Implementation and compliance in antidoping policy: how much compliance is enough

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Implementation and compliance in anti-doping
policy how much compliance is enough?

• Barrie Houlihan
• Loughborough University
• ESRC seminar, 31st March 2009

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Structure of the presentation

• Implementation and compliance
• Compliance and the World Anti-Doping Code
• The nature of the compliance problem in
  anti-doping
• Factors that affect compliance/non-compliance
• Designing a compliance system
• Conclusions and concluding questions

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Distinguishing compliance from implementation

• Compliance lies conceptually between
  implementation and impact
• 'Measuring and achieving compliance is more
  difficult than measuring and achieving
  implementation. It involves assessing the extent
  to which policy actors follow through on the
  steps they have taken to implement international
  accords' (Jacobson and Weiss, 1995 123).
• Compliance is about intensity of commitment

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The Code and the chain of compliance
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The Code and the chain of compliance

• Article 23 specifies the Articles that must be
  incorporated into rules of signatory
  organisations
• Monitoring by biennial reports
• Consequences of non-compliance include
  ineligibility to bid for events, forfeiture of
  offices and positions within WADA ineligibility
  or non-admission of any candidature to hold any
  international event in a country cancellation of
  international events and symbolic and other
  consequences
• Compliance with UNESCO Convention separate (
  still under discussion?)
• WADA monitoring breaches of Code not compliance
  with Code?

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Selecting the focus for compliance activities

• Need for an analysis of risk countries, NGBs,
  clubs, athletes, stages of an athletes career
  for example
• At global level Sydney OG 32 (16) countries
  accounted for 90 of all medals Beijing OG 32
  (15.6) countries accounted for 83 of all medals
• In UK between 1988 and 2002 1076 violations, but
  70 in 8 sports (football, athletics, cycling,
  equestrian racing, power-lifting, rugby league,
  rugby union weight-lifting)
• In UK over last 12 months 31 violations 68 in
  four sports (r league, r union, football
  equestrian

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The Code and the chain of compliance

• WADA questionnaire (April 2006)
• Self completion
• Vague/ambiguous
• Quantitative rather than qualitative
• Audited?
• Supporting evidence required?
• The best under the circumstances?
• Alternatives/reform?

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The Code and the chain of compliance

• Examples of questions
• a) Is a process for therapeutic use exemption in
  place?
• b) Do you perform OCT?
• c) How much target testing do you carry out?
• d) Do you have a system in place for collecting
  and processing whereabouts information?

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Framework for analysing compliance
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Factors affecting the achievement of compliance
the nature of the problem

• Collaboration problems
• Joint compliance preferable to joint violation
• BUT embeds a preference at individual level to
  violate while (if) others comply
• Most compliance regimes are centred on
  collaboration problems
• These compliance regimes often survive due to
  lack of depth (e.g. in-competition testing)

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Factors affecting the achievement of compliance
the nature of the problem

• Co-ordination problems
• Co-ordination of individual decisions
• Non-compliance affects non-complier as much as
  others
• Non-compliance relatively easy to detect
• Therefore basis of compliance is self-interest
• Once an equilibrium point in negotiations between
  parties has been reached no one has (or should
  have) an incentive to defect
• Minimal need for sanctions and policing

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Factors affecting the achievement of compliance
motives for compliance

• Perceived self-interest (protect the rank order)
• Requires no change in practice
• Prohibited behaviour is not relevant
• Enforcement is weak or unlikely
• Means to a more significant objective
• Commitment to regulatory aims (e.g. fair
  competition)

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Factors affecting the achievement of compliance
causes of non-compliance

• Choice, for example due to
• a desire to retain the benefits of the 'badge'
  but avoid the obligations
• only agreed under pressure (diplomatic, moral,
  financial etc.)
• objective is partial/selective compliance
• free-rider strategy (benefit from the compliance
  of others, but avoid those costs themselves)
• resources needed for compliance have been
  diverted elsewhere
• benefits of compliance have low domestic
  political salience
• Inability, due to
• lack of necessary financial or scientific
  resources
• lack of administrative capacity e.g. no
  regulatory infrastructure or subjects of
  regulation are remote e.g. Australian cyclists,
  African footballers
• Inadvertence, due to
• inadequate, but sincere, attempt at local
  implementation
• incompetence i.e. poor application of policy tools

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Understanding motivations to comply calculation

• Rational actor model
• Focus on individual
• Compliance is a strategic choice (probability of
  detection, likelihood and severity of sanctions)
• Utility maximisation
• Amoral

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Understanding motivations to comply social
motivation

• Desire for approval from significant others
  (university, club, friends, family) may, over
  time, have a socialising effect as result of
  multiple interactions
• Multiple interactions have formal and informal
  aspects which define shared expectations of
  acceptable compliance

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Understanding motivations to comply social
motivation

• Identity the development of the self in response
  to the social world
• Identity provides a frame for viewing, and making
  sense of, the Code, doping control procedures and
  officers
• Identity contributes to in-group/out-group
  differentiation (whether athletes and NADO share
  a common endeavour)

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Understanding motivations to comply normative
motivations

• Moral/ideological basis
• Founded on the importance of community
  socialisation tacit understandings of what is
  reasonable and right a moral duty to comply
• Acceptance that regulations are important (shame
  a key element)
• Perception that regulations are reasonable
  (whereabouts) and reasonably implemented
  regulations are enforced fairly

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Compliance systems design

• Moves away from the rational actor model to an
  assumption that systems design is an independent
  variable in compliance
• Assumes that there is a general propensity to
  comply and that non-compliance is best addressed
  through a problem solving strategy of capacity
  building, rule interpretation and transparency,
  rather than through coercive enforcement

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Compliance systems design

• Compliance systems have three levels of rules
• Primary rule system who gets regulated and by
  what means the greater the transparency the
  better the more specific the easier to identify
  compliance and non-compliance (but loss of
  subtlety)
• Compliance information system maximise
  transparency ensure collection of relevant and
  high quality data, and the thorough analysis of
  data external verification rather than a
  reliance on self-certification
• Non-compliance response system range of
  responses need to be available (range from
  UNESCOs capacity building fund to exclusion of
  sports/countries from the O PG) and capacity to
  impose sanctions must be unequivocal

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Compliance system design on the regulatory front
line

• Increasing interest in decisions, motivations and
  capabilities of front line staff enforcement
  style consultants or cops
• Degree of formalism and facilitation affect
  compliance
• Formalism backfires if it is perceived as
  overbearing and excessive
• Facilitation becomes ineffective if it becomes
  too accommodating
• How do doping control officers see themselves -
  enforcers or educators?
• How do they perceive the variety of violations
  as problems to be solved or a intentional acts of
  defiance?
• What scope is there for discretion in enforcing
  compliance?

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Conclusions and concluding questions

• International and national anti-doping systems
  assume anti-doping is a collaboration problem and
  that (many/most) athletes etc are rational
  utility maximisers
• Increasing complexity will undermine a deterrence
  model
• A deterrence model plus complexity will result in
  increasing opposition to anti-doping regime
• __________________________________________________
  _
• Can the doping problem be effectively redefined?
• What do we know of the motives of athletes,
  support staff and administrators?
• What assumptions inform the WADA and NADO
  compliance systems?

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