Historical Context of USLatin American Relations

1
Historical Context of US-Latin American Relations

• The Cold War Starts Truman and Eisenhower

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NEW RULES THE COLD WAR

• Two actors (bipolarity, no longer a multipolar
  world)
• Basis of Conflict Now Different Ideology,
  National Security
• New nature of global conflict (i.e., a new game)
  
• Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it
  his own social system
• (Stalin as quoted on Smith 2008115).

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NEW RULES THE COLD WAR

• The game becomes zero-sum (for the most part)
• Each side strove mightily to establish military
  superiority over the other, yet there existed no
  plausible change of military victory (Smith
  2000121).
• Hence Containment and Domino Theory
• Not empires, but more large spheres of influence
• Worldwide in scope
• Not within a subsystem
• Proxy warfare

4
The Truman Doctrine

• (PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN'S ADDRESS BEFORE A
  JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 12, 1947)
• One of the primary objectives of the foreign
  policy of the United States is the creation of
  conditions in which we and other nations will be
  able to work out a way of life free from
  coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war
  with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over
  countries which sought to impose their will, and
  their way of life, upon other nations.

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The Truman Doctrine

• We shall not realize our objectives, however,
  unless we are willing to help free peoples to
  maintain their free institutions and their
  national integrity against aggressive movements
  that seek to impose upon them totalitarian
  regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition
  that totalitarian regimes imposed on free
  peoples, by direct or indirect aggression,
  undermine the foundations of international peace
  and hence the security of the United States.

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The Truman Doctrine

• I believe that it must be the policy of the
  United States to support free peoples who are
  resisting attempted subjugation by armed
  minorities or by outside pressures.
• I believe that we must assist free peoples to
  work out their own destinies in their own way.

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The Truman Doctrine

• I believe that our help should be primarily
  through economic and financial aid which is
  essential to economic stability and orderly
  political processes.
• The free peoples of the world look to us for
  support in maintaining their freedoms.
• If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger
  the peace of the world -- and we shall surely
  endanger the welfare of our own nation.
• Great responsibilities have been placed upon us
  by the swift movement of events.

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More Truman Admin

• By the end of the Truman administration
• Increased Military assistance to Latin America
  (1951, 38.2 million in direct military
  assistance, 51.7 million un 1952Smith, 126).

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More Truman Admin

• Kennan recommended three major foreign policy
  goals
• The protection of our raw materials.
• The prevention of military exploitation of Latin
  America by the enemy.
• The prevention of the psychological mobilization
  of Latin America against us.

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More Truman Admin

• He went on to say The final answer might be an
  unpleasant onebutwe should not hesitate before
  police repression by the local government. This
  is not shameful since the Communists are
  essentially traitors.It is better to have a
  strong regime in power than a liberal one if it
  is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by
  Communists.
• Heading into the Eisenhower administration Ike
  criticized the Truman administration for
  neglecting Latin America in the campaign, but
  once in office adoption similar policies

11
Everybody Likes Ike! (Right?)

• Heading into the Eisenhower administration Ike
  criticized the Truman administration for
  neglecting Latin America in the campaign, but
  once in office adoption similar policies
• The View from the South
• We are puzzled and dismayed by the fact that
  while the nations that suffered most of the
  impast of the Second World War, have been
  entirely rebuily and even exceeded the levels
  enjoyed before the conflict, other nations are
  suffering a decline in their public and private
  revenues (Oswald Aranha, Brazils wartime
  foreign minister as quoted in Raymont, 92).
• SecState John Foster Dulles
• Do nothing to offend the dictators, they are the
  only people we can depend on (John Foster
  Dulles, SecState for Ike, as quoted on Smith
  131).
• stop coddling the Latins Dulles to the State
  Department Staff (Raymont, 93).

12
Eisenhower

• Milton Eisenhower (in a report on the region)
• The possible conquest of a Latin American nation
  today would not be, so far as anyone can foresee,
  by direct assault. It would come, rather,
  through the insidious process of infiltration,
  conspiracy, spreading of lies, and undermining
  free institutions. Highly disciplined groups of
  communists are busy, night and day, illegally or
  openly, in the American republics (as quoted in
  Smith, 127).

13
Key Issues from the Eisenhower Administration

• The Eisenhower Administration, US Foreign Policy
  vis-à-vis Latin America had three major
  components
• Elimination of Latin American Communist Parties
• Assertion (or reassertion) of state control over
  labor
• Diplomatic exclusion of the Soviet Union from
  the Western Hemisphere

14
Eisenhower

• Guatemala
• The Nixon trip to the region.
• Brazil and Operation Pan America
• Hemispheric relations/unity
• Kubitschek and labor/social policy
• Seen by Milton Eisenhower as simply a way to
  obtain US money.
• Waiting for Godot (see Raymont, 116)
• Damage to relations/looking eastward?

