The Logics of Separatism in Southeast Asia and Beyond: Geography, Demography, Economics and Politics

1
The Logics of Separatism in Southeast Asia and
Beyond Geography, Demography, Economics and
Politics

• Dr Graham K. Brown
• Research Officer, Centre for Research on
  Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE)
• University of Oxford

2
The Cases
Pattani
Mindanao
Aceh
Sabah

• Malay/Muslim minority concentrated in 3
  provinces
• Relatively poor area
• Historic links with the Malay peninsula

• Muslim minority concentrated in four regions
• Relatively poor area
• Historic links with Borneo and Brunei

• Ethnic Acehnese minority concentrated in
  province
• Oil/gas reserves
• Historic links with Malay peninsular Ottoman
  Empire

• Non-Malay, mostly Christian minorities
• Relatively poor area
• Historic links with Mindanao and the Brunei
  Sultanate

3
Four Logics

• Geography Historical processes of state
  formation and border-drawing
• Demography State migration policies and
  minoritization
• Economics Inter- and intra-regional horizontal
  inequalities
• Politics Politicization of resentment

4
Measuring Ethnic Difference (i)

• Subnational Group Difference (SGD) In a
  population of n ethnic groups, which constitute
  proportion si of the subnational region S in
  question and proportion pi of the rest of the
  population P

5
Distributions of PADs by Maximum Subnational
Group Difference
6
Ethnic Peripheries
Inter-Regional Difference (SGD), 20 quantiles
7
Non-Separatist Regions in Q20
FRAC
DIFF
REGION
COUNTRY
FRAC
DIFF
REGION
COUNTRY
0.121
0.572
Central Region
Guinea
0.433
0.737
Western Region
Kenya
0.062
0.562
C. Java
Indonesia
0.360
0.654
W. Java
Indonesia
0.168
0.675
Sekong
Laos
0.376
0.675
W. Visayas
Philippines
0.089
0.659
Himachal Pr.
India
0.303
0.625
Amhara
Ethiopia
0.224
0.872
Bali
Indonesia
0.410
0.743
NWFP
Pakistan
0.215
0.869
W. Sumatra
Indonesia
0.521
0.924
West Nile
Uganda
0.181
0.909
Gorontalo
Indonesia
0.510
0.911
W. Nusateng.
Indonesia
0.122
0.913
Tigray
Ethiopia
0.437
0.812
Bangka-Belitung
Indonesia
0.087
0.886
Lakshadweep
India
0.398
0.761
S. Kalimantan
Indonesia
0.018
0.837
FATA
Pakistan
0.154
0.551
Yogyakarta
Indonesia
0.012
0.958
North East
Kenya
0.448
0.854
Caprivi
Namibia
8
Geographic Logic Fuzzy Borders and Ethnic
Peripheries

• Precolonial ma??ala states Porous borders,
  spheres of influence, mountain boundaries
• Colonial state formation Hard borders,
  centre-periphery relations, water boundaries
• Postcolonial state formation Geo-politics

9
Ethnohistories

• Our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra, had always been a
  free and independent sovereign State since the
  world begun. Holland was the first foreign power
  to attempt to colonize us when it declared war
  against the sovereign State of Acheh, on March
  26, 1873, and on the same day invaded our
  territory, aided by Javanese mercenaries After
  World War II our fatherland was turned over by
  the Dutch to the Javanese by hasty fiat. (ASNLF,
  1976)
• For many centuries, the Bangsamoro people were a
  free, sovereign and independent nation. In the
  early 15th century no less than the reigning
  Emperor of China had written with his own hand an
  epitaph on the Mausoleum of one of our Kings,
  saying "That he was a brave King and he was the
  Master of the East!" But owing to the centuries
  of war and turmoil wrought by endless waves of
  foreign conspiracy and aggressions, we've lost
  our freedom. Consequently, our sovereignty is
  being exercised by people other than the
  Bangsamoro people themselves. (Nur Misuari, 2000)
• Patani, Jala, Narathiwat have always been Malay
  territory, as long as history goes back and even
  before the establishment of Bangkok.(Che Man,
  2005)
• Throughout the centuries from the dawn of history
  the Sinhalese and Tamil nations have divided
  between them the possession of Ceylon, the
  Sinhalese inhabiting the interior of the country
  in its Southern and Western parts from the river
  Walawe to that of Chilaw and the Tamils
  possessing the Northern and Eastern districts
  (TULF, 1976)

