Security in Plan 9 Russ Cox, Eric Grosse, Rob Pike, Dave Presotto, Sean Quinlan Presented by Vijay Srinivas Nori April 19, 2006 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Loading...

PPT – Security in Plan 9 Russ Cox, Eric Grosse, Rob Pike, Dave Presotto, Sean Quinlan Presented by Vijay Srinivas Nori April 19, 2006 PowerPoint presentation | free to download - id: 72894-ZDc1Z



Loading


The Adobe Flash plugin is needed to view this content

Get the plugin now

View by Category
About This Presentation
Title:

Security in Plan 9 Russ Cox, Eric Grosse, Rob Pike, Dave Presotto, Sean Quinlan Presented by Vijay Srinivas Nori April 19, 2006

Description:

1. Security in Plan 9. Russ Cox, Eric Grosse, Rob Pike, Dave Presotto, Sean Quinlan ... 'Plan 9 from Bell Labs', R Pike et. al., Computing Systems, 1995 scs. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:82
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 19
Provided by: napoleonb
Learn more at: http://www.cs.uiuc.edu
Category:

less

Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Security in Plan 9 Russ Cox, Eric Grosse, Rob Pike, Dave Presotto, Sean Quinlan Presented by Vijay Srinivas Nori April 19, 2006


1
Security in Plan 9Russ Cox, Eric Grosse, Rob
Pike, Dave Presotto, Sean QuinlanPresented by
Vijay Srinivas NoriApril 19, 2006
2
Outline
  • Overview
  • Plan 9 Security Problems
  • Proposed Solutions
  • Results
  • Conclusion

3
Overview
  • Plan 9 is a microkernel based OS
  • Developed at Bell Labs (late 1980s) 2
  • Several Problems in Security Architecture
  • Redesigned security architecture to be
  • Simple to Use
  • Simple to modify/update
  • Simple to understand and verify
  • Focus Practical causes of Security holes

4
Outline
  • Overview
  • Plan 9 Security Problems
  • Proposed Solutions
  • Results
  • Conclusion

5
Problems Analyzed (1)
recompile/relink restart security modules
6
Problems Analyzed (2)
  • Enhance ease of use
  • Many security violations due to user inexperience
    with complex security
  • e.g. installing X.509
  • certificates

7
Problems Analyzed (3)
Local File Store
User
Same password!
8
Problems Analyzed (4)
PLAN 9 File Transport Protocol
Authentication Protocol
9
Outline
  • Overview
  • Plan 9 Security Problems
  • Proposed Solutions
  • Results
  • Conclusion

10

Required at bootstrap to load the existing keys
Factotum
  • Components of the Security Architecture

11
System Redesign
  • Factotum
  • All security code packaged in
  • Debug, modify, add new protocols on the fly
  • Programs dont need to be compiled with crypto
    code talk to factotum agents
  • When modifying security modules
    recompile/relink and restart factotum

12
Factotum Working
  • Requests password for secstore at startup
    performs all authentications from then on (like
    Kerberos 3)
  • Factotum keeps its keys in volatile memory
  • -passwords as plaintext (-noswap)
  • User talks to factotum using a RPC like protocol
  • Copy initial set of stores from Network Server
    secstore at startup using encrypted
    communication.

13
Changes to 9P
9P File Service
Client
Factotum
afd ready for mount!
14
Outline
  • Overview
  • Plan 9 Security Problems
  • Proposed Solutions
  • Results
  • Conclusion

15
Results
  • Achieved Ease of Use (subjective)
  • Achieved Security (subjective)
  • The Group is moving their computing environment
    outside the corporate firewall
  • Primary computing environment for several
    developers of Plan 9
  • Ease of Development/Maintainance
  • Only update factotum e.g. with bug fixes

16
Outline
  • Overview
  • Plan 9 Security Problems
  • Proposed Solutions
  • Results
  • Conclusion

17
Conclusion
  • It is HARD to write safe code
  • Logic mistakes, OS bugs, compiler bugs
  • Bugs WILL exist but once detected should be
    easy to fix or perform damage control
  • Factotum has all the security code
  • Smaller code ( few thousand lines)
  • Easy to verify and less error prone

18
References
  • 1 Security in Plan 9, Russ Cox et. al.,
    Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
  • 2 Plan 9 from Bell Labs, R Pike et. al.,
    Computing Systems, 1995 scs.stanford.edu
  • 3 Kerberos An Authentication Service for Open
    Network Systems, Jennifer G. Steiner et. al.,
    Proc. Winter USENIX Conference, 1988
About PowerShow.com