Missile Defense Technology Value Model

1
Missile Defense Technology Value Model
Paul Collopy January 26, 2004
2
MDA Value Model Status Briefing
Todays Outline

• Overview
• Purpose in MDA context
• Example - Explosively Formed Projectile
• Development Status
• Value Model Results
• How to Use the Model
• Remaining Tasks

3
Overview of Technology Value Model
Technology Metrics (Buckets)
System Elements
Technology
BAAM Emplacement
Element Metrics Cost and Pkill
injection
Launch Detection
Launch Detection
Resolution
1.00
Layered Defense System
Tracking from Space
Sensitivity
25,000
Scan Time
1.00
Booster Rocket
. . .
Tracking from Space
Command and Control
Technology Value
Resolution
1.00
ScanTime
1.40
Accuracy
85
Aerodynamic Shell
. . .
Kill Vehicle
Explosively Formed Projectile
Guidance System
4
Technology Buckets

• Sensors
• Processing
• Command, Control and Communications
• Targeting
• Navigation
• Flight Control
• Maneuverability
• Tracking
• Discrimination
• Kill Mechanism
• Kinetic Kill
• Energetic Kill
• Other Kill
• Defeat without Kill

• Battle Management
• Structural Materials
• Propulsion
• Aerodynamics
• Countermeasures

5
Layered Defense System
Scenarios
Asset Value
Pkill
Performance
Boost Phase Intercept
Net Value
cost per kill
Unit Cost
Cost
Pkill
Performance
Net Value
Net Value
Midcourse Intercept
System Elements
cost per kill
Unit Cost
Cost
Pkill
Performance
Conventional Terminal Intercept
Net Value
cost per kill
Unit Cost
Cost
. . .
. . .
. . .
BAAM Airborne Laser Pulsed Excimer Laser Rapidly
Deployed Terminal Intecept
given optimum deployment
6
Scenarios for Value Model

• RATIONALE
• 5 dimensions
• missiles
• Location uncertainty
• Complexity of CMs
• Potential targets
• Type of warhead
• Most likely threats (from 2000 CIA NIE)
• Medium or short-range missiles from sea
• Missiles w/nuc or chem warheads from DPRK or
  China
• Medium- or short-range missiles from Iran or Syria

• SCENARIOS
• NYC attacked with 1-3 SCUD-Bs fired from ships
• NYC attacked with 2 MIRVed missles w/CMs
• Major US west coast cities attacked by 10-40
  missiles from China w/CMs
• Guam attacked from DPRK
• Toyko attacked by 2-20 missiles from DPRK
• CENTCOM HQ or Tel Aviv attacked from Iran

7
Cost of Loss
2nd Intifada
60
50
World Trade Center
40
Cost per casualty ( millions)
30
20
Asymptote 2M x 1.5
Auto Product Liability
10
OK City
0
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
Casualties
8
Concepts and Kill Chains
Boost phase
Airborne
Space
Midcourse
Terminal
intercept
laser
based laser
intercept
intercept
Ground / sea interceptor deployed in kill zone



Aircraft / satellite stationed in kill zone


Deployment rockets based in kill zone
Launch detected





Low altitude tracking (below horizon)


Off-board high altitude tracking



Decision to intercept





Target discrimination

Deployment to interceptor kill zone
Interceptor boosted to target



On board tracking





Tracking laser illuminating target


Beacon laser illuminating target


Weapon laser on target


Weapon laser dwell time sufficient


Laser damage defeats attack


Kill vehicle maneuvers to intercept



Interceptor defeats attack



9
Determination of Pkill
1 - P1
Deployed in Kill Zone
Kill Chain Midcourse Intercept
1 - P2
P1
Launch Detected
1 - P3
P2
Off Board High Altitude Tracking
1 - P4
P3
Decision to Intercept
1 - P5
P4
Interceptor Boosted to Target
1 - P6
P5
System Elements
Target Discrimination
1 - P7
P6
On Board Tracking
1 - P8
P7
Kill Vehicle Maneuvers to Intercept
1 - P9
P8
Interceptor Defeats Attack
P9
intercept (kill)
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Derivation of Net Value
Assume a set of n interceptor missiles attacking
a target. The probability of an individual
missile killing the target is pk. All
interceptors are equivalent, and order is
unimportant, so that all pks are equal.
pk
pk
1 - pk
pk
1 - pk
pk
1 - pk
pk
1 - pk
pk
1 - pk
1 - pk
Target Survives
(
)
Probability that the target survives is
n
-

p
1
p
k
survives
(
)
n
Thus, the probability of a kill is
-
-

p
1
1
p
k
kill
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Derivation of Net Value
If the value of the asset attacked by the target
is V, the expected value of saving the asset is
We wish to show each technology to its best
advantage. Therefore we optimize the number of
interceptors to maximize net value. The optimal
number of interceptors is designated n.
s
ö
æ
1


cqk

ç
ln

ç
-
p
1
ø
è
k
12
Derivation of Net Value
s

cqk
ö
æ
1

ç
ln

ç
-
p
1
ø
è
k
ö
æ
ö
æ
V
V
s

ç



ç




ln
cqk
ln
s
n

ç

ç
ö
æ
cqk
cqk
1
ø
è
ø
è

ç
ln

ç
-
p
1
ø
è
k
ö
æ
(
)
V
(
)
(
)

n
n

-
-
-


-


ç

NV
s
n
p
1
1
V
-

-

p
1
V
-
-
V
V
ln
cqk
cqk

ç
k
k
cqk
ø
è
13
Modified Cost per Kill
5
4
3
2
1
pk
0
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
Probability of kill
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Technology Value
Net Value
Discounted Value
Expected Value
Technology NPV
With Technology
-
x
-
x
Baseline
Discount Factor
(without technology)
IOC
Technology Readiness Level
Cost to Develop
Technology Risk
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How to Use the Model

• Trade Studies
• Technology Evaluation
• Parametric Studies
• Optimization
• Response Surface Analysis
• Distributed Optimal Design
• Linear Model

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Value Model Applications
1996
1997
2001
2000
2002
2002
2002