GENOCIDE PREVENTION: The Role of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur

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GENOCIDE PREVENTION The Role of Bystanders in
Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur

• Studium Generale, Auditorium, Maastricht
  University, 30 November 2009
• Fred Grünfeld

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• University of Maastricht, Faculty of Law,
  Department International Law, Maastricht Centre
  of Human Rights and University College
  Maastricht.
• University of Utrecht, Faculty of Humanities,
  Centre for Conflict Studies, School of Human
  Rights Research.
• Chair of Pioom, Interdisciplinary Projects for
  the Study of Root Causes of Human Rights
  Violations, on the Causes of Gross Human Rights
  Violations
• Financially supported by the Horstman Foundation,
  Leader in the Dutch Resistance movement during
  the Second World War.

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OUTLINE

• 1. What is Genocide ?
• 2. What/who is the Bystander ?
• 3. Failure of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica
  and Darfur.

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Raphael Lemkin 1900-1959

• GENOS means in Greek race or tribe
• CIDE means in Latin killing
• Churchill Crimes without a name
• Crime of all Crimes, the most serious

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Destruction

• Genocide is the deliberate destruction of a
  specific group
• Destruction because of their birth, their
  existence, their being
• Not because of their views, opinions or actions

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Deliberate annihilation

• Genocide is the deliberate, planned and
  systematic annihilation of a specific group of
  people
• SPECIFIC GROUP
• BY THE STATE
• WITH INTENT
• Politicide refers to political opponents
  (democide both but excluding war)

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Five stages of Repression by Hilberg

• Shutting off the supply of information for all
  outsiders
• Restricting participation to those with knowledge
• Prohibiting criticism by outsiders
• Absence of public talk of process of repression
  and destruction
• Killings but using euphimism (final solution, auf
  Transport nach Osten)

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• Article 2
• Genocide means any of the following acts
  committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
  part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
  group, as such
• ( a ) Killing members of the group
• ( b ) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
  members of the group
• ( c ) Deliberately inflicting on the group
  conditions of life calculated to bring about its
  physical destruction in whole or in part
• ( d ) Imposing measures intended to prevent
  births within the group
• ( e ) Forcibly transferring children of the group
  to another group.

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definitions of genocide

• "a form of one-sided mass killing in which a
  state or other authority intends to destroy a
  group, as that group and membership in it are
  defined by the perpetrator." Frank Chalk and Kurt
  Jonassohn
• "the mass killing of substantial numbers of
  human beings ... under conditions of the
  essential defenselessness and helplessness of the
  victims." Israel Charny
• "sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to
  physically destroy a collectivity directly or
  indirectly, through interdiction of the
  biological and social reproduction of group
  members, sustained regardless of the surrender or
  lack of threat offered by the victim." Helen Fein
• "the promotion and execution of policies by a
  state or its agents which result in the deaths of
  a substantial portion of a group ...when the
  victimized groups are defined primarily in terms
  of their communal characteristics, i.e.,
  ethnicity, religion or nationality." Barbara
  Harff and Ted Gurr
• Genocide is not extreme war or conflict it is
  extreme exclusion. Exclusion may start with
  name-calling, but may end with a group of people
  being excluded from a society to the point where
  they are destroyed. James M. Smith

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GENOCIDE CONVENTION

• Article 3
• The following acts shall be punishable
• ( a ) Genocide
• ( b ) Conspiracy to commit genocide
• ( c ) Direct and public incitement to commit
  genocide
• ( d ) Attempt to commit genocide
• ( e ) Complicity in genocide.

