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UW Medicine Networking Update

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Title: UW Medicine Networking Update


1
UW Medicine Networking Update
  • Terry Gray
  • Associate Vice President, IT Infrastructure
  • University of Washington
  • 16 April 2004

2
Key Elements of the Partnership
  • Changed CC now responsible for...
  • In-building network implementation
    and operational support for med ctrs, clinics
  • Med center network design for real
  • Not Changed CC still responsible for...
  • Network backbone, routers
  • Regional and Internet connectivity
  • SoM and Health Sciences networking

3
Why the Partnership Makes Sense
  • Consistency, interoperability, manageability
  • Leverage CC networking expertise
  • Clinical/research hi-performance network needs
  • 24x7 Network Operations Center (NOC)
  • Advanced network management tools
  • Avoid design/build organizational conflicts
  • Beyond the network... hope to share distributed
    system architecture and network computing
    expertise

4
Near-term Progress and Plans
  • Created Top 10 list --now up to Top 20 )
  • Agreement on standard maintenance window
  • Static addressing work-around (sDHCP)
  • FDDI, VLAN elimination
  • Subnet splits/upgrades (1500 computers)
  • Equipment upgrades
  • Router consolidation, dedicated subnets, separate
    med center backbone
  • Equipment, outlet location database updates
  • Initial wireless deployment
  • NetVersant and Cisco external studies

5
The Challenge
  • Create a network computing environment
  • with excellent security
  • excellent supportability
  • that users find reliable and responsive

6
Context A Perfect Storm
  • Increased dependency on network apps
  • Decreased tolerance for outages
  • Decades of deferred maintenance...
  • Inadequate infrastructure investment
  • Some old/unfortunate design decisions
  • Some fragile applications
  • Fragmented host management
  • Increasingly hostile security environment
  • Increasing legal/regulatory liability
  • Increasing importance of research/clinical
    leverage

7
Context Some Numbers
8
Network Device Growth
Note Most dips reflect lower summer use last
one is a measurement anomaly
9
Network Traffic Growth (linear)
10
Network Traffic Growth (log)
11
System Elements
  • Environmentals (Power, A/C, Physical Security)
  • Network
  • Client Workstations
  • Servers
  • Applications
  • Personnel, Procedures, Policy, and
    Architecture Failures at one level can trigger
    problems at another level need Total System
    perspective

12
Systemic Network Problems (some of these go back
decades)
  • Old infrastructure (e.g cat 3 wire)
  • Non-supportable technologies (e.g. FDDI)
  • Non-supportable (non-geographic) topology
  • Expensive shortcuts (e.g. cat5 mis-terminated)
  • Security based on individual IP addresses
  • Subnets with clients and critical servers
  • Documentation deficiency
  • Contact database
  • Device location database
  • Critical device registry

13
Systemic General Problems
  • Ever-increasing system complexity, dependencies
  • Ever-increasing threats, liabilities
  • Departmental autonomy
  • Un-controlled hosts
  • Un-reliable power and A/C in equipment rooms
  • No net-oriented application procurement
    standards
  • Are HA and DRBR expectations realistic?
  • Are backup plans workable?

14
Key Operational Objectives
  • simplicity
  • lower cost
  • higher MTBF (modulo redundancy)
  • lower MTTR (quicker diagnosis)
  • consistency
  • deterministic outlet behavior (Network Utility
    Model)
  • connection transparency (open/deterministic
    Internet)
  • easier problem diagnosis
  • These objectives conflict with other goals

15
Design Tradeoffs
  • Networks Connectivity Security Isolation
  • Fault Zone size vs. Economy/Simplicity
  • Reliability vs. Complexity
  • Prevention vs. (Fast) Remediation
  • Security vs. Supportability vs.
    Functionality Differences in NetSec approaches
    relate to
  • Balancing priorities (security vs. ops vs.
    function)
  • Local technical and institutional feasibility

16
Tradeoff Examples
  • Defense-in-depth conjecture (for N layers)
  • Security MTTE (exploit) ? N2
  • Functionality MTTI (innovation) ? N2
  • Supportability MTTR (repair) ? N2
  • Perimeter Protection Paradox (for D devices)
  • Firewall value/efficiency ? D
  • Firewall effectiveness ? 1 / D
  • Border blocking criteria
  • Threat cant reasonably be addressed at edge
  • Wont harm network (performance, stateless block)
  • Widespread consensus to do it
  • Security by IP address

