The%20US%20Military%20Today - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

View by Category
About This Presentation
Title:

The%20US%20Military%20Today

Description:

The length of the conflict in Iraq now exceeds our participation in WW II ... Out-of-Control Defense Budget,' in America's Defense Meltdown, pp. 219-244. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:24
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 20
Provided by: chet154
Learn more at: http://smartpei.typepad.com
Category:

less

Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: The%20US%20Military%20Today


1
The US Military Today
  • Chet Richards
  • Boyd 2008November 7, 2008Prince Edward Island

2
A few problems
  • The length of the conflict in Iraq now exceeds
    our participation in WW II
  • The length of the conflict in Afghanistan now
    exceeds all nations participation in WW II.
  • The likely outcome of Iraq will be a Shiite
    Islamic theocracy allied with Iran
  • The likely outcome of Afghanistan will be
    restoration of Taliban rule or worse
  • Our total bill for these conflicts will be
    between 3 and 5 trillion dollars

3
It wasnt for lack of resources
DoD Total Obligational Authority
Cold War Average
Includes plus-ups to the base budget but does
not include supplementals for the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Sources 1948- 2006, National
Defense Budget Estimates for FY2008 (The
Greenbook), pp. 62-67 2007-2009, W. Wheeler,
Understand, Then Contain Americas
Out-of-Control Defense Budget, in Americas
Defense Meltdown, pp. 219-244.
4
Or because we faced some credible threat
US DoD Spending Compared to Possible Opponents
W. Wheeler, Understand, Then Contain Americas
Out-of-Control Defense Budget, in Americas
Defense Meltdown, p. 223, citing IISS 2008. US
figure includes plus-ups.
5
The generations of war model
6
The Utility of Military Force
  • Conventional weapons and forces
  • Approx. 20 division equivalents, 3200 tactical
    fighter/attack aircraft, 200 ships
  • Nuclear warfare
  • 14 Ballistic missile submarines, 120 bombers,
    10,000 warheads
  • Counterinsurgency
  • Intelligence
  • Privatization

7
Conventional warfare
  • Not between nuclear-armed powers
  • No major wars between Israel and Arab states
    after 1973, India Pakistan after 1971, or USSR
    USA or China USA, etc.
  • Does not rule out occasional sparring
  • Non-nuclear states are either
  • US allies, or
  • Extremely weak
  • Conclusion Conventional forces are expensive
    and largely useless

8
Nuclear warfare
  • World is awash in nuclear weapons and material
  • Russia 15,000 US 10,000 France 348 Britain
    200 China 200 Israel 75-200 Pakistan 60
    India 40-50 N. Korea 5-12
  • Major nuclear inventories can obviously be
    downsized
  • But NOT eliminated
  • Would make large-scale conventional war possible
    again, even inevitable

Source Bruce G. Blair, Primed and Ready, The
Defense Monitor, Center or Defense Information,
May/June 2007.
9
Counterinsurgency
  • Governments can often defeat insurgencies in
    their midst by
  • Better governance, or
  • Eliminating troublesome minorities, or
  • Some combination of both
  • Outside powers, however, have rarely defeated
    insurgencies on foreign soil
  • And attempts to do so often compromise the
    legitimacy of the local government in the eyes of
    its own people

Sources include Gompert, D. C. (2007). Heads we
win the cognitive side of counterinsurgency
(COIN) RAND counterinsurgency paper No. 1. Santa
Monica, CA The Rand Corporation. Van Creveld, M.
(2007). The changing face of war. New York
Ballentine. Sullivan, P. L. (2007). War aims and
war outcomes Why powerful states lose limited
wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(3)
496-524.
10
Intelligence
  • Most military problems since end of WW II can be
    tagged as intelligence failures
  • Misunderstood who we were fighting and what they
    were fighting for
  • Obvious solution is better intelligence, but
  • Extremely difficult to do
  • Doesnt justify large budgets
  • Runs into problem of telling truth to power
  • Seen by military as a supporting element for
    operations, whereas at the national level, the
    converse should be true.

11
For example
  • There were larger problems with contract
    linguists than poor management and expense
    Several Iraqi translators turned out to be part
    of the insurgency these translators supplied
    information about operations of our soldiers to
    insurgents. (127)
  • An Iraqi citizen who told the police about a
    house suspected of holding hostages might well
    discover he was talking to a confederate of the
    kidnappers. (173)
  • Steven K. OHern, The Intelligence Wars, Lessons
    from Baghdad. (Amherst, NY Prometheus, 2008)

12
Privatization
  • Our (largely) public system isnt working.
  • 700 BN/yr rest of world, combined
  • 7 years in Afghanistan, nearly 6 in Iraq
  • More of same will only produce more of same, but
    at higher cost.
  • Our opponents are already privatized.
  • non-state
  • cellular, networked, distributed, global
  • low cost of entry (and exit)
  • Rate of evolutionary change is a function of the
    amount of variation present in the population
    (Fishers Law).

13
Why privatize?
  • Bankrupt companies can go out of business.
  • Markets unleash competition.
  • variety, rapidity, initiative, creativity
  • Privatization has a long military history.
  • privateers mercenaries
  • British East India Company(1600-1858)
  • PMCs today
  • Nothing less will force the amountof change that
    we need.
  • As Van Creveld suggests, its goingto happen
    anyway.

14
Whats going to happen to armies?
  • Distinctions between war and crime will break
    down (204) as will the difference between armed
    forces and civilians (194)
  • Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings
    and massacres
  • Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the
    civilian population, and extreme dispersion have
    become the norm (208) The problem of subversion
    is likely to be serious (211)
  • Much of the task of defending society against
    nontrinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private
    security companies, with a corresponding decrease
    in the utility, size, and technological
    complexity (cost) of military forces
  • Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be
    replaced by police-like security forces on the
    one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that
    the difference is always clear, even today) (225)
  • Van Creveld, Transformation of War

15
Whats going to happen to armies?
  • Distinctions between war and crime will break
    down (204) as will the difference between armed
    forces and civilians (194)
  • Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings
    and massacres
  • Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the
    civilian population, and extreme dispersion have
    become the norm (208) The problem of subversion
    is likely to be serious (211)
  • Much of the task of defending society against
    nontrinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private
    security companies, with a corresponding decrease
    in the utility, size, and technological
    complexity (cost) of military forces
  • Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be
    replaced by police-like security forces on the
    one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that
    the difference is always clear, even today) (225)
  • Van Creveld, Transformation of War

16
Whats going to happen to armies?
  • Distinctions between war and crime will break
    down (204) as will the difference between armed
    forces and civilians (194)
  • Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings
    and massacres
  • Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the
    civilian population, and extreme dispersion have
    become the norm (208) The problem of subversion
    is likely to be serious (211)
  • Much of the task of defending society against
    non-trinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private
    security companies, with a corresponding decrease
    in the utility, size, and technological
    complexity (cost) of military forces
  • Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be
    replaced by police-like security forces on the
    one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that
    the difference is always clear, even today) (225)
  • Van Creveld, Transformation of War

17
Sign-off sermonette
  • It is far from clear whether good intentions
    plus stupidity or evil intentions plus
    intelligence have wrought more harm in the
    world.
  • Dörner, The Logic of Failure, 8
  • A great nation is like a great man When he makes
    a mistake, he realizes it. Having realized it,
    he admits it. Having admitted it, he corrects it
    He thinks of his enemy as the shadow that he
    himself casts.
  • Tao Te Ching (Mitchell trans., 61)

18
Questions?Comments?Accolades?
19
T
www.jaddams.com
About PowerShow.com