10
Ethnohistories

• Contrast from Sabah
• Sabah was a land of freedom until the middle of
  the nineteenth century in the sense that there
  was no organised form of government and a state
  did not exist until 1881. Before that,
  geographically Sabah had existed since time
  immemorial. But there was no community, no
  overall administration, no state economy, no
  state government only mountains, jungles,
  rivers, the surrounding seas, and isolated
  villages scattered over the more than 29,000
  square miles of tropical and warm equatorial
  land.
• (Ongkili 1981)

11
The discourse of decolonization

• The question of Acheh-Sumatra is not a question
  of "separatism" - as alleged by the Indonesian
  Javanese neo-colonialists - but a question of
  self-determination of the people of Acheh-Sumatra
  and a question of decolonization of the former
  Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) which has not been
  decolonized legally and properly in accordance
  with the purpose and the meaning of the Charter
  of the United Nations, and with the United
  Nations Resolution on the Granting of
  Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
  (Hassan di Tiro, 1976)
• Petition for the Decolonization of the Bangsamoro
  Homeland in Southern Philippines, and Request for
  United Nations Assistance in its Establishment as
  the Independent Bangsamoro Republic Of Mindanao
  those who continued to tenaciously pursue their
  demand for independence have been discredited as
  international terrorists or secessionists or
  separatists. (MNLF, 2001)
• Before a succession of western nations (including
  the Portuguese, Dutch and the British) ruled the
  island, there were two distinct kingdoms on the
  island, the Tamil Kingdom in the north and the
  Sinhala kingdom in the South. Sinhala
  colonisation of traditional Tamil areas was
  started in the fifties, and was intensified in
  the eighties... Colonisation continues unabated.
  (LTTE, n.d.)

12
Atavism, Mobilization and Islam

• Many scholars, particularly Westerners and
  particularly recently (i.e. post 9/11), tend to
  focus on the Islamic dimension in separatist
  movements, drawing purported links between
  various regional groups and Al-Qaeda (Chalk,
  Gunaratna, Abuza, etc.).
• Problematic nature of these claims myopic,
  ahistorical, based on poor or simply inaccurate
  data (Hamilton-Hart 2006 Brown 2007 Connors
  2007 Sidel 2007).
• Alternative explanation may focus on the
  historical role of Islam in early pre-colonial
  state formation in SE Asia and its concomitant
  atavistic appeal.

13
Demographic Logic

• Many of the post-second world war states of
  Southeast Asia faced ethnic peripheries, left
  over from the mismatch between colonial
  border-drawing and the patterns of pre-colonial
  settlement and state-formation. A typical
  response of these newly independent states and,
  in some cases their colonial predecessors, to the
  potential problems was to encourage in-migration
  to the ethnic peripheries by more loyal
  representative of the putative nation-state,
  often in the name of development. Far from
  undermining the likelihood of secession, such
  policies typically exacerbated local grievances
  by adding to the sense of marginalization among
  peripheral communities.

