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Beyond Election Day: An Analysis of Post-Election Voting Procedures


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Title: Beyond Election Day: An Analysis of Post-Election Voting Procedures

Beyond Election Day An Analysis of
Post-Election Voting Procedures
  • Al Stone
  • May 8, 2006
  • CMSC 691V

Beyond Election Day
  • No other research efforts have been specifically
    targeted on the after-election processes
  • Current state of affairs in most states is
    probably extremely vulnerable
  • Nature of government

Presentation Framework
  • Post-Election Procedures
  • Desirable Properties of Elections
  • Application of Properties
  • Existing Best Practices in Other Industries
  • Suggestions
  • Caltech/MIT
  • The Constitution Project
  • Analysis and Discussion

Election Process (Cradle to Grave)
  • Retrieve election materials from storage and/or
    receive new election materials.
  • Certify election materials.
  • Districting (or redistricting).
  • Voter registration.
  • Train election officials and develop ballots.
  • Deliver provisional and absentee ballots.
  • Physically set up precincts.
  • Carry out voting on Election Day.
  • Post-Election Procedures.

Post-Election Procedures
  • Election Clean-up and Collection of Materials
  • Transportation
  • Tabulation and Recount
  • Voting Equipment Audits
  • Examination of Records and Exceptions
  • Storage and Protection
  • Security and Legal Consideration

An Election MUST Have
  • Vote Integrity
  • Voter Privacy
  • Resistance to Disruption
  • Voting System Reliability
  • Election Completeness
  • Voter Properties

Election Clean-up and Collection of Materials
Clear the Polling Place
Check All Votes and Equipment for Tampering
Shut Down and Collect Voting Machines
Collect Votes and/or Vote Equipment
Collect Secondary Data
Desirable Properties of Collection
  • Vote Integrity Collected so that votes are not
    destroyed or altered
  • Voter Privacy Collected so that voters cannot
    be identified with their votes by outside
  • Resistance to Disruption Uninterrupted and
    uncorrupted collection
  • Voting System Reliability Collected so that
    machines can be reused and checked for tampering
  • Election Completeness All necessary materials

Election Clean-up and Collection of Materials
  • Physical Security
  • Tamper Verification
  • Proper and Secure Containers
  • Careful Collection
  • Electronic equipment, second pass
  • Graceful Shutdown

Caltech/MIT Suggestions Insuring the Integrity
of the Electoral Process
  • Inventory of Equipment
  • Number of Ballots Cast
  • Number of Votes for Federal Office
  • Number of Registered Voters
  • Voter Count from Check-In List
  • Absentee Ballot Count
  • Challenged and Returned Absentee Ballots
  • Challenged Provisional Ballots
  • Number of Early Voters
  • Transportation Records
  • Storage Records

Election Clean-up and Collection of Materials
What Else?
  • Exceptions and Errors
  • Roster of Poll Workers

Load the Materials
Move the Materials
Unload the Materials
Desirable Properties of Transportation
  • Vote Integrity Transported such that votes
    remain in tact and unaltered
  • Voter Privacy Transported so that outside
    interests cannot see how someone voted.
  • Resistance to Disruption Transported without
    outside interference
  • Voting System Reliability Machines are safely
    and securely transported
  • Election Completeness Full, secure, and
    absolute transport of votes, systems, and data

The Stanley Cup
  • Fisher Peak, BC and Mt. Elbert, CO
  • Auto Glass Plant
  • Roller Coaster, Universal Studios
  • Motorcycle Passenger
  • Jetski Passenger
  • Baptismal Font
  • Rideau Canal Dropkick 1905
  • Geraniums 1906
  • Flat Tire Roadside Luck 1924
  • Buoyancy Tests 1991 and 1993
  • Slovakian Debut 2003
  • Air Canada Weight Restrictions 2004

  • Secure Vehicles
  • Non-stop Transport
  • Careful, Secure Loading and Unloading
  • Police Presence
  • Driver Authentication
  • Electronic Transportation
  • Encryption and Authentication
  • Absentee Issues

Tabulation and Recount
Capable Systems
Electronic Tabulation
Manual Tabulation
Receive Votes
Count Votes By Hand
Transport Machines
Count Votes
Desirable Properties of Tabulation and Recount
  • Vote Integrity Tabulation exactly as votes are
  • Voter Privacy Tabulation without publishing or
    exchanging voter information
  • Resistance to Disruption No outside
    interference on counting and recording before
  • Voting System Reliability Where applicable,
    tabulating such that the machine is left
    functional and intact
  • Election Completeness Thorough and accurate

