Water and Sanitation Aspects of Tsunami Recovery

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Water and Sanitation Aspects of Tsunami Recovery

• Mark Toy
• May 1, 2008

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International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
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Fundamental Principles of the International Red
Cross Red Crescent Movement
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International Services Mission
International Services helps vulnerable people
communities around the world prevent, prepare for
respond to disasters, complex humanitarian
emergencies life-threatening health conditions.
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Core International Services
Psychosocial Support
Preparedness
Disaster
Response
Food
Restoring Family Links
Armed Conflict
Humanitarian Emergencies
Water Sanitation
Maternal Child Health
Health
Infectious Diseases
Promoting the Fundamental Principles
International Humanitarian Law throughout
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International Services Finances
Note All costs except those covered by
restricted donations are covered by tsunami
interest in FY 2006.
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Fog of International Disaster Response
Humanitarian Coordinator
UNDAC
MEDIA
Affected
OSSOC
Donor Govts
OCHA Geneva
Government
Affected Population
ICRC
UNDP
Host National Society
Humanitarian Coordinator
UNICEF
HCR
DART
CMOC
IFRC
WFP
Humanitarian Coordinator
Ambassadors
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International Disaster Response
ARC International Disaster Response
Disaster Planning Preparedness
International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies
Cash
Disaster Strikes!
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Vulnerability Capacity
Relief Supplies
183 National Red Cross Red Crescent
Societies
Disaster Response
International Response Teams
Linking Relief to Development
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American Red Cross Tsunami Emergency Response
During the first 6 months

• Emergency food assistance to over 1.6 M people
• Vaccinations to 1.1 M children
• Relief items tents, sleeping mats, cooking
  sets hygiene kits gt400,000 people
• Psycho-social support gt100,000 people
• Water sanitation

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American Red Cross Tsunami Recovery Program
Goal Expedite community recovery reduce
chronic vulnerabilities
Community Health Disease Control
Restoration Rebuilding
Disaster Preparedness
Water sanitation Psycho-social support
Community school-based health
nutrition Disease control
Enhancing disaster preparedness response
capabilities Developing community disaster
preparedness plans Restoring Family Links
In partnership with US non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) UN agencies, expand
recovery development in affected communities.
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Tsunami Recovery Update
FY05 emergency response expenditures
projections for Tsunami Recovery FY06-10
1 as of 11/30/05 all totals are approximate.
2Fiscal years (FY), July 1 - June 30 3Per a Jan.
13, 2005 press release, direct support may
represent up to 6 of total costs.
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Water and sanitation in Indonesia

• Over 100 million people in Indonesia lack access
  to safe water
• Only 2 access to sewerage in urban areas is one
  of the lowest in the world among middle-income
  countries.
• Women in Jakarta report spending US 11 per month
  on boiling water, implying a significant burden
  for the poor.
• Decentralized responsibility for WSS, but no
  funding.
• Annual investment in WSS US2 per capita (2005
  estimate)

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Water and sanitation in Indonesia

• Diarrhea second leading killer of children under
  five in the country and accounts for about 20 of
  child deaths each year.
• Every year, at least 300 out of 1,000 Indonesians
  suffer from water-borne diseases
• The absence of an established sanitation network
  forces many households to rely upon private
  septic tanks or to dispose of their waste
  directly into rivers and canals.
• As of 2001, an estimated 90 of Jakarta's shallow
  wells were polluted by domestic waste.
• Source Wikipedia

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Watsan Challenges in Aceh

• One of least developed provinces because of 30
  year civil war distrust of Javanese
• Earthquake/tsunami further reduced professional
  class by 1/3
• High water table exacerbated by earthquake
• Logistical difficulties (no road to Aceh Jaya,
  islands)
• Lack of local capacity local standards
  (cesspit, leaky septic tanks, shallow well)

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Watsan Challenges in Aceh

• Competition for staff, materials
• Housing construction not considering watsan
• Delays in securing land titles, easements
• Inconsistent approach by aid groups
• Integrating hardware with software
• Pressure to build vs. demand-driven approach
  (relief vs. sustainable development)
• Sense of entitlement from emergency phase (cash
  for work)

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American Red Cross challenges

• Risk averse culture
• Program design, scope
• Working through national societies
• Construction contracts
• Umbrella funding agency to UN, NGOs
• Bureaucratic method of decision making

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American Red Cross challenges

• Lack of capacity at time of Tsunami
• Lack of human resources support
• Stretched again after Katrina (9/05)
• Time, scope constraints of funding intent
• Tsunami program separate from rest of
  International Services
• New staff
• Lack of institutional memory
• Little staff continuity from emergency phase

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Water and Sanitation Program

• Hardware
• Water supply
• Sanitation
• Software
• Hygiene promotion (PHAST)
• Water and sanitation committees

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Temporary Shelters

• Cited where land available
• Built quickly
• Short-term considerations
• Trucked water not sustainable
• Poor sanitation
• Lighting/security issues

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Temporary Shelters

• Shelter needs Indonesia - July 2005

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Pulo Aceh

• British Red Cross shelter
• 4 villages
• About 250 houses
• Phased construction
• Temporary shelters/watsan
• Permanent facilities
• Spring supply gravity fed, 4 km transmission

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Aceh Jaya

• Major empasis for Red Cross Movement
• Most severe damage
• Difficult logistics
• District capital Calang of pre-Tsunami
  population of 15,000, only 3,000 survived.
• In one neighborhood, only 18/2200 survived

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High water table

• Normally high water table coastal area
• Subsidence caused by earthquake
• Drop of over one meter in some areas
• Poor draining soils in many areas
• Saltwater intrusion

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Competition for staff, materials

• High competition for construction materials
• Shelter
• Infrastructure
• Inflation twice that of rest of Indonesia
• Katrina happened Sept. 2005
• Plastic pipe prices increased by 50

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Competition for staff, materials

• Lack of professional staff
• Lack of national staff with English language
  skills
• Reverse brain drain
• Transmigration
• Economic migrants using services meant for
  Tsunami victims

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Housing independent of watsan

• Little consideration of site conditions
• Reverse of normal land development
• Poor site selection increased costs, difficulties
  of installing proper sanitation
• Agencies assigned areas
• Shelter construction often not contiguous
• Houses often built without provision of water,
  sanitation, electricity
• Needs of renters not addressed

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Innovative techniques

• Shallow septic tanks
• Constructed wetlands
• Subsurface wetlands
• Separate black, gray water disposal
• Composting latrines
• Biofilters
• Rain Catchment
• Household water treatment

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Lessons Learned

• Better continuity between emergency, recovery
  phases
• Shelter agencies must integrate water and
  sanitation when planning
• Coordination, not competition, between agencies
• Standardize levels of service for immediate
  response, recovery
• Be realistic about timeframe cannot go beyond
  community capacity

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Tsunami Lessons Learned

• Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (http//www.tsunami-e
  valuation.org/ )
• World Bank (http//web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERN
  AL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESIAEXTN/0,,c
  ontentMDK21164835menuPK50003484pagePK2865066
  piPK2865079theSitePK226309,00.html )
• Aidwatch (http//www.reliefweb.int/library/documen
  ts/2006/eoa-idn-28feb.pdf)
• American University Symposium May 2006
  (http//www.cpbintl.org/Documents/TsunamiSymposium
  SummaryMay06CPBI-AU.pdf