14
Population of Mindanao by religion 1903-2000
15
Migrants living in Aceh, 1990
16
Population of Southern Region of Thailand, 1960
2000
1960 2000
Buddhist Muslim Other Buddhist Muslim Other
Chumphon 98.8 0.1 1.1 98.9 0.7 0.4
Krabi 61.3 38.1 0.6 65.2 34.7 0.1
Nakhon Si Thammarat 94.4 4.9 0.7 93.1 6.2 0.7
Narathiwat 20.7 1.1 17.9 0.1
Pattani 21.8 0.4 19.2 0.1
Phangnga 80.8 17.9 1.3 76.3 23.2 0.5
Phatthalung 91.5 8.0 0.5 88.3 11.1 0.6
Phuket 81.2 17.1 1.7 81.6 17.1 1.3
Ranong 87.2 11.9 0.9 88.5 10.9 0.6
Satun 16.8 0.3 31.9 0.3
Songkhla 77.9 18.6 3.5 76.6 23.2 0.2
Surat Thani 96.5 2.0 1.5 97.3 2.0 0.7
Trang 86.2 12.1 1.7 86.0 13.7 0.3
Yala 28.5 10.4 31.0 0.1
Southern Region 72.9 25.3 1.8 71.6 28.0 0.4
78.2
82.0
77.8
80.7
82.9
67.8
61.1
68.9
17
Population dynamics Sabah, 1951-2000
1951 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Dusun 35.3 32.0 28.2 83.0 12.5 18.4
Kadazan 35.3 32.0 28.2 83.0 6.0 18.4
Murut 5.6 4.9 4.8 83.0 2.9 3.3
Bajau 13.4 13.1 11.8 83.0 11.7 13.2
Malay - - 2.8 83.0 6.2 11.7
Other Indigenous 18.5 17.5 19.2 83.0 14.7 15.0
Indonesian - - 6.1 83.0 8.0 -
Chinese 22.3 23.0 21.4 16.2 11.5 10.1
Others 5.0 9.5 5.7 0.8 1.9 4.8
Non-Malaysian Citizens - - - - 24.5 23.6
Christian 8.7 16.6 27.2 27.8
Muslim 34.5 37.9 51.3 63.7
Other (Mostly animist) 56.8 45.5 21.5 8.5
TOTAL POPULATION (000s) 334 454 653 1,239 1,734 2,603
18
Economic Logic Horizontal Inequalities

• Horizontal inequalities (HI) defined as
  socio-economic inequalities between ethnic,
  religious, or regionally-defined groups.
• Strong econometric evidence of link between HI
  and conflict, both in terms of regional
  disaggregation of conflict intensity in specific
  case studies, e.g. Indonesia (Mancini 2007) and
  Nepal (Gates Murshed 2005), and of incidence of
  conflict in cross-country datasets, e.g. Østby
  2007.

19
Economic Logic Horizontal Inequalities

• Focus here on two dimensions
• Inter-regional HIs Disparities in regional
  socio-economic performance between (would-be)
  separatist region and the rest of the country
• Intra-regional HIs Disparities in
  ethno-reigious socio-economic performance within
  (would-be) separatist region

20
Effect of relative GDP per capita conditional on
group difference
Notes Logistic regression, N21,343
pseudo-R20.3200. Other variables, including
political system (Polity index federal dummy)
and national economic performance (GDP per
capita GDP per capita growth), held at mean
values.
21
Economic Logic (i) Inter-Regional Horizontal
Inequalities Thailand
22
Economic Logic (i) Inter-Regional Horizontal
Inequalities - Mindanao

• 1972 GDP per capita at outbreak of conflict
  (1972) gt20 lower than national average and
  barely half that of Luzon
• 1990 Mindanao as a whole remains at around 80
  of national rate but ARMM much worse, barely 30
  of national rate. ARMM provinces bottom of every
  national HDR since 1992 further decline in late
  1990s precedes resumption of violence.

23
Economic Logic (i) Inter-Regional Horizontal
Inequalities - Aceh

• 1970s Discovery of oil and natural gas keeps
  provincial GDP per capita well above national
  average. Low poverty in 1980, Aceh ranked 24
  out of 26 provinces in terms of poverty
• 1990 poverty rate increased over 200, now
  ranked 8 out of 26 GDP per capita remains among
  the highest

