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Beyond Election Day: An Analysis of Post-Election Voting Procedures

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Title: Beyond Election Day: An Analysis of Post-Election Voting Procedures


1
Beyond Election Day An Analysis of
Post-Election Voting Procedures
  • Al Stone
  • May 8, 2006
  • CMSC 691V

2
Beyond Election Day
  • No other research efforts have been specifically
    targeted on the after-election processes
  • Current state of affairs in most states is
    probably extremely vulnerable
  • Nature of government

3
Presentation Framework
  • Post-Election Procedures
  • Desirable Properties of Elections
  • Application of Properties
  • Existing Best Practices in Other Industries
  • Suggestions
  • Caltech/MIT
  • The Constitution Project
  • Analysis and Discussion

4
Election Process (Cradle to Grave)
  • Retrieve election materials from storage and/or
    receive new election materials.
  • Certify election materials.
  • Districting (or redistricting).
  • Voter registration.
  • Train election officials and develop ballots.
  • Deliver provisional and absentee ballots.
  • Physically set up precincts.
  • Carry out voting on Election Day.
  • Post-Election Procedures.

5
Post-Election Procedures
  • Election Clean-up and Collection of Materials
  • Transportation
  • Tabulation and Recount
  • Voting Equipment Audits
  • Examination of Records and Exceptions
  • Storage and Protection
  • Security and Legal Consideration

6
An Election MUST Have
  • Vote Integrity
  • Voter Privacy
  • Resistance to Disruption
  • Voting System Reliability
  • Election Completeness
  • Voter Properties

7
Election Clean-up and Collection of Materials
Clear the Polling Place
Check All Votes and Equipment for Tampering
Shut Down and Collect Voting Machines
Collect Votes and/or Vote Equipment
Collect Secondary Data
8
Desirable Properties of Collection
  • Vote Integrity Collected so that votes are not
    destroyed or altered
  • Voter Privacy Collected so that voters cannot
    be identified with their votes by outside
    interests
  • Resistance to Disruption Uninterrupted and
    uncorrupted collection
  • Voting System Reliability Collected so that
    machines can be reused and checked for tampering
  • Election Completeness All necessary materials
    collected

9
Election Clean-up and Collection of Materials
  • Physical Security
  • Tamper Verification
  • Proper and Secure Containers
  • Careful Collection
  • Electronic equipment, second pass
  • Graceful Shutdown

10
Caltech/MIT Suggestions Insuring the Integrity
of the Electoral Process
  • Inventory of Equipment
  • Number of Ballots Cast
  • Number of Votes for Federal Office
  • Number of Registered Voters
  • Voter Count from Check-In List
  • Absentee Ballot Count
  • Challenged and Returned Absentee Ballots
  • Challenged Provisional Ballots
  • Number of Early Voters
  • Transportation Records
  • Storage Records

11
Election Clean-up and Collection of Materials
What Else?
  • Exceptions and Errors
  • Roster of Poll Workers

12
Transportation
Load the Materials
Move the Materials
Unload the Materials
13
Desirable Properties of Transportation
  • Vote Integrity Transported such that votes
    remain in tact and unaltered
  • Voter Privacy Transported so that outside
    interests cannot see how someone voted.
  • Resistance to Disruption Transported without
    outside interference
  • Voting System Reliability Machines are safely
    and securely transported
  • Election Completeness Full, secure, and
    absolute transport of votes, systems, and data

14
The Stanley Cup
  • Fisher Peak, BC and Mt. Elbert, CO
  • Auto Glass Plant
  • Roller Coaster, Universal Studios
  • Motorcycle Passenger
  • Jetski Passenger
  • Baptismal Font
  • Rideau Canal Dropkick 1905
  • Geraniums 1906
  • Flat Tire Roadside Luck 1924
  • Buoyancy Tests 1991 and 1993
  • Slovakian Debut 2003
  • Air Canada Weight Restrictions 2004

15
Transportation
  • Secure Vehicles
  • Non-stop Transport
  • Careful, Secure Loading and Unloading
  • Police Presence
  • Driver Authentication
  • Electronic Transportation
  • Encryption and Authentication
  • Absentee Issues

16
Tabulation and Recount
Tabulation
Scheduling
Capable Systems
Electronic Tabulation
Manual Tabulation
Recount
Receive Votes
Count Votes By Hand
Transport Machines
Count Votes
17
Desirable Properties of Tabulation and Recount
  • Vote Integrity Tabulation exactly as votes are
    cast
  • Voter Privacy Tabulation without publishing or
    exchanging voter information
  • Resistance to Disruption No outside
    interference on counting and recording before
    certification
  • Voting System Reliability Where applicable,
    tabulating such that the machine is left
    functional and intact
  • Election Completeness Thorough and accurate
    tabulation

