aerospace capacity
  • Better respect of the environment (sustainable
    growth approach)
  • improved safety
  • 2020 situation
  • Integrated Air Ground Space System
  • Operates during all phases of flight
  • Communicates through data link

23
Importance
  • It is important that aviation practitioners who
    are designing future systems have foreknowledge
    of potential future hazards.
  • A change to any one system could affect other
    systems. Interactions of future changes to
    several systems could likewise affect the whole.
  • These changes could have adverse impacts on the
    safety of the Global Aviation System.
  • The goal of "discovering" future hazards is to
    eliminate, avoid or mitigate hazards in the
    future that may arise as a result of the changes.
    This will reduce the risk of future incidents and
    accidents.

24
WHATS FAST?
  • OBJECTIVES
  • WHATS SO SPECIAL?
  • WHAT FAST IS AND WHAT NOT
  • COMPOSITION
  • CORE TEAM

25
OBJECTIVES of the FAST method
  • Studying potential future changes in the
    Aerospace System in order to
  • Identify relevant Areas of Change AoC either
    within or external to the aviation system
  • Identify Hazards, both inherent to the AoC as
    well as those arising from interaction with other
    AoCs
  • Develop recommendations to eliminate hazards or
    mitigate their effects, such as
  • Tools to analyze and mitigate the hazards
    including studies and simulations to quantify the
    risks of identified hazards
  • Providing probable hazard information to
    influence entities that shape the future

26
DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS
  • Concept of considering a comprehensive set of
    Areas of Change affecting aviation safety
  • Using a broad representation of domain experts
    representing diverse affected organizations
    within an Expert Team hazard-discovery setting
    looking for direct and indirect hazards
  • Direct- as well as Indirect hazard(s)
    identification, with indirect hazards resulting
    from interaction among AoCs within a novel
    future operational scenario - identifies hazard
    catalysts not ammenable to computational modeling
  • Maintaining and providing to the aviation
    community an up-to-date repository of AoCs,
    possible aviation futures, Technology Watch Items
    hazards.
  • Offering a Future Hazard Analysis method that can
    be used universally by any organization
  • Having a FAST Core Team ready to assist Customers
    using its Future Hazard Analysis method

27
What the FAST is and is not
  • The FAST process is a systematic approach to
    identification of
  • Wide range of changes affecting aviation safety
    (AoCs)
  • Systemic vulnerabilities and hazards within
    highly integrated systems
  • Boundary aspects not only within aviation but
    external to it that may be the catalysts for
    future hazards including common cause factors and
    interactions
  • The FAST process is not a risk assessment method
    - that is, it doesnt estimate relative frequency
    of hazards.
  • The FAST generally does not recommend or develop
    safety interventions - FAST can feed Risk
    Assessment and Risk
  • Management processes in which safety
    interventions are developed and implemented, and
    action efficacy is monitored. These are best left
    to the customers.

28
COMPOSITION
  • MEMBERS from
  • DGAC, CAA-UK, CAA-NL, ENAC, EASA,
  • Civil Aircraft Inspection Board of Poland,
  • ASD, EC/Joint Research Centre, EUROCONTROL,
  • ERA/EASYJET, IFALPA/SAS Norway, IAPA, IFA, Air
    Transport Association of Canada, NASA
  • Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, Fokker, Rockwell
    Collins
  • CORE TEAM is driving force, meeting approximately
    quarterly

29
FAST METHOD
  • DEFINITIONS
  • CUSTOMERS
  • STAKEHOLDERS
  • EXPERT TEAMS
  • TECHNOLOGY WATCH ITEMS
  • PROCESS FLOWS

30
DEFINITIONS
  • CUSTOMERS are organizations that have authority
    to either recommend or implement changes to the
    Global Aviation System
  • STAKEHOLDERS are organizations that may be
    impacted by an envisioned change to the Global
    Aviation System
  • EXPERT TEAM
  • Drawn from Customer Stakeholder organizations
  • Selected by FAST and Customer collaboratively
    based on the envisioned future being considered
  • Must have specific expertise associated with the
    future being evaluated
  • No experience with FAST method required

initiate changes
affected by changes
31
DEFINITIONS, cont.
  • TECHNOLOGY WATCH ITEMS
  • A repository of tell-tale advances in technology
    and other relevant factors that may indicate
    which possible aviation future is unfolding and
    thereby signal if postulated direct hazards
    and/or indirect hazards (interaction hazards) are
    coming about.
  • To be revisited after significant events
    (incidents accidents) and be part of risk
    assessment plans.
  • Maintained for the benefit of the worldwide
    aviation community similar to the CAST Problem
    Statements.