17
Network Security Chronology
  • 1990 Five anti-interoperable networks
  • 1994 Nebula shows network utility model viable
  • 1998 Defined border blocking policy
  • 2000 Published Network Security Credo
  • 2000 Added source address spoof filters
  • 2000 Proposed med ctr network zone
  • 2000 Proposed server sanctuaries
  • 2001 Ban clear-text passwords on CC systems
  • 2001 Proposed pervasive host firewalls
  • 2001 Developed logical firewall solution
  • 2002 Developed Project-172 solution
  • 2003 Slammer, Blaster death of the Internet
  • 2003 Developed flex-net architecture

18
Next-Gen Network Architecture
  • Parallel networks more redundancy
  • Supportable (geographic) topology
  • Med center subnets separate backbone zone
  • Perimeter, sanctuary, and end-point defense
  • Higher performance
  • High-availability strategies
  • Workstations spread across independent nets
  • Redundant routers
  • Dual-homed servers

19
Success Metrics
  • Toms
  • Nobody gets hurt
  • Nobody goes to jail
  • Steves
  • Four Nines or bust!
  • High ROI (Return On Investment)
  • Terrys
  • Low ROI (Risk Of Interruption)
  • Low MTTR (Quick to Fix)
  • High predictability (No surprises)

20
Lessons
  • Net reliability host security are inextricably
    linked
  • Five 9s is hard (unless we only attach phones?)
  • for , best security investment is central host
    management
  • Nebula existence proof security in an open
    network
  • Watch out for unfair cost shifting
  • The cost of static IP configuration is very high
  • Controlling net access is hard --hublets,
    wireless
  • Even host firewalls dont guarantee safety
  • Perimeter firewalls may increase user confusion,
    MTTR
  • It only takes one compromise inside to defeat a
    firewall
  • Next-generation threats firewalls wont help
  • Even so defense-in-depth is a Good Thing

21
Questions? Comments?
22
Network Security Addendum
23
Recent Events
  • attacks
  • slammer (Jan 2003)
  • blaster (Aug 2003)
  • sobig (Sep 2003)
  • mydoom (Feb 2004)
  • witty (Mar 2004)
  • impact
  • demise of the open/transparent/deterministic
    Internet
  • demise of the network utility model
  • demise of the unmanaged/autonomous PC
  • demise of reliable email

24
Seven Security Axioms
  • 1. Network security is maximized when we assume
    there is no such thing.
  • 2. Large security perimeters mean large
    vulnerability zones.
  • 3. Firewalls are such a good idea, every
    computer should have one. Seriously.
  • 4. Remote access is fraught with peril, just like
    local access.
  • 5. One person's security perimeter is another's
    broken network.
  • 6. Private networks won't help (Limits of
    isolation).
  • 7. Network security is about psychology as well
    as technology.

25
Network Security Credo
  • Focus first on the edge (Perimeter Protection
    Paradox)
  • Add defense-in-depth as needed
  • Keep it simple (e.g. Network Utility Model)
  • But not too simple (e.g. offer some policy
    choice)
  • Avoid
  • one-size-fits-all policies
  • cost-shifting from guilty to innocent
  • confusing users and techs (broken by design)

26
Preserving the Net Utility Model
  • What is it?
  • Why important?
  • Incompatible with perimeter security?
  • Too late to save?
  • NUM-preserving perimeter defense
  • Logical Firewalls
  • Project 172
  • Foiled by static IP addressing
  • Requires all hosts be reconfigured

27
Conflicting Perspectives
  • System administrator view
  • some prefer local control/responsibility
  • some prefer central/big-perimeter defense
  • some underestimate cost impact on others
  • User view
  • want just enough openness to run apps
  • prefer unlisted numbers?
  • Network operator view
  • concerned about increased support costs and
    repair times due to growing complexity and
    unpredictability
  • concerned about loss of network functionality

