Secure%20Ad-Hoc%20Network - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Secure%20Ad-Hoc%20Network

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Power consumption is worse than computing or network resource ... Should be swift to renew symmetric key. Pre-computed certificate. Threshold cryptography ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Secure%20Ad-Hoc%20Network


1
Secure Ad-Hoc Network
  • Eunjin Jung
  • ejung_at_cs.utexas.edu

2
What is Ad-Hoc Network?
  • Ad-Hoc Network
  • Subset of peer-to-peer computing problem
  • Sensor network
  • Wireless and mobile
  • Physically neighboring participants
  • No infrastructure

3
Truth is
  • Ad-Hoc Network relies on
  • Base Station
  • Offline configuration
  • Potential
  • Military operation use
  • Sensor network
  • Pervasive, ubiquitous computing

4
Challenges in Ad-Hoc Network
  • Mobility
  • Restricted computing resource
  • Restricted power resource
  • Unreliable communication
  • Ad-Hoc
  • Transient states
  • No trustworthy third party
  • Often security protocol integrated with others

5
Security in Ad-Hoc Network
  • Availability
  • Sleep Deprivation Torture
  • Power consumption is worse than computing or
    network resource consumption, because the device
    cannot recover as soon as the attack finishes
  • Jamming
  • Spectrum Spread, Frequency Hopping

6
Security in Ad-Hoc Network
  • Confidentiality
  • Easier to passively eavesdrop
  • Cannot rely on expensive cryptosystem
  • Symmetric key cryptography is used
  • Small key, frequent update vs. large key,
    intermittent update

7
Security in Ad-Hoc Network
  • Authorization
  • Network resource
  • Inherently vulnerable to bandwidth stealing
  • Should reject routing unauthorized packet
  • Transient states
  • Security associations between principals are
    transient
  • Static authorization policy is unfeasible

8
Security in Ad-Hoc Network
  • Authentication
  • Cannot rely on central server
  • Neither on public key cryptography
  • Should be adaptive to transient authorization
    policy
  • Should be swift to renew symmetric key
  • Pre-computed certificate
  • Threshold cryptography

9
Security in Ad-Hoc Network
  • Integrity
  • Similar to any communication
  • Use traditional solution based on symmetric key
  • Non-Repudiation
  • Based on public/private key cryptography
  • Hard to achieve with limited computing resource
  • Content with certificates

10
Security in Ad-Hoc Network
  • Tamper-Resistance
  • Security not only on communication, but also on
    its physical status
  • Intrusion Detection
  • Shares have to be revoked and renewed when
    compromised
  • Anonymity
  • Hide the identity of the senders and receivers

11
Security in mobile network
  • AAA properties
  • Authentication
  • Authorization
  • Accounting
  • Standard in CDMA2000 packet core network

12
Everything comes to
  • Proper authentication scheme is the key to solve
    security problem in ad-hoc network
  • Hierarchical authentication scheme
  • Less mobility, higher in hierarchy
  • Multilevel authentication scheme
  • Link layerBT01
  • Routing layerPSWCT01
  • Application layer

13
Traditional ways do not work
  • Indirect KerberosFG96
  • Assuming application-level proxy to delegate
    public key operations
  • Base station can do the job if there is one
  • Duplicated servers
  • Tradeoff between mobility and cost

14
Early works may not either
  • Authentication protocols for PCS LH95
  • offer even non-repudiation
  • Assumption of static and high-capability HOME
    base station works with mobile-IP
  • Assumption of reliable communication between home
    base station and current one
  • Frequent cryptographic operation including public
    key operation on the subscribers side

15
SPINS authenticated routing
  • streaming authentication
    protocol
  • Two-party key agreement protocol
  • SNEP(Secure Network Encryption Protocol)
  • data confidentiality, two-party data
    authentication, and data freshness
  • Key from , further operation on
    SNEP

16
SPINS authenticated routing
  • Problem
  • Assumption on the functionality of base station
  • Lack of local operation

17
Decentralized solutions
  • Emulations of Certificate Authority
  • Key agreement based on prior context or offline
    agreement
  • Self-organized public key infrastructure

18
Shamirs secret sharing scheme
  • Interpolating scheme (mgt1)

19
What is threshold cryptography?
  • (m, n) threshold scheme
  • m-out-of-n scheme, secret sharing scheme
  • 1 sender(dealer) distributes partial
    secret(shares, shadows) to n participants
  • Any m parts put together can retrieve the secret,
    but not less than m
  • Perfect for any group of at most m-1 participants

20
Threshold Scheme
  • Tradeoff between security and reliability
    according to the choice of m and n
  • Reliability measure
  • Target of denial of service attack n-m1
  • Security measure
  • Target of compromising m
  • Good for distributed authentication

21
Emulation of Certificate Authority
  • Each entity has a share of group key
  • More than m entities can act as a certificate
    authority local operation
  • Each entity computes partial certificate out of
    partial secret
  • Proactively update shares, and actively revoke
    any compromised ones

22
Still problem remains
  • Requires collaborative users have to respond
    the partial certificate request anytime.
  • Who can be a dealer?
  • Shares are given to principals in bootstrap phase
    (still base station?)

23
Password based public key infrastructure
  • Prior context is assumed, so all participants
    share a weak secret.
  • Extending Diffie-Hellman method to agree on
    stronger symmetric key among multi-parties.

24
Password based public key infrastructure
  • O(n) steps

c1S4
m1
gS1
P(c1gS1bs2S3)
gS1S2S3
m2
m4
gS1S2S3
gS1S2S3
gS1S2
m3
25
Password based public key infrastructure
  • Need to communicate with all group members and
    select a leader
  • Static group assumption

26
Self-organized public-key infrastructure
  • Each user publishes its own certificate and some
    for others
  • Each user maintains certificate repository, some
    issued by itself, rest by others.
  • Trust graph each user is a node, and an edge
    (u,v) denotes user u published certificate to v.

27
Self-organized public-key infrastructure
28
Self-organized public-key infrastructure
  • How many certificates should be stored in the
    repository to cover all pairs in the ad hoc
    network? covers 95
  • Certificate neighbor may not be available at the
    trust graph construction time
  • Tested on PGP trust graphs does that represent
    ad hoc network properly?

29
No scheme is perfect yet
  • Security issues in ad-hoc networks are converged
    into authentication problem without
    infrastructure, in peer-to-peer manner.
  • The burden of CA is reduced, but still we need
    co-ordination
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