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Seven stages by Lecomte

• 1. definition of the target group
• 2. registration of the victims
• 3. designation of the victims
• 4. confiscation of goods
• 5. exclusion from working activities
• 6. systematic isolation
• 7. mass extermination
• All stages in the Holocaust and in Rwanda

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Holocaust Studies and Genocide Studies

• Un-precendented and Total
• Exterminalist anti-semitism
• As paradigme
• Repeated but also in part
• War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
• Victim oriented or perspective of perpetrator and
  bystander included of societal transformation

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Eight Stages of Genocide by Stanton

• Classification us and them
• Symbolization yellow star of David
• Dehumanization hate radio
• Organization special army units
• Polarization silencing the moderate
• Preparation separation of the victims
• Extermination mass killing, genocide
• Denial cover up evidence

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Genocides in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur

• Why did the international bystanders fail to act
  to prevent or to stop the genocides in Rwanda,
  Srebrenica and Darfur?
• In what way would the international bystander
  have been able to act with the available
  instruments?
• Why were all the warnings not translated into
  action or, more precisely, what are the reasons
  for non-action or the ineffectiveness of the
  action that was undertaken?

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Each case

• 1. WARNINGS
• 2. INSTRUMENTS
• 3. DECISION-MAKING

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DARFUR
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DEATH TOLL

• Rwanda 1994 800,000 in 100 days 8,000 a day
• Srebrenica 1995 8,000 in 5 days 1,600 a day
• Darfur 2003-2005 200,000 in 1000 days 200 a day

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RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
1 Before
Prevent
2 During
React
3 After
Rebuild
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EARLY WARNING

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NEVER AGAIN

• EARLY WARNING DOES NOT LEAD AUTOMATICALLY TO
  EARLY ACTION OR ANY ACTION
• AT THE MOMENT WHEN DECISIONS ARE MADE, PREVIOUS
  NEVER AGAINS ARE FORGOTTEN

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WARNINGS INSTRUMENTS

• BOTH IN RWANDA AND IN SREBRENICA AND IN DARFUR
• WARMINGS WERE AVAILABLE
• INSTRUMENTS WERE AVAILABLE
• THIRD PARTIES (BYSTANDERS) COULD HAVE PREVENTED
  IN BOTH CASES THE GENOCIDE

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The Atrocity Triangle
C Bystanders

• A Perpetrators

B Victims
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The bystanderthe third party that will not act
or that will not attempt to act in solidarity
with the victims of gross human rights
violations.

• AFTERWARD FOUR ROLES
• PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS
• COLLABORATORS AND RESCUERS IN THE END

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON Warning IN RWANDA 1.

• HATE PROPAGANDA PRIOR TO GENOCIDE PUNISHED AS
  INCENTIVE TO GENOCIDE
• WEAKER MANDATE UNAMIR THAN NEEDED BECAUSE OF
  FEASABILITY
• OUTSPOKEN RELIABLE EARLY WARNINGS NOT FORWARDED
  TO SC
• ANY DECISION-MAKING BY SC WAS PRECLUDED
• the withholding of this information from the
  members of the security council by the un
  bureaucracy precluded any security council
  decision in this field.

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AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS IN RWANDA 2.

• THE OPTION TO LINK THE EVACUATION FORCE WITH
  UNAMIR WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN ANY WESTERN CAPITAL
  OR AT THE UN.
• RIZA WAS NOT PREPARED ON APRIL 14 TO PROPOSE AN
  ENFORCEMENT POWER TO SC (DUTCH ARCHIVES).
• SC VOTED UNANIMOUSLY FOR FORCE REDUCTION TO 270
  PERSONS ON April 21.

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CONTINUING MAIN CONCLUSIONS 3.

• DOMINATING TRUST IN PRESIDENT AND PEACE PROCESS
• SHIFT IN PERCECEPTION NEEDED
• FROM PROMOTING PEACE TO EMERGING GENOCIDE

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON WARNING IN SREBRENICA 1.

• In May 2005 SC Members and UN Officials knew
  about intended Serbian Attack but they did not
  share this information with the Dutch.
• A preventative military enforcement attack was
  excluded by the UN and the major powers
• No SC debate on maintaining safe area Srebrenica

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AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS IN SREBRENICA 2.

