Title: Towards Realistic Models for Evolution of Cooperation
1Towards Realistic Models for Evolution of
Cooperation
2 about procedure
- Briefly go over the paper
- Clarify major points
- Describe simulations (not in paper)
3RoadMap
- Introduction
- Cooperation Models
- Simulations
- Conclusion
?
4Evolution of Cooperation
- Animals cooperate
- Two questions
- How does cooperation as a strategy becomes stable
evolutionarily? - How does cooperation arise in the first place?
5Darwinian Natural Selection
- Survival of the fittest
- If evolution is all about individual survival,
how can cooperation be explained? - Fittest what?
6Fittest what ?
- Individual
- Rational agency theory (Kreps, 1990)
- Group
- Group selection theory (Wilson, 1980)
- Gene
- Selfish gene hypothesis (Dawkins, 1979)
- Organization
- Classic organizational theory (Simon, 1969)
7RoadMap
- Introduction
- Cooperation Models
- Group Selection
- Kinship Theory
- Direct Reciprocity
- Indirect Reciprocity
- Social Learning
- Simulations
- Conclusion
?
8Group Selection
- Intuition we ban cannibalism but not
carnivorousness - Population/species basic unit of natural
selection - Problem explain war, family feud, competition,
etc.
9Kinship Theory I
- Intuition nepotism
- Hamiltons Rule
- Individuals show less aggression and more
cooperation towards closer kin if rule is
satisfied - Basis for most work on kinship theory
- Wrights Coefficient of Related r
- Self r1
- Siblings r0.5
- Grandparent-grandchild r0.25
10Kinship Theory II
- Cannot explain
- Competition in viscuous population
- Symbioses
- Dynamics of cooperation
11Direct Reciprocity
- Intuition being nice to others who are nice
- Reciprocal Altruism
- Trivers (1971)
- Tit-for-tat and PD tournament
- Axelrod and Hamilton (1981)
- Cannot explain
- We cooperate not only with people who cooperate
with us
12Indirect Reciprocity
- Intuition respect one who is famous
- Social-biological justifications
- Biology generalized altruism (Trivers, 1971,
1985) - Sociobiology Alexandar (1986)
- Sociology Ostrom (1998)
- 3 types of indirect reciprocity
- Looped
- Observer-based
- Image-based
13Indirect Reciprocity Looped
- Looped Indirect Reciprocity
- Boyd and Richerson (1989)
14Indirect Reciprocity Observers
- Observer-based Reciprocity
- Pollock and Dugatkin (1992)
15Indirect Reciprocity Image
- Image (reputation) based Reciprocity
- Nowak and Sigmund (1998, 2000)
16Social Learning
- Intuition imitate those who are successful
- Cultural transmission
- Boyd and Richerson (1982)
- Docility
- Simon (1990, 1991)
17Critiques of Existing Models
- Many theories each explaining one or a few
aspects of cooperation - Unrealism of model assumptions
18Unrealism for Existing Models
- asexual, non-overlapping generations
- simultaneous play for every interaction
- c.f., Abell and Reyniers, 2000
- dyadic interactions
- mostly predetermined behavior
- c.f., May, 1987 (lack of modeling stochasticity)
- discrete actions (cooperate or defect)
- social structure and cooperation
- c.f., Simon, 1991 Cohen, et al., 2001
- extend social learning
- c.f., Simon, 1990
19RoadMap
- Introduction
- Cooperation Models
- Simulations
- Nowak and Sigmund Game
- Prisoners Dilemma Game
- Simons Docility Hypothesis
- Conclusion
?
20Nowak and Sigmund Game
- Payoff Matrix
- C 0.1
- B 1.0
- Image Adjustment
- A 1
Interact Not interact
Donor -C 0
Recipient B 0
Interact Not interact
Donor A -A
Recipient 0 0
21Using Global Image 1 Run
22Using Global Image 100 Runs
23Dynamics using Global Reputation
24Using 10 Observers/Interactions
25Evolutionary PD Game
- Repeated Prisoners Dilemma Game
- Agent Actions
- Action cooperate, defect
- Payoff Matrix
C D
C 3/3 0/5
D 5/0 1/1
26PD Game Agent Strategies
- All defecting (AllD)
- Tit-for-tat (TFT)
- Reputational Tit-for-tat (RTFT) using various
notions of reputation
27Base Case PD Game
28Simple Groups social structures
- Group structure affects members
- Interactions, observations, and knowledge
- Persistent structure
- Groups actions
- Observed indirectly through member's actions
29Group Membership
- Member agents
- Have public group identity
- Directly associated with one environment
- Group Structure is a Tree
- Least common ancestral node (LCAN)
- Events occur with respect to a shared environment
30Shared Environment Example
- Agents Group
- A1,A2 G1
- A3,A4 G2
- A5,A2 G1
- A1,A3 G0
- A5,A3 G0
31PD Game with Group Reputation(varying encounters
per generation EPG)
32PD Game with Group Reputation (100 EPG varying
Inter-group interaction probability)
33Groups/Organizations bounded rationality
explanation
- Docility
- Cooperation (altruism) as an explanation for the
formation of groups/organizations - Why individuals identify with a group?
- boundedly rational individuals
- increase their survival fitness
- (Simon, 1969, 1990, 1991)
34PD Game with Docility(50 cooperators and 50
defectors 100 EPG 1.0 IP)
35Conclusion
- Reviewed 5 major approaches to study evolution of
cooperation - Provided 2 main critiques for existing models
- Constructed model extensions addressing the
critiques
36Implications for Computer Science
- Artificial intelligence
- Benevolent agents are not good enough
- (c.f., multi-agents systems)
- Learning theory can be used to study evolution of
cooperation - Systems
- Improve system design by understanding the
dynamics of agents - Accountability substrate needed for distributed
systems
37Future Plan
- Extend the simple group social structure
- Overlapping generations
- Sexual reproduction
- Extend social learning using realistic/robust
learning model
38Modeling Diploid Organisms
39Modeling Diploid Organisms
40Modeling Diploid Organisms
One of 2 Child Chromosomes
Parental Chromosomes
41Simulation Demo
C D
C R/R S/T
D T/S P/P
- PD strategies viewed as a probability vectors
- Strategy ltPI, PT, PR, PP, PSgt
- TFT lt 1, 1, 1, 0, 0 gt
- AllD lt 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 gt
- AllC lt 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 gt
- STFT lt 0, 1, 1, 0, 0 gt
42Simulation a search problem
- Search Optimal PD Strategy
- Search space I, T, R, P, S probabilities