European population development mostly about transitions, divergence and interactions'

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European population development mostly about
transitions, divergence and interactions.

• First DT Reproduction delayed and divergent,
  and longer life - for some.
• Second DT A transition in partnership, or more
  diversity?
• Third DT? Migration and its consequences.
• Feedback and homoeostasis the invisible
  elephant?

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Fertility and its unknown future - delayed and
divergent.

• Little guidance from theory
• Near-universal low fertility but highest
  Western TFR is 75 higher than lowest.
• Not declining further 2-3 decades of near
  stability outside the South, CEE and FSU.
• Most period trends (if any) are upwards.
• Fertility now more compatible with work.
• Maybe positive relationship with status.

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TFR trends, groups of countries, 1950-2002
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Fertility can go up as well as down
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Reversal of the correlation between womens
workforce participation and fertility 1970 -1990
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Does public policy affect the birth rate?
Feedback from demographic analysis and projection.

• Family policy (was) mostly aimed at welfare.
• Most effects probably unintended.
• Policy may institutionalise the life course.
• Pronatalist argument now overt (EU Green Paper)
• Comparative studies show weak effects
• Single-country studies show stronger effects
• Labour market, child-care, money all important,
  but payment seldom promotes parenthood.
• Culture, gender equity fundamental?

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What do women want?

• Will most women/couples continue to want two
  children? (now lt2 in Germany, Austria).
• If so look after the interests of women and
  population will look after itself? If not..
• Are men still necessary?
• Lone parenthood women do it their way?
• New biological / evolutionary thinking on need to
  procreate and to nurture suggests that desire
  for children may be fundamental.

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The other half of the demographic transition
longer lives for some

• Contrasting views on sustainability of recent
  increases in survival.
• Current Western demographic trends mostly
  favourable, including oldest-old (e.g France
  2004 e0m 76.7 e0f 83.8). But not all
  (Netherlands, Denmark).
• Biological views less optimistic new threats
  (e.g. obesity), artificial nature of current
  levels of survival..
• Masculinisation and convergence - of female
  mortality?
• Diverging trends in CEE, former Soviet Union.
  Dependence on political system?

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Expectation of life at birth, both sexes, latest
data (quintiles) source WHO
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Male expectation of life at birth, trends
1950-2002
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Male expectation of life, former Soviet Union
1950 - 2003
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Obesity prevalence among adults, around 1990 and
2000.
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The revolution in partnership

• Second Demographic Transition now the
  mainstream concept among population scholars. A
  comprehensive theory.
• Displacement of marriage
• The fragility of partnerships
• The normality of extra-marital birth
• ?Lower fertility?

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The displacement of marriage all heading the
same way?
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A coherent syndrome
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Or not? Total fertility rate and proportion of
births outside marriage
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Some remaining questions

• Must a transition be permanent and universal?
• So far result is diversity, not uniformity,
  although most trends still upwards.
• Has the transition stalled at the Alps?
• Will Muslims follow, in Europe or in Turkey?
• Are costs sustainable, with population ageing?
• Are alternative explanations possible for the
  same empirical phenomena, e.g. in CEE countries?

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Reversible? Marriage rates can go up as well as
down.
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Sustainable?

• SDT rests partly on welfare. Can we afford SDT
  AND unavoidable population ageing?
• Fiscal burdens e.g. divorce adds 15 to UK
  benefit bill (15 bn) creates 3 for 2 new
  households.
• Psychosocial externalities. In UK and US at
  least, the SDTs new living arrangements can
  damage childrens (social) health.

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Are the CEE and FSU countries really so post
materialist?
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Demographic consequences of migration a third
demographic transition in the making?

• Primary contributor to population growth, as
  well as moderating decline.
• Heterogeneous process, strongly influenced by
  policy.
• Some elements self-reinforcing. (chain and
  marriage migration)
• Potential for substantial ethnic replacement.

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UK population 2004-2071(1000s) growth through
immigration.
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Sweden 2004-2050 projected total population,
millions, standard and zero-migration
assumptions.
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Growth of male South Asian ethnic minority
populations of marriageable age, and
entry-clearance applications for wives/fiancees
1981-2001.
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Sweden 1980. Projected population by background
to 2020 and 2050 ()
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Netherlands 2003/4 - 2050. Percent of population
of foreign origin, medium variant and
zero-migration projections.
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Comparison of results of European foreign-origin
projections
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Demographic feedback the invisible elephant?

• Feedback and interaction mechanisms notably
  absent from much recent demographic thinking and
  official projection. BUT
• Are SDT and population ageing both affordable?
• Do projections influence demographic futures?
• Can trends be self-reinforcing (US, Japan,
  Italy)?
• Could population decline promote fertility
  increase?
• Does (ethnic) immigration promote (native)
  emigration?
• Can poorest poor populations really quadruple?

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The idea of Gianpiero Dalla Zuannas paper... in
summary
Persistent low fertility and persistent strong
immigration can be endogenous components of
economic growth
Low fertility accelerates economic growth,
increasing the human capital of the children
Immigrations are indispensable for a long period
economic growth in low fertility countries,
contrasting the repugnant consequences of low
fertility lack of unskilled workers and aging of
population
Low fertility and immigrations are the secret
demographic engine of the economic growth in
some Western countries
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The social process in the real case...
Couples adopt low fertility as a strategy for
social mobility of children
Children have higher chances and desire better
jobs
Low level jobs are left empty
Immigrants fill in low level jobs, but quickly
adapt to the host society in term of low
fertility strategies
Even children of immigrants have higher chances
and desire better jobs
... are these hypotheses confirmed?
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Declining population - alternative responses and
feedbacks (Hannibals revenge vs. small is
beautiful vs. small is expensive).
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Feedback between (foreign) immigration and
(native) emigration?
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Summary remarks

• Diversity of fertility prospects of increase?
• Questions remain about SDT
• Divergent mortality trends continue East / West
• So assumptions of convergence through
  globalisation may not be justified.
• Migration can have major permanent effects on
  population composition a third transition and a
  one-way demographic globalisation? Not
  incorporated into most projections
• Can we ever model feedbacks and homoeostatic
  mechanisms?