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Eisenhower

• The view from the South
• As you know, reaction throughout Latin America
  has been bad. Intervention is considered a worse
  evil than communism, especially since
  intervention is never applied to foster a
  democratic cause (Costa Rican President José
  Figueres to Adolf A. Berle, a former adviser to
  FDR, as quoted in Smith, 142).

16
VP Nixon Goes South

• On May 13, 1958, it may have seemed to many
  people that Latin Americans just did not like the
  United States anymore. That afternoon, Vice
  President Richard Nixon, while on a good will
  mission to South America, headed a motorcade into
  Caracas, Venezuelas capital. When the cars
  slowed down, onlookers rushed to gather around
  them. For twelve minutes, the crowd rocked the
  vehicles, bashed them with sticks and iron bars,
  spat on the windows, and shouted at the
  passengers. The U.S. delegates and their
  Venezuelan escorts feared for their lives, and
  barely escaped. The incident brought a climax to
  protests that marred every stop on Nixons
  itinerary. Whatever else this was, most witnesses
  agreed, it was anti-Americanism--unbridled
  hostility toward "the United States." Costa Rican
  president José Figueres, like others, tried to
  define the problem narrowly "People cannot spit
  on a foreign policy which is what they meant to
  do." Others feared a tide of revolution. As one
  aide told Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
  "The preponderance of U.S. influence in Latin
  America is being challenged." Among shaken U.S.
  diplomats, the general consensus was at least
  that "real violence" against U.S. representatives
  was "something new," a qualitative leap in
  boldness stemming from resentment against nearly
  every aspect of U.S. influence in Latin America.

Source Alan McPherson, Yankee No!
Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations
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The Cuban Revolution
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The Cuban Revolution
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The Cuban Revolution
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Source http//www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuban
-rebels/NI-FidelsRevolution.pdf
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Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the
Department of State

• Havana, December 31, 1958--6 p.m.
• (1) Government believed in control more of
  province than Kieffer indicated. Army offensive
  has recovered number of small towns and cities in
  past three days. Rebels still control much of
  province, particularly mountainous areas, and
  capable causing disturbances in all but principal
  cities.

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Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the
Department of State

• (2) As Department aware, Guevara is extreme
  leftist and anti-American, and sometimes reported
  to be Communist. Cienfuegos background
  questionable, with considerable evidence he
  Communist much of which supplied by Kieffer.
  American newsmen who interviewed Cienfuegos less
  than 1 line not declassified he not Communist.
  No evidence rebel forces Las Villas operating
  under Communist orders. DR and Segundo Frente
  troops believe not Communist influenced.
  Marinello in hiding and whereabouts unknown.
  less than 1 line not declassified DR source
  stating Guevara attempting to install local
  Communist leaders as civilian heads of towns
  occupied by rebels and DR hard pressed to offset
  such activities. Difficult to assess allegations
  accurately, since GOC Government of Cuba
  attempting to discredit revolutionary movement
  with charges it Communist. As example, police in
  plainclothes today distributing pamphlets in
  Habana allegedly from Communist youth calling on
  people to support general strike.
• (3) Communists undoubtedly profiting by
  distributed and unsettled situation and
  endeavoring infiltrate opposition groups with
  some success.

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Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the
Department of State

• (4) Embassy had not been advised of any Kieffer
  allegations, has not sent anyone into area, and
  does not plan to do so.
• Smith

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Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the
Department of State

• 681. Reliably informed Colonel Ramon Barquin has
  been released from prison on Isle of Pines, is
  now in Habana and has assumed control of armed
  forces from Cantillo with latter's approval.
  Military vehicles now patrolling disturbed areas
  city with military police to maintain order.
  Barquin said to have sent word to Fidel Castro
  and Urrutia to come to Habana where he will
  deliver control of government to them.
• Comment This is encouraging development,
  increasing possibility of early accord between
  armed forces and rebel movements. Also
  strengthens position of military vis-a-vis
  rebels.

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Castro Comes to Washington
1959
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Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the
Department of State Havana, October 6, 1959
(excerpt)

• 1 have just had one-hour conversation with
  Minister of State Roa. After reiterating to him
  that I found general sympathy with stated
  democratic social objectives Cuban revolution, I
  also found considerable perplexity and doubt
  among people with whom I spoke as to Cuban
  attitudes toward US and free world, I said that I
  found no evidence of any press or other
  "campaign" or "conspiracy" against Cuba, adding
  that attitudes I had found represented harvest of
  anti-American attitudes, statements and actions
  by leading representatives of Cuban Government
  and party press. I urged him to believe present
  state our relations not due anything other than
  these attitudes, statements and actions. I said
  that many people believed hand of friendship we
  had extended to present GOC had been neglected.
• He replied that he believed I was hypersensitive
  on this score and stated true attitude Cuban
  people toward US reflected by ovation which I
  received at local ball park last Saturday night.
  (This was indeed heart-warming experience
  involving expression some 25,000 people all
  classes of very friendly attitude toward US.)

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The Cuban Revolution