  • Electronic Tabulation
  • DRE and Optical Scan
  • Secure vote-recording equipment, vote-tabulation
    equipment, transportation

Tabulation and Recount
  • Motivated Election Workers
  • Breaks, quiet, environmental factors
  • Secure, Private Tabulation
  • Collection of Materials

  • Auditing of Materials
  • Scheduling
  • Capable Equipment

Recount Votes
Examine Logs
Test Voting Systems
Receive Votes
Desirable Properties of Auditing Machines
  • Vote Integrity Verify that the machine is not
    altering or erroneously recording votes
  • Voter Privacy Verify that the machine is not
    recording or broadcasting results more than
  • Resistance to Disruption Audit away from
    outside interference
  • Voting System Reliability Test all possible
    functions of the system for correctness and
  • Election Completeness Audit thoroughly and
    efficiently, quickly in the case of a recount.

  • Not only in case of a recount
  • Periodic
  • Not only auditing votes
  • Equipment, Exceptions Log, Secondary Data
  • Audit similarly to tabulation
  • Secure Location, Motivated Workers, Emphasis on
  • Machine testing
  • Test all functions similar to Certification tests
    before storage

Examination Phase
  • Records
  • Sign-in and Sign-out, Election Official Roster,
    Voting Turnout, etc.
  • Paper is cumbersome, easy to destroy
  • Electronic Poll Books
  • Exceptions
  • Keep track of breakdowns

Lockup and Surveillance
Desirable Properties of Storage
  • Vote Integrity Store votes exactly as cast and
  • Voter Privacy Store voter information securely
    and decouple from votes where possible
  • Resistance to Disruption Store so that
    materials are safe from outside intrusion
  • Voting System Reliability Store units safely
  • Election Completeness Store everything
    necessary to start the next election and store it

Lockup and Surveillance
  • Perimeter Security
  • Environmental Factors
  • Secure, Proper Containers
  • Periodic Inspection
  • Capacity Issues
  • Summary Re-Evaluation of Location

Insider Threat
  • Maine, 1998
  • Two legislative aides plead guilty to breaking
    into a ballot storage area in the Maine State
    House and tampering with the ballots being stored
    pending a recount of two close elections for the
    state legislature. Caltech/MIT Report, pg 42.

Other Industries
  • Banking Its only money!
  • Pros Vaults, Armed Guards, Armored Vehicles,
    Trained and Secure Tellers, Strict Policies,
    Periodic Audits, Ink Traps, Seamless Absentee
  • Cons Money, Identity Fraud, Robberies, Insurance
    Safety Net, ATM Security Flaws
  • Shipping What security?
  • Pros Principles of Competition (Speed,
    Integrity, Privacy, Completion), Legal Backing,
    Tracking Software, Tamper Detection
  • Cons No Resistance, Inaccuracy, Delays

Other Industries
  • Computer
  • Pros Encryption and Authentication, Private
    Channels, Individual Tokens
  • Cons Easily Disrupted, Identity Theft
  • Gaming
  • Pros Adversarial Model, Defined Ruleset,
    Objective Third Party
  • Cons Limits in Adversarial Models, Trivial

Caltech/MIT Suggestions What Is, What Could Be
  • Auditable Equipment For Recounts
  • Restricted Absentee Voting With Uniform Reporting
    of Results
  • Coercion, Fraud/Security, Accuracy, and Speed
  • Periodic Equipment Auditing
  • Less Ambiguous Recount Processes
  • AMVA system
  • Replaceable components decrease likelihood of
    corrupt vendors
  • All Voting Machines should implement multiple
    means of recording votes

Constitution Project Suggestions
  • Sufficient Time for Counting and Contesting
  • States define valid vote
  • States establish recount rules
  • States provide post-election audits

Analysis and Conclusions
  • Secure vs. Cost-Effective
  • No longer limited by other properties, but by
    money priorities
  • Auditing
  • Recount or no, more than just votes
  • Lessen the Impact of Absentee Issues
  • Care and Accuracy vs. Speed

Source Material
  • Report of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology
    Project What Is What Could Be, 2001
  • Comprehensive and Far-Reaching
  • First seminal report in response to the 2000
    Florida election debacle.
  • Insuring the Integrity of the Electoral Process
    Recommendations for Consistent and Complete
    Reporting of Election Data, Oct. 2004,
    Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project
  • Building Consensus on Election Reform, August
    2001, The Constitution Projects Forum on
    Election Reform