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Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) CREATE Conference

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S&T knowledge products. Policy guidelines ... Integrate all biodefense related knowledge. Accelerate understanding of the bioterrorist threat ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) CREATE Conference


1
Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC)CREATE
Conference
  • Bill Colston
  • Director
  • November 18, 2004

2
The life sciences revolution is producing
knowledge that has immediate biodefense
implications
  • Complete genome of more than 100 microbial
    pathogens, including smallpox, anthrax, botulism,
    and plague are already freely available on the
    internet
  • Dual use problem experiments of concern
  • Force multipliers
  • Virulence
  • Transmissibility
  • Host range
  • Dissemination
  • Weaponization
  • Evading biological countermeasures
  • Diagnostics (environmental and medical)
  • Therapeutics (vaccines, Ab/Av resistance)

National Academies Report - Biotechnology
Research in the Age of Terrorism, NAS, October
8, 2003
3
The biggest impediment to all-source analysis
is the human resistance to sharing information
9/11
  • Intra- and Inter-agency silos
  • By mission Intelligence, Law enforcement, Public
    Health, etc.
  • By domain genomics, assessments, transportation,
    etc.
  • No distributed, secure network
  • Old mainframe model
  • Privacy/classification concerns not addressed
    (OUO to SCI)
  • Not readily scaleable to future needs

4
The mission of the BKC is to provide
scientifically rigorous, actionable information
to all stakeholders
BKC
Knowledge integration discovery
Policy guidelines
Analysis and interpretation
Subject matter experts
Secure, tailored access
ST knowledge products
Stakeholders
5
The goal of the BKC is to enable better, more
timely understanding of the threat from
bioterrorism
you know
you dont know
  • Integrate all biodefense related knowledge

Actionable information
Identified gaps
You know
  • Accelerate understanding of the bioterrorist
    threat

Biodefense Knowledge Center
You dont know
Unidentified gaps
Non-accessed information
  • Enable understanding through technology


6
Last week we provided DHS senior staff with an
info bulletin to exercise our reachback processes
  • Soybean rust is foreign plant pathogen
  • Economic losses are expected to be from 640
    million to 1.3 billion in FY05
  • Research restricted to one USDA lab in US

7
Long term studies include Material Threat
Assessments (MTAs)
  • Material threats include biological, chemical,
    and radiological agents
  • Category A biological agents (anthrax, smallpox,
    etc.)
  • Chemical weapons
  • Radiation dispersal devices
  • There are several high-level goals for the MTAs
  • Identify plausible worst case attack methods
  • Determine the technical and operational
    feasibility of the attacks
  • Estimate the number of people exposed
  • Determine critical knowledge gaps

8
The MTAs are designed to inform Bioshield
countermeasures procurements
Bioshield Act July 21, 2004. "By authorizing
unprecedented funding and providing new
capabilities, Project BioShield will help America
purchase, develop and deploy cutting-edge
defenses against catastrophic attack,"
9
Example scenario FMD outbreaks recently occurred
in South America
  • Common questions include
  • Are we at risk?
  • Do we trade livestock products with those
    regions?
  • Are there frequent travelers from those regions
    to the US?
  • Are we prepared?
  • Do we have vaccine in the vaccine bank that
    matches the outbreak strain?
  • Do we have protein/nucleic acid assays capable of
    detecting that strain?
  • Do we have sufficient reagents on-hand to enable
    surge testing?
  • Do we know key virus info (species-preference,
    incubation period, etc.)
  • Do unique features of the outbreaks suggest foul
    play?
  • Are known adversaries located near the outbreaks?
  • Has the outbreak strain been seen in S. America
    before?
  • Do we know how it was introduced?
  • Have recent intel reports suggested intentional
    use of FMD is likely?

10
By fusing disparate data sources, we can address
some of these questions
Jordan
North American Vaccine Bank
FMDV Vaccine
Contains
Operates in
Protects against
Sero-Type O
Known Adversary Group
Previously isolated in
Operates in
Has discussed
Form of
Form of
FMDV
Monte Alegre District
Genetic Sequence from Isolate
Deployed Assay Signature
Related to
Subset of
Related to
Related to
Located in
Outbreak
Potential Data Sources
ProMed email
Describes
Intelligence data
ProMed Message
Genomic data
Vaccine stockpile data
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