32
FAST Methodology / Process
1. Responsible Party Proposes Change(s) to Global
Aviation System recognizes need for systematic
prediction of hazard(s) associated with changes
and need to design potential hazards out of
system or avoid or mitigate hazard(s)
33
OVERVIEW of PROCESS RESULTS
  • Work progressed in phases
  • Phase I (Oct/99-Sep/00) Established methodology,
    identified 157 changes affecting the aviation
    system.
  • Phase II (Nov/00-July/01) Prioritised Areas of
    Change
  • Phase III (Oct/01-Jan/04) Analysed highest
    priority Area of Change Increasing Reliance on
    Flight Deck Automation
  • Phase IV (Feb 05-Mar06) Re-check/update AoC
    list, develop Process Handbook/Generic
    Presentation/Public Website,
  • Phase V (Mar 06-July 06 ConOps 2011 analysis
    ANS-1.

34
OVERVIEW OF RESULTS
  • TOP 4 AREAS OF CHANGE
  • SYNTHESIS FROM TOP 20 AoC
  • PHASE III OUTPUT
  • ConOps 2011 ANS-1 ANALYSIS

35
TOP 4 AREAS OF CHANGE
  • PRIORITISED CATEGORIZED FROM CURRENT LIST OF
    179
  • Increasing Crew Reliance on Flight Deck
    Automation (Aircraft)
  • Emergence of New Concepts for Airspace Management
    (Air Navigation System)
  • Introduction of New Technologies with Unforeseen
    Human Factors Aspects (Crew)
  • Proliferation of Heterogeneous Aircraft with
    Widely-varying Equipment and Capabilities
    (Aircraft)

36
SYNTHESIS FROM TOP 20 AREAS OF CHANGE
  • Introduction of new air, ground, and
    satellite-based automated systems
  • Increased heterogeneity of aircraft types
    flight capabilities, equipage software,
    airspace utilization approaches, and development
    directions timelines for airborne, ground, and
    space-based aviation support systems
  • Increase in absolute numbers of aviation
    operations and corresponding reduction in safety
    margins as a result of increased demand,
    decreased separation and more frequent operation
    in or near adverse weather conditions
  • Ensuring adequate maintenance of air- and
    ground-based systems in an environment of
    increased outsourcing of work, increased
    complexity of hardware, firmware software, and
    a shortage of qualified maintenance personnel

Common threads as they appeared within the 2001
top 20 AoC synthesis.
37
PHASE III OUTPUT
  • Analysis of highest priority AoC Increasing Crew
    Reliance on Flight Deck Automation
  • Identification/prioritisation of hazards
  • Development and prioritisation of recommendations
    addressing most important hazards
  • Introduction of Technology Watch Items
  • Present the methodology used and lessons-learned

38
Eurocontrols FAST ConOps Workshops
  • ConOps is the Eurocontrol Concept of Operation
    for 2011
  • FAST was tasked to identify future hazards in
    ConOps
  • Two workshops held (6-9 June and 17-20 July 2006)
    with European and US experts

39
CONOPS 2011 - CONTENT
  • Concept of Operations 2011
  • Description of the ATM System in 2011 - the Main
    Changes
  • The ATM Components, OIs and System Enablers
  • The ATM Operational Model
  • The Key Enablers SWIM, the Network Operations
    Plan and
  • Collaborative Decision Making
  • The Principles of the Layered Planning Process
  • High-Level System Capabilities
  • Business Impact Statements
  • Annexes
  • The Actors Roles and Responsibilities
  • Operational Scenarios and Use cases

40
FAST ConOps Evaluation From EUROCONTROL final
comments
  • Lessons learned
  • Very useful exercise
  • Hazards identified may allow improving ConOps
  • Pass results to SESAR, maybe a FAST customer
  • FAST methodology requires further development
  • Subsequent development
  • FAST Handbook upgraded
  • Clarification of AoC use for
  • Hazard Identification / Enrichment
  • Mitigations
  • Link to classical Risk Assessment Methods
  • Transferable methodology

41
FAST Website
http//fast.jrc.it/ Under development
http//fast.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ Final URL
42
An essential element of a safety strategy
  • Future hazards can not be entirely extrapolated
    from the past
  • There is a need to address future changes and
    hazards in safety today
  • FAST offers a method of worldwide interest