18
Tabulation
  • Electronic Tabulation
  • DRE and Optical Scan
  • Secure vote-recording equipment, vote-tabulation
    equipment, transportation

19
Tabulation and Recount
  • Motivated Election Workers
  • Breaks, quiet, environmental factors
  • Secure, Private Tabulation
  • Collection of Materials

20
Recount
  • Auditing of Materials
  • Scheduling
  • Capable Equipment

21
Auditing
Recount Votes
Examine Logs
Test Voting Systems
Receive Votes
22
Desirable Properties of Auditing Machines
  • Vote Integrity Verify that the machine is not
    altering or erroneously recording votes
  • Voter Privacy Verify that the machine is not
    recording or broadcasting results more than
    necessary
  • Resistance to Disruption Audit away from
    outside interference
  • Voting System Reliability Test all possible
    functions of the system for correctness and
    functionality
  • Election Completeness Audit thoroughly and
    efficiently, quickly in the case of a recount.

23
Auditing
  • Not only in case of a recount
  • Periodic
  • Not only auditing votes
  • Equipment, Exceptions Log, Secondary Data
  • Audit similarly to tabulation
  • Secure Location, Motivated Workers, Emphasis on
    Completeness
  • Machine testing
  • Test all functions similar to Certification tests
    before storage

24
Examination Phase
  • Records
  • Sign-in and Sign-out, Election Official Roster,
    Voting Turnout, etc.
  • Paper is cumbersome, easy to destroy
  • Electronic Poll Books
  • Exceptions
  • Keep track of breakdowns

25
Lockup and Surveillance
26
Desirable Properties of Storage
  • Vote Integrity Store votes exactly as cast and
    tabulated
  • Voter Privacy Store voter information securely
    and decouple from votes where possible
  • Resistance to Disruption Store so that
    materials are safe from outside intrusion
  • Voting System Reliability Store units safely
  • Election Completeness Store everything
    necessary to start the next election and store it
    well

27
Lockup and Surveillance
  • Perimeter Security
  • Environmental Factors
  • Secure, Proper Containers
  • Periodic Inspection
  • Capacity Issues
  • Summary Re-Evaluation of Location

28
Insider Threat
  • Maine, 1998
  • Two legislative aides plead guilty to breaking
    into a ballot storage area in the Maine State
    House and tampering with the ballots being stored
    pending a recount of two close elections for the
    state legislature. Caltech/MIT Report, pg 42.

29
Other Industries
  • Banking Its only money!
  • Pros Vaults, Armed Guards, Armored Vehicles,
    Trained and Secure Tellers, Strict Policies,
    Periodic Audits, Ink Traps, Seamless Absentee
    Banking
  • Cons Money, Identity Fraud, Robberies, Insurance
    Safety Net, ATM Security Flaws
  • Shipping What security?
  • Pros Principles of Competition (Speed,
    Integrity, Privacy, Completion), Legal Backing,
    Tracking Software, Tamper Detection
  • Cons No Resistance, Inaccuracy, Delays

30
Other Industries
  • Computer
  • Pros Encryption and Authentication, Private
    Channels, Individual Tokens
  • Cons Easily Disrupted, Identity Theft
  • Gaming
  • Pros Adversarial Model, Defined Ruleset,
    Objective Third Party
  • Cons Limits in Adversarial Models, Trivial
    Importance

31
Caltech/MIT Suggestions What Is, What Could Be
  • Auditable Equipment For Recounts
  • Restricted Absentee Voting With Uniform Reporting
    of Results
  • Coercion, Fraud/Security, Accuracy, and Speed
  • Periodic Equipment Auditing
  • Less Ambiguous Recount Processes
  • AMVA system
  • Replaceable components decrease likelihood of
    corrupt vendors
  • All Voting Machines should implement multiple
    means of recording votes

32
Constitution Project Suggestions
  • Sufficient Time for Counting and Contesting
    Procedures
  • States define valid vote
  • States establish recount rules
  • States provide post-election audits

33
Analysis and Conclusions
  • Secure vs. Cost-Effective
  • No longer limited by other properties, but by
    money priorities
  • Auditing
  • Recount or no, more than just votes
  • Lessen the Impact of Absentee Issues
  • Care and Accuracy vs. Speed

34
Source Material
  • Report of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology
    Project What Is What Could Be, 2001
  • Comprehensive and Far-Reaching
  • First seminal report in response to the 2000
    Florida election debacle.
  • Insuring the Integrity of the Electoral Process
    Recommendations for Consistent and Complete
    Reporting of Election Data, Oct. 2004,
    Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project
  • Building Consensus on Election Reform, August
    2001, The Constitution Projects Forum on
    Election Reform
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