Violent NonState Actors and Regional Security Challenges

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Violent Non-State Actors and Regional Security
Challenges

• Presentation for
• 20th Maritime Security Conference
• Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
• Dalhousie University

Dakota L. Wood Senior Fellow
June 11, 2009
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Agenda

• Violent Non-State Actors
• Proxies in State Competitions
• Hybrid Battlefields G-RAMM and Advanced
  Technologies
• The North American Context
• Challenges, Implications, and Areas for
  Collaboration

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Violent Non-State Actors
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Violent Non-State Actors

• Non-state actors can effectively challenge a
  state when the state lacks
• Legitimacy and authority
• Capacity to provide public/collective goods
• Sound economic management
• A sense of collective interest and inclusiveness
• VNSA Types
• Warlords
• Militias
• Paramilitary Forces
• Insurgencies
• Terrorist Organizations
• Criminal Organizations/Youth Gangs
• Crime is simply a continuation of business by
  other means. The aim of transnational criminal
  organizations is to derive as much profit as
  possible from their activities within the
  limits of acceptable risk.

Violent Non-State Actors and National and
International Security Phil Williams,
International Relations and Security Network
(ISN), Nov 2008
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Proxies in State Competitions
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Leveraging of Proxy Forces

• (US/UK) French partisans vs. Germany/Vichy
  (France)
• (US) Sicilian Mafia vs. Germany (WWII Sicily)
• (US) Hmong in SE Asia vs. N. Vietnamese
  operations (Laos)
• (US) Contras vs. Sandinista Junta (Nicaragua)
• (US) Mujahideen vs. Soviets (Afghanistan)
• (Iran/Syria) Hezbollah vs. Israel (Lebanon)
• (KSA/Iran/Egypt(?)) Hamas vs. Israel (Gaza)
• (Russia) Criminal actors/separatists vs. Georgia
  (S. Ossetia/Abkhazia)

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Hybrid Battlefields

• G-RAMM and Advanced Technologies

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The Proliferation of Precision G-RAMM

• Guided rocket/artillery/mortar/missile (G-RAMM)
• Guided indirect-fire rockets (GMLRS)
• Guided artillery (Excalibur, Krasnopol)
• Guided mortar (Strix, Merlin, Aquila, Fireball,
  PGMM, Mor)
• Guided missiles (SAMs, MANPADs, anti-armor,
  cruise missiles, UAVs)
• Requires nation-state support (cost, tech
  sophistication)
• Stingers in Afghanistan Kornet, C-802 ASCMs in
  Lebanon EFPs in Iraq
• Requires an effective battle networkhere today!
• Targeting (Google Earth), command and control
  (cell phones, Internet), BDA immediately on the
  Internet
• Weapons of choice for future proxy wars
  exploitation by well-resourced VNSAs

Most dangerous near-term threat advanced
anti-armor missiles, MANPADs, and guided mortars
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Modern Tech on the Battlefield

• Modern technologies enable even small
  organizations to field more lethal and capable
  weapon systems, maintain awareness of an
  ever-broadening battlespace, and coordinate
  activities among dispersed forces
• Whereas advanced technologies and the advantages
  they convey were only available to state
  militaries in the past (cost, complexity,
  production capability), modern technologies are
  making such capabilities ever more affordable and
  available to non-state actors
• Proliferation of modern weapon systems and highly
  advanced commercial technologies have the
  potential to bring non-state forces up to par
  with first-rate militaries in many circumstances
• Now emerging is the potential for
  non-state/sub-state forces to inflict tactical
  and potentially operational level defeats on
  modern military forces

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Some Lessons of Recent Urban Conflicts

• Small arms play a disproportionately significant
  role
• Mortars are highly regarded, but may be less
  effective than anticipated
• Machine guns are more valuable than assault
  rifles (force equalizer)
• RPGs are omnipresent and very effective weapons
• Bunker-busting weapons are invaluable
• Armored vehicles require more protection
• Lightly protected armored vehicles have limited
  value

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Some Lessons of Recent Urban ConflictsG-RAMM
and Advanced Technologies

• Small arms play a disproportionately significant
  role
• Modern arms/ammunition make this even more
  troubling
• Mortars are highly regarded, but may be less
  effective than anticipated
• Guided mortars introduce precision, make indirect
  fires even more a concern for state security
  forces
• Machine guns are more valuable than assault
  rifles (force equalizer)
• Advanced optics/imaging capabilities and modern
  multi-option communications enable more
  effective, dispersed, small/micro-unit tactics
• RPGs are omnipresent and very effective weapons
• Increased ranges, more effective/broader range of
  warhead options, reduced warning times
• Bunker-busting weapons are invaluable
• Thermobaric weapons now available in arms
  markets, as well as broader range of
  RPG/anti-armor warhead options
• Armored vehicles require more protection
• IEDs/EFPs proven performers have dramatically
  escalated cost of response

Overhead surveillance now available to non-state
actors
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Second Lebanon War Summer 2006

• Hezbollah fired nearly 4,000 rockets into Israel
  (over 125/day)
• Had14,000 in reserve at the end
• Militia made sophisticated use of ATGM ambushes
  of armored forces
• Also used anti-armor munitions in an
  anti-personnel mode
• Limited use of armed UAVs
• Limited use of C-802 ASCM
• Employed modern, advanced communications and
  surveillance technologies
• Secure fiber, satellite, cellular communications
• Thermal imaging and low-light enhanced optics
• Remote operations of surveillance nets