43
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
For FAST Output Status see
http//fast.jrc.it
44
BACKUP CHARTS
45
Acronyms
  • ADREP ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting
    System
  • AoC Area of Change developed by FAST
  • AGS Air Ground Space System
  • ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider
  • ATC Air Traffic Control
  • AWOS Automatic Weather Observation System
  • CAST Commercial Aviation Safety Team (North
    America)
  • CICTT CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
  • ConOps In FAST context Eurocontrols Concept of
    Operations for
  • 2011
  • ConOps General air traffic providers concept of
    operations
  • ESSI European Safety Strategy Initiative
  • ECAST European Commercial Aviation Safety Team
    (EuroCAST)
  • ECCAIRS European Co-ordination Centre for
    Aviation Incident
  • Reporting Systems

46
Acronyms - continued
  • FAST Future Aviation Safety Team
  • GTG Gate-to-Gate
  • ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
  • JAA Joint Aviation Authorities (Europe)
  • JSSI JAA Safety Strategy Initiative
  • JSAT Joint Safety Analysis Team (CAST)
  • JSIT Joint Safety Implementation Team (CAST)
  • JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office (part
    of NGATS in
  • USA)
  • NGATS Next Generation Air Transportation
    System (USA)
  • SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research Programme
  • TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System
  • TAWS Terrain Avoidance Warning System

47
FAST Contribution to CAST Safety Plan
Introducing and integrating the Prospective
component of safety
Accident Analysis JSATS Historic
Accident JSITs
Safety Enhancements
CAST Plan
CAST Plan Revision
Master Contributing Factors
Safety Metrics
JIMDAT Process
Incident Analysis Process Historic
Emerging Risk
Remaining Risk JSA/IT
Enhancements
Operational Data Analysis (NASA
ISDSR) Diagnostic
Changing Risk
Aviation System Changes
Yes
Develop Contributing Factors (new or emerging)
Predictive Analysis (FAST FST) Prognostic
No
Present In Master Factors?
Identify Causal Factors
External Changes
Identify Future Hazards
B. Smith 2/7/06
48
Area of Change (AoC) Submission Process
Continuous Call For New Aocs
Refine Wording Add Descriptive Comments
Candidate AoC
External Group or Individual
FAST Core Team
Comparison with Existing AoC List
Review for FAST Consistency
New?
Okay?
yes
no
no
yes
Evaluate for Potential to Enrich Existing AoCs
Concatenate to Existing AoC List
49
(No Transcript)
50
Examples of global Air Ground Space system
Technology Watch ItemsTheme I
  • Development of system using Artificial
    Intelligence (e.g. neural nets, fuzzy logic).
  • Development of intelligent aircraft (with
    systems of smart sensors, microprocessors and
    adaptive control that monitor operator
    performance, environment and automatically avoid
    hazardous situations)
  • Emergence of computational capabilities and
    monitoring systems that could replace
    conventional air traffic control functions
  • Development of intelligent vehicles (e.g.
    smart cars) as cross fertilisation may affect
    aviation
  • Collaborative decision making (CDM) Computer
    Support to Cooperative Work (CSCW)
  • eSafety of road and air transport and eHealth,
    Multimodal Interfaces, Semantic-based knowledge
    systems, technology-enhanced learning

51
Example of how Customer Vision of Future would
have beenused in past
  • If at some point in the past, a study of the
    potential future hazards related to Reduced
    Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) had been
    conducted, the Expert Team performing the
    analysis would likely have needed to generate the
    following description of the potential
    consequences of implementation of RVSM in order
    to extract potential future hazards
  • "Assuming that each airplane has physical
    enhancements and each crew has procedures to
    properly manage vertical separation less than
    current rules, we believe that increased
    collision hazard is not likely. There however is
    a slight hazard increase due to wake turbulence
    descending from overhead airplanes and causing
    loss of control of encountering aircraft. We
    therefore recommend that there a study be done of
    all existing airplanes to determine the
    likelihood of a strong cruise wake descending to
    flight levels occupied by other aircraft, minus
    the altitude uncertainty. Altitude uncertainty
    must be considered and quantified in the study
    however, because actual separation may be much
    less than the candidate reduced value. We also
    recommend review of TCAS/ACAS protection with the
    FAA to ensure that the TCAS will not
    significantly contribute to collision likelihood.
    We want to avoid TCAS causing an accident. We
    hear however that the Military will be fielding
    new navigation technology, GPS, which if applied
    to civilian airplanes, will significantly
    increase the lateral precision with which
    airplanes will fly intended airways. Airplanes
    will then be closer to each other vertically and
    laterally. In this case, collision and/or wake
    vortex upset risk may significantly increase.
    If you see intentions to adopt GPS technology for
    civil transport navigation (watch item), then we
    recommend that studies are conducted and the
    Industry agrees to mitigating practices such as
    intentional cross-track stagger. Care should be
    taken when doing so to ensure that wind direction
    is considered in the study."

- purely hypothetical not representative of
FAST recommendations
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