28
Generic Security Toolkit
  • host choice truly thin clients species
    diversity
  • host configuration management
  • conventional firewalls
  • logical firewalls
  • private addressing (e.g. project 172)
  • IDS, IPS, ADS
  • vulnerability scanning, anti-virus tools
  • QoS (to protect critical traffic types)
  • isolated networks (physical, VLAN, VPN)
  • non-technical policies, education, staff

29
Lines of Defense
  • network isolation for critical services
  • host integrity (Make the OS net-safe)
  • host perimeter (integral ACLs/firewalling)
  • cluster/lab perimeter (sanctuary, FW, LFW)
  • network zone perimeter (P172, FW)
  • real-time attack detection and containment
  • user education

30
Perimeter Firewalls
  • increase time-to-infection
  • increase time-to-repair
  • provide defense-in-depth
  • may look like a broken network to users
  • are defeated by a single hacked host
  • are defeated by tunneling/encryption
  • often give a false sense of security
  • encourage backdoors
  • may be a performance bottleneck
  • may inhibit legitimate activities, innovation
  • create a vulnerability zone that is hard to
    protect
  • vpns, laptops, wifi, usb drives, social engr
    attacks
  • the more you depend on perimeter defense, the
    more you must invest in defending the perimeter

31
Operational Impact by firewall type
  • host -- best case user interaction w/FW
    possible
  • cluster -- no impact on net diagnosis beyond
  • logical -- low impact on basic net diagnosis
  • subnet -- impacts almost all diagnosis
  • zone -- impacts inter-zone diagnosis
  • border --impacts inter-enterprise diagnosis NB
    cost of maintaining firewall config depends on
    who is doing it, and how many rules/exceptions
    there are.

32
Limits of Isolation attack gateways
  • hosts connected to two different networks can
    become attack gateways between the two
  • example home PCs with VPN connection to
    protected network
  • safer remote access SSH, SSL, K5, RDP, SSL VPNs

33
Med Center Zone Perimeter
  • purpose
  • time to defend against zero-day events
  • protect the otherwise unprotected
  • defense-in-depth
  • reduced annoyance/noise traffic
  • DOS attack mitigation
  • options
  • conventional inline firewall
  • private addressing NAT or proxies
  • both

34
Protecting Non-fixable Devices
  • FDA-approved devices, printers, etc
  • protection options (besides zone perimeter)
  • private addressing
  • individual firewall, VPN, or NAT box (25 -
    2500) --depending on performance requirements
  • cluster/lab perimeter firewalls
  • logical firewalls

35
NOC view of Firewall Approaches
  • EPFW End-Point Firewall
  • LFW Logical Firewall w/masquerading NAT
  • SFW Subnet Firewall
  • BZFW Border or Zone Firewall
  • P172 Project 172-phase III (Private
    addresses with NAT)

  • IDEAL EPFW LFW P172 SFW
    BZFW
  • Policy Enforcement Point? Host
    Host Subnet Zone Subnet Zone
  • Requires host reconfigure? No
    Yes Yes Yes No No
  • Requires network reconfig? No
    No No No Yes
    Yes
  • Destroys E2E transparency? No
    No No No Yes Yes
  • Assured NOC access to switches? Yes
    Yes Yes Yes No No

36
Network Security Trends
stealth / advanced scanning techniques
Blended attacks
High
denial of service
DDOS attacks
sniffers
www attacks
automated probes/scans
back doors
packet spoofing
Attack Sophistication
disabling audits
hijacking sessions
burglaries
exploiting known vulnerabilities
password cracking
self-replicating code
password guessing
Low
37
Impact of Recent Security Events
  • more perimeter firewalls (demise of open
    Internet, NUM)
  • more VPNs
  • more tunneling (firewall friendly apps)
  • more encryption (thanks to RIAA)
  • more collateral damage (from attacks remedies)
  • worse MTTR (complexity, broken tools)
  • constrained innovation (e.g. p2p, voip)
  • cost shifted from guilty to innocent
  • pressure to fix computer security problems in
    network
  • pressure for private nets
  • pressure to make network topology match org
    boundaries
  • blaster triggered more perimeter defense, but
    showed weakness of conventional perimeter defense
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