Title: SECURITY IN THE POSTCOLD WAR ERA and the potential role of quantitative methods in decision making
1SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (and the
potential role of quantitative methods in
decision making)
- Los Angeles
- 15 February, 2006
- William J. Perry David Alderson
2NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONS
- STAKES ARE HIGH
- PROBLEMS INCREDIBLY COMPLEX
- NEVER ENOUGH TIME OR DATA
3LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE
- SEPARATE THE VARIABLES
- Apply analytical tools to one variable
- DEAL WITH STOCHASTIC VARIABLES
- Statistical uncertainty pervasive
- CONDUCT SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
- Given data is always wrong
4LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN USING QUANTITATIVE METHODS
IN POLICY DECISIONS
- REAL UNCERTAINTIES IN DATA
- TOO LITTLE TIME FOR REFLECTION
- LITTLE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
- SENSITIVITY TO UNCERTAINTIES
- POLITICAL OR PERSONAL AGENDAS
5NATIONAL SECURITY TODAY---THE LEGACY OF DESERT
STORM
- US MILITARY DOMINATES ALL OTHER MILITARY FORCES
- OTHER MAJOR POWERS MORE THAN A DECADE BEHIND
- REGIONAL POWERS HAVE NO CHANCE OF MATCHING
- BUT EVERY MEASURE HAS A COUNTERMEASURE
6(No Transcript)
7ASYMMETRIC WARFARE (Life is full of unintended
consequences)
- INSURGENCY WARFARE
- CYBERWARFARE---attack computers
and commo links - TERRORISM
- WEAPONS of MASS DESTRUCTION
8INSURGENCY WARFARE
- In Desert Storm US forces had a great advantage
in intel and PGMs - In Iraq today insurgent forces may have the
advantage in intel - And PGMs are only useful if one knows where to
direct them - New tactics, weapons, and intel are needed to
deal with insurgent operations
9CYBER WARFARE
10WAR ON TERRORISM
- DIPLOMACYStop Nuclear Proliferation
- MILITARYTerrorist bases/Host Nations
- LAW ENFORCEMENTTerrorist cells
- INTELLIGENCEDetect terrorist plans
- TREASURY---Bottle up terrorist finances
- TRANSPORTATIONImprove travel safety
- Center for Disease Control---Vaccines,
Antibiotics, Training of First Responders
11WMD TERRORISM
- Al Qaeda has stated goal of killing millions of
Americans - 9-11 demonstrated they are serious
- To achieve this goal requires WMD
- OBL has stated that it is religious duty of his
followers to get WMD - We cannot with certainty prevent suicide bombers,
but we can take actions to minimize risk of WMD
terrorism
12NUCLEAR TERRORISM
- Unlikely to stop nuclear bomb or fissile material
from being shipped into US - Consequence management has minimal affect after
a nuclear detonation - Best defense is keeping terror group from getting
bomb or fissile material - We know how to do that but it is not easy
13LOOSE NUKES in EARLY 90s
- Cold War over, but still 20,000 nukes
- SU dissolved nukes in 4 countries
- These countries in some turbulence
- Congress passed Nunn-Lugar in 92
- I made its implementation top priority
- First step--denuclearizing former SSRs
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15NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
- North Korea already has nuclear bombs may be
building more - Iran is developing the capacity to develop highly
enriched uranium that could be used to make
nuclear bombs - Do either of these problems lend themselves to
quantitative analysis?
16Quantitative Analysis of a Hypothetical Problem
- Assumed facts are based on actual history of
North Korean nuclear program - The scenario, however, is purely hypothetical
- The hypothetical situation is invented to
highlight importance of quantitative analysis,
not as a prediction as to what will happen - Numbers are not realistic (they were cooked up
to make the problem interesting). - The problem is oversimplified (i.e. overlooking
the highly enriched uranium program) to make the
calculations relatively easy
17- US makes offer at 6-party meeting
- Non-first strike pledge
- Will sign treaty to end Korean War
- Will open interest office, and consider embassy
at later date - Will agree to NK reactor only after dismantlement
- All of this conditional on NK rejoining NPT and
accepting anytime-anywhere challenge
inspections - NK counteroffer at 6-party meeting
- Offers dismantlement only after reactor delivered
- Offers to rejoin NPT inspection of Yongbyon by
IAEA accepts one challenge inspection per year - If counteroffer is not accepted NK threatens to
- break off talks
- ramp up production of plutonium (10 bombs per
year) Sell products of their nuclear program
18HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM
- NK crisis arises as a result of 6-party meeting
- President has called a Natl. Security meeting to
decide what action he will direct - Sec Def plans to recommend military action
- Sec State plans to recommend further diplomacy
- Presidents Guidance
- I will base my decision primarily on which
alternative makes the better case for reducing
the likelihood of a terrorist detonating a
nuclear bomb in one of our cities as a result of
bombs or fissile material obtained from NK
19DECISION TWO ALTERNATIVES
- Alternative A SecDef
- Do not bargain away dismantlement and inspection
provisions in US offer - Do not allow further nukes to be built
- Authorize a military strike on Yongbyon to
destroy all facilities---can be done with high
confidence and with no US casualties. - Alternative B SecState
- Accept NK counteroffer with only minor
modifications - Reactor can be attacked if NK does not fulfill
agreement - Our satellites (more open NK) provide adequate
verif.