Implications for VNSAs in regional conflicts
over the next decade?
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The North American Context
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Drug Trafficking Maritime Corridors
gt65 of maritime cocaine traffic via Pacific
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(No Transcript)
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Regional Trafficking Networks
Spain/ Europe
Iran
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Lebanon
Europe/ Africa
Cartels
Venezuela
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• Collaborations
• Drug Trafficking
• Weapons Trafficking
• Human Trafficking
• Document Forgery
• Money Laundering
• Smuggling

FARC
Trafficking
Relationship
Nigeria/ W. Africa
Cocaine to Market
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• Tri-Border Actors
• Hezbollah
• Al Qaeda
• Hamas
• Islamic Jihad
• Al Gamaat
• Al Islamiyya
• et al

Hezbollah
Relationships, communications corridors, and
overlapping interests create opportunities for
exploitation in various competitions, whether
local, regional, or global.
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Drug Cartels/Youth Gangs

• Extreme violence
• Murder, rape, mutilations, beatings,
  intimidation, coercion
• Primarily gang v. gang, but shows willingness to
  use violence to protect interests
• Heavily armed
• Crew-served and heavy sniper weapons
• Anti-air, anti-armor, anti-tank weapons
• Semisubmersibles, go fast boats
• Fixed and rotary wing aviation
• Mines, grenades, RPG, heavy machine guns (.50
  cal, 40mm)
• Latest generation encrypted comms electronic
  intercept/collection capabilities
• Night vision, low-light imaging, advanced/remote
  surveillance capabilities
• Increasingly well trained
• Recruitment of military special forces, federal
  police personnel
• Receive additional training from foreign actors,
  to include small unit tactics and bomb making
• Penetrate legitimate institutions
• Government, military, police, courts, business,

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Drug Cartels/Youth Gangs

• Concentrate illicit power to challenge or
  undermine political and judicial processes
• Moreover, the manner in which criminal
  organizations use corruption to maintain a low
  risk, highly permissive environment has
  debilitating effects on the rule of law and on
  the integrity of state structures.
• Conditions of chaos are generally not conducive
  to good business. At the same time, when states
  collapse but some semblance of order is
  maintained then organized crime flourishes in the
  emerging opportunity space.
• Violence and the threat of violence are used to
  maintain internal discipline, to protect or
  enlarge market share, and to deal with threats,
  whether from rivals or from government and law
  enforcement agencies.
• Proliferation of maras can overwhelm the
  governments, the police and the legal systems
  with their sheer audacity, violence and numbers.
• VNSAswill increasingly align with others to
  create a complex and confusing set of
  geopolitical and organizational rivalries that
  will often prove difficult to untangle.

Violent Non-State Actors and National and
International Security Phil Williams,
International Relations and Security Network
(ISN), Nov 2008
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Spheres of Competition
Intra-Regional/Local
DPRK ROK
Trans-Regional
US Russia
Pakistan India
DPRK Japan
US PRC
Russia Georgia
US Venezuela
Iran KSA
US Iran
US DPRK
Iran Israel
Colombia Venezuela
Hezbollah Israel
Drug Cartel LATAM
Drug Cartel Drug Cartel
Street Gang Street Gang
Mara Mara
VNSA
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Challenges, Implications, and Areas for
Collaboration
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Drug Cartels, VNSAs, Regional Challenges

• Parasitic, cancerous, corrosive
• Dependent on host, but ultimately lethal if
  unaddressed
• Unquenchable drive to expand
• Corrupts all elements of society
• Social compact with legitimate authorities
• Productive business practices
• Confidence in the rule of law
• Social cohesion
• Activities create and maintain opportunity space
  available for exploitation in larger state
  competitions
• Can serve as strategic distracter
• Impact as a force multiplier against target
  state
• Create domestic instabilities, displace
  authorities in contested spaces
• Threat amplified by acquisition of
  G-RAMM/advanced technologies
• A-RPG/ATGMs, MANPADs, A-IED/EFPs, ASCMs, UAVs,
  etc.

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Issues for Consideration

• Hybrid threats with regional impact
• Organized crime/gangs/VNSAspotential proxies in
  State competitions
• State exploitation of proxies use to hobble,
  distract, destabilize opponent
• Potential certainly exists given current regional
  penetration by VNSAs
• VNSAs present more of a military threat than
  would normally be expected
• Expect surprises MANPADs, ASCMs, guided
  munitions, IEDs/EFPs, cyber attack, enhanced
  C4ISR
• Comprehensive, regional, trans-jurisdictional
  approaches required
• Local, Departmental, National (LE, IC, Military),
  Regional
• Military, law enforcement, civic/social,
  information operations
• Relevant, effective, legal frameworks
• Aggressive, sustained efforts essential to
  success
• Cartels/VNSAs will employ extreme measures to
  survive
• Each state can serve as a bulwark against, or a
  sanctuary for, VNSAs

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Areas of Collaboration

• Sustained dialogue on shared interests and
  dangers
• Maritime, air, border, interior patrolling,
  surveillance, and interdiction
• Sharing of information and intelligence
• Continued expansion of trade and business
  opportunities
• Especially important as an opportunity-counter to
  crime/gangs
• Intentional, sustained advancement of positive
  social values, civic institutions, public good
• Methodically foster a culture of lawfulness

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Questions?