24
Economic Logic (i) Inter-Regional Horizontal
Inequalities Sabah
25
Economic Logic (ii) Intra-Regional Horizontal
Inequalities Thailand
Region, Religion Language Region, Religion Language Female Education Female Education Male Education Male Education Household Assets Household Assets
Region, Religion Language Region, Religion Language Buddhist Muslim Buddhist Muslim Buddhist Muslim
Central 7.807 9.197 0.736
Southn 5.253 3.627 6.140 4.079 0.443 0.400
Malay 2.920 3.524 0.405
Central 6.809 8.151 0.541
Southn 4.948 3.546 5.788 4.091 0.331 0.317
Malay 2.785 3.401 0.316
Rural Urban
Rural
26
Economic Logic (ii) Intra-Regional Horizontal
Inequalities Mindanao
27
Economic Logic (ii) Intra-Regional Horizontal
Inequalities Mindanao
28
Economic Logic (ii) Intra-Regional Horizontal
Inequalities Aceh

• Two types of Javanese in-migrants urban
  professionals rural settlers (transmigration)
• Lhokseumawe Industrial Zone came to assume the
  obtrusive character of a high-income,
  capital-intensive, urban, non-Muslim,
  non-Acehnese enclave in a basically low-income,
  labor-intensive, rural, Muslim, Acehnese
  province (Emmerson 1983)
• 1990 Urban unemployment rate among ethnic
  Acehnese twice that of Javanese among those
  educated to Senior High or above, Acehnese
  unemployment stands at 13.1 Javanese at 2.7.
• 1990 Among rural population, Javanese
  landholdings significantly larger than Acehnese
  50 of Javanese in agricultural occupations have
  landholdings larger than 2 Hectares equivalent
  rate among ethnic Acehnese less than 30

29
Economic Logic (ii) Intra-Regional Horizontal
Inequalities Sabah
1982 1987 1989
Malay 1.44 1.44 1.41
Kadazan/Dusun 0.78 0.66 0.69
Bajau 0.70 0.83 0.80
Murut 0.41 0.57 0.67
Other Bumiputera 0.77 n.a. n.a.
Chinese 1.67 2.00 1.95
Others 2.94 n.a. n.a.
30
Political Logic The role of the state (i)

• Aceh Initial, relatively small scale insurgency
  easily dealt with by the military but ushers in a
  period of high repression and discrimination
  (including preferential in-migration) which
  fosters wider resentment
• Mindanao Inter-religious land conflicts emerge
  in the 1960s turn to explicitly separatist
  violence comes after Jabidah Massacre, biased
  police intervention in land conflicts and
  declaration of Martial Law

31
Political Logic The role of the state (ii)

• Thailand First wave of insurgency comes after
  Phibul virtually outlaws Malay language, customs
  and practices Recent wave linked to
  disestablishment of bodies for Muslim grievances
  and harsh police response to Muslim protests.
• Sabah 1985 state election focal point for
  non-Muslim grievances Muslims parties steal
  the election protest rallies, bombings Federal
  government intervenes, accepting non-Muslim
  victory, despite political antipathy

32
Three tenses of separatism Past perfect

• Separatism (unsurprisingly) is associated with
  ethnic peripheries, often left over from
  colonial state formation. But this is
  insufficient to explain the incidence of
  separatism necessary but not sufficient?
• Pre-colonial (ethno)histories can provide strong
  mobilizing potential through atavistic (and often
  glamourized or sanitized) depictions of a past
  Glorious Age

33
Three tenses of separatism Present imperfect

• Demographic minoritization and socio-economic
  marginalization and/or perceptions of
  exploitation provide substantial fuel for
  separatist discontent
• During these last thirty years the people of
  Acheh, Sumatra, have witnessed how our fatherland
  has been exploited and driven into ruinous
  conditions by the Javanese neo-colonialists they
  have stolen our properties Acheh, Sumatra, has
  been producing a revenue of over 15 billion US
  dollars yearly for the Javanese neo-colonialists,
  which they used totally for the benefit of Java
  and the Javanese (ASNLF Declaration of
  Independence, 4/12/1976).

34
Three tenses of separatism Future progressive

• These conditions have tended to create localized
  discontent and low-level violence. But it has
  been the intervention of the state in ways
  perceived as directly and deliberately
  discriminatory that have prefigured the emergence
  of mass-based movements seeking a separate future
  from the existing nation state.

35
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• Terima Kasih