20CIA Estimates
- NK has made 4 bombs Pu for 6 more p1
- Terrorist with nuke bomb is successful p0.5
- In response to Treaty
- NK turns in all Pu p1
- NK cheats, doesnt turn in bombs p0.3
- NK turns in bombs, but covertly builds more
p0.2 - NK would sell bomb to terrorist p0.6
- In response to Attack
- All Pu is destroyed in attack p1
- 4 bombs survive attack p0.8
- NK would sell bomb to terrorist p0.4
- (p is low because NK cannot make more)
21DECISION TREE
0.5
0.7
expected success 86.8
0.94
0.868
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.8
0.84
expected success 84.0
22SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
- Decision does not depend on Prob(Terrorists
succeed) - Decision does depend on beliefs about NK behavior
Prob(NK sells bombDiplomacy)
Prob(NK covertly builds bombsDiplomacy)
Individual table values are Prob(successDiplomacy
) (GREEN Diplomacy has higher expected success
RED Attack results in higher expected
success) All other input values assumed at their
nominal levels.
23SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (2)
Prob(bombs and Pu destroyedAttack)
Prob(NK sells bombAttack)
Individual table values are Prob(successAttack) (
GREEN Diplomacy has higher expected success
RED Attack results in higher expected success)
24BIOTERRORISM
- Bioterrorism can be almost as deadly as nuclear
terrorism (Dark Winter) - Cannot prevent terror groups from getting bio
agents (anthrax exists in farmyards) - But Consequence Management can make a huge
difference in fatalities - Effective consequence mgt. must be planned,
provisioned and practiced
25SMALLPOX an abbreviated history
- 1949 last documented case of smallpox in US
- post-WWII large bioweapons effort by US, SU
- 1969 US unilaterally abandons program
- 1972 US halts systematic vaccination programs
- 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
- 1978 last global case of smallpox
- 1974-1991 Iraq operates bioweapons program
North Korea believed to have one
TODAY unknown status of smallpox stockpiles,
highly susceptible US population
26STAGES OF SMALLPOX INFECTION
asymptomatic non-infectious vaccine sensitive
- vaccine only effective lt 3 days after initial
infection - vaccine complications 3/106 (death in 40 of
such cases)
3 days
incubating
asymptomatic non-infectious vaccine insensitive
- early detection isolation are most important
for treatment
10-14 days
- aches, fever, rash, pustules
- spread by inhalation
- 1g smallpox can infect 100 people via aerosol
symptomatic infectious vaccine insensitive
symptomatic
3-5 days
symptomatic isolated deceased / immune
- no cure
- mortality rate 30
removed
14-17 days
27DEBATE ON RESPONSE STRATEGY
- isolation who? when? how?
- vaccination who? when? how?
- how best to support a public health
infrastructure with limited resources? - stochastic models (Wein, et.al.)of disease
transmission - to understand the potential magnitude of attack
scenarios - to evaluate the efficacy of prevention and
response strategies
28HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION 2
- FBI captures Al Qaeda operative at LAX who is in
possession of a portable nebulizer containing
enough variola (smallpox) virus to infect 1000
people - Upon questioning, the Al Qaeda operative reveals
he was part of a plan with 4 other operatives who
were to release the virus at 4 other national
airports - Unknown if the operative is telling the truth
29ASSUMED INITIAL RESPONSE
- FBI notifies DHS, CDCP, WHO to alert all
hospitals and clinics to be on lookout for early
symptoms of smallpox infection - Distribution of smallpox vaccine to distribution
centers all over the country - Preparation for massive vaccination and
quarantine program
30CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENTHYPOTHETICAL TWO-PART PLAN
- 1. massive vaccination program
- will involve taking over all public schools in
the country for one day - will use nearly the entire US stockpile
- 2. mandatory 10-day quarantine program
- for all people infected with smallpox
- for all people who refuse vaccination
- Estimated cost
- 40B for plan implementation
- 420 deaths (out of 300M) from vacc. side effects
31DECISION TWO ALTERNATIVES
- Director of CDCP must advise President
- Alternative 1 initiate immediately the mass
vaccination and quarantine program - Alternative 2 delay implementation of program
until confirmed appearance of smallpox
32ASSUMED INPUTS
FOUR SCENARIOS
mass attack
1
vaccinate now
no attack
2
mass attack
3
wait
no attack
4
33- 1st Generation Deaths
- 2nd Generation Deaths
- no vaccination
- recent vaccination
- 3rd Generation Deaths
- no vaccination
- recent vaccination
- Fatal Side Effects
- Total Deaths
- Cost of Deaths
- Cost of Plan
- Total Cost
1200 1500 350 0 0 420 3470 6.94 B 40
B 46.94 B
0 0 0 0 0 420 420 0.84 B 40 B 40.84 B
1200 12000 0 15000 3500 420 32120 64.24
B 40 B 104.24 B
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
34DECISION TREE
scenario
mass attack
1
vaccinate now
no attack
2
mass attack
3
wait
no attack
4
35SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (1)
base case
36SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (2)
- Assuming we knew the Prob(attack) and actual
Infection Rate, what would be the best policy?
Infection Rate
Probability of Attack
Values are cost of implementing the best policy
(in Billions of USD) (GREEN best policy is
INITIATE RED best policy is WAIT)
37LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN USING QUANTITATIVE METHODS
IN POLICY DECISIONS
- REAL UNCERTAINTIES IN DATA
- TOO LITTLE TIME FOR REFLECTION
- LITTLE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
- SENSITIVITY TO UNCERTAINTIES
- POLITICAL OR PERSONAL AGENDAS
38APPLYING LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE
- Define uncertainty in stochastic terms and seek
to find bounds - Setup analysis in general terms before problem
becomes crisis - Use quantitative analysis to frame problem and
put bounds on decision - Present analysis to decision maker with emphasis
on sensitivity analysis