• NORDIC peacekeepers successful with tanks to
  deter Serbian aggressor in safe area at Tuzla.
• DUTCH peacekeepers not only missed military
  enforcement power but they did not try in any way
  to deter or resist Serbian aggression.
• NATO AIR support was available but not used at
  the moment of the attack on Srebrenica.

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LESSONS LEARNED

• RECOGNITION OF ANNAN OF MISTAKES IN PERCEPTION IN
  2004 (CHANGING MINDS)
• CHAPTER VII MEASURES (USE OF FORCE AUTHORIZED)
  WHEN national authorities are manifestly failing
  to protect their populations from genocide
  sept.05
• INVOLVEMENT OF SC WITH GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS
  VIOLATIONS HAS INCREASED TREMENDOUSLY

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R2P

• Sovereignty (STATE SOVEREIGNTY NOT AS A BARRIER
  BUT AS A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ITS PEOPLE)
• 1.PROTECT OWN POPULATION
• 2.HELP GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT OWN POPULATION
• 3.COLLECTIVE ACTION, EXTREEM NEED AND LACK OF
  WILL (RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT, HUMANITARIAN
  INTERVENTION, CHAPTER VII DECISIONS)

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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE26 February 2007

• CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
  ON THE
• PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF
  GENOCIDE
• (BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA v. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

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Obligations to prevent

• it is clear that the obligation to prevent is one
  of conduct and not one of result. The obligation
  of States parties is rather to employ all means
  reasonably available to them, so as to prevent
  genocide so far as possible.
• A State does not incur responsibility simply
  because the desired result is not achieved
  responsibility is however incurred if the State
  manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent
  genocide which were within its power, and which
  might have contributed to preventing the
  genocide.(430)

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Prevention awareness of danger

• a State may be found to have violated its
  obligation to prevent even though it had no
  certainty, at the time when it should have acted,
  but failed to do so, that genocide was about to
  be committed or was under way
• it is enough that the State was aware, or should
  normally have been aware, of the serious danger
  that acts of genocide would be committed.(432)

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Duty to act

• a States obligation to prevent, and the
  corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant
  that the State learns of, or should normally have
  learned of, the existence of a serious risk that
  genocide will be committed.(431) (see art. 8 for
  UN)

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DARFUR, CONFLICT CHARACTERISTICS

• PRIORITY FOR NORT-SOUTH CONFLICT SUDAN
• GENOCIDE OR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
• STRONG PUBLIC OPINION

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WARNINGS FROM THE START 1.

• UN RAPPORTEUR, KAPILAS ROLE
• UN HEAD HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
• NGOs
• USA INQUIRY, LABELING GENOCIDE, SEPTEMBER 2004

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INSTRUMENTS DARFUR 2.

• DIPLOMACY CEASE FIRE
• ARMS EMBARGO
• AFRICAN PEACE KEEPERS, EU FORCE in CHAD, UN PEACE
  KEEPERS
• NO NO-FLY ZONE, NO SEIZURE OF WEAPONS
• ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
• PROSECUTION, BASHIR TRAVELS

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON DARFUR 3

• CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION IN SC BUT NO
  ACTION AT THE START PREVENTION FAILED - AND
  WEAK DECISIONS LATER
• INCREASING CONFUSING SITUATION, good versus bad,
  international conflict Chad and CAR
• STRONG INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF SUDAN, China 80
  oil, Russia weapons, US intelligence
• SMART LEADERS, giving impression of cooperation
  but in fact doing the opposite

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DARFUR
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CONCLUDING QUOTE

• The bystanders at the state level and at the
  international level did not act in solidarity
  with the victims. They did not attempt to rescue
  the victims by preventing,rescuing victims or
  halting the genocide.
• Evaluating afterwards, we may conclude that
  these bystanders turned into collaborators who
  facilitated the genocidaires by not acting
  against continuing atrocities.
• Lit. Genocide Studies and Prevention, volume 4,
  issue 2, 2009, pp. 221-237 Failures to Prevent
  Genocide in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur.
  http//arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?did20161