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An Effective Architecture and Algorithm for Detecting Worms with Various Scan Techniques

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Title: An Effective Architecture and Algorithm for Detecting Worms with Various Scan Techniques


1
An Effective Architecture and Algorithm for
Detecting Worms with Various Scan Techniques
  • Sarma Vangala
  • Department of Electrical Computer Engineering,
  • University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA.
  • Joint work with J.Wu, L. Gao and K.Kwiat

2
Introduction
  • Self-propagating malicious code
  • Spread fast (Nimda), DDoS attacks (Blaster)
  • Millions of dollars in cost
  • Find targets - scan
  • More information to carry ? slower spread

3
Motivation
  • Can worms choose targets more carefully to spread
    effectively?
  • Is there an effective architecture to detect
    worms in large scale attacks?

4
Contributions
  • New scan techniques
  • - Routable scan
  • - Divide-Conquer scan
  • - Complete scan
  • Worm detection
  • - Architecture
  • - Victim Number Based algorithm

5
Overview
  • Various scanning techniques
  • Worm detection architecture
  • Victim Number Based algorithm
  • Performance of the detection algorithm
  • Conclusions

6
AAWP Model
  • N Total of vulnerable machines
  • T of scan targets
  • s Scan rate
  • ni infected upto tick i
  • ni1 ni N-ni1-(1-1/T)sni

7
Selective Random Scan
  • Select addresses belonging to existing machines
  • Remove reserved or unallocated (Bogon list, IANA
    IP v4 AAM)
  • Slapper worm (only 162 /8 prefixes)
  • Faster spread

8
Spread of Selective Random Scan
9
Routable Scan
  • Scan routable addresses from global BGP tables
  • Disadvantage large code size
  • How to reduce it ?

10
Code Size of Routable Scan
  • Route Views UOregon BGP table
  • 112K ? 17918 address segments (merging)
  • 17916 ? 1926 (? 15.4kB database, 216 threshold)
  • 1926 ? ? 3kB (20 segments contribute 90
    addresses)

11
Spread of Routable Scan
12
Divide Conquer Scan
  • Divide address space among victims
  • Faster spread
  • Single point of failure
  • Smaller address space ? smaller code size ?
    smaller scan traffic ? stealthier

13
Spread of Divide Conquer Scan
14
Complete Scan
  • Exact list of assigned IP addresses
  • Difficult to differentiate legitimate scans from
    worm scans ? difficult to detect
  • Large code size (100M addresses ? 400MB database)
    ? very slow spread
  • Specific vulnerability - smaller

15
Spread of Complete Scan
16
Comparison of Various Scan Techniques
17
Comparison
  • Stealthier scanning not always necessary
  • Speed is important (random scan not always bad)
    Tradeoff needed
  • Combinations effective
  • Blaster worm
  • - 60 random
  • - 40 local subnet

18
Detection?
  • Common properties of worms to detect?
  • What architecture is needed?
  • How do we say there is a worm using the
    architecture?

19
Further
  • Worm Detection Architecture
  • Abnormalities of worm incidents and Decision
    rules
  • Victim Number Based Algorithm

20
Generic Worm Detection Architecture
21
Address Space Selection
  • Monitor addresses being scanned by worm
  • Random Scan - any address (scans every address)
  • Routable and Divide Conquer - assigned addresses

22
How do we say there is a worm?
  • Hosts scanning specific ports of inactive
    addresses - VICTIMS
  • Sudden increase in of VICTIMS ? Something
    abnormal (maybe worm)

23
Victim Decision Rules
  • One Scan Decision Rule (OSDR) Too many false
    alarms
  • Two Scan Decision Rule (TSDR)

24
Victim Number Based Algorithm
  • Gather scan packets (Detection Architecture)
  • Decide if victims (Decision Rules)
  • Set adaptive threshold (Ti) for current tick i
  • Is Vi1 Vi gt Ti ?
  • If Yes for r continuous ticks, report
    detection center

25
Validation of Victim Number Based Algorithm
  • Validation using traffic traces from WAND
    research group
  • WAND trace AAWP dynamics and a /16 detection
    network
  • More victim increase rate, faster scan

26
Detection of Random Scan Worm
27
Detection of Routable Scan Worm
28
Detection of Divide Conquer Scan Worm
29
Conclusions
  • Stealthier and faster scans as attackers get more
    sophisticated
  • Stealth not always an issue, speed does matter!
  • Faster detection using simple algorithm
  • Code Red Detection
  • - Random Scan ( lt 4)
  • - Routable Scan ( lt 1.5)

30
More Information
  • An Effective Architecture and algorithm for
    Detecting Worms with Various Scan Techniques, J.
    Wu, S. Vangala, L.Gao, K.Kwiat, at
  • http//www-unix.ecs.umass.edu/lgao/ndss04.pdf
  • Offline svangala_at_ecs.umass.edu